State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0385

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Wayne Keith Parmenter,
Appellant.

Filed February 23, 2026
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge*

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-24-1552

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Symon S. Schindler-Syme, Assistant County
Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Wayne Keith Parmenter challenges his conviction of illegally carrying or
possessing a pistol without a permit under Minnesota Statues section 624.714, subdivision
1a (2022). Before trial, Parmenter moved to suppress the pistol arguing that the evidence
was unlawfully discovered when the police searched his car for controlled substances after
arresting him for driving while impaired. In a separate motion, Parmenter challenged the
constitutionality of section 624.714, subdivision 1a. The district court denied both
motions. Because the district court correctly determined that the firearm was discovered
incident to a lawful arrest and did not err by denying Parmenter’s constitutional challenge,
we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2024, the police observed a car run a red light.
1 They conducted a traffic
stop and identified the driver as Parmenter. When the police interacted with Parmenter,
they observed that he had pinpoint pupils and his eyes were glassy. Based on their training
and experience the police determined that these were indicators of impairment.
During the stop, Parmenter agreed to perform a field sobriety test. The police
observed other signs of impairment during the field tests, including a lack of smooth pursuit

1 The following facts regarding Parmenter’s arrest and the subsequent discovery of the
firearm are drawn from the district court’s order that Parmenter challenges on appeal .
Parmenter does not challenge the district court’s factual findings on appeal.
3
in both eyes and unsteady balance. As a result, the police believed Parmenter was under
the influence of a controlled substance and arrested him.
After placing Parmenter under arrest, the police searched his car for controlled
substances. The arresting officer believed, based on experience, that when people are using
controlled substances and operating a car , they almost always have paraphernalia or
controlled substances within the car. And the officer explained that underneath the driver’s
seat is a common place to find these items. When the police searched Parmenter’s car,
they discovered a pistol and ammunition beneath the driver’s seat.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Parmenter with one count of carrying or
possessing a pistol without a permit2 and one count of third-degree driving while impaired
by a controlled substance.3
Parmenter filed a motion to suppress the evidence and dismiss both counts. At the
omnibus hearing, the state dismissed the third-degree driving- while-impaired charge
because the toxicology reports revealed that Parmenter did not have any amount of a
controlled substance in his body at the time of traffic stop. However, based on the facts
discussed above, the district court determined that the police had probable cause to arrest
Parmenter and that they had searched his car incident to a lawful arrest. The district court
therefore denied Parmenter’s motion to suppress the pistol.
Parmenter later filed another motion requesting that the district court order a second
omnibus hearing to determine the constitutionality of section 624.714, subdivision 1a. At

2 Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 624.714, subdivision 1a.
3 Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 1(7) (Supp. 2023).
4
a pretrial hearing, Parmenter generally argued that another hearing was necessary to
determine whether section 624.714, subdivision 1a remained constitutional in light of the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc.
v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). The state contended that the Minnesota Supreme Court
has already held that section 624.714, subdivision 1a is constitutional in a pre-Bruen
opinion, State v. Hatch, 962 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 2021).
The district court denied Parmenter’s motion and explained its reliance on Hatch:
“It’s a precedential case. It is issued by the highest court here in Minnesota. I reviewed
Hatch; I can’t find a distinction between the defendant there and your client. I think that
the analysis is on point. And so, I am going to deny your motion.”
Following a one-day trial, the jury found Parmenter guilty of carrying or possessing
a pistol without a permit. The district court entered judgment of conviction, imposed a
stayed sentence, and placed Parmenter on supervised probation for two years.
Parmenter appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err by denying Parmenter’s motion to suppress
the pistol obtained from the warrantless search of his car.

