In re the Estate of Gordon Jaenisch, Deceased, and In re the Estate of MaryAnn Shirley Jaenisch, Deceased.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0315

In re the Estate of Gordon Jaenisch, Deceased, and
In re the Estate of MaryAnn Shirley Jaenisch, Deceased.

Filed December 15, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Chippewa County District Court
File Nos. 12-PR-24-74, 12-PR-24-75

J. Richard Stermer, Krystal M. Lynne, Stermer & Sellner, Chtd., Montevideo, Minnesota
(for appellant Trudy Friedl)

Douglas D. Kluver, Kluver Law Office and Mediation Center, P.L.L.C., Montevideo,
Minnesota (for respondent Thomas A. Jones)

Tamara Leyendecker, River Falls, Wisconsin (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
This appeal is taken from an order filed in consolidated probate cases concerning
the estates of a married couple who died within four months of each other. An adult child
of the decedents petitioned the district court for an order determining that the decedents’

∗Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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former residence was their homestead when they died, despite the decedents’ failure to file
notices of homestead rights within six months of their respective relocations from the
residence to a nursing home. The district court denied the petition on the ground that there
is no evidence that either decedent was under a legal disability that precluded the filing of
homestead notices during the relevant six-month periods. We conclude that the district
court did not err in that ruling. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
MaryAnn Jaenisch and Gordon Jaenisch were born in 1932 and 1931, respectively.
They owned a residence on rural property in Chippewa County as tenants in common and
lived there together until Gordon moved to a nursing home in the city of Montevideo in
August 2021. MaryAnn joined Gordon there in January 2023 but moved to an assisted-
living facility four months later. Gordon passed away in June 2023 at the age of 92, and
MaryAnn passed away in October 2023 at the age of 91.
MaryAnn and Gordon had two children: Trudy Friedl and Tamara Leyendecker.
Friedl and Leyendecker are the sole heirs to both MaryAnn and Gordon. Friedl lived in
MaryAnn and Gordon’s Chippewa County home after their deaths and during district court
proceedings. Leyendecker lives in Wisconsin.
These probate cases were commenced in January and February 2024. The petitions
commencing the actions disclosed that each decedent owned a half-interest in their joint
residence, valued at approximately $100,000 each. In April 2024, Chippewa County
Family Services filed a claim of approximately $210,000 against Gordon’s estate based on
his receipt of Medical Assistance benefits. A funeral home filed a claim of approximately
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$16,000 against MaryAnn’s estate. In May 2024, the district court appointed Thomas A.
Jones to serve as special administrator of both estates.
In October 2024, Friedl filed a document captioned “petition for election of
homestead rights.” She requested an order stating that MaryAnn and Gordon’s former
residence was their homestead when they died and recognizing the ongoing validity of the
homestead exemption. In support of the petition, Friedl executed and filed a one-page
affidavit stating that she lives on the property; that her sister, Leyendecker , lives in
Wisconsin; and that she and Leyendecker are the sole surviving beneficiaries of their
parents’ estates and homestead. Friedl ’s affidavit does not contain any information as to
whether her parents ever were subject to a legal disability. Friedl filed a memorandum of
law in which she described petitions and orders filed in prior guardianship and
conservatorship cases concerning Gordon and MaryAnn.
Jones responded to Friedl’s petition by filing an affidavit and a memorandum of
law. In the memorandum, Jones stated that neither Gordon nor MaryAnn filed a notice of
homestead status within six months of their respective relocations from their residential
property to a nursing home. Jones asserted that Gordon “appears to have relocated to the
