State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0364

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shane Maurice McPike,
Appellant.

Filed February 23, 2026
Affirmed; motion denied
Bentley, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-12222

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook , Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
In this direct appeal from a conviction for first-degree sale of controlled substances
and possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, appellant argues that the district court
erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during the execution of a search
warrant at his residence. Specifically, he argues that the search warrant application did not
allege facts sufficient to support a nexus between the apartment and his alleged criminal
activity. We affirm.
FACTS
The following facts derive from the evidence and testimony received at a jury trial.
Law enforcement was investigating appellant Shane Maurice McPike for alleged criminal
activity related to controlled substances and firearm possession. Pursuant to that
investigation, officers were surveilling the apartment building believed to be McPike’s
residence when McPike arrived in his vehicle. Officers initiated a stop. McPike was in the
driver’s seat, and a female passenger sat in the front passenger seat. Officers asked McPike
and his passenger to exit the vehicle, took both into custody, and searched the vehicle.
During the search, officers located a bag containing suspected heroin on the passenger-side
floor of the car. After the vehicle search was conducted , Officer W. applied for a warrant
to search the apartment.1

1 We refer to the officers by their initials instead of their full names in accordance with our
rules of public access. See Minn. R. Pub. Access to Recs. of Jud. Branch 8, subd. 2(b)
(recommending that appellate opinions limit disclosure of witness identities “to what is
necessary and relevant”).
3
Officer W. alleged the following facts in the search-warrant application. Officer W.
is an officer with the Gun Investigations Unit of the Minneapolis Police Department with
training in “street level sales of narcotics, and undercover narcotics operations.” He was
contacted by a confidential informant (CI), who alleged that McPike deals “large amounts
of heroin and cocaine in the Minneapolis area” and belongs to the Family Mob street gang.
The CI claimed that McPike supplied the “entire Family Mob gang with illegal narcotics.”
The CI also alleged to have personally observed McPike possessing “multiple ounces of
cocaine within the last week” as well as a “handgun which he uses to protect himself from
being robbed of his drugs and/ or drug money.” The CI provided a physical description of
McPike and his phone number, and the CI stated that they “had firsthand knowledge that
McPike,” accompanied by his girlfriend, “was going to be driving to Chicago . . . to pick
up multiple kilos of heroin and cocaine.” Officer W. said he knew “a Shane McPike from
prior investigations” and showed the CI a photo of McPike. The CI confirmed that the
person in the photo was the same person who the CI knew to be dealing narcotics.
In the search-warrant application, Officer W. continued to explain that he had
obtained a warrant to track McPike’s cellphone and received “GPS pings” indicating that
the phone was in Chicago. Two days later, Officer W. received more GPS pings indicating
that the phone was moving back toward Minnesota. Officer W. arranged to have plain-
clothed officers monitor an apartment building believed to be McPike’s residence. No
specific facts were alleged in the application about how Officer W. knew it was McPike’s
residence. Officer W. then described the stop of McPike’s vehicle, and he additionally
stated that officers recovered $1,625 in cash from McPike’s person in a search incident to
4
arrest. Officer W. requested that the court authorize a search warrant for the apartment to
search for “illegal narcotics, firearm[s], contraband, and other items.” The district court
determined that probable cause existed sufficient to search the apartment and issued the
warrant.
In the ensuing search of the apartment, officers located a large plastic bin that
contained a firearm, magazines to a firearm, a bag holding a mixture of heroin and fentanyl
weighing 53.178 grams plus-or-minus 0.022 grams, and a bag of cocaine weighing 134.765
grams plus-or-minus 0.022 grams.
Respondent State of Minnesota initially charged McPike with three counts relating
to the sale and possession of controlled substances and possession of ammunition or any
firearm by an ineligible person. The complaint was later amended to add five counts, for a
total of eight counts.
2
Before trial, McPike moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of the
apartment. McPike argued that the search warrant lacked probable cause because
Officer W.’s application did not articulate how he knew the apartment was McPike’s

