State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0464

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Reed Sullivan Klatt,
Respondent.

Filed September 8, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Worke, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-24-503

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Jeffrey D. Albright, Assistant County Attorney,
Chaska, Minnesota (for appellant)

Charles R. Rooney, Halberg Criminal Defense, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
In this pretrial appeal, the state challenges the district court’s order suppressing
evidence obtained after a sheriff’s deputy stopped respondent’s vehicle. Because we
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conclude that the deputy had reasonable suspicion justifying an expansion of the traffic
stop, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
The following facts were elicited at a contested-omnibus hearing. In May 2024, a
sheriff’s deputy on patrol stopped a vehicle with an inoperable taillight. As the deputy
approached the vehicle, he recognized the driver as respondent Reed Sullivan Klatt, based
on prior interactions.
The deputy’s first interaction with Klatt occurred in December 2023 when Klatt was
the complainant in an unrelated matter and the deputy met with him as part of his
investigation. The deputy testified that, during the meeting, Klatt’s “eyes were clear and
his manners were calm, and [the deputy] did not observe any signs of impairment.”
The deputy’s second interaction with Klatt occurred in February 2024. The deputy
testified that, during this encounter, he “observed a change in behavior from the first time
that [he] saw [Klatt].” He testified that Klatt’s “eyes were bloodshot and watery” and that
Klatt was “kind of in an excited state.” During the conversation, Klatt admitted that he
uses alcohol and cannabis and “stated that he would not stop.”
The deputy testified that, when he approached Klatt’s vehicle during the May traffic
stop, he did not immediately observe any alcohol containers or drug paraphernalia, did not
detect the smell of alcohol or marijuana, and did not observe any visible smoke. But he
testified that, upon speaking with Klatt, the deputy “immediately recognized that his eyes
were bloodshot and watery and that his pupils were dilated.” The deputy explained that,
in response to the light from his flashlight, Klatt’s pupils did not restrict and remained
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instead “more dilated than [he] would expect normally.” The deputy testified that he
suspected Klatt was impaired based on his dilated pupils, his bloodshot and watery eyes,
and his prior knowledge that Klatt used drugs and alcohol.
The deputy asked Klatt to step out of the vehicle and observed that Klatt’s “balance
and coordination seemed fine.” Klatt submitted to field sobriety testing during which the
deputy observed additional signs of impairment. The deputy placed Klatt under arrest and
searched his vehicle. Inside Klatt’s vehicle, the deputy found several open alcohol
containers.
Appellant State of Minnesota charged Klatt with underage drinking and driving and
violating the open-bottle law. The district court granted Klatt’s motion to suppress,
concluding that the deputy unlawfully expanded the traffic stop into a driving while
impaired (DWI ) investigation because “the [d]eputy’s observation of [Klatt] with
bloodshot and watery eyes, and dilated pupils, [was] insufficient to provide reasonable
[articulable] suspicion of intoxication,” and that the deputy’s prior interactions with Klatt
did not support such a suspicion.
This appeal followed.
DECISION
Critical impact
To successfully challenge a pretrial suppression order, the state “must clearly and
unequivocally show both that the [district] court’s order will have a critical impact on the
state’s ability to prosecute the defendant successfully and that the order constituted error.”
State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted). The state can
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show critical impact when “excluding the evidence completely destroys the state’s case”
or “significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.” State v. McLeod, 705
N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).
To prove the underage drinking and driving charges against Klatt, the state needs
evidence that Klatt was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle after
consuming alcohol. Minn. Stat. § 169A.33, subd. 2 (2022). To prove the open-bottle
violation, the state needs evidence that Klatt was in his vehicle while in possession of an
open alcohol container. Minn. Stat. § 169A.35, subd. 3 (2022).
Because the district court suppressed all evidence obtained from the deputy’s
expansion of the traffic stop, including Klatt’s chemical test and open alcohol containers,
we conclude that the district court’s suppression order critically impacts the state’s ability
to prosecute Klatt.
Motion to suppress
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
[appellate courts] review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster, 752
N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). A district court’s determination of
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity is a legal determination that appellate courts review
de novo. State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012). This court accepts a “district
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous,” id., but “may independently
review facts that are not in dispute.” Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502.
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“The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures.” State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021) (citing U.S. Const. amend.
IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10). Generally, evidence obtained during an unconstitutional
search or seizure must be suppressed. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 177-78 (Minn.
2007).
“Warrantless searches and seizures are generally unreasonable,” Taylor, 965
N.W.2d at 752, but a law enforcement officer may “conduct a brief investigatory stop if
they have reasonable, articulable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’” Birkland
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 940 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Minn. App. 2020) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
“An officer seeking to expand the duration or scope of the traffic stop beyond its
original justification may only do so if he or she had a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32, 38
(Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). “[E]ach incremental intrusion . . . [must be] tied to and
justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop,
(2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonable suspicion as defined by Terry.” State v.
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 365 (Minn. 2004).
Here, the state argues that reasonable suspicion supported the expansion of the
traffic stop. “Reasonable suspicion must be particularized and based on specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.” Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752 (quotation omitted). The reasonable-
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suspicion standard is “not high,” but requires more than a mere “hunch of criminal
activity.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted).
In determining whether the reasonable-suspicion standard is met, this court weighs
the totality of the circumstances. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752. This court may consider
“the officer’s experience, general knowledge, and observations; background information,
including the nature of the offense suspected and the time and location of the seizure; and
anything else that is relevant.” State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012).
The state argues that the deputy justifiably expanded the traffic stop because Klatt’s
dilated pupils and bloodshot and watery eyes constituted two indicia of impairment, and
two indicia of impairment are sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion. 1 We agree.
In Klamar, a trooper pulled behind a vehicle stopped on the shoulder of the freeway.
Id. at 690. After asking the driver to step out of the vehicle, the trooper “noticed an odor
of alcohol emanating from [the driver] and that [the driver]’s eyes were bloodshot and
watery.” Id. The trooper expanded the scope of the stop and conducted a DWI
investigation. Id. The investigation indicated that the driver was intoxicated, and she was
charged with DWI. Id. The district court determined that the trooper did not have
reasonable suspicion to expand the stop and dismissed the charge. Id. We reversed,
concluding that “[t]he trooper’s observation of two indicia of intoxication specific to [the

