In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Luke Adam Frank.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0338

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Luke Adam Frank.

Filed August 4, 2025
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Chippewa County District Court
File No. 12-PR-23-611

Thomas G. Kramer, Kramer Law Office, Granite Falls, Minnesota (for appellant Luke
Adam Frank)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent commissioner of human services)

Matthew D. Haugen, Chippewa County Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota (for respondent
Chippewa County)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his indeterminate civil commitment to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP), arguing that the record lacks clear and convincing evidence
that (1) he meets the definition of a sexually dangerous person (SDP) or (2) he has a sexual
psychopathic personality (SPP). Appellant argues in the alternative that (3) he proved by
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clear and convincing evidence that a less-restrictive alternative to commitment is available
and appropriate. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Luke Adam Frank was born in May 1989, and is now 36 years old. When
appellant was 16 years old, he sexually abused his eight -year-old cousin, M.G. Appellant
was charged with one count of first -degree criminal sexual conduct and two counts of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct; he later pleaded guilty to second -degree criminal
sexual conduct and was placed on probation.
In late 2007, when appellant was 18 years old and still on probation for his offense
against M.G., appellant sexually abused 14 -year-old J.P., who was considered learning
disabled. Appellant was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, third-degree criminal sexual
conduct. The district court sentenced appellant to a stayed sentence of 36 months in prison
and placed him on probation for five years.
In October 2020, a coworker of appellant’s then girlfriend, M.B., reported to law
enforcement that she became concerned after overhearing M.B. comment that she had been
sleeping on the couch because appellant wanted to sleep alone with her 11 -year-old
daughter, I.B. After I.B. and her 12-year-old sister, R.P., were removed from the home
and placed in foster care , they reported to their child -care provider that they had been
sexually abused by appellant. I.B. told the child -care provider that when she slep t in the
basement with appellant, he took off her clothes and touched her private area with his hands
and penis. According to I.B., appellant said that he wanted I.B. to take over her “mom’s
spot.”
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Both R.P. and I.B. were interviewed by law enforcement. R.P. disclosed that, when
appellant would take her on trips in his semi -truck, he would rub her nipples over her
clothes and watch her in the shower while he was shaving. I.B. disclosed that appellant
sexually abused her for over a year in two different houses as well as in his semi -truck.
I.B. reported that, during the abuse, appellant would touch her privates , and she would
touch his “nuts” with her hand; that appellant simulated sexual intercourse with I.B. on top
of him and that, when they were done, there was “white stuff” on her private area; that she
was too scared to say “no”; and that appellant told her not to tell anyone about the abuse.
Appellant was charged with three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and
one count of second -degree criminal sexual conduct for his conduct related to I.B. R.P.
later made additional disclosures related to appellant’s abuse. R.P. reported that appellant
penetrated her vagina with a finger; licked her vagina; penetrated her vagina with his penis,
which hurt; put his hand over her mouth and said, “shh,” during the abuse; and told her not
to tell her mom.
Following R.P.’s additional disclosures, appellant was charged by amended
complaint with three counts of first -degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct related to R.P. A few days later, appellant was
charged with failing to register as a predatory offender. Appellant later pleaded guilty to
the fail ure-to-register charge, as well as two counts of gross misdemeanor fifth -degree
criminal sexual conduct —one count each related to both I.B. and R.P. He was then
sentenced in June 2022, to two consecutive 365 -day jail sentences for the fifth -degree
criminal-sexual-conduct offenses, and a year and a day for the failing-to-register offense.