2 The amended complaint charged McPike as follows: count one, first-degree sale of
17 grams or more of cocaine or methamphetamine within 90 days, Minn. Stat. § 152.021,
subd. 1(1) (2020); count two, first-degree sale of 50 grams or more of a narcotic other than
cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine within 90 days, Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(4)
(2020); counts three and four, possession of ammunition or any firearm by a person with a
conviction for a crime of violence, Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020); count five,
first-degree possession of 50 grams or more of cocaine or methamphetamine, Minn. Stat.
§ 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020); count six, second-degree possession of 50 grams or more
narcotic—not cocaine, methamphetamine, or heroin, Minn. Stat. § 15 2.022, subd. 2(a)(4)
(2020); count seven, first-degree sale of ten grams or more of heroin within 90 days, Minn.
Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(3) (2020); and count eight, first-degree possession of 25 grams or
more of heroin, Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(3) (2020).
5
residence or how there was a “high probability that evidence of a crime will be found in
the apartment at that time[.]” (Emphasis omitted.) McPike also noted that the CI’s tip
alleged only that McPike was transporting drugs in his car and did not mention the
apartment. Without a connection between the apartment and the illegal activity, McPike
argued, there was no probable cause to search. The state argued in response that the warrant
application “established a sufficient nexus between [McPike], the apartment, and criminal
activity based on a totality of the circumstances.”
The district court denied McPike’s motion to suppress. The district court determined
that the search warrant affidavit “provided sufficient probable cause for the Signing Judge
to find the CI credible” and “established a sufficient nexus to assume that [McPike’s]
residence is a location where drugs and contraband would be found.” The district court
determined that the CI was credible because law enforcement corroborated “several
detailed tips provided by the CI”—namely, McPike’s identifying characteristics and cell
phone number, his travel to Chicago, and th at McPike had controlled substances in his
vehicle when he returned, even if the quantity was less than the CI had anticipated. With
regard to the nexus to the apartment, the district court determined that the search warrant
application provided “ample reason to believe [McPike] was engaged in illegal drug
activity” and, “[u]nder the totality of the circumstances, the presence of heroin and large
amount of cash are indicative of drug sale.” The district court further explained:
Although [McPike] did not enter [the apartment] upon
his return from Chicago, Illinois, the search warrant affidavit
still supplies sufficient information to establish a nexus
between evidence of [McPike’s] criminal drug activity and [the
apartment]. The Court does not elect to engage in a
6
hypertechnical analysis regarding Officer [W.’s] knowledge of
[McPike’s] apartment number. Officer [W.] has interacted with
[McPike] in the past, and from the totality of the
circumstances, the Court is able to infer that Officer [W.] knew
this building and apartment number to be [McPike’s] residence
when he submitted the search warrant application specifically
for [this apartment].

The court concluded that it was “reasonable . . . to believe that [McPike] would keep drug-
related contraband in his place of residence.”
At trial, the state presented several officers who testified about their search of
McPike’s apartment. Two forensic scientists with the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
testified to the composition and weight of the substances obtained in the search and
described the results from DNA testing on the firearm and magazine, which revealed a
“mixture of two or more individuals” but with a “major male DNA profile that matches
[McPike].”
The jury found McPike guilty of all eight counts. The district court convicted
McPike of counts one through three and sentenced McPike to 100 months’ imprisonment
on count one and to 60 months’ imprisonment on count three. The court did not impose a
sentence on count two and did not adjudicate the remaining counts.
McPike appeals the denial of the motion to suppress.
DECISION
McPike argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
because the search warrant for the apartment was not supported by probable cause. He
maintains that Officer W.’s application did not allege facts that establish a nexus between
the alleged criminal activity and that location.
7
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10. To
search a residence, officers usually must obtain a valid warrant supported by probable
cause. State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014); Minn. Stat. § 626.08
(2020). Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will
be found in a certain location, which in turn requires evidence of a “sufficient
‘nexus’ . . . between the evidence sought and the place to be searched.” Yarbrough, 841
N.W.2d at 622. A nexus “may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances,” id., even
without direct observation of criminal activity at the location, State v. Ruoho, 685 N.W.2d
451, 456 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2004). Factors that courts
consider under a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis include “the type of crime, the
nature of the items sought, the extent of the defendant’s opportunity for concealment, and
the normal inferences as to where the defendant would usually keep the items.” Yarbrough,
841 N.W.2d at 623.
When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence obtained in a
search pursuant to a warrant, we “afford the district court’s [probable cause] determination
great deference.” State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. 2001). We focus our
review on “whether the judge issuing the warrant had a substantial basis for concluding
that probable cause existed.” State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 222-23 (Minn. 2010)
(quotation omitted). We limit the scope of our review “to the information presented in the
application, and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that information.” State
v. Nagle, 26 N.W.3d 585, 590 (Minn. 2025).
8
For the following reasons, considering the CI’s tip, Officer W.’s personal familiarity
with McPike, and the drugs and cash found in law enforcement’s search of McP ike’s
person and his vehicle, we conclude that there was a substantial basis for the district court’s
probable-cause determination.
CI’s Tip
The tip from the CI supports both an inference that McPike was engaged in criminal
activity and a nexus between that activity and the apartment. Specifically, the CI informed
law enforcement that McPike supplied the Family Mob street gang with drugs. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that evidence that an individual sells drugs in large
quantities supports an inference that he may have drugs in his residence. See Yarbrough,
841 N.W.2d at 623 (“It may be reasonable to infer that drug wholesalers keep drugs at their
residences[.]”). The tip therefore supports the district court’s probable-cause determination
because it alleges both the nature of criminal activity McPike was involved in and provides
reason to believe that evidence of that activity may be found in the apartment. 3
McPike argues that the CI’s information was not reliable and, therefore, does not
support the probable-cause determination. We disagree. “In determining probable cause,
[courts] must consider the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying
hearsay information.” State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Minn. 1998) (quoting Illinois

