In the Matter of the Welfare of: C.L.B., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0353

In the Matter of the Welfare of: C.L.B., Child.

Filed September 29, 2025
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-24-1915

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Laura G. Heinrich, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant C.L.B.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent state)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
This appeal centers on appellant C.L.B.’s failure to timely serve his restitution
affidavit, resulting in the district court’s denial of his request for a contested hearing and
subsequent restitution order. C.L.B., a juvenile who received a stay of adjudication for
motor-vehicle theft, argues that the district court erred by concluding that it could not

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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conduct the hearing because he failed to timely serve his restitution affidavit. He further
asserts that his attorney’s failure to timely serve a restitution affidavit was ineffective
assistance of counsel. Because the district court did not err in its refusal to hold the
contested restitution hearing and the failure to comply with the affidavit deadline was not
ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm.
FACTS
Following an incident in June 2024, the state filed a delinquency petition charging
14-year-old C.L.B. with theft of a motor vehicle. Based on an agreement with the state,
C.L.B. waived his trial rights and admitted to the elements of the offense, and he received
a stay of adjudication for six months with unsupervised probation. The district court
ordered a restitution study.
A restitution report was filed on December 17, indicating a restitution request of
$6,115 based on an affidavit from the owner of the vehicle. Three days later, the district
court ordered C.L.B. to pay the requested amount. On December 23, C.L.B. filed a motion
challenging the restitution amount; he disputed both the claimed amount of loss and his
ability to pay. The district court scheduled a contested restitution hearing for Tuesday,
February 4, 2025.
On Thursday, January 30, 2025, C.L.B. submitted a restitution affidavit. That same
day, the state moved to strike the restitution hearing and enter a final judgment on
restitution because C.L.B. had not complied with the statutory requirement to serve the
affidavit at least five business days before the hearing. See Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd.
3(a) (2024). The district court conducted the hearing as scheduled but focused on the
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state’s motion. Counsel for C.L.B. acknowledged that the affidavit was untimely but
argued that there was good cause to proceed, claiming that she was delayed in submitting
the affidavit because of difficulties communicating with C.L.B. at his group home;
alternatively, she asked the court to grant a continuance. The court denied both requests at
the hearing. In a subsequent written order, the court noted counsel’s efforts to coordinate
with C.L.B. but explained: “There is not a good cause exception listed in the plain language
of the juvenile or criminal restitution statutes nor was a request made by counsel with
sufficient time prior to the hearing for the Court to fully consider such a request.” Because
C.L.B. did not “meet[] his burden of production with [a] timely affidavit,” it denied his
restitution challenge and ordered him to pay $6,115 in restitution.
C.L.B. appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err by concluding that it could not conduct a
contested restitution hearing.

A victim of a crime has the right to receive restitution as part of the disposition of a
juvenile-delinquency proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1 (a) (2024);
In re Welfare of I.N.A., 902 N.W.2d 635, 640 -42 (Minn. App. 2017) , rev. denied (Minn.
Nov. 28, 2017). If the juvenile challenges the amount of restitution, they have a burden of
production that includes a “detailed” affidavit in which they “set[] forth all challenges to
the restitution or items of restitution, and specif[y] all reasons justifying dollar amounts of
restitution which differ from the amounts requested by the victim or victims.”
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Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a). “The affidavit must be served on the prosecuting
attorney and the court at least five business days before the hearing.” Id.
This five-day deadline is the focus of this appeal. The supreme court has described
the timing language as “plain and unambiguous” and concluded that an affidavit served
after that deadline is untimely, obviating any need to further address the challenge to
restitution. State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 310, 336 (Minn. 2016). And more recently, w e
held that the deadline is not a jurisdictional requirement but a claim-processing rule.
State v. White, 996 N.W.2d 206, 215 (Minn. App. 2023). This means that the deadline may
be waived or forfeited, but it is “unalterable on a party’s application.” Id. at 213 (quoting
Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15 (2005)).
C.L.B. contends the district court erroneously denied his challenge to the amount of
restitution because it concluded that his failure to comply with the deadline was
jurisdictional, contrary to White. This assertion presents a question concerning the
authority of the district court to order restitution, an issue we review de novo.
State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 2015). De novo review here is particularly
appropriate because the issue concerns the interpretation of applicable caselaw.
State v. O’Neill, 945 N.W.2d 71, 76 (Minn. App. 2020), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2020).
Our de novo review leads us to disagree with C.L.B. While C.L.B. briefly asserted
at the hearing that the deadline was not jurisdictional, neither the district court’s oral
remarks nor its written order described the deadline as jurisdictional. Rather, the court
described it as mandatory, with no exceptions, which is consistent with Smith and White.
Because C.L.B. undisputedly failed to comply with the affidavit deadline and the state did
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not waive or forfeit the deadline, the district court did not err by enforcing it and denying
C.L.B.’s challenge to restitution without a contested hearing.
II. The failure to comply with the affidavit deadline was not ineffective assistance
of counsel.