Parmenter first challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the pistol. He argues
that the district court erred when it determined that the search of his car was a
constitutionally valid search incident to a lawful arrest.4 To evaluate this challenge of the

4 Parmenter does not challenge the district court’s determination that police had probable
cause to arrest him and instead argues only that “[t]he search of [his] car did not satisfy
either circumstance in which a search incident to arrest is justified.”
5
district court’s pretrial order, we review factual findings for clear error and legal
determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “In general, warrantless
searches and seizures are unreasonable in the absence of a legally recognized exception to
the warrant requirement.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 33 (Minn. 2016). Here, the
police did not have a warrant to search the car. Therefore, unless an exception to the
warrant requirement applies, the search of Parmenter’s car was unconstitut ional.
State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Minn. 2001).
One well established exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest.
State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Minn. 2015), aff’d sub nom.
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016). The purpose of this exception is to
prevent the destruction of evidence and to remove “any weapons the arrestee might use to
resist arrest or flee.” Ture, 632 N.W.2d at 628. Accordingly, there are two possible
justifications for a search of a vehicle incident to arrest: (1) “if the arrestee is within
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search,” or (2) if “it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). And the scope of a search incident to arrest is
very broad. State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1998).
Here, the district court found that the police had probable cause to arrest Parmenter
for driving while impaired by a controlled substance, the police reasonably suspected that
Parmenter was under the influence of controlled substances, and the police’s experience
6
was that “people who use controlled substances and operate vehicles almost always have
paraphernalia or controlled substances within the vehicle.” Based on this record, the
district court found that it was reasonable for the police to believe that evidence of the
crime would be found in the car. The court therefore concluded that the warrantless search
was a constitutional search incident to lawful arrest and denied Parmenter’s motion. We
agree.
Our decision is grounded on the reasoning of Gant, in which the United States
Supreme Court addressed the constitutional parameters of a warrantless search of a vehicle
incident to a lawful arrest. 556 U.S. at 343-44. In Gant, the police arrested Gant for driving
with a suspended license, handcuffed him, and locked him in the back of a patrol car. Id.
at 335. The police then searched Gant’s car and found cocaine in the pocket of a jacket in
the backseat. Id. The Supreme Court stated that a search incident to arrest is
constitutionally justified where it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the
crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. Id. at 343. But that rationale did not extend
to Gant’s situation because “Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license—an
offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment
of Gant’s car.” Id. at 344. Accordingly, because the police could not have reasonably
expected to find evidence of the crime of ar rest in Gant’s car , the Court held that the
warrantless search was unlawful. Id.
Here, unlike in Gant, the record supports the finding that the police who searched
Parmenter’s car reasonably believed that evidence of the crime of arrest would be found in
his car. Before searching Parmenter’s car, the police observed multiple signs of
7
impairment consistent with controlled -substance use. Based on these interactions, the
police arrested Parmenter because they believed that he was under the influence of a
controlled substance. The police also knew that “people who use controlled substances
and operate vehicles almost always have paraphernalia or controlled substances within the
vehicle.”
Therefore, the record supports the district court’s finding that the police reasonably
believed that “the vehicle contains[ed] evidence of the offense of arrest.” Id. at 351; see
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 234-35 (2011) (stating that after Gant, an automobile
search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest is constitutional if the police have reason to
believe that the vehicle contains evidence relevant to the crime of arrest). Accordingly, the
district court correctly determined that the search of Parmenter’s car was a constitutionally
valid search incident to lawful arrest.
To persuade us otherwise, Parmenter argues that the only evidence relevant to the
“crime of arrest” here—driving under the influence of a controlled substance —would be
found on his person or in his body, not within the car. And he points to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004), to support his
argument that it “was not reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest
would be found in [his] vehicle.” We disagree.
Certainly, the facts here differ from Belton and Thornton where a vehicle search
took place after the police smelled marijuana and saw suspected marijuana in the car,
Belton, 453 U.S. at 455-56, and recovered drugs from the arrestee’s person, Thornton, 541
U.S. at 618. But these factual variations do not alter the parameters of a warrantless vehicle
8
search incident to a lawful arrest—and one such parameter is “when it is ‘reasonable to
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” Gant, 556
U.S. at 343 (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)). For the reasons
discussed above, the record supports the finding that the police reasonably believed that
Parmenter’s car contained evidence of controlled substance use while operating a vehicle—
the crime of arrest here.
Finally, Parmenter argues that the search was not justified because there was no
danger that he could reach anything in the car given that, at the time of the search, he was
“handcuffed and confined to the back of a police squad car.” But the district court did not
determine that the search of Parmenter’s car was justified because the driver’s seat was
within his reach. Instead, the court reasoned consistent with Gant, that the search of the
vehicle was justified because the police “had a reasonable belief that evidence of an
intoxicating substance could be found in the vehicle and more specifically, under the seat.”
Accordingly, Parmenter’s argument that the search was not justified based on his proximity
to the driver’s seat does not persuade us to reach a different conclusion in this case.
Because the record supports the district court’s finding that the police reasonably
believed that they would find evidence of the crime of arrest in Parmenter’s car, the court
correctly determined that the search of the car was a constitutionally valid search incident
to lawful arrest. We therefore discern no error in the denial of Parmenter’s motion to
suppress the pistol.