3 The state argues that this drug-wholesaler inference is sufficient on its own to support
probable cause. We do not reach this argument because we conclude under a totality -of-
the-circumstances analysis that the warrant application presents a substantial basis for the
district court’s probable-cause determination. Evidence of McPike’s alleged involvement
in drug sales is a relevant consideration in our analysis, regardless of whether the drug-
wholesaler inference would be sufficient to support probable cause on its own.
9
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). “[V]eracity can be proven by showing that details of
the tip have been sufficiently corroborated so that it is clear the informant is telling the
truth on this occasion.” State v. Holiday , 749 N.W.2d 833, 840 (Minn. App. 2008)
(quotation omitted). The “preferred” basis of knowledge in CI tips includes “[r] ecent
personal observation of incriminating conduct.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 269
(Minn. 1985). A CI’s allegation, that “the event was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to
greater weight than might otherwise be the case.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 234.
Here, law enforcement corroborated information provided by the CI about McPike’s
phone number and McPike’s travel to Chicago. Because “[e]ven corroboration of minor
details lends credence to an informant’s tip,” the corroboration of these details supports
that the CI had a basis of knowledge for the information communicated to Officer W.
Holiday, 749 N.W.2d at 841. The CI also alleged personal, recent observations of McPike
possessing multiple ounces of cocaine, entitling the tip to “greater weight.” Gates, 462 U.S.
at 234.
McPike focuses on the fact that the CI informed law enforcement that McPike was
traveling to Chicago to pick up “kilos” of narcotics but, when officers searched McPike’s
car upon his return from Chicago, they found a much smaller quantity of heroin. We do
not view that inaccuracy to be fatal to the overall reliability of the tip. “In satisfying the
corroboration requirement, there is no mandate that every fact in the CI’s tip be
corroborated, that a certain number of facts be corroborated, or that certain types of facts
must be corroborated. ” Holiday, 749 N.W.2d at 841. Law enforcement corroborated
several other critical details in the CI’s tip, even if every detail was not confirmed or
10
accurate. The tip had sufficient veracity regarding McPike’s criminal activity to support
the existence of probable cause.
Officer W.’s Personal Knowledge
The warrant application included a reference to Officer W.’s personal knowledge
and prior experience with McPike. McPike argues that this information was too vague and
conclusory to tie McPike and any criminal activity to the apartment. A law enforcement
officer’s training and personal knowledge “can be a proper factor to consider in making a
probable-cause determination.” State v. Brennan, 674 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Minn. App. 2004),
rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 20, 2004); see also State v. Munoz, 385 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Minn.
App. 1986) (stating that an officer’s personal knowledge may corroborate other evidence
and support probable cause). Officer W. stated in the warrant application that he was
familiar with a “Shane McPike” from previous investigations, and he confirmed that the
CI’s tip was about the same person by showing the CI a photo of McPike. Officer W. also
set up surveillance of the apartment he believed to be McPike ’s residence, and McPike
arrived at that very location when returning from Chicago. We apply a common-sense
approach to reviewing warrants, rather than a hypertechnical analysis. See Ruoho, 685
N.W.2d at 456. Common-sense inferences drawn from Officer W.’s personal knowledge
and McPike’s arrival at the apartment supports that McPike resided at that location. And
because the CI alleged that McPike sells large quantities of drugs, McPike’s residence was
a location where police were likely to find evidence of that activity . See Yarbrough, 841
