In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0406

In re the Marriage of:

Amanda Joy LeMont, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Travis Jerome LeMont,
Appellant.

Filed December 29, 2025
Affirmed in part and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-FA-23-417

Cody D. Schmidt, Gammello-Pearson, PLLC, Baxter, Minnesota (for respondent)

Lori L. Athmann, Jovanovich, Dege & Athmann, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and
Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this appeal from a judgment and decree of dissolution (J&D), appellant argues
that the district court: (1) made clearly erroneous findings and improper rulings regarding
child support; (2) made clearly erroneous findings in its division of the marital estate,
leading to an incorrect equalization payment; (3) erroneously ordered him to be responsible
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for some of the children’s extracurricular expenses and a portion of their future vehicle
expenses; and (4) did not make the necessary findings regarding the statutory factors in
allocating the income-tax dependency exemption to respondent.
Because appellant has not demonstrated that the district court committed reversible
error in relation to division of the parties’ 2022 tax liability, valuation of his business tools,
and allocation of the income-tax dependency exemptions, we affirm in part. However,
because insufficient factual findings exist to afford meaningful review on all other issues
raised by appellant, we also remand.
FACTS
Appellant Travis Jerome LeMont (Father) and respondent Amanda Joy LeMont
(Mother) married in April 2017 and together have two minor children. Shortly after the
parties’ separation, Mother filed a dissolution petition in March 2023.
The parties stipulated to joint physical custody and joint legal custody. They
additionally agreed to a parenting schedule in which the children would primarily live with
Mother, and Father would have overnight parenting time every other weekend and evening
parenting time each Wednesday. The agreement established a holiday parenting schedule
and included a provision that each parent would receive three nonconsecutive vacation
weeks each year.
The district court held a one-day court trial in June 2024 to address the remaining
financial and property issues. Following the trial, the district court entered a J&D which
incorporated the parties’ stipulation regarding custody and parenting time. We next
highlight the district court’s findings and conclusions relevant to the issues in this appeal.
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Child Support
In calculating child support, the district court first made findings as to the parties’
incomes. Father is a self-employed owner of a flooring business. Mother argued that
Father’s annual gross income should be calculated at $114,118 based on his 2022 tax
return. Father countered that his 2022 income was atypical due to a “large, lucrative
project” secured by his business and argued that his income should be more closely aligned
with his 2023 tax return at $97,002. The district court found that “averaging the disputed
amounts” was appropriate and calculated Father’s annual gross income as $127,365.48, or
$10,613.79 per month.
Regarding Mother’s income, the district court noted that Mother is a licensed
practical nurse working 32 hours per week at a $24.20 hourly rate and, despite Father’s
arguments to the contrary, found that she is not voluntarily underemployed and accordingly
declined to impute additional income to her. It found Mother’s gross monthly income to
be $3,353.
Based on these incomes, the district court found that Father’s share of parental
income for child support (PICS) is 76% and that Mother’s share is 24%. It also found that,
for the child-support calculation, Mother has 287 annual overnights, and Father has 78
annual overnights. From these findings, the district court required that Father pay $1,525
in monthly basic support and $200 in monthly medical support for the parties’ children.
The district court also obligated Father to pay $32,025 in retroactive support. To secure
this child-support obligation, the district court required that Father obtain a life-insurance
policy providing a death benefit of $275,000.
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Division of Marital Estate and Equalization Payment
Pertinent to the issues on appeal, the district court also ordered that each party be
individually responsible for any tax liabilities they individually incurred in 2022 and 2023.
The district court additionally valued Father’s work tools at $10,000.
In calculating the equalization payment, the district court found that the gross
amount Mother owed Father was $36,568.41. Regarding the amount Father owed Mother,
the district court found that Father is responsible for reimbursing Mother $18,339.06 for
the children’s activity fees, his PICS portion of the children’s medical expenses, and
Mother’s medical and dental insurance premiums. The district court explained that this
amount includes $5,380.68 that Father owes Mother as part of a personal-property
settlement. When adding Father’s $32,025 in retroactive child support, the district court
calculated that the gross amount Father owes Mother was $50,364.06. Offsetting this
amount by the $36,568.41 that Mother owes Father, the district court found that the net
amount Father owed Mother was a final equalization payment of $13,795.65.
Extracurricular and Children Vehicle Expenses
In allocating extracurricular expenses, the J&D required that Father be solely
responsible for costs of extracurricular activities in which the children have been
historically involved and that the parties should divide expenses associated with other
extracurricular activities according to the PICS percentages.
The J&D additionally provided that, when a minor child obtains a driver’s license,
the parties shall split the cost of acquiring a vehicle and its insurance according to the PICS
percentages, up to $10,000.
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Income-Tax Dependency Exemption
The J&D included a provision allowing Mother to claim both children on her state
and federal income returns. The district court explained that “in review of the financial
resources of each party, . . . [Mother’s] ability to provide for the needs of the children
would be negatively impacted should she not receive the dependency exemption.” The
district court added that, in reaching this conclusion, it “considered [Mother’s] income
compared to [Father’s], [Mother’s] reasonable monthly expenses, and that [Mother] has
the children more than 75% of the overnights.” Father filed a motion for amended findings
which, for purposes of the issues on appeal, the district court denied.
Father appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court’s child-support order must be remanded for additional
findings.