9
II. The district court did not err by denying Parmenter’s motion to challenge
the constitutionality of section 624.714, subdivision 1a.

Parmenter also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to challenge the
constitutionality of section 624.714, subdivision 1a, which prohibits people from carrying
or possessing a pistol in a public place “without first having obtained a permit to carry the
pistol.” Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a. This statute, he asserts, may violate the Second
Amendment of the United States Constitution which protects “the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms.” U.S. Const. amend. II. And a hearing was necessary, Parmenter
argues, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen, which changed the analysis
for determining whether a statute violates the Second Amendment.
Under Bruen, to determine whether a statute complies with the Second Amendment,
“[a] court first must ask whether ‘the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an
individual’s conduct.’” State v. Gaal, 21 N.W.3d 256, 263 (Minn. App. 2025) (quoting
Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126). If so, “the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.”
Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2126. And if the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct,
the court must then ask whether the government can “justify its regulation” by
“demonstrat[ing] that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of
firearm regulation.” Id.; see also United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 1897 (2024)
(discussing Bruen).
Parmenter submits that the district court erred by denying his constitutional claim
in reliance on Hatch, a pre -Bruen decision in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
10
concluded that section 624.714, subdivision 1a, was constitutional under a strict scrutiny
analysis.5
The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law that we review de novo.
State v. Fitch, 884 N.W.2d 367, 373 (Minn. 2016). But de novo review does not free us
from our obligation to follow applicable precedent. And the Minnesota Supreme Court, in
Hatch, specifically held that the statute Parmenter challenges was constitutional. 962
N.W.2d at 662.
In Gaal, we recently addressed whether another Minnesota statute which prohibits
the possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person who has been convicted of a crime
of violence, Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2) (2022), was
constitutional since the United States Supreme Court decided Bruen. 21 N.W.3d at 262-
265. There, we first considered whether State v. Craig, 826 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 2013),
existing Minnesota Supreme Court precedent that held that the statute was constitutional
prior to Bruen, remained good law. Id. at 264. We explained:
It is an elementary principle that this court is bound by the
opinions of the Minnesota Supreme Court on questions of both
state and federal law. But the United States Supreme Court is
the final authority concerning the interpretation of the United
States Constitution. Thus, an opinion of the United States
Supreme Court may overrule an opinion of the Minnesota
Supreme Court on an issue of federal constitutional law.

5 Parmenter also contends that, to the extent the district court denied the motion because it
was untimely, the district court erred because he challenged the constitutionality of the
statute. Because the district court denied Parmenter’s motion on the merits by relying on
Hatch, we do not address his timeliness argument.
11
Id. at 264-65 (quotations and citations omitted). We also observed that the federal circuits
were split in deciding whether their precedent that existed prior to Bruen remained valid.
Id. at 265. And we recognized the uniqueness of the question before this court compared
to our federal counterparts because we were asked to “determine the vitality of an opinion
of a superior court, not our own court.” Id.
We thus emphasized that “an opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court is a definitive
statement of the law of Minnesota, and that this court should not encroach on the supreme
court’s authority.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). And we reasoned that, “given the
lack of clarity and a federal circuit split, we see no reason to depart from our usual practice
of applying supreme court precedent and leaving to the supreme court ‘the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.’” Id. (quoting State v. Brist, 812 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn.
2012)). We therefore concluded that the existing precedent from the Minnesota Supreme
Court remained binding authority as to the constitutionality of Minnesota Statutes section
624.713, subdivision 1(2), until the supreme court instructed otherwise. Id.
That reasoning applies here as well.
6 Parmenter asks this court to remand his case
so that the district court can reassess the vitality of the supreme court’s decision in Hatch

