State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0403

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lester Ray Wiley,
Appellant.

Filed February 23, 2026
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-24-3111

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Eva F. Wailes , Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Florey, Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
In this appeal from the judgment of conviction for second-degree burglary, appellant
challenges the district court’s decision to impose a 120-month prison sentence, an upward
durational departure up to the statutory maximum, based on appellant’s admission that he
was a “career offender” under Minnesota Statutes section 609.1095, subdivision 4 (2022).
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion when it relied on the career-offender
statute to depart from the presumptive sentence, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2024, Hopkins police officers were notified of a burglary in progress at
a Hopkins tobacco shop. Surveillance footage revealed a male suspect using a crowbar to
force entry through the front door. The suspect then forced his way into the display cases
and stole approximately $15,000 worth of merchandise. A license plate reader located near
the business captured footage of a vehicle appearing to case the business before the
burglary and leaving shortly after the burglary. Officers obtained a tracking warrant and
learned the vehicle was registered to appellant Lester Ray Wiley. Surveillance footage of
Wiley’s apartment building also showed Wiley returning home shortly after the burglary ,
wearing clothing consistent with the suspect from the store’s surveillance footage. Officers
arrested Wiley.
3
Wiley admitted to his involvement in the January 2024 burglary , as well as his
involvement in two other unrelated burglaries in Ramsey County.1 Wiley told investigators
that he kept the stolen merchandise in a storage unit and in his apartment. Wiley described
his storage unit as a “treasure trove” of stolen items. Officers conducted a search of
Wiley’s storage unit and recovered two large bags of stolen merchandise from the tobacco
shop, several cash tills, power tools, jewelry, wallets, and other stolen items from different
burglaries. Officers also conducted a search of Wiley’s apartment and recovered items
associated with the two Ramsey County burglaries. Respondent State of Minnesota
charged Wiley with second-degree burglary while possessing a tool to gain access to
money or property when entering the building, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
609.582, subdivision 2(a)(4) (2022).
At his plea hearing, Wiley entered a straight plea to second-degree burglary and
waived his constitutional right to a Blakely trial.2 Wiley also agreed that his past burglary
convictions were similar in nature and demonstrated a pattern of criminal activity. The
district court accepted Wiley’s plea. The district court also ordered a pre-sentence
investigation (PSI), which recommended a presumptive commitment to prison of 30
months.

1 In Ramsey County, Wiley was charged with second-degree burglary and third-degree
burglary. These cases are currently pending.

2 Under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004), a criminal defendant has the
right to a jury trial on aggravating facts in support of an upward sentencing departure. See
also State v. Shattuck, 689 N.W.2d 785, 786 (Minn. 2004) (applying Blakely in Minnesota).
4
The state sought an upward departure from the presumptive sentence to the statutory
maximum of 120 months, based on Wiley’s status as a career offender under Minnesota
Statutes section 609.1095, subdivision 4. Wiley filed a motion requesting a downward
dispositional departure based on the improvement of his mental health. Wiley also filed a
dispositional advisor memorandum, which described his background, family history,
mental-health history, employment, remorse, and his attitude moving forward.
At his sentencing hearing, Wiley’s counsel argued in support of the dispositional
departure, stating that he was particularly amenable to probation given the changes Wiley
had made in his life over the past year. Wiley’s counsel noted that Wiley had been seeking
treatment for his major depressive disorder and atypical schizophrenia, had maintained a
year of sobriety, and had begun rebuilding relationships with his family. Wiley also
expressed remorse and accountability for his actions. In response, the state argued that
Wiley’s prior burglary convictions did not demonstrate a particular amenability to
probation.
After hearing testimony, the district court imposed a 120-month executed sentence,
stating:
I believe that Mr. Wiley has certainly met the standard
in terms of an upward departure pursuant to his admission as a
career offender. I think this is not the first time. I would have
to look back in my notes, but I believe this is the fourth or fifth
time that there’s been an admission of him being a career
offender.
He is on -- had an ongoing offense of a pattern of
criminal activity, and he really -- these prior sentences have not
rehabilitated him in a way in which the Court can find comfort
that we would be able to have Mr. Wiley exist within the
general community and not violate the laws.
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His prior incarcerations didn’t change him so as to allow
him to engage and connect and work within society without
committing other crimes. He’s admitted to being a career
offender. He’s demonstrated a failure of rehabilitation. The
Court finds no mitigating factors to justify dispositional
departure in this case.
I think it’s commendable of the work that he ’s been
doing in 2024. But I don’t believe, based upon the information
before the Court, that it rises to the level of proving Mr. Wiley
to be particularly amenable to probation, as the Court best
understands the law.
So at this juncture, I will find and sentence Mr. Wiley
to 120 months in the Department of Corrections with credit for
18 days. This is a durational departure, aggravated, based upon
that career offender status.