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During his incarceration on his failure -to-register offense, appellant was deemed
appropriate for sex -offender treatment in MSOP but was not in prison long enough to
complete treatment. Respondent Chippewa County later retained an independent expert,
Dr. Sara Vaccarella, to review appellant’s records and provide an opinion on whether
appellant satisfied the criteria for civil commitment as an SDP and as a person with an SPP.
Although Dr. Vaccarella opined that appellant met the criteria for commitment as an SDP,
and that he was a person with an SPP, she recommended proceeding on an SDP petition
only. Dr. Vaccarella also recommended that appellant “be offered the opportunity to
complete treatment prior to a petition being filed, or prior to a civil commitm ent being
ordered, if such an option exists.”
In May 2024, respondent filed a petition seeking a determination that appellant
meets the criteria for civil commitment as an SDP and as a person with an SPP. Dr. Linda
Marshall was appointed as the first examiner and, at appellant’s request, Dr. Michael
Thompson was appointed as the second examiner. A trial was then held on respondent’s
commitment petition at which respondent called appellant, M.B., I.B., R.P., Dr. Marshall,
and Dr. Thompson. Appellant called his cousin, Dr. Vaccarella, his former proba tion
officer, his pastor, a friend, and a clinician at MSOP.
Both I.B. and R.P. testified extensively about the sexual abuse they endured from
appellant. And both Dr. Marshall and Dr. Thompson testified that that appellant satisfied
the criteria for civil commitment as an SDP and as a person with an SPP.
Dr. Vaccarella testified that she recommended committing appellant as an SDP. She
also testified that she did not find appellant to be a person with an SPP because she only
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found him to meet three of the four statutory conditions for SPP commitment. But she
acknowledged that she was unaware that “the law only requires” that an individual satisfy
one of the four statutory conditions to qualify as a person with an SPP. See Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.02, subd. 15 (2024). And she acknowledged that, if the law only required that
appellant meet one or more of the SPP conditions, he is a person with an SPP. Dr.
Vaccarella further testified that, although she recommended that appellant be provided with
the opportunity to do sex -offender treatment before civil commitment, she was unaware
that appellant was no longer under the supervision of the department of corrections.
The district court determined that appellant “satisfied the requirements for
commitment” as an SDP and as a person with an SPP. The district court also determined
that MSOP is “an appropriate treatment program for [appellant], and there are no less
restrictive alternatives that meet [appellant’s] needs and the requirements of public safety.”
The district court, therefore, indeterminately committed appellant to MSOP as an SDP and
as a person with an SPP. This appeal follows.
DECISION
The Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act: Sexually Dangerous Persons and
Sexual Psychopathic Personalities, Minn. Stat. §§ 253D.01 -.36 (2024), governs the civil
commitment and treatment of sex offenders. Before civilly committing a person as an SDP
or a person with an SPP, a district court must find “by clear and convincing evidence that
the proposed patient is a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental illness.” Minn.
Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (2024). Under that standard, this court reviews a district court’s
factual findings for clear error “to determine whether they are supported by the record as a
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whole,” In re Civ. Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 22 (Minn. 2014) , and defers to a
district court’s credibility determinations, In re Civ. Commitment of Stone, 711 N.W.2d
831, 839 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2006). When applying the clear-
error standard of review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings,
do not reweigh the evidence, do not find facts, and do not reconcile conflicting evidence.
In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 -22 (Minn. 20 21). Further, we
“need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the
correctness of the findings of the [district] court.” Id. at 222 (quotation omitted). We
review de novo whether the facts “satisfy the statutory standard for civil commitment.”
Stone, 711 N.W.2d at 836.
I. The district court did not clearly err in finding that clear and convincing
evidence supports appellant’s commitment as an SDP.

