Matthew Eric Zinda, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0329

Matthew Eric Zinda,
Appellant,

vs.

Joshua Heintzeman,
Respondent.

Filed February 2, 2026
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CV-24-2821

Matthew Zinda, Brainerd, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

R. Reid LeBeau II, Chalmers, Adams, Backer, and Kaufman, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the dismissal, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, of his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2024), against respondent -state
representative. Appellant argues that the district court (1) erred in granting respondent’s
motion to dismiss; (2) abused its discretion in awarding respondent costs and attorney fees;
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(3) exhibited bias against him; and (4) violated his rights by denying his request for in
forma pauperis (IFP) status and the imposition of a cost bond. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Joshua Heintzeman is an elected member of the Minnesota House of
Representatives for District 6B. Pro se appellant Matthew Eric Zinda 1 sued respondent,
alleging that respondent “individually and under color of law” unlawfully deprived
appellant of his rights to free speech and to petition by blocking/deleting appellant’s posts
on respondent’s “Facebook page, titled ‘Representative Josh Heintzeman.’” Appellant also
alleged that respondent, as “an elected Minnesota House Representative for District 6B,”
violated appellant’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when he blocked /deleted
appellant’s Facebook posts, thereby “unlawfully denying [appellant] his right to participate
in th e public forum.” Appellant sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for actual,
compensatory, and punitive damages. The following facts are alleged by appellant.
On June 14, 2024, appellant commented on respondent’s “Representative Josh
Heintzeman” Facebook page. Appellant’s comment was made in response to respondent’s
post claiming to have received an endorsement from the Minnesota Police and Peace
Officers Association. About an hour later, appellant attempted to return to the Facebook
page but discovered that he had been “blocked” from viewing the page. Sometime later,
however, “Representative Josh Heintzeman” reappeared in appellant’s Facebook search