Wiley appeals.

DECISION
The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a statutory-
maximum 120-month prison sentence based on the career -offender statute,
Minnesota Statutes section 609.1095, subdivision 4.

We review a district court’s decision to depart from the presumptive sentencing
guidelines for an abuse of discretion. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014).
“If the reasons given for an upward departure are legally permissible and factually
supported in the record, the departure will be affirmed.” State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d
596, 601 (Minn. 2009). Conversely, “if the district court’s reasons for departure are
improper or inadequate, the departure will be reversed.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines “prescrib[e] a sentence or range of sentences
that is presumed to be appropriate.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308 (quotation omitted).
“Because the [sentencing] guidelines’ goal is to create uniformity in sentencing, departures
are justified only in exceptional cases.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Minn.
6
2016). The sentencing guidelines require the district court to impose the presumptive
sentence “unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to
support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2022). “Substantial and compelling
circumstances are those circumstances that make the facts of a particular case different
from a typical case.” State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. App. 2009).
“Minnesota Statutes section 609.1095, subd ivision 4, states that a court ‘may
impose an aggravated durational departure from the presumptive sentence up to the
statutory maximum’ when the defendant qualifies as a [career] offender.” Vickla v. State,
793 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. 2011). “To qualify as a [career] offender, the defendant must
have five or more prior felony convictions and the present offense must be a felony that
was committed as part of a pattern of criminal conduct.” Id. “The statute does not limit
the court’s discretion and does not require any additional findings before sentencing a
defendant to the statutory maximum.” Id. “[T]he Sentencing Guidelines provide that a
defendant’s status as a ‘career offender’ under section 609.1095, subdivision 4, is a
sufficient reason to depart from the pres umptive sentence.” Id. “But a court departing
under the [career] offender statute must provide written reasons that specify that the
requirements of the statute have been met.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Before imposing an upward durational departure, the district court reviewed the
dispositional advisor’s report, the PSI report, and the treatment court’s triage investigative
report. In explaining its decision, the district court emphasized Wiley’s extensive criminal
history, describing it as “vast” and noting that he had engaged in similar conduct for more
than 40 years. The district court further noted that, in light of the scope and persistence of
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that history, Wiley’s conduct was “significantly more serious.” The district court also
relied on Wiley’s prior admissions that he is a career offender, observing that “this is the
fourth or fifth time that there’s been an admission of [Wiley] being a career offender.”
Based on this, the district court imposed an aggravated sentence under the career-offender
statute, reasoning that “[Wiley’s] prior incarcerations didn’t change him so as to allow him
to engage and connect and work within society without committing other crimes. He’s
admitted to being a career offender. He’s demonstrated a failure of rehabilitation.”
The record supports the district court’s findings. Wiley has 11 prior felony
convictions dating back to 1983. Eight of those convictions involved burglary-related
offenses. The treatment court’s triage report described Wiley as a sophisticated and prolific
offender, emphasizing that his criminal conduct extended over more than 40 years. During
his plea hearing, Wiley agreed that he had previously admitted to being a career offender
on at least two occasions. He also agreed that his prior convictions demonstrated a pattern
of criminal activity, and that his past burglary convictions were similar in nature.
Wiley first argues that the sentence imposed by the district court is excessive because
the underlying conviction is “not based on any aggravated offense conduct.” Wiley contends
