State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0358

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Daniel Leith Renville,
Appellant.

Filed December 22, 2025
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Redwood County District Court
File Nos. 64-CR-24-183, 64-CR-24-450

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shannon Ness, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Cochran , Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions for failing to register as a predatory offender,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying his presentence motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas. We affirm.
FACTS
In December 2023, appellant Daniel Leith Renville was released to the community
after serving a 201-month sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
In March 2024, respondent State of Minnesota alleged that Renville failed to
provide law enforcement with his primary and secondary addresses. The state charged
Renville with two counts of failure to fulfill predatory-offender-registration requirements
(registration requirements). A pre-plea sentencing worksheet showed that, with five
criminal-history points, Renville’s presumptive sentence was 30 months in prison, with a
range of between 26 and 36 months.
Renville was in custody until June 2024. Soon after his release, law enforcement
completed a compliance check and discovered that Renville was not residing at his
registered address. The state charged Renville with two additional counts of failure to
fulfill registration requirements.
In late June 2024, the district court held a hearing. The parties had reached an
agreement resolving four separate files. In the first matter, Renville would plead guilty to
one count of fail ure to fulfill registration requirements, and the other count would be
dismissed. In the second matter, Renville would plead guilty to one count of failure to
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fulfill registration requirements, and the other count would be dismissed. In the third and
fourth matters, the charges would be dismissed. 1 Additionally, another matter that was
under review at the county attorney’s office would not be charged out.2 The district court
noted that “the range of sentencing would be between 26 and 30 months,” but there was
“no agreement” as to sentencing. The district court also stated that “the sentences would
be sentenced concurrently to each other.”
Renville indicated that he understood the agreement and that by pleading guilty, he
would be waiving his right to a jury trial. He also agreed that he had enough time to speak
with his attorney and that nobody pressured or forced him to plead guilty.
Renville then admitted that, when he was on supervised release, the department of
corrections (DOC) discussed registration requirements with him. He agreed that he was
given notice that he was required to register, that he knew that he was required to register,
and that he knew that he was required to register his primary address. Renville agreed that
law enforcement went to his listed address in March 2024 and discovered that he was not
residing there. He admitted that he was residing at a different residence and did not notify
law enforcement of his address change. Renville also admitted that, in June 2024, he was
under the same duty under the registration laws. He agreed that if he did not have a primary
address, he was required to “keep law enforcement updated [as to] where [he] was staying.”
Renville admitted that when he was released from jail in June 2024, he did not complete a