In challenging the child-support award, Father argues that the district court made a
mathematical error in calculating his income, erroneously failed to impute additional
income to Mother, and accordingly adopted an erroneous PICS percentage and awarded an
inaccurate amount of retroactive support. He relatedly challenges the requirement that he
obtain life insurance to secure this support obligation.
A district court has broad discretion to provide for the support of the parties’
children. Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984). An abuse of discretion occurs
when a district court sets support in a manner that is against logic and the facts on the
record, or it misapplies the law. See id. (addressing the setting of support in manner that
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is against logic and facts on the record); Sefkow v. Sefkow , 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.
App. 1988) (addressing an improper application of law). “A court’s determination of
income must be based in fact and will stand unless clearly erroneous.” Newstrand v. Arend,
869 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15,
2015).
Additionally, “[p]articularized findings are necessary to facilitate appellate review,
to ensure that prescribed standards are utilized by the [district] court, and to satisfy the
parties that an important question is fairly considered and decided by the [district] court.”
Reyes v. Schmidt, 403 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Minn. App. 1987) (quotation omitted); see also
In re Civ. Commitment of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 807, 809, 813 (Minn. App. 2014)
(reversing and remanding a district court’s grant of a petition for civil commitment because
the district court failed to make “findings of fact that are sufficiently particular to permit
meaningful appellate review”).
Minn. Stat. § 518A.34 (2024) addresses calculation of child-support obligations. In
making this calculation, a district court first calculates the obligor’s basic-support
obligation by determining each parent’s gross income; calculating each parents’ PICS and
corresponding PICS percentages; determining the combined basic-support obligation; and
applying a parenting-expense adjustment formula to calculate the obligor’s basic-support
obligation. Id. (b)(1)-(6). A district court separately computes child-ca re support and
medical-support obligations and then combines these calculations with the basic-support
obligation to calculate a presumptive child-support obligation. Id. (a), (h). “[C]ertain
adjustments or credits may apply based on whether the parents have nonjoint children and
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each parent’s amount of parenting time.” Haefele v. Haefele, 837 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn.
2013); accord Minn. Stat. §§ 518A.34(c), .36 (2024). A district court may deviate from
the presumptive child-support obligation as provided in Minn. Stat. § 518A.43 (2024).
Calculation of Father’s Income
As described above, Mother argued that Father’s annual gross income is $114,118
and Father argued that his annual income should be $97,002. In calculating the parties’
income, the district court found “that averaging the disputed amounts is warranted under
the circumstances” and, based on the averaging, found Father’s monthly gross income to
be $10,613.79 and annual gross income to be $127,365.48. The district court, however,
does not explain what it meant by the phrase “disputed amounts.” If the district court meant
“disputed amounts” to refer to the incomes identified in the district court’s findings as
noted above, an average of these amounts would have resulted in an income of $105,560,
an amount substantially less than the district court’s calculation of $127,365.48. Nor are
we otherwise able to discern how the district court reached its finding of Father’s income.
We therefore conclude that there are insufficient findings to permit appellate review
of the district court’s calculation of Father’s income and accordingly remand for additional
findings. See Reyes, 403 N.W.2d at 293.
Calculation of Mother’s Income
Father relatedly challenges the district court’s finding of Mother’s gross income.
He argues that Mother is not employed full time because she works 32 hours per week. He
contends that, based on this fact, the district court should have imputed additional income
to Mother.
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Father relies on Minn. Stat. § 518A.32, subd. 1 (2024), which provides:
If a parent is voluntarily unemployed, underemployed, or
employed on a less than full-time basis, . . . child support must
be calculated based on a determination of potential income.
For purposes of this determination, it is rebuttably presumed
that a parent can be gainfully employed on a full-time basis.
As used in this section, “full time” means 40 hours of work in
a week except in those industries, trades, or professions in
which most employers, due to custom, practice, or agreement,
use a normal work week of more or less than 40 hours in a
week.

