Nicole Blissenbach, Commissioner, Department of Labor and Industry, State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0445

Nicole Blissenbach, Commissioner,
Department of Labor and Industry,
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Quotable Kids Pediatric Therapy Clinic, PLLP, et al.,
Relators.

Filed December 8, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Connolly, Judge

Occupational Safety & Health Review Board
File No. OAH 22-1901-38929

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Kevin Jonassen, Scott Grosskreutz, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Janet M. Dorr, Erin M. Edgerton Hall, Frederikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for relators)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Bond,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Relators challenge a decision by the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health
Review Board (the Board) that dismissed their appeal. Relators assert that the Board erred
by determining that it does not have authority to hear appeals from administrative-law
2
judge (ALJ) decisions related to alleged retaliation under Minnesota Statutes
section 182.669 (2024). The Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (the
Department) (respondent) agrees that the Board erred . Because the Board is statutorily
required to hear the appeal, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
Quotable Kids Pediatric Therapy Clinic was a children’s therapy clinic business in
Minnesota and North Dakota. The clinic was owned by Andrea Volk (collectively with
Quotable Kids, relators). Dr. Rene Mooney worked as a psychologist for Quotable Kids
beginning in January 2020.
At the start of the COVID -19 pandemic, Quotable Kids permitted employees to
work remotely. When employees were informed that they were expected to return to in -
person work beginning in early May of 2020, Dr. Mooney expressed concerns. Following
a conversation with relator Volk and the clinic’s office manager, Dr. Mooney was
furloughed. During the furlough, Dr. Mooney took administrative steps toward
establishing her own practice.
Dr. Mooney was recalled from furlough with a return date of June 9, 2020.
Dr. Mooney again expressed concerns about a return to in-person work. It was also during
this time that relator Volk became aware of Dr. Mooney’s steps to establish her own
practice. Dr. Mooney was terminated on June 8, 2020.
Dr. Mooney filed a discrimination complaint with the Department and a contested -
case hearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) from January 30 to
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February 1, 2024.1 Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a final decision concluding that
Dr. Mooney was terminated in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 182.654 (2024).
The ALJ found Dr. Mooney was entitled to back pay and compensatory damages. The
ALJ noted in her decision that relators could appeal the decision to the Board.
Relators appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board. The Board granted the appeal
in August 2024 and scheduled oral argument for December 2024. In November 2024, after
both parties had submit ted briefing to the Board, the Board removed the matter from the
schedule. The Board directed the parties to submit memorand a on the issue of whether it
had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Both parties agreed that the Board was statutorily
required to hear the appeal.
In February 202 5, the Board concluded that it did not have jurisdiction and
dismissed the appeal. The Board determined that it could only hear appeals under
Minnesota Statutes section 182.661 (2024), related to citations and penalties, but that
matters under Minnesota Statutes section 182.669, related to discrimination, were outside
the Board’s authority.
Relators appealed. Respondent again agrees with relators’ position.
DECISION
Relators challenge the Board’s decision to dismiss an appeal from the ALJ ’s
decision concluding that relators discharged Dr. Mooney in violation of the Minnesota

1 Effective August 1, 2025, the legislature changed the name of the Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH) to the Court of Administrative Hearings. See 2025 Minn.
Laws ch. 39, art. 2, § 17 (amending Minn. Stat. § 14.48, subd. 1 (2024)). But the office’s
title was still OAH at the time of this decision.
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Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973. Minn. Stat. §§ 182.65-.679 (2024). Relators
argue that the Board erred by determining that it does not have statutory authority to hear
appeals from an ALJ’s decision under Minnesota Statutes section 182.669.
To resolve this dispute, we must determine the meaning of Minnesota Statutes
section 182.669. “When a decision turns on the meaning of words in a statute or regulation,
a legal question is presented. In considering such questions of law, reviewing courts are
not bound by the decision of the agency and need not defer to agency expertise.” St. Otto’s
Home v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs. , 437 N.W.2d 35, 39 -40 (Minn. 1989) (citations
omitted). The interpretation of a statute is a matter we review de novo. Nelson v. Nelson,
866 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Minn. 2015).
Our goal when interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislature ’s
intent. Walsh v. State, 975 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Minn. 2022); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16
(2024) (describing the court ’s role in interpreting statutes). To do so, we first consider
whether the language of the statute is plain. Walsh, 975 N.W.2d at 122. Statutory language
is plain when it is subject to only one reasonable interpretation, in which case we apply
that interpretation. Id. When determining whether a statute ’s language is plain, we read
the statute as a whole, giv ing effect to all its provisions, and avoid conflicting
interpretations. Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl , 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000).
Our analysis may include surrounding sections. Cent. Hous. Assocs., LP v. Olson , 929
N.W.2d 398, 402 (Minn. 2019). This is particularly appropriate when the statute in
question is part of a set of laws that forms a “coherent legislative policy.” State by Smart
Growth Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, 954 N.W.2d 584, 591 (Minn. 2021) (quotation
5
omitted); see also Olson, 929 N.W.2d at 402 (“Sometimes the operation of a statutory
provision only becomes clear when it is read in conjunction with the rest of the legislative
act of which it is a part.” (quotation omitted)). We discern the plain meaning of the statute
by reading it “in harmony” with the other components of the policy. Smart Growth
Minneapolis, 954 N.W.2d at 591; see also City of St. Paul v. Eldredge , 800 N.W.2d 643,
648 (Minn. 2011) (stating “we read the statute as a whole and turn to statutes relating to
the same subject in order that we may avoid conflicting interpretations and give effect to
all statutory provisions”).
When the statutory language in question is plain, we apply that interpretation.
Walsh, 975 N.W.2d at 122. If the statutory language is ambiguous —meaning susceptible
to more than one reasonable interpretation—we ascertain legislative intent by considering
canons of statutory construction and legislative history. Spann v. Minneapolis City
Council, 979 N.W.2d 66, 73 (Minn. 2022); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16.
I. The Board’s statutory authority to hear appeals from an ALJ under
Minn. Stat. § 182.669.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973 (the Act) was established with the
goal of preventing injuries and illnesses in the workplace and encompasses all of Minnesota
Statutes chapter 182. Minn. Stat. § 182.65, subd. 2(a) (2024). The Act protects employees
from discrimination after exercising any of their rights related to workplace safety and
health under the Act. Minn. Stat. § 182.669. If an ALJ “finds that an employee has been
discharged or otherwise discriminated against b y any person because the employee has
6
exercised any right authorized under [the Act],” the ALJ may order that the employee is
entitled to backpay, compensatory damages, and other appropriate relief. Id.
The Act also created the Board. Minn. Stat. § 182.664 (2024). The Act provides
that the Board “ shall review and decide appeals from final decisions and orders of the
commissioner, including decisions issued by administrative law judges . . .” Id., subd. 3.
Additionally, the Act provides that “[t] he decisions and orders of an administrative law
judge . . . may be appealed to the review board .” Id., subd. 5(a). The Board then “shall
have authority to revise, affirm, remand, or reverse the decision and order of administrative
law judges.” Id., subd. 5(b).2
In this case, the ALJ’s order stated that the decision was appealable to the Board
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 182.664, subdivision 5. However, three months
after granting the appeal, the Board determined that it was not statutorily authorized to
consider the matter. The Board determined that , because Minnesota Statutes section
182.664—the statute that created the Board —was “silent regarding the universe of ALJ
decisions over which the Board has appellate review authority,” it must independentl y
analyze each of the relevant statutes, reading each statute in isolation from its statutory
context. In doing so, the Board reasoned that the legislature’s use of the provision “may
be appealed to the [B]oard” in Minnesota Statutes section 182.661 (related to citations and
penalties) evidenced a different legislative intent from the discrimination statute because
section 182.669 does not contain similar appeal language. The Board determined that it

