Daniel Francis Link, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0466

Daniel Francis Link,
Appellant,

vs.

Jeffrey Hidde, et al.,
Respondents,

Itasca Driftskippers Snowmobile Club, Inc.,
Respondent,

Personnel Dynamics, LLC,
Respondent.

Filed September 8, 2025
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-CV-23-2435

Richard E. Student, Meshbesher & Student, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Kevin F. Gray, Troy A. Poetz, Matthew W. Moehrle, RGP Law, Ltd., St. Cloud, Minnesota
(for respondents Jeffrey Hidde, et al. and Itasca Driftskippers Snowmobile Club, Inc.)

John D. Undem, Undem Law Office, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent Itasca
Driftskippers Snowmobile Club, Inc.)

John E. Radmer, Lenae M. Pederson, Ryan Paukert, Meagher + Geer, P.L.L. P.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Personnel Dynamics, LLC)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bond, Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
James David Link (JD) was driving a snowmobile on a trail managed by Itasca
Driftskippers Snowmobile Club Inc. when he collided with a trail -grooming machine
operated by Driftskippers worker Jeffrey Hidde, pinning JD beneath the machine and
killing him by traumatic asphyxia. The trustee for JD’s next of kin, Daniel Link, sued Hidde
and Driftskippers in a negligence action that the district court dismissed by summary
judgment on statutory- immunity grounds. Link appeals, arguing among other things that
Hidde and Driftskippers are not entitled to statutory or official immunity. Because the
Municipal Tort Claims Act immunizes Driftskippers and because Hidde is entitled to
official immunity for Driftskippers’ trail maintenance on behalf of Itasca County, we
affirm.
FACTS
Because this appeal arises from the district court’s dismissal by summary judgment,
we base our review on the mostly undisputed facts construed in the light most favorable to
Daniel Link as the party against whom summary judgment was entered. See Warren v.
Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 374–75 (Minn. 2019); Minn. R. Civ. P. 56. The Itasca
Driftskippers Snowmobile Club Inc. is a nonprofit organization that maintains and grooms
more than 72 miles of snowmobile trails over both public and private land, receiving
funding from a grant- in-aid program administered by the state under a sponsorship
agreement with Itasca County.
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James David Link (JD) was snowmobiling in March 2023 with his father and
nephew outside of Grand Rapids on a trail managed by Driftskippers. Near dusk, JD was
rounding a corner at about 20 to 30 miles per hour when he suddenly encountered a trail-
grooming machine that was moving toward him at about 5 miles per hour. Jeffrey Hidde,
a Driftskippers worker, was operating the machine on the left side of the trail— the same
side where JD’s snowmobile was traveling. He was smoothing the bend where snow would
typically get “burnt up.” Both men turned in the same direction, trying to avoid colliding.
JD braked and “went sideways,” slamming into the blade of the groomer and disappearing
from Hidde’s view. Hidde tried to stop the brakeless groomer by running it into a tree
before enabling an emergency stop function. He opened his driver’s side door looking for
JD, but a branch prevented him from exiting.
JD was pinned beneath the groomer’s tread. The two other snowmobilers arrived
and urged Hidde to reverse the machine to move it off of JD, who was conscious and
moving his arms. JD’s father, who had seen the collision, threw open the groomer’s
passenger door and insisted that Hidde “get it off him.” Hidde was still unaware that JD
was under the groomer, and when he finally learned of it, he began a sequence of operations
trying unsuccessfully to restart the machine. JD’s nephew had called 9-1-1, and Hidde
answered questions asked by the emergency dispatcher, explaining the group’s location on
the trail. JD’s father suggested that Hidde use the groomer’s blade to lift the machine off
JD. The attempt failed.
Hidde phoned Driftskippers colleagues, trying to understand how to restart the
machine. He eventually reached Driftskippers’ trail-grooming coordinator, who tried to
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calm Hidde and walk him through the restarting process. The coordinator asked Hidde if
the groomer’s door was open and informed him that it had to be closed. Hidde implored