An SDP is a person who (1) “has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct as
defined in [Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 8],” (2) “has manifested a sexual, personality, or
other mental disorder or dysfunction,” and (3) “as a result, is likely to engage in acts of
harmful sexual conduct as defined in [ Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 8 ].” Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.02, subd. 16(a) . “Harmful sexual conduct” is “sexual conduct that creates a
substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to another.” Id., subd. 8(a).
A. Course of harmful sexual conduct
The district court determined that appellant “has engaged in a course of harmful
sexual conduct for purposes of the SDP law,” which “includes his conviction offenses,
including his offenses against [I.B.] and [R.P.]” The district court also determined th at
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these offenses “have occurred over a prolonged period,” and have “included fondling,
simulated sexual intercourse, masturbation, and penetration. In addition, he has used
threats related to his sexual abuse,” which “poses a substantial likelihood of serio us
physical or emotional harm.”
Appellant challenges the district court’s determination that he engaged in a course
of harmful sexual conduct by arguing that his fifth -degree criminal -sexual-conduct
offenses against I.B. and R.P. are not “within the harmful sexual conduct definition”
contained in section 253D.02, subdivision 8. But a district court may consider allegations
of sexual misconduct and is not restricted to considering convictions alone when
determining whether a defendant has engaged in a “course of harmful sexual conduct.”
Stone, 711 N.W.2d at 837. In other words, “the course of conduct need not consist solely
of convictions, but may also include conduct amounting to harmful sexual conduct, of
which the offender was not convicted.” In re Civ. Commitment of Ramey , 648 N.W.2d
260, 268 (Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2002). The district court is “in
the best position to determine the weight to be attributed to each factor [and] to evaluate
the credibility of witnesses—a critical function in these cases that rely so heavily” on expert
opinions. Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 23-24.
Here, the fifth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct offenses against I.B. and R.P. arose
from allegations of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Such conduct can be considered
in determining whether appellant engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct. See
Stone, 711 N.W.2d at 837. Both I.B. and R.P. testified at length about the sexual abuse
they endured by appellant and the resulting harm they suffered. Although appellant
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challenges I.B. and R.P.’s credibility, and maintains that he engaged in inappropriate
touching of their breasts, as evidenced by his guilty plea to fifth-degree criminal sexual
conduct, the district court specifically found I.B. and R.P.’s testimony to be credible and
did not find appellant’s testimony on the issue to be credible. It is well settled that we defer
to this credibility determination , as well as the district court’s credibility determinations
regarding the experts’ testimony that appellant en gaged in a course of harmful sexual
conduct. See id. at 839. As such, the district court did not err in considering the allegations
made by I.B. and R.P. in determining that appellant engaged in a course of harmful sexual
conduct.
Appellant also argues that the district court erred in finding that he engaged in a
course of harmful sexual conduct because there was “a significant break in time between
the inappropriate events.” Indeed, the district court found, and the record reflects, that
appellant pleaded guilty to (1) second-degree criminal sexual conduct in 2006, for conduct
against M.G.; (2) third -degree criminal sexual conduct in 2008, for conduct against J.P.;
and (3) two counts of fifth -degree criminal sexual conduct in 2022, for offenses against
I.B. and R.P. Although there was a gap in time between the second offense and the conduct
related to the third and fourth offenses, such a period of tim e during which appellant may
not have committed any offenses does not preclude a finding of a course of harmful sexual
conduct. See Stone, 711 N.W.2d at 838. Both Dr. Marshall and Dr. Thompson testified
that, based on appellant’s conduct related to his offenses, appellant engaged in a course of
harmful sexual conduct for SDP purposes. The district court specifically credited this
testimony, and we defer to that credibility determination. See id. at 839. The district court
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did not clearly err in determining that appellant engaged in a course of harmful sexual
conduct.
B. Sexual, personality, or other mental disorder
Next, appellant challenges the district court’s determination that he “currently
suffers from a sexual, personality or other such mental disorder,” claiming that the “sexual
personality disorder presented by the examiners was paraphilic disorder not otherwise
specified,” and that “[t]his diagnosis is suspect in that it is not with in the eight categories
of paraphilia.” And h e argues that his “not otherwise specified” diagnosis “carries an
absence of professionally recognized diagnosis” and “does not rise to the level of clear and
convincing evidence that [he] currently suffers from a sexual personality or other such
mental disorder.”
We are not persuaded. Appellant cites no authority for his position that the experts’
diagnoses does not satisfy the SDP criteria for the manifestation of a “sexual, personality,
or other mental disorder or dysfunction” under section 253D.02, subdivision 16(a). And
the supreme court has said that a person’s disorder or dysfunction must “not allow them to
adequately control their sexual impulses, making it highly likely that they will engage in
harmful sexual acts in the future.” In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 876 (Minn. 1999).
Here, the district court found that there is “clear and convincing evidence that
[appellant] has sexual, personality, or other mental disorders as required for SDP
commitment,” and that, “as a result of these disorders, [appellant] lacks adequate control
over his sexually harmful behavior.” The district court’s findings are supported by the
record. Dr. Marshall diagnosed appellant with sexual disorder of Unspecified Paraphilic
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Disorder (non -consent), Unspecified Depressive Disorder, and Unspecified Personality
Disorder, and opined that her paraphilic disorder diagnosis is based on appellant’s recurrent
intense fantasies, urges, or behaviors of sexual assault of underage females who could not
consent. She also diagnosed appellant with an Unspecified Personality Disorder due to his
maladaptive personality traits and noted that he has a history of a variety of other diagnoses.
Similarly, Dr. Thompson diagnosed appellant with Unspecified Paraphilic Disorder.
He also opined that other diagnoses may be applicable, but the paraphilic disorder
diagnosis appears directly related to appellant’s risk. And although Dr. Thompson testified
that he did not diagnos e a personality disorder, he stated that he did not disagree with
Dr. Marshall’s personality disorder diagnosis. Rather, he testified that it is difficult to make
such a diagnosis solely on records, and that he did not do enough “digging” on the issue.
The district court found that the experts have the “experience, education, and
training that gives them a basis to have an opinion about [appellant’s] current mental
disorders,” and based its decision on the experts’ opinions. It was within the district court’s
purview to rely on the experts’ opinions regarding whether appellant has sexual,
personality, or other mental disorders as required by the SDP statute. See Ince, 847 N.W.2d
at 23-24 (stating that the district court is “in the best position to determine the weight to be
attributed to each factor [and] to evaluate the credibility of witnesses —a critical function
in these cases that rely so heavily” on expert opinions). Accordingly, the district court did
not err in determining that appellant satisfies this requirement for commitment as an SDP.