N.W.2d at 623. Officer W.’s knowledge and experience therefore also support the
existence of probable cause.
11
Evidence Recovered in the Vehicle Search and the Search Incident to Arrest
The cash and heroin found in the search of McPike’s person and his vehicle provide
additional support for the district court’s probable-cause determination. Possession of a
small quantity of controlled substances is not enough, by itself, to establish a nexus to a
different location, but when “significantly more evidence link[s] [the defendant’s] drug
activity on the street to his home,” a nexus may be supported. State v. Kahn, 555 N.W.2d
15, 19 (Minn. App. 1996). Similarly, possession of a large amount of cash may support an
inference that a defendant is selling controlled substances. See State v. Collard, 414
N.W.2d 733, 736 (Minn. App. 1987) (considering a large sum of cash found in the
defendant’s car among factors supporting his intent to sell), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 15,
1988). McPike’s possession of the small quantity of heroin and large amount of cash upon
arrival at the apartment’s parking lot strengthens both the inference of his involvement in
drug sales and the nexus between that activity and the apartment.
McPike relies on Kahn to argue that his possession of a small quantity of drugs did
not support an inference that he was selling drugs or that drugs may be found in the
apartment. In Kahn, a search warrant was granted for a defendant’s home after he was
stopped approximately 80 miles from his residence with one ounce of cocaine in his
vehicle. 555 N.W.2d at 18. We concluded that these facts alone were not sufficient to
support probable cause to search the residence because “[m]ore than mere possession of an
ounce of cocaine is required to demonstrate probable cause that an individual is a dealer
and that his home contains evidence or contraband.” Id.
12
Kahn is not analogous here. The conclusion in Kahn turned on the 80-mile distance
between his residence and the location of the car search. McPike was stopped in the parking
lot of his apartment. Also, although McPike possessed a smaller amount of drugs on his
person and in his car than Kahn did, other factors exist here that support the inference that
McPike was selling drugs and that evidence could be found in the apartment, including the
cash and the CI’s tip.
Totality of the Circumstances
Considering these factors together, we conclude that the district court did not err in
determining that the totality of the circumstances alleged in the warrant application
supported an inference of a nexus between McPike’s alleged drug dealing and the
apartment. The district court could reasonably infer from the CI’s tip that evidence of
McPike selling large quantities of drugs could be found in his residence. It could also infer
that the apartment was McPike’s residence from Officer W.’s knowledge and from the fact
that McPike returned there after a trip to Chicago. And those inferences are further
supported by the officers’ discovery of heroin and a large quantity of cash upon McPike’s
arrival at the apartment’s parking lot. From these facts, the district court reasonably could
infer a nexus between McPike’s alleged criminal activity and the location to be searched.
It follows that there was a substantial basis for the district court’s determination of probable
cause to search the apartment.
Before concluding, we note that the state moved to strike a portion of McPike’s
reply brief that referenced information in the application for the cellphone-tracking warrant
that the state obtained before it sought a warrant to search his apartment. The state
13
maintains that information in the cellphone-tracking warrant application is outside the
scope of our review of the validity of the apartment search warrant. We do not rely on the
cellphone warrant application or the challenged portion of McPike’s reply in our analysis,
and, for that reason, we deny the state’s motion to strike as moot. See Justice v. Marvel,
LLC, 979 N.W.2d 894, 903 n.9 (Minn. 2022) (denying a motion to strike a portion of a
party’s brief as moot when the court did not rely on the challenged material in its analysis).
Affirmed; motion denied.