2 2024 amendments to these subdivisions do not impact the court’s analysis. See 2024
Minn. Laws ch. 110, art. 3, §§ 2, 3.
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could only hear appeals under section 182.661, related to citations and penalties, and that
discrimination matters under section 182.669 were outside the Board’s authority.
Both parties agree that the Board’s interpretation of the statute was improper. We
also agree. The Act, which was established to address injuries and illnesses in the
workplace, and encompasses all of Minnesota Statutes chapter 182, forms a coherent
legislative policy. See Smart Growth Minneapolis, 954 N.W.2d at 591. As such, the plain
meaning of the statute is discerned by reading it in harmony with other components of the
policy. Id. This means section 182.669 must be read together with section 182. 664 to
determine the statute’s meaning.
Section 182.664 provides that the Board “shall review and decide appeals from final
decisions and orders of the commissioner, including decisions issued by administrative law
judges . . .” Minn. Stat. § 182.664 subd. 3 (emphasis added). Additionally, the statute
provides that “[t] he decisions and orders of an administrative law judge . . . may be
appealed to the review board .” Id., subd. 5(a) (emphasis added). The Board then “ shall
have authority to revise, affirm, remand, or reverse the decision [s] and order [s] of
administrative law judges.” Id., subd. 5(b) (emphasis added).
When interpreting a statute, appellate courts are generally guided by the
legislature’s definitions. State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn. 2013). When used in
a statute, the legislature has defined “shall” as mandatory, and “may” as permissive. Minn.
Stat. § 645.44, subds. 15, 16 (2024).3 When read in this context, section 182.664 provides

3 Mandatory is defined as “ constituting a command; required; preemptory .” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1148 (12th ed. 2024).
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parties with the discretion to appeal an ALJ’s decision to the Board, but once appealed, the
Board: “[is required to] review and decide appeals from final decisions and orders of the
commissioner, including decisions issued by administrative law judges . . .” Minn. Stat.
§ 182.664, subd. 3; and “[is required to] have the authority to revise, affirm, remand, or
reverse the decision and order of administrative law judges.” Id., subd. 5(b).
In applying the legislative definition, we hold that the statute’s language is plain and
is subject to only one reasonable interpretation. Section 182.664 unambiguously requires
the Board to hear all appeals of ALJ decisions arising under chapter 182. This includes
appeals taken under the section 182.669 d iscrimination statute. This interpretation is
consistent with Minnesota Rules chapter 5215, which outlines the rules and procedures for
appeals before the Board. Chapter 5215 contains language consistent with section 182.664
and states: “[a]ny party or intervenor may file a notice of appeal of the decision of the
administrative law judge with the board.” Minn. R. 5215.5000, subp. 1 (2023).
The Board’s initial interpretation that it cannot hear appeals under section 182.669,
due to the statute’s omission of similar appeal language found in section 182.661 ,
impermissibly adds words and meaning to an unambiguous statute. See Rohmiller v. Hart,
811 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. 2012) (stating the court “cannot add words or meaning to a
statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”).
Accordingly, the Board erred in concluding that it did not have statutory authority
to hear appeals from ALJ decisions under Minnesota Statutes section 182.669.
Consequently, we reverse and remand so that the Board can hear the appeal.
Reversed and remanded.