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C. Highly likely to reoffend sexually
The third element of the SDP statute requires that appellant be “likely to engage in
acts of harmful sexual conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 16 (a). In assessing this
factor, the supreme court has identified the following factors, known as the Linehan factors,
as relevant when determining the danger an offender poses to the public:
(a) the person’s relevant demographic characteristics (e.g., age,
education, etc.); (b) the person ’s history of violent behavior
(paying particular attention to recency, severity, and frequency
of violent acts); (c) the base rate statistics for violent behavior
among individuals of this person ’s background ( e.g., data
showing the rate at which rapists recidivate, the correlation
between age and criminal sexual activity, etc.); (d) the sources
of stress in the environment (cognitive and affective factors
which indicate that the person may be predisposed to cope with
stress in a violent or nonviolent manner); (e) the similarity of
the present or future context to those contexts in which the
person has used violence in the past; and (f) the person’s record
with respect to sex therapy programs.

In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1994). These factors apply in both SDP and
SPP cases. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 189 (Minn. 1996), vacated and remanded on
other grounds sub nom., Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997).
The district court here analyzed the Linehan factors as they related to both
appellant’s civil commitment as an SDP and as a person with an SPP. Without specifying
which Linehan factor he is challenging, appellant generally argues that the record does not
support a finding that he is highly likely to reoffend. To support his position, appellant
contends that the district court failed to consider Dr. Vaccarella’s opinions related to
appellant’s maturation process, as well as other witness testimony that p urportedly rebuts
the district court’s finding that appellant is likely to reoffend.
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Appellant’s argument ask s us to reweigh the evidence , which we cannot do. See
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221 . The district court here thoroughly analyzed the Linehan
factors and made detailed findings with respect to each factor. In making these findings,
the district court relied on the evidence presented by respondent and determined that this
evidence credibly showed that appellant is highly likely to reoffend. Al though appellant
refers to testimony that may support his position that he is unlikely to reoffend, the district
court specifically found this testimony to not be credible and we defer to that determination.
See Stone, 711 N.W.2d at 83 9. Therefore, in light of the record as a whole, the district
court did not err in determining that respondent proved by clear and convincing evidence
that appellant meets the criteria for civil commitment as an SDP.
II. The district court did not clearly err in finding that clear and convincing
evidence supports appellant’s commitment as a person with an SPP.

An SPP is the existence of
such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of
behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or
failure to appreciate the consequences of personal acts, or a
combination of any of these conditions, which render the
person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to
sexual matters, if the person has evidenced, by a habitual
course of misconduct in sexual matters, an utter lack of power
to control the pers on’s sexual impulses and, as a result, is
dangerous to other persons.

Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 15.
Similar to his arguments related to his commitment as an SDP, appellant argues that
the district court erred in finding that he is a person with an SPP because his “behavior
does not demonstrate a longstanding pattern of sexual misbehavior,” and instead shows “a
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significant break in time between the inappropriate events.” He contends that this “break
in time does not support the finding of a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters.”
Appellant’s argument is unavailing. Regarding whether appellant engaged in “a
habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters,” under the SPP statute, “‘habitual’ . . .
entail[s] a concept of similarity or pattern.” Stone, 711 N.W.2d at 837. Here, the district
court found that appellant’s “offenses occurred over several years and were consistent
across time against a range of victims in various circumstances and unimpeded by external
resources that were in place to orient him to change. He reoffended even after completing
sex offender treatment.” Thus, the district court determined that appellant “has engaged in
a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters.”
The district court’s findings are supported by the record. Again, the record reflects
that, between 2006, and 2022, appellant was convicted of four criminal -sexual-conduct
offenses. Although there was a gap between some of appellant’s offenses, Dr. Thompson
opined that this gap does not negate the habitual -course requirement, but confirms the
habitual nature of appellant’s behavior and lack of control over his sexual impulses.
Specifically, Dr. Thompson testified that appellant
is an individual who . . . despite treatment and legal sanctions,
the habitual nature of his sexual behavior is such that a ten year
span went by and he still went ahead and committed additional
sexual offenses. So to me, the . . . course component is actually
enhanced by signific ant break of . . . time between the . . .
periods of time in which he offended.