1 In opposing the suppression motion in district court, the state argued that dilated pupils,
bloodshot eyes, and watery eyes constitute three distinct indicia of impairment. The state
does not make that assertion on appeal, and instead describes “bloodshot and watery eyes”
as a single indicium.
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driver] reasonably justified further intrusions in the form of field sobriety and preliminary
breath testing.” Id. at 696.
Here, as in Klamar, the deputy observed two indicia of impairment specific to Klatt:
dilated pupils and bloodshot and watery eyes. But the district court noted that, although
the deputy observed those two indicia, he observed “no others” and pointed out that the
deputy did not observe Klatt slurring his speech or exhibiting an unsteady gait, and did not
observe an odor of alcohol or marijuana. The district court concluded that, in the totality
of the circumstances, the indicia that did indicate that Klatt was impaired were “rather
weak” because “the majority of the circumstances . . . did not indicate [that Klatt] was
impaired.” (Emphasis added.)
The district court’s analysis was incorrect. Reasonable suspicion does not require
that an officer observe a driver exhibiting a majority of the known indicia of impairment.
In this case, the deputy observed Klatt with dilated pupils and bloodshot and watery eyes.
Consistent with our decision in Klamar, his observations provided an “independent basis”
of suspicion that justified expansion of the traffic stop. Moreover, in the context of the
more-demanding probable-cause standard, we have said that the absence of certain indicia
does not invalidate or negate the existence of other indica. See, e.g., State v. Prax, 686
N.W.2d 45, 49 (Minn. App. 2004) (concluding that driver “perform[ing] well” on field
sobriety tests did not negate other indicia of impairment supporting probable cause), rev.
denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2004); State v. Grohoski, 390 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn. App. 1986)
(concluding that district court “improperly focused on the absence of other indicia of
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intoxication” because a “DWI suspect need not exhibit every known sign of intoxication
in order to support a determination of probable cause”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 27, 1986).
Because the deputy observed Klatt exhibiting two indicia of impairment, we
conclude that the district court erred in determining that the deputy lacked reasonable
suspicion justifying the expansion of the traffic stop.
Reversed and remanded.