nursing home due to physical infirmary, [but] there is no indication in the record that Mr.
Jaenisch suffered from any diminished mental capacity within that 6 -month window that
would constitute a legal disability.” Jones also asserted that MaryAnn “relocated from the
nursing home to assisted living due to her ability to live independently” and “never
expressed any desire or intent to return to her homestead.” Jones acknowledged that the
county previously had sought and obtained emergency guardianships and conservatorships
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over both Gordon and MaryAnn. But Jones asserted that both Gordon and MaryAnn
voluntarily consented to the appointments of guardians and conservators and that, as a
matter of law, a finding of incapacity is not required for the voluntary appointment of a
guardian or a conservator. Jones further asserted that the guardianship and conservatorship
for MaryAnn was sought “primarily due to the alleged neglect Ms. Jaenisch was
experiencing at the hands of her live-in daughter, Trudy Friedl,” who, according to the
county, “had a practice of dropping her mother off at the nursing home for the entire day
while Ms. Friedl was at work.” Consequently, Jones argued that both Gordon’s and
MaryAnn’s interests in the residential property were non-homestead at the times of their
respective deaths. Jones executed and filed an affidavit providing evidentiary support for
his arguments.
The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on Friedl’s petition. Friedl and Jones
appeared with counsel; Leyendecker appeared on a self-represented basis. At the outset of
the hearing, the district court engaged in a colloquy with counsel and Leyendecker to
clarify the issues needing resolution. During that discussion, Leyendecker stated that she
opposed the petition because the debt to the county “needs to be paid off” and cannot be
paid “until the house is sold.”
After that preliminary discussion, the district court stated to Friedl’s attorney: “This
is your petition. You may proceed.” Friedl’s attorney presented a brief oral argument in
support of the petition. Specifically, Friedl argued that the district court previously had
found that MaryAnn “had a delusional disorder” and was “ unable to make rational
decisions about her needs” and that those findings show that “ she was under a legal
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disability . . . during the relevant six-month period after she moved out of the homestead.”
Friedl did not call any witnesses or offer any exhibits into evidence.
Jones’s attorney then presented oral argument . Jones argued that neither Gordon
nor MaryAnn intended to return to the residential property after moving out. Jones also
argued that Gordon “perhaps” had a physical disability when he went to a nursing home
but that neither Gordon nor MaryAnn had a legal disability during the six-month period
following their respective relocations. Jones argued further that the mere existence of a
guardianship or a conservatorship does not necessarily mean that a protected person has a
legal disability and that both Gordon and MaryAnn voluntarily consented to the
appointment of a guardianship and a conservatorship. Jones did not call any witnesses or
offer any exhibits into evidence.
The district court made oral findings of fact from the bench, including a finding that
the record “is not sufficient to show that either decedent was . . . incapacitated or under
legal disability of any kind during those six-month periods.” The district court concluded
that “the property was not homestead property” when Gordon and MaryAnn died, denied
the petition, and stated its intention to file an order. Two weeks later, the district court filed
a four-page order with findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order denying the
petition.
Friedl appeals. Her attorney has filed an appellate brief on her behalf. Neither Jones
nor Leyendecker has filed a responsive brief. Nonetheless, it is this court’s duty to decide
the appeal on the merits. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.