1 Both respondent and appellant “were Republican Party candidates for State
Representative for Legislative District 6B on the 2024 primary election ballot.” Zinda v.
Simon, 12 N.W.3d 706, 708 (Minn. 2024).
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results and, over the next few days, appellant continued to join the public discourse on this
public forum.
On June 18, 2024, respondent posted on the “Representative Jo sh Heintzeman”
Facebook page a letter he signed that demanded the University of Minnesota deplatform
and withdraw an offer of employment to a prospective employee . An individual
commented on this post, criticizing it on grounds of suppressing free speech. Respondent
replied to the individual, stating “that’s interesting. . . . . .feel free to back up your
accusation.” (Ellipses in original.) A few days later, appellant commented on the post by
purportedly adding “factual support” for the individual’s accusation by way of an
allegation that respondent had authored legislation that the Star Tribune claimed “muzzles
free speech.” A few hours later, however, appellant returned to the page and discovered
that his reply to respondent had been deleted. Appellant attempted to re-post his reply, but
his attempt was blocked by respondent. And by June 27, 2024, the thread involving the
letter to the University of Minnesota had been deleted from under th e original post on
respondent’s Facebook page.
Respondent moved to dismiss appellant’s complaint under Minn. R. Civ. P.
12.02(e), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Respondent argued
that appellant’s claims should be dismissed because appellant’s complaint “fails to allege
that [respondent] possessed actual authority to speak on behalf of the state and exercised
that authority.” Respondent also sought an award of costs and attorney fees because
appellant’s claims were frivolous.
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The district court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss with prejudice, concluding
that appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under section 1983
because appellant’s complaint “fails to support [appellant’s] claims that [respondent’s]
comments or conduct was in furtherance of his official responsibilities and duties.” The
district court also granted respondent’s request for an award of costs and attorney fees.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I.
Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of his action. A district court may
grant a motion to dismiss if the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). To state a claim for relief, a complaint need only
“contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. “A claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with
the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d
598, 603 (Minn. 2014) . In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12.02(e), a
district court must “consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts
as true and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Finn
v. Alliance Bank, 860 N.W.2d 638, 653 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).
In reviewing a district court ’s grant of a motion to dismiss under rule 12.02(e), we
“construe the complaint to allow the claim to go forward unless there is no way to construe
the alleged facts —and the inferences drawn from those facts —in support of the claim.”
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Demskie v. U.S. Bank N at’l Ass’n, 7 N.W.3d 382, 386 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).
We apply a de novo standard of review to a district court ’s grant of a motion to dismiss
pursuant to rule 12.02(e). DeRosa v. McKenzie, 936 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2019).
The United States Code provides a cause of action against “[e]very person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” deprives
someone of a federal constitutional or statutory right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This sta tute
“protects against acts attributable to a State, not those of a private person.” Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 194 (2024).
Recently, the Supreme Court in Lindke considered a claim brought under section
1983. Id. In that case, a municipal official maintained a Facebook page on which he posted
both personal updates and information relating to his government job. Id. at 191-93. After
a constituent posted negative comments, the official deleted the negative comments and
blocked the constituent from commenting on the official ’s Facebook page. Id. at 190-91,
193. The constituent sued, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights. Id. at 193.
On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that, while state action is “easy to spot”
in “run-of-the-mill” cases, sometimes “the line between private conduct and state action is
difficult to draw.” Id. at 195. The Court then emphasized that this is especially true in the
context of social media websites like Facebook, where the line between a public official’s
personal communications and official communications “is often blurred.” Id. at 197. The
Court established the following two-part test for when a pu blic official ’s social media
activity constitutes state action under section 1983: “if the official (1) possessed actual
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authority to speak on the State ’s behalf, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when
he spoke on social media.” Id. at 198.
Lindke’s first prong asks whether the public official possesses “actual authority
rooted in written law or longstanding custom to speak for the State.” Id. at 201. “That
authority must extend to speech of the sort that caused the alleged rights deprivation.” Id.
In other words, there “must be a tie between the official ’s authority and the gravamen of
the plaintiff ’s complaint.” Id. at 199 (quotation omitted). The scope of an official ’s
authority can be determined based on the “relevant statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage.” Id. at 200. And in some cases, “a grant of authority over particular subject
matter may reasonably encompass authority to speak about it officially.” Id.
Assuming actual authority exists, Lindke’s second prong asks whether the public
official “purported to exercise that authority when he spoke on social media.” Id. at 198.
The context of an official ’s speech is critical in this step. For example, a mayor likely
invokes state authority if he posts “on his Facebook page: ‘Pursuant to Municipal
Ordinance 22.1, I am temporarily suspending enforcement of alternate -side parking
rules.”’ Id. at 203. By contrast, if the mayor merely shares on his Facebook page otherwise
available information such as a link to a parking announcement on his city ’s webpage, “it
is far less likel y that he is purporting to exercise the power of his office.” Id. Because
categorizing social media posts into private versus official action “is a fact -specific
undertaking in which the post ’s content and function are the most important
considerations,” “it is crucial for the plaintiff to show that the official is purporting to
exercise state authority in specific posts.” Id.
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The district court here relied on Lindke in granting respondent’s motion to dismiss.
As a threshold matter, the district court stated that it “cannot find that any act by
[respondent] asserted ” in appellant’s complaint “was done in pursuance of a legislative