6 We have recognized that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen changed the analysis for
determining whether statutes are constitutional under the Second Amendment. See
State v. Jones, 25 N.W.3d 732, 736 (Minn. App. 2025) (“To determine whether a
challenged law infringes on a person’s Second Amendment right, the United States
Supreme Court has declared that the inquiry must be ‘rooted in the Second Amendment’s
text, as informed by history.’” (quoting Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2127)). And this court has
applied that analysis to determine the constitutional validity of statutes that the Minnesota
Supreme Court has not already addressed. See id. at 735-38; see also Gaal, 21 N.W.3d at
268-71. But that is not the case before us here.

12
that section 624.714, subdivision 1a, is constitutional. But Hatch, like Craig, binds lower
Minnesota courts, including this one. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to
depart from our usual practice of leaving to the supreme court “the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.” Brist, 812 N.W.2d at 57 (quotation omitted). As a result,
we discern no error in the district court’s reliance on Hatch and denial of Parmenter’s
motion to challenge the constitutionality of Minnesota Statutes section 624.714,
subdivision 1a.7
III. Parmenter has forfeited the arguments in his pro se supplemental brief
on direct appeal.

Parmenter also filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he seeks relief. There, he
contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the prosecution engaged
in misconduct.

7 To persuade us otherwise, Parmenter also argues that the remand is necessary for the
parties to “develop the necessary factual record and legal arguments so that this Court and
ultimately the Minnesota Supreme Court has an adequate record to review the dis trict
court’s decision on appeal.” It is true that parties are not ordinarily permitted to seek
appellate review of issues that were not raised in, or considered by, the district court. See
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988); see also Roby v. State, 463 N.W.2d
580, 582 (Minn. 1988) . However, the supreme court may still “address an issue in the
interests of justice if addressing the issue will not work an unfair surprise on a party.”
Johnson v. State, 673 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn. 2004). And the supreme court is authorized
to request supplemental briefing on an issue that was not before the district court. See
State v. Thompson, 937 N.W.2d 418, 421-422 n.2 (Minn. 2020) (noting that the supreme
court could address an issue that was not raised before the district court when the parties
agreed on the relevant facts, only disputed an issue of law, and provided supplemental
briefing on that issue). We are therefore not persuaded that remand is necessary at this
stage given the clear direction from the supreme court in Hatch that section 624.714,
subdivision 1a, is constitutional.
13
When considering pro se arguments, several principles govern our review. Courts
have a duty to reasonably accommodate pro se litigants, so long as there is no prejudice to
the adverse party. Kasson State Bank v. Haugen, 410 N.W.2d 392, 395 (Minn. App. 1987).
“Although some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court has
repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as
attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115,
119 (Minn. App. 2001). Accordingly, claims in a pro se supplemental brief that are
unsupported by either arguments or citation to legal authority are forfeited unless
prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection. State v. Montano, 956 N.W.2d 643, 650-
51 (Minn. 2021).
Parmenter first claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
“Defense Counsel made several errors by not pursing Parmenter’s defenses and arguments
or by asking critical questions of [the arresting officer] during the Omnibus, at trial and not
getting [a second officer’s] body camera footage or calling [the second officer] as a
witness.” He further argues that “Defense also failed, forgot or chose not to pursue” a
specific line of questioning with the arresting officer “despite Parmenter’s wish to do so,”
and “did not address any of the other issues that Parmenter wanted presented and argued
at both the Omnibus and trial. ” Parmenter also asserts that the “Prosecution in this case
engaged in misconduct by not admitting the officers’ mistakes but instead covering them
up and manufacturing the case that he wanted to present instead of the facts that actually
occurred.”
14
But although Parmenter generally cites to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
686 (1984), he fails to set forth the legal standard to determine whether he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. Nor does he cite to any legal authority that would support
his argument that the prosecution engaged in misconduct. P armenter therefore failed to
adequately brief these issues, and prejudicial error is not obvious on mere inspection.
Accordingly, he has forfeited these arguments on direct appeal. See Montano, 956 N.W.2d
at 650-51. Because we conclude that Parmenter forfeited these claims on direct appeal, we
do not reach the merits of his arguments.
Affirmed.