(Emphasis added.)

In calculating Mother’s income, the district court explained that, after considering
the parties’ testimony and evidence, Mother “is not voluntarily underemployed and that a
32-hour work week is typical in [Mother’s] industry.” Mother’s trial testimony supports
this explanation. Notedly, she testified that 32 hours per week is considered full time in
her department, that working less than 40 hours per week is similarly common in her
department, and her hours entitle her to full-time benefits. By relying on Mother’s
testimony, the district court made an implicit credibility finding, and appellate courts defer
to a district court’s credibility findings. Lewis v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 737 N.W.2d 591,
594 (Minn. App. 2007). Because the record supports the district court’s finding that a
32-hour work week is typical in Mother’s industry, we discern no error in the district
court’s calculation of Mother’s income. See In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d
214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (explaining that a finding is clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly
contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a
whole” (quotation omitted)).
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Calculation of Parenting Time
Father further argues that the district court improperly calculated the number of
overnights in determining the parenting-time expense adjustment. The district court found
that, for purposes of calculating child support, Mother has 287 annual overnights while
Father has 78 annual overnights. Father contends that this figure improperly excludes his
parenting time for three nonconsecutive weeks of vacation each year and at least three
holiday/non-school-day overnights.
Under the calculation of the parenting-expense adjustment, the amount of parenting
time impacts a parent’s support obligation. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.36, subd. 2. “[T]he
percentage of parenting time means the percentage of time a child is scheduled to spend
with the parent during a calendar year according to a court order averaged over a two-year
period.” Id., subd. 1(a). In determining this percentage, a district court may calculate “the
number of overnights or overnight equivalents that a parent spends with a child pursuant
to a court order.” Id.
It is unclear from the J&D how the district court arrived at its calculation that Father
has 78 annual overnights with the children given that this number only appears to cover
Father’s school-year, weekend-overnight parenting time but does not consider Father’s
summer parenting time or certain holiday parenting time for the entire year. Because we
are unable to discern how the district court arrived at this number, we remand for additional
findings regarding the district court’s calculation of Father’s parenting time. See Reyes ,
403 N.W.2d at 293.