1 One matter included a charge of threats of violence. Another matter included two felony
charges for failing to follow a registration requirement to complete and sign a verification
form, and for intentionally providing false information.
2 There was a case pending regarding fraudulent use of an EBT card.
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form indicating where he would be staying . The district court asked Renville if he had
provided law enforcement with a registration update with a new address. Renville replied:
“I attempted to, but no.”
The district court determined that the factual bases were sufficient to support the
guilty pleas and stated that it would order “a [p]resentence [i]nvestigation in both files.”
In August 2024, Renville moved to withdraw his guilty pleas prior to sentencing.
The district court held a hearing. Renville had discharged his attorney and was self-
represented. Renville argued that he could not plead guilty to offenses he did not commit.
He claimed that he was “overwhelmed . . . with multiple charges and threatened by
[defense counsel] of consecutive sentences.” The district court asked: “Do you understand
that if you do go to trial, the specter of consecutive sentences is a real possibility?” Renville
replied: “Yes.” The district court questioned: “[W]hen you used the phrase ‘threatened by
[defense counsel],’ he advised you that if you went to trial on these files, and were found
guilty in more than one of them, there is a possibility that the sentences would run
consecutive, is that correct?” Renville replied: “Yes.”
The district court denied Renville’s motion. The district court found that Renville
provided the following reasons to support his withdrawal motion: “(1) he cannot plead
guilty to crimes that he did not commit; [and] (2) he was not informed that he would be
sentenced in both files but rather believed he would only be sentenced on one count.” The
district court first concluded that Renville provided adequate factual bases supporting the
charges. The district court then framed the second reason as a challenge to the effectiveness
of Renville’s counsel. The district court concluded that Renville failed to show that his
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counsel was ineffective by advising Renville that “he would likely face a much longer
sentence if he took the matters to trial.” The district court denied the motion without
addressing whether the state would be prejudiced by the granting of the motion because
Renville had failed to meet his burden to provide a fair and just reason supporting plea
withdrawal.
On December 9, 2024, the district court sentenced Renville to two concurrent 30-
month prison sentences. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Renville argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas presentencing.
A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.
State v. Townsend, 872 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2015). But any time before
sentencing, a district court may permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if it is “fair
and just to do so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. A district court considers: (1) a
defendant’s reasons for withdrawal, and (2) the prejudice that withdrawal would cause the
state, given its reliance on the plea. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 2010).
The defendant bears the burden of proving a fair-and-just reason for withdrawal. State v.
Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. App. 2011). We review a district court’s application
of the fair-and-just standard for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Renville argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
because he proved that it was fair and just to permit plea withdraw al for three reasons:
(1) he is innocent, (2) his attorney coerced him into pleading guilty by telling him that he
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could receive consecutive sentences, and (3) he pleaded guilty believing that he would
receive only one sentence. The record supports the district court’s decision to deny
Renville’s plea-withdrawal motion.
First, as the district court determined, there is no evidence of Renville’s innocence.
And the transcript from the plea hearing shows that Renville provided sufficient factual
bases to support his guilty pleas. See State v. Tuttle, 504 N.W.2d 252, 256-57 (Minn. App.
1993) (affirming district court’s rejection of defendant’s claim of innocence when guilty
plea contained admission establishing guilt).
When he submitted his guilty pleas, Renville admitted that he was on supervised
release, that the DOC discussed registration requirements with him, that he knew that he
was required to register, that he knew that he was required to register his primary address,
that he was residing at an address different from his registered address, and that he did not
notify law enforcement of his new address. Renville also admitted that, if he did not have
a primary address, he was required to “keep law enforcement up dated [as to] where [he
was] staying.” Renville admitted that he did not complete a form indicating where he
would be staying. Renville’s admissions are sufficient to show that he is guilty of failing
to fulfill registration requirements.
Second, Renville argues that his attorney coerced him into pleading guilty by telling
him that he could receive consecutive sentences if h e had a trial and was found guilty of
more than one offense. But when he pleaded guilty, Renville agreed that nobody pressured
or forced him to plead guilty. And while he claimed at the plea-withdrawal motion hearing
that he was “overwhelmed . . . with multiple charges and threatened by [defense counsel]
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of consecutive sentences,” Renville indicated that he understood that, if he was found guilty
of more than one offense after a trial, “consecutive sentences [were] a real possibility.”
The district court clarified that Renville’s description of defense counsel’s “threat” was
counsel’s advice that consecutive sentences were a “possibility” after trial.
So, Renville told the district court that he knew that consecutive sentences were a
possibility if he went to trial. Yet, he claims that his attorney coerced him into pleading
guilty by advising him that he could receive consecutive sentences if he went to trial. It is
difficult to understand how Renville felt coerced by his attorney advising him that he could
receive consecutive sentences when Renville knew that he could receive consecutive
sentences. Renville does not provide authority showing that an attorney is ineffective for
providing accurate advice or telling a defendant something of which he is already aware.
Finally, Renville argues that he pleaded guilty believing that he would receive only
one sentence. But the record shows that at the plea hearing, the district court stated that
there was “no agreement” as to sentencing, that it would order a presentence investigation
in “both files,” and that “the sentences would be sentenced concurrently to each other.”
(Emphasis added.) This indicates that more than one sentence was contemplated by the
court and the parties at the time of the plea itself. The district court therefore did not abuse
its discretion by denying Renville’s presentencing plea-withdrawal motion.
Affirmed.