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DECISION
Friedl argues that the district court erred by denying her petition for an order that
Gordon and MaryAnn’s jointly owned residential property was their homestead when they
died.
A.
We begin by describing the applicable law. Chapter 510 of the Minnesota Statutes
provides that a person’s homestead is exempt from certain debts. “The house owned and
occupied by a debtor as the debtor’s dwelling place, together with the land upon which it
is situated . . . , shall constitute the homestead of such debtor and the debtor’s family, and
be exempt from seizure or sale under legal process on account of any debt not lawfully
charged thereon in writing,” with certain exceptions and limitations. Minn. Stat. § 510.01
(2024); see also Minn. Stat. §§ 510.02, .03, .05 (2024). An owner of homestead property
may move away from the property “without affecting such exe mption, if the owner does
not thereby abandon the same as the place of abode.” Minn. Stat. § 510.07 (2024). But
the owner’s right to retain the homestead exemption after moving out is limited in time and
subject to a condition:
If the owner shall cease to occupy such homestead for more
than six consecutive months the owner shall be deemed to have
abandoned the same unless, within such period, the owner shall
file with the county recorder of the county in which it is
situated a notice, executed, witnessed, and acknowledged as in
the case of a deed, describing the premises and claiming the
same as the owner’s homestead.

Id. If an owner files a notice claiming homestead status within six months of vacating the
property, the exemption may continue for no more than five years, “unless during some
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part of the term the premises shall have been occupied as the actual dwelling place of” the
owner or the owner’s family. Id.
The probate code governs the homestead rights of a deceased person and provides,
in part:
If the homestead passes by descent or will to the spouse
or decedent’s descendants . . . , it is exempt from all debts
which were not valid charges on it at the time of decedent’s
death except that the homestead is subject to a claim filed
pursuant to section 246.53 for state hospital care or 256B.15
for medical assistance benefits.

Minn. Stat. § 524.2-402(c) (2024).
This court has recognized that, despite the obligation to file notice of a homestead
claim within six months of vacating homestead property, “longstanding caselaw
establishes that an owner is not required to file such notice if he is under a legal disability
that precludes him from filing it.” In re Est ate of Eckley, 780 N.W.2d 407, 410 (Minn.
App. 2010) (citing Millett v. Pearson, 173 N.W. 411, 412 ( Minn. 1919), and Beigler v.
Chamberlin, 176 N.W. 49, 50 (Minn. 1920)). The legal disability necessary to excuse a
failure to file a homestead-exemption claim within six months does not include the owner’s
“‘need for physical care outside of the home’ that resulted in her residence in a nursing
home.” Id. at 411 (quoting In re Estate of Hoffman, 354 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. App.
1984) (emphasis added), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 2, 1985)). This is so because “[a] person
who needs to live in a care facility rather than in his own house due to physical infirmity
is still capable of filing the required legal notice.” Id. However, “a person who lacks
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mental capacity is unable to take the necessary legal steps to preserve his homestead
rights.” Id.
In Eckley, this court recited the district court’s uncontested findings that, “as a result
of multiple strokes, decedent was ‘confused and unable to make or communicate
decisions,’ could not speak, and was only occasionally able to respond by nodding his
head”; “lacked sufficient understanding or capacity needed to make or communicate
responsible decisions concerning his estate”; and “never regained his mental capacity.” Id.
at 412. We then concluded that the decedent “was incapable of taking the legal steps
necessary to protect his estate, such as filing notice of homestead status pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 510.07,” and, thus, retained his homestead rights despite not filing notice of a claim
within six months of moving from the homestead property to a nursing home. Id.
B.
In this case, Friedl and Jones appear to agree that, because MaryAnn died after
Gordon, the existence or non-existence of her homestead rights is the determinative issue.
In its written order, the district court recited the historical facts and then made the
following findings:
Neither of the decedents were ever found to be confused
or incapable of communicating responsible decisions. The
decedents were allowed to stipulate to the guardianship /
conservatorship, as well as to the appointment of a specific
individual for appointment to each office . . . . In addition,
both were allowed to retain the right to vote. Finally, MaryAnn
was allowed to relocate from the nursing home to a less
restrictive assisted living arrangement where she lived more
independently without incident prior to her death. Neither
decedent ever expressed any desire or intent to return to her
homestead.
9

The district court cited the applicable statutes and the Eckley opinion and concluded
as follows:
Aside from the mere fact that the decedents had
voluntarily consented to the establishment of a guardian and
conservator prior to their deaths, the petitioner has not
submitted any evidence that the decedents lacked the mental
capacity to take the legal steps necessary to preserve their
homestead rights either through themselves or their guardian
or conservator. The Property was non-homestead at the time
of the survivor, MaryAnn Jaenisch’s death.