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Life Insurance
Father challenges the district court’s requirement that he obtain a life-insurance
policy to secure his support obligation, arguing that Mother made no request for such a
policy outside her proposed J&D and that the district court made no findings about his
ability to secure the policy. Whether to require a child-support obligor to provide life
insurance on the obligor’s life to insure his or her support obligation is discretionary with
the district court. Hunley v. Hunley, 757 N.W.2d 898, 900-01 (Minn. App. 2008).
Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518A.71 (2024), “[i]n all cases when . . . support payments
are ordered, the court may require sufficient security to be given for the payment of” these
expenses. See Hunley , 757 N.W.2d at 900 (“Minnesota law permits district courts to
impose life insurance as security for child support payments because child support does
not end with the obligor’s death.”). In Hunley, this court affirmed a district court’s
requirement that the child-support obligor—the mother—obtain a life -insurance policy as
security for child support. Id. at 901-02. In doing so, this court explained that the obligor
made significantly more money than the obligee and that, “if tragedy befell her, the welfare
of her children would be seriously impacted.” Id. at 901. Likewise, here, the district court
explained that “[s]o long as a child of the parties remains a minor, [Father] shall name
[Mother], or a trust for the benefit of the children, as a beneficiary of a life-insurance policy
on [his] life, providing a net death benefit of $275,000.” The district court’s decision to
require that Father obtain life insurance was, therefore, within its discretion. However,
because the J&D made insufficient findings underlying the basis for arriving at this
amount, we remand for additional findings. We note that, because we are separately
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remanding for additional findings regarding child support which may result in a different
child-support amount, any changes to the child-support award may impact the amount of
the life-insurance policy.
II. The district court did not clearly err in allocating the parties’ 2022 income-tax
liabilities and in valuing Father’s tools, but we remand for additional findings
on the calculation of the equalization payment.