that the district court abused its discretion by imposing “a quadruple aggravated durational
departure” based on Wiley’s criminal history. We are not persuaded.
Under section 609.1095, subdivision 4, the district court may impose a sentence up
to the statutory maximum without a finding of severe aggravating circumstances if the
defendant qualifies as a career offender. See Vickla, 793 N.W.2d at 269 (“The [career-
offender] statute does not limit the court’s discretion and does not require any additional
8
findings before sentencing a defendant to the statutory maximum.”). Even if section
609.1095, subdivision 4, did require a finding of aggravating circumstances, Wiley’s status
as a career offender is an aggravating factor that the district court considered. See Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.b.9 (stating that an offender being sentenced as a “career offender”
is an aggravating factor that may be used for departure). Wiley’s status as a career offender
gave the district court sufficient reason to depart from the presumptive sentence.
Accordingly, because the district court’s reason for an upward departure was permissible
and supported by the record, we discern no abuse of discretion.
Next, Wiley contends that even if an upward departure is warranted based on his
status as a career offender, a sentence of four times the presumptive sentence was excessive
and unreasonable, in part, because the district court made no findings of severe aggravating
circumstances in the underlying second-degree burglary offense.
Wiley points to the supreme court’s decision in Neal v. State, 658 N.W.2d 536, 547
(Minn. 2003), to support the contention that a quadruple durational departure from the
presumptive sentence, based on his status as a career offender, is excessive and
unreasonable.
In Neal, the appellant received a 480-month sentence for kidnapping —a departure
more than four times the presumptive sentence. Id.at 540. The district court imposed the
upward durational departure under the dangerous-offender statute, Minnesota Statutes
section 609.1095, subdivision 2 (2002), which permits such a departure when an offender
has two or more prior convictions for violent crimes and the district court determines that
the offender is a danger to public safety. Id. at 541. After comparing Neal’s sentence to
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departures imposed in other kidnapping cases, the supreme court concluded that the
sentence was disproportionate to the gravity of the offense and was therefore unreasonable
and excessive. Id. at 547.
Wiley argues that, as in Neal, a sentence approximately four times the presumptive
sentence is disproportionate to his burglary conviction. We may consider sentences
imposed in comparable departure cases to determine whether a sentence is “unjustifiably
disparate.” Vickla, 793 N.W.2d at 270. “But for a sentence to be comparable, the
sentencing departure must be based upon the same or similar reasons.” Id.
Wiley’s reliance on Neal is misplaced. Unlike Neal, Wiley’s upward durational
departure was imposed under the career -offender statute, not the dangerous- offender
statute. See Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd s. 2, 4. Because the departures are based on
different statutory grounds, Neal does not provide a meaningful comparison. Furthermore,
even if we were to compare Wiley’s sentence to other departure cases, sentences imposed
under the career-offender statute similar to Wiley’s have been upheld as reasonable. See
Vickla, 793 N.W.2d at 272 (affirming statutory-maximum 240-month sentence for forgery
under the career-offender statute); State v. Holt, No. A23-1063, 2024 WL 2813903, at *2
(Minn. App. June 3, 2024) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by
imposing aggravated durational departure for felony domestic assault under the career -
offender statute); State v. Clemons, No. A16-1083, 2017 WL 1833246, at *3 (Minn. App.
May 8, 2017), rev. denied (Minn. July 18, 2017) (affirming departure under career-offender
statute); State v. Clarke, No. A13-0801, 2014 WL 1875779, at *3- 4 (Minn. App. May 12,
10
2014) (concluding that 258-month sentence imposed under career -offender statute was
within district court’s discretion).3
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a statutory-
maximum 120-month prison sentence based on the career-offender statute.
Affirmed.

3 We cite these nonprecedential opinions as persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).