C.
Friedl contends that the district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous on the
ground that they “disregard[] substantial evidence of legal disability.” Friedl asserts that
the decedents’ disabilities are demonstrated by the fact that guardians and conservators
were appointed for each of them. To support that statement, Friedl refers to certain
documents in the addendum to her brief consisting of pleadings and orders filed in
guardianship and conservatorship cases concerning Gordon and MaryAnn. But the
documents she references, as well as other documents in her addendum, were not
introduced into evidence in district court proceedings in this case.1

1Friedl asserts in her appellate brief that, “[w]hile the December 16, 2024, hearing
was labeled an evidentiary hearing, no opportunity was presented to submit evidence;
rather, only oral arguments were made.” Our review of the record reveals that the district
court did not in any way restrict Friedl’s opportunity to present evidence at the evidentiary
hearing. After the discussion of preliminary matters, the district court stated to Friedl ’s
attorney: “This is your petition. You may proceed.” Friedl’s attorney never sought to
introduce any evidence at the hearing.
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The rules of appellate procedure provide, “The documents filed in the trial court,
the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any, shall constitute the record on
appeal in all cases.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01. “It is well settled that an appellate
court may not base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal, and that matters
not produced and received in evidence below may not be considered.” Plowman v.
Copeland, Buhl & Co., 261 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. 1977); see also Eagan Econ. Dev.
Auth. v. U -Haul Co. of Minnesota, 787 N.W.2d 523, 530 (Minn. 2010); MacDonald v.
Brodkorb, 939 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2020); Mitterhauser v. Mitterhauser, 399
N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn. App. 1987).
The only exception to the rule stated above, which is a narrow exception, applies to
evidence that is (1) conclusive, (2) incontrovertible, and (3) offered for the purpose of
affirming a district court decision. Plowman, 261 N.W.2d at 583; see also In re Livingood,
594 N.W.2d 889, 895- 96 (Minn. 1999); 301 Clifton Place L.L.C. v. 301 Clifton Place
Condo. Ass’n, 783 N.W.2d 551, 559 (Minn. App. 2010). None of the requirements of the
exception are satisfied in this case. First, the outside-the-record evidence on which Friedl
relies is inconclusive because the appointment of a guardian or conservator “is only prima
facie evidence of mental incompetency.” Long v. Campion, 84 N.W.2d 686, 694 ( Minn.
1957). Second, in the district court, Jones disputed Friedl ’s argument that Gordon and
MaryAnn were subject to legal disabilities during the six-month periods following their
relocations from their residential property to the nursing home. And third, Friedl relies on
outside-the-record evidence to reverse, not affirm, the district court’s decision. Thus,
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pursuant to the general rule of rule 110.01 and Plowman, we may not consider the
documents at pages 10 through 68 of Friedl’s addendum.
This court applies a clear-error standard of review to a district court ’s findings of
fact. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; In re Civil Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221
(Minn. 2021). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the
weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Kenney,
963 N.W.2d at 221 (quotation omitted). “If there is reasonable evidence to support the trial
court’s findings of fact, a reviewing court should not disturb those findings.” Fletcher v.
St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999).
The evidentiary record relevant to Friedl’s petition consists of two affidavits: one
by Friedl and one by Jones. Friedl’s affidavit includes no information whatsoever as to
whether Gordon and MaryAnn ever were subject to a legal disability. Accordingly, the
district court did not clearly err by finding that “the petitioner has not submitted any
evidence that the decedents lacked the mental capacity to take the legal steps necessary to
preserve their homestead rights either through themselves or their guardian or
conservator.”
Jones’s affidavit does not state that Gordon and MaryAnn ever were subject to a
legal disability. Jones ’s affidavit refers to the fact that guardianship and conservatorship
petitions were filed but explains that the petitions were granted only because Gordon and
MaryAnn consented to the appointments of guardians and conservators. Jones is correct
that, if a person voluntarily consents to the appointment of a guardian or a conservator, a
district court may grant the petition for such an appointment without finding that the person
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is “incapacitated.” See Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 416(c). Thus, the district court did not err by
concluding that Gordon and MaryAnn’s residential property did not have homestead status
when MaryAnn died.
In sum, the district court did not err by denying Friedl’s petition for an order
determining that the decedents’ former residence was their homestead when they died.
Affirmed.