Father challenges the division of the marital estate, arguing that the district court
improperly ordered each party to be individually responsible for tax liabilities incurred in
2022 and erroneously valued his business tools. He additionally contests the district court’s
calculation of the equalization payment. We address each in turn.
In a dissolution proceeding, a district court “shall make a just and equitable division
of the marital property of the parties without regard to marital misconduct, after making
findings regarding the division of the property.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2024). A
district court “need not make an equal division of the property.” Brockman v. Brockman,
373 N.W.2d 664, 665 (Minn. App. 1985). “A [district] court has broad discretion in
evaluating and dividing property in a marital dissolution and will not be overturned except
for abuse of discretion. [Appellate court s] will affirm the [district] court’s division of
property if it had an acceptable basis in fact and principle even though [the reviewing court]
might have taken a different approach.” Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn.
2002) (citation omitted).
2022 Income-Tax Liabilities
The parties filed separate income-tax returns for the years 2022 and 2023 although
they were still married. Father contests the provision in the J&D that requires the parties
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to be individually responsible for tax liabilities incurred in the 2022 tax year. He does not,
however, contest the same provision for the 2023 tax year.
The relevant provision in the J&D states that “[e]ach party shall be individually
responsible for any tax liabilities incurred from tax years 2022 and 23.” In challenging this
provision, Father argues that, because the family had a practice of not paying income taxes
until the tax returns were prepared and the family resided as a single unit until February 1,
2023, the parties equally benefited from not paying taxes throughout the year by
maximizing their disposable income. Therefore, Father maintains, it was improper to
require him to be responsible for his individual tax liabilities totaling $26,596 and requiring
that Mother only be responsible for her $5,813 in tax liabilities.
Father principally relies on Chamberlain v. Chamberlain in support of his argument.
615 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. App. 2000). In Chamberlain, we affirmed a provision in a J&D
that required the ex-wife to share in her divorced husband’s income -tax liability, noting
that: the parties typically paid taxes one or two years late; the ex-wife refused to file joint
tax returns, which would have decreased collective tax liability; and the ex- husband’s
“failure to pay taxes timely freed up cash that both parties spent.” Id. at 414. Pointing to
Chamberlain, Father argues that the parties similarly benefited from not paying taxes
during the 2022 calendar year when they resided as a family unit and that Mother refused
to file joint tax returns in 2022, which would have decreased their collective tax liability.
We are unpersuaded.
Chamberlain addressed whether the district court acted within its discretion by
requiring the ex -wife to pay a portion of the ex -husband’s tax liabilities. Id. From
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Chamberlain, it does not follow that the district court necessarily abuses its discretion in
coming to a contrary conclusion. Given the district court’s significant discretion in
dividing the marital estate, it acted within its discretion by requiring the parties to be
responsible for their individual 2022 tax liabilities.
Business Tools
Father, in challenging the district court’s valuation of his business tools at $10,000,
as Mother requested, argues that this amount improperly included a $3,000 floor sander
“which he undisputedly did not own.” We review this factual finding for clear error.
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013).
In valuing the tools, the district court referenced testimony from Mother’s father,
T.V., who indicated that Father told him that he owns all of his tools. By awarding the
value of $10,000 which Mother requested, the district court made an implicit credibility
determination to which appellate courts defer. Lewis, 737 N.W.2d at 594. Although T.V.
did not unequivocally state that Father owned every tool, it is not clearly erroneous for the
district court to have interpreted the testimony accordingly. The district court therefore did
not clearly err by valuing Father’s tools at $10,000.
Equalization Payment
In calculating the final equalization payment of $13,795.65, the district court found
that Father is responsible for $18,339.06 in expense reimbursements related to the minor
children’s activity fees, medical expenses, and insurance premiums. Father contests this
finding, arguing that there is no evidentiary support for this amount because Mother only
requested, and provided evidence for, expenses totaling $8,429.27. The district court
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appeared to include a $5,380.68 personal-property settlement in this calculation, and Father
relatedly contends that the record lacks evidence of such an agreement.
The specific provision challenged by Father in the J&D states that Father “is
responsible for $18,339.06 in expense reimbursements for the minor children’s activity
fees, medical bills for the minor children, his 76% PICS portion for medical expenses and
optical bills for the minor children, and [Father’s] medical and dental insurance premiums
to [Mother].”1 Although the district court explained the types of expenses underlying the
calculation, it does not fully explain how it arrived at $18,339.06 as the amount of the
expense reimbursement. As Father notes, Mother requested that Father pay her
“$8,429.27 . . . for medical bills and optical bills for the children and [Father], medical and
dental premiums for [Father], and activity fees of the children.” Our review of the record
does not reveal an agreement between the parties that Father pay Mother $5,380.68 in a
personal-property settlement. Because we are unable to discern the district court’s basis
for finding that Father is responsible for at least part of the $18,339.06 in expense
reimbursements, we conclude that there is insufficient information to review this finding
and accordingly remand for additional findings. See Reyes, 403 N.W.2d at 293.

1 We note that any changes to the PICS percentages on remand would necessarily impact
these expenses to the extent they are based on PICS percentages.
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III. Remand is necessary for additional findings on the allocation of the children’s
extracurricular expenses and prospective vehicle expenses.

Extracurricular Expenses
Father challenges a provision of the J&D that provides that he shall be solely
responsible for the costs of extracurricular activities in which the children have historically
participated. The J&D included the following conclusion of law:
[Father] shall be solely responsible for the cost of
extracurricular activities and associated equipment that the
children have been historically involved in, including, but not
limited to: bowling, baseball, dance, and basketball. For all
new types of activities or sports, the parties shall divide the cost
according to the PICS. All expenses over $250 shall be agreed
upon in writing before a party is to assume liability for the
costs.