duty.” The district court then determined that appellant’s complaint “fails to support [his]
claims that [respondent’s] comments or conduct was in furtherance of his official
responsibilities and duties.”
Appellant argue s that, as “a Minnesota House Representative . . . , legislative
matters are in . . . Respondent’s ‘bailiwick”’ and, therefore, respondent “possessed actual
authority to speak on the State’s behalf on legislative matters.” And appellant contends
that respondent “purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the [pleaded] social-
media posts.” We are not persuaded.
Accepting appellant’s pleaded facts as true, there is no evidence that could be
introduced to support appellant’s claims under either of Lindke’s prongs. As to the first
prong, appellant fails to identify any specific law, regulation, or authority allowing
respondent to speak on the state’s behalf in connection with the speech of the sort that
caused the alleged First Amendment violations. And while respondent’s role as a
Minnesota State Representative may vest him with some type of authority to engage w ith
citizens, appellant “must show more than that [respondent] had some authority to
communicate with residents on behalf of [the state].” Lindke, 601 U.S. at 199. Rather, the
“alleged censorship must be connected to speech on a matter with in [respondent’s]
bailiwick.” Id.
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Here, appellant alleges that respondent utilized his “Representative Josh
Heintzeman” Facebook page to discuss government business in relation to his role as a
state representative by posting (1) a statement that he received an endorsement from the
Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association and (2) a picture of a letter he signed that
demanded the University of Minnesota deplatform and withdraw an offer of employment
to an individual. But appellant fails to identify any relevant statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage vesting authority in respondent to speak on the state’s behalf. Although
appellant refers to statutes that respondent allegedly authored, these statutes do not
demonstrate that respondent had authority to speak on behalf of the state. Without such
details, appellant fails to satisfy Lindke’s first prong. See Lindke, 601 U.S. at 198.
Appellant’s complaint also fails under Lindke’s second prong. As the Supreme
Court stated, “[a]n official does not necessarily purport to exercise his authority simply by
posting about a matter within it.” Id. at 203. And , as a private citizen with his own
constitutional rights, respondent was free “to speak about public affairs in [his] personal
capacit[y].” Id. For example, he “might post job -related information for any number of
personal reasons, from a desire to raise public awareness to promoting his prospects for
reelection.” Id.
Here, even if respondent possessed actual authority to speak on behalf of the state,
there is no indication that respondent was exercising that authority related to the pleaded
Facebook posts. For example, the post stating that respondent received an end orsement
from the Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association relates to respondent’s
reelection campaign. See id. And the post of the letter to the University of Minnesota
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indicates that respondent was merely sharing otherwise available information related to a
letter he signed; he was not ex ercising any purported authority to speak on behalf of the
state when he posted the picture of the letter. Consequently, accepting appellant’s pleaded
facts as true, appellant’s claim also fails under the second Lindke prong. See id. at 198.
And because appellant failed to satisfy either Lindke prong, the district court did not err in
granting respondent’s motion to dismiss.
II.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in awarding respondent
costs and attorney fees. But although the order granting respondent’s motion to dismiss
also granted respondent’s motion for costs and attorney fees, the order did not decide the
amount of the award of costs and attorney fees. And we take judicial notice of the district
court’s subsequent order vacating the part of i ts order granting respondent’s motion for
attorney fees and costs. As such, there is no award of costs and attorney fees for us to
review.
III.
Appellant argues that the district court exhibited bias against him by “unilaterally”
bringing up various defenses for respondent. But our review of the district court’s order
leads us to conclude that the court was making determinations based on the allegations set
forth in appellant’s complaint; there is no indication that the district court raised defenses
on behalf of respondent or otherwise showed favoritism to respondent.
Appellant further argues that the district court demonstrated bias against him by
falsely accusing him of dishonesty related to ellipses in a post made by respondent. This
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post by respondent was made in response to a post made by another individual and stated:
“that’s interesting. . . . . .feel free to back up your accusation.” ( Ellipses in original.) In
addressing this post, the district court stated that appellant’s “use of . . . ellipse[s] . . .
implies portions of the response have been intentionally omitted” and that such a “deletion
of words from a quote can significantly alter the original meaning of a quote and potentially
change the context or implication and even result in leaving a claim without factual
support.”
As appellant points out, the ellipse s were in the original post by respondent,
indicating that the district court erroneously assumed that appellant had omitted part of the
post. But the common use of an ellipsis is to omit portions of a quote, and appellant gave
no indication that the ellipses were part of the original quote. Under these circumstances,
the district court was well within its purview to assume that appellant had omitted a portion
of the post. And the district court’s inference from the common application of an ellips is
certainly does not indicate that the court was biased in any way against appellant. As such,
appellant’s claim that the district court was biased against him is unavailing.
IV.
Finally, appellant argues that the district court “deprived [him] of Constitutional
Rights under color of law, to evade this court’s review” of the order dismissing appellant’s
claims. More specifically, he appears to allege that his rights were violated when the
district court denied his request for IFP status and imposed a cost bond related to this
appeal, thereby frustrating his attempt to seek review of the order dismissing appellant’s
complaint. But as respondent points out, the denial of IFP status and the requirement of a
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cost bond did “not deny review of the underlying case.” Rather, appellant was required to
pay a filing fee and get a cost bond to obtain review. See Minn. Stat. § 357.08 (2024)
(requiring appellant to pay filing fee for appeal); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 107.02
(authorizing district court to require cost bond for appeal) . And appellant’s argument s
related to his IFP status have already been addressed through previous orders of this court.
As such, appellant has not shown that his rights were violated by the denial of IFP status
and the imposition of a cost bond.
Affirmed.