Dr. Marshall agreed that appellant’s “sexual misconduct was habitual and was a course.”
The district court found the experts’ testimony credible, and we defer to that determination.
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See id. at 839. As such, the district court did not clearly err in determining that appellant
has engaged in a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters.
Appellant also argues that, because Dr. Vaccarella “did not recommend that a
commitment go forward on the claim that [a]ppellant was” a person with an SPP, her
opinions “raise serious question[s] as to the appropriateness” of the district court’s findings.
But, as with the rest of appellant’s arguments, this argument attacks the district court’s
credibility determinations and the weight the district court gave to the evidence presented.
Under the clear -error standard of review, we do not reweigh the evid ence and do not
reconcile conflicting evidence. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221 -22. The district court
made over 500 findings of fact, demonstrating the thoroughness of the district court’s order,
and appellant has not shown that any of the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous
or otherwise unsupportive of the district court’s decision. Accordingly, the district court
did not err in determining that appellant is a person with an SPP.
III. The district court did not clearly err in finding that civil commitment is
appropriate because there are no less restrictive alternatives that meet
appellant’s needs and the requirements of public safety.

Appellant challenges the district court’s decision that, even assuming that he
qualifies as an SDP or person with an SPP, appellant failed to present clear and convincing
evidence that a less restrictive alternative existed. Minnesota law provides that:
If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the respondent is [an SDP] or a person with [an SPP], the court
shall commit the person to a secure treatment facility unless the
person establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a less
restrictive treatment program is available, is willing to accept
the respondent under commitment, and is consiste nt with the
person’s treatment needs and the requirements of public safety.
15

Minn. Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 3. Appellant bears the burden of establishing that a less -
restrictive alternative to commitment exists. Ince, 847 N.W.2d at 25.
Appellant argues that he “did present a plan for a less restrictive and more
appropriate treatment plan” than civil commitment, which includes outpatient treatment.
To support his position, appellant asserts that he “does not risk public safety,” and tha t he
has experience as an “over the road truck driver” who possess es a commercial driver’s
license “that would quickly lead to a trucking job.” Appellant claims that this “employment
would provide funds to meet the expenses of treatment,” and that he has “a place to live
and a support network in his cousin, his pastor and a friend.”
We disagree. The district court considered appellant’s position and rejected it,
determining that, “because [appellant] is highly likely to re -offend sexually without
intensive sex offender treatment and has an utter lack of power to control his sexual
impulses, it is inappropriate to place [appellant] in the community.” In making this
determination, the district court noted that appellant “will be under no form of supervision
if released into the community, and while his dedication to post -incarceration treatment is
laudable, it is to o little, too late.” The district court also recognized that the “financial
requirements for self -financed sex offender treatment would be substantial,” and that
appellant “has not developed sufficient skills or a support system so that he can be safely
released to the community.” And the district court found that, although appellant has
“completed sex offender treatment in the past, he reoffended after treatment, so . . .
treatment completion is not a protective factor for him.” Thus, the district court determined
16
that MSOP “is an appropriate treatment program for [appellant], and there are no less
restrictive alternatives that meet [appellant’s] needs and the requirements of public safety.”
The district court’s findings are supported by the record. Both Dr. Marshall and Dr.
Thompson testified that outpatient sex offender treatment is insufficient for appellant and
would not be safe for him or the community because he does not have enough re straint to
keep himself from reoffending and refrain ing from all access to children. In fact, Dr.
Thompson testified that appellant “requires intensive sexual offender treatment with . . . a
hammer over his head,” and that such treatment needs to be “unde r the direction or
supervision of the Court. Otherwise I don’t believe that he’ll engage in it.”
Moreover, both experts testified that the only viable treatment option for appellant
is MSOP. And, as respondent points out, appellant failed to “produce clear and convincing
evidence that any outpatient sex offender treatment program would accept him under civil
commitment.” Rather, appellant testified that he has not gone through any kind of
admissions process at any program and has only left messages and sent a letter. Although
appellant disagrees with the weight given to the experts’ opinions by the district court, and
argues that his conduct should not be viewed as posing a danger to the public because the
fifth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct offenses do “not present such a level of danger that
would cause the need for secure, involuntary in -patient care,” appellant’s attempts to
minimize his offenses against I.B. and R.P. conflict with the district court’s credibility
determinations. Again, we defer to this credibility determination and the weight to be given
to the evidence presented at trial. Therefore, on this record, the district court did not err in
17
determining that appellant failed to establish a less -restrictive alternative to commitment
by clear and convincing evidence.
Affirmed.