Father argues that expenses for extracurricular activities fall under the definition of child
support such that, when ordering an additional amount for such expenses, the district court
imposed an upward deviation of child support and failed to make findings to support this
upward deviation.
Child support refers to payment “for basic support, child care support, and medical
support.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 20 (2024). Basic support, in turn, includes
expenses related to “a child’s housing, food, clothing, transportation, and education costs,
and other expenses relating to the child’s care.” Id., subd. 4 (2024). District courts must
follow the procedures set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518A.34 in calculating the presumptive
child-support obligation.
To deviate from a presumptive child- support obligation, district courts must
consider the eight factors set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518A.43, subd. 1. These factors are
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(1) the parties’ financial circumstances, (2) the extraordinary needs of the children, (3) the
standard of living the child would enjoy if the parents were living together, (4) “whether
the child[ren] reside[] in a foreign country for more than one year” with a materially
different cost of living, (5) the party receiving the tax exemption and corresponding
benefits, (6) the parties’ debts, (7) the obligor’s total payments as they relate to
wage-garnishment limitations, (8) and impact on a reunification plan in cases involving
court-ordered out-of-home placement. Minn. Stat. § 518A.43, subd. 1.
The district court made no finding that it was intending Father’s obligation to pay
for extracurricular activities to be an upward deviation from the child-support guidelines.
And, assuming that the district court so intended, the J&D fails to demonstrate a complete
analysis of the statutory factors. Though the district court found that Mother could not
afford these expenses, it did not make specific findings that Father can afford them as is
required under factor one. And the district court made no findings as to the other relevant
factors (the record suggests that factors four, seven, and eight are inapplicable). We
therefore remand for additional findings on this issue. See Reyes, 403 N.W.2d at 293.
Vehicle Expenses for Children
Father additionally challenges the following provision of the J&D: “When a minor
child obtains their driver’s license, the parties shall split the cost, up to $10,000, of the
child’s vehicle and insurance according to the PICS.” He argues that Mother made no
request for this provision and there was no evidence presented for this provision at trial.
The district court made no findings explaining the basis for the district court’s allocation
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of vehicle expenses and our review of the record confirms an absence of any evidence to
support this finding. We therefore remand for additional findings. See id.
IV. The district court acted within its discretion when it allocated the income-tax
dependency exemption to Mother.

Father challenges the allocation of the income-tax dependency exemption to
Mother, arguing that the district court failed to make findings on the required statutory
factors.
We review a district court’s allocation of an income-tax dependency exemption for
an abuse of discretion. See Ludwigson v. Ludwigson, 642 N.W.2d 441, 449 (Minn. App.
2002) (“The allocation of federal-tax exemptions is within the [district] court’s
discretion.”). In allocating a tax exemption, a district court “shall consider . . . (1) the
financial resources of each party; (2) if not awarding the dependency exemption negatively
impacts a parent’s ability to provide for the needs of the child; (3) if only one party or both
parties would receive a tax benefit from the dependency exemption; and (4) the impact of
the dependent exemption on either party’s ability to claim” certain federal tax credits or
subsidies. Minn. Stat. § 518A.38, subd. 7 (2024).
Contrary to Father’s argument, the district court considered the relevant factors. In
its J&D findings, the district court explained, “in review of the financial resources of each
party, that [Mother’s] ability to provide for the needs of the child would be negatively
impacted should she not receive the dependency exemption.” The district court added that,
“[i]n reaching this conclusion, the Court considered [Mother’s] income compared to
[Father’s], [her] reasonable monthly expenses, and that [Mother] has the children more
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than 75% of the overnights.” This explanation demonstrates that the district court
considered the parties’ financial resources, Mother’s ability to provide for the children’s
needs without the exemption, and that only Mother would receive this exemption. As to
factor four, regarding which the district court made no findings, Father does not claim, nor
does the record indicate, that the statutorily enumerated tax subsidies are relevant to the
income-tax dependency exemption. We therefore affirm the district court’s allocation of
the income-tax dependency exemption to Mother. Our decision does not preclude the
parties from addressing this issue upon a showing of a substantial change in these factors
as a result of other issues for which we have ordered a remand.
The district court maintains its discretion upon remand whether to rely on the
existing record or reopen the record. Also, to the extent the findings of fact the district
court makes on remand require or allow alteration of its other decisions, it shall have the
authority to make whatever adjustments to those other decisions it deems equitable. To
the extent it, on remand, adjusts its other decisions, it shall adequately explain those
adjustments.
Affirmed in part and remanded.