Juvenile-delinquency proceedings “must measure up to the essentials of due process
and fair treatment.” In re Welfare of B.A.H., 845 N.W.2d 158, 163 (Minn. 2014) (quoting
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967)). As part of that due- process right, juveniles have the
right to effective assistance of counsel in delinquency proceedings. Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
When reviewing a claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance, we use the two-prong
test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). State v. Ellis-
Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. App. 2017); see State v. Cram, 718 N.W.2d 898, 906
(Minn. 2006) (applying Strickland to claim of ineffective assistance regarding restitution).
That test requires a showing that (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 715 (Minn. 2019) (quotations omitted). And either
prong may be dispositive. Id. “Application of the Strickland test involves a mixed question
of law and fact, which we review de novo.” Id.
C.L.B. contends his trial counsel was ineffective in two respects: (1) she did not
allow sufficient time to communicate with him to secure a restitution affidavit from him
before the deadline, and (2) she “failed to stay abreast” of controlling precedent regarding
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the court’s authority to hear a restitution claim without a timely restitution affidavit. We
address each issue in turn.
Timely Communication
C.L.B. contends counsel was objectively unreasonable in managing her
communication with him, considering his known disabilities, because she did not start
contacting him about the affidavit “immediately” after filing the restitution challenge. But
he identifies no authority aside from the professional rule requiring reasonable
communication with clients. See Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4 (requiring a lawyer to
“reasonably consult with” and “reasonably inform[]” a client). And counsel’s description
of her efforts to communicate with C.L.B., which he does not dispute, does not indicate
that she failed to comply with this rule or otherwise was objectively unreasonable in
communicating with him.
Counsel filed the motion challenging restitution on December 23, 2024, and the
district court set a hearing date of February 4, 2025. This made January 28 the deadline
for serving the affidavit. Because she knew that C.L.B. “has special needs,” and she had
limited ability to contact him at his group home, she began the process of trying to contact
him to obtain the affidavit nearly two weeks before that deadline. On January 16 counsel
contacted his program manager, explaining that she needed to obtain a restitution affidavit
from C.L.B. “in the next 10 days,” but received no response. She then attempted to contact
C.L.B. by text message, phone call, and through others involved in his care , but was
repeatedly stymied. In short, the record reflects that counsel made a concerted effort to
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navigate her client’s challenging circumstances to secure the restitution affidavit. That she
was unsuccessful does not make her efforts objectively unreasonable.
Knowledge of Controlling Precedent
C.L.B. also contends counsel was ineffective because she apparently “did not know
about the holding in White” that the affidavit deadline is not jurisdictional. He is correct
that “[a]n attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to his case combined
with his failure to perform basic research on that point is a quintessential example of
unreasonable performance under Strickland.” State v. Babineau, 23 N.W.3d 396, 411
(Minn. App. 2025) (quoting Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274 (2014)). But that is not
the case here. While counsel did not cite White to the district court, she accurately argued
the holding of that case—that the affidavit deadline is not jurisdictional. More over, as
discussed above, the holding in White does not require a different result from the one the
district court ordered, so failure to expressly invoke that case did not prejudice C.L.B.
Accordingly, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel also fails.
Affirmed.