the two snowmobilers to shut the passenger door, and he closed it himself when they didn’t
respond. Hidde then restarted the groomer and backed it off of JD.
More than ten minutes had passed since the collision, and JD was no longer
conscious. The medical examiner pronounced him dead that evening, reporting his time of
death as 6:01 p.m., about a half hour after the last of two emergency calls, and recorded
the cause of death as traumatic asphyxia. An expert witness later opined that his injuries
from the collision were not immediately fatal and that removing the groomer sooner would
have prevented his death.
Daniel Link, on behalf of JD, sued Hidde, Driftskippers, and two other entities
whose liability is not at issue on appeal, alleging wrongful death by negligence. Hidde
testified by deposition about his training and trail-grooming procedures. Hidde said that he
had been only informally trained by Driftskippers but that he had been grooming trails for
over 40 years. He had been directed by the trail-grooming coordinator on the day of the
accident to groom the trail. He walked around and checked the groomer midway through
his grooming that evening. He said he was unaware of any policies Driftskippers had about
operating groomer vehicles on the left side of a trail, explaining that he would groom trails
where they needed grooming.
All defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary
judgment dismissing Link’s complaint, determining that Driftskippers was immune from
liability because it had a reduced duty of care under Minnesota Statutes sections 604A.20–
5
.27 (2024) and that Hidde was immune from suit under Minnesota Statutes section 466.03
(2024). Link appeals.
DECISION
Link appeals from the district court’s summary-judgment decision. The district
court should grant summary judgment when no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56. 01. On
appeal, we determine de novo whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether
the district court erred in applying the law. STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P.,
644 N.W.2d 72, 76–77 (Minn. 2002). We turn to Link’s arguments that Hidde owed JD a
common-law duty of care, that Driftskippers is not immunized under Minnesota Statutes
section 466.03, and that Hidde is not protected by official immunity.
I
We first address the threshold question of whether Hidde owed JD a duty under the
common law, as a negligence claim requires “the existence of a duty of care.” Domagala
v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 22 (Minn. 2011). The undisputed facts reflect that JD died
because of his continued pinning beneath the groomer, which Hidde operated and failed to
quickly remove from JD. The primary focus of Link’s allegation is that Hidde negligently
failed to remove the groomer after JD became pinned under it. Negligence law “imposes a
general duty of reasonable care when the defendant’s own conduct creates a foreseeable
risk of injury to a foreseeable plaintiff.” Id. at 23. We reject the idea that Hidde, absent
immunities, could not as a matter of law have a duty to move the groomer off JD. We
instead address the issues of statutory and common-law immunity.
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II
Link argues that Driftskippers is not protected by statutory immunity. Whether
immunity applies is a legal question we review de novo. Kariniemi v. City of Rockford, 882
N.W.2d 593, 599 (Minn. 2016). The Municipal Tort Claims Act, Minnesota Statutes
sections 466.01–.15 (2024), provides statutory immunity for cities, counties, towns, and
other quasi-governmental entities. See Minn. Stat. §§ 466.01, subd. 1, 466.03. “Statutory
grants of immunity are narrowly construed” and “rest in the notion that the judicial branch
of government should not, through the medium of tort actions, second-guess certain policy-
making activities that are legislative or executive in nature.” Hoff v. Surman, 883 N.W.2d
631, 634 (Minn. App. 2016); cf. Nusbaum v. County of Blue Earth, 422 N.W.2d 713, 718
(Minn. 1988). T his immunity for cities extends to organizations that receive state trail-
assistance-program funds “for activities associated with the administration, design,
construction, maintenance, and grooming of snowmobile trails.” Minn. Stat. § 84.83, subd.
4(a) (2024). Driftskippers is one of those organizations.
Link first argues that Driftskippers is not entitled to summary judgment because a
fact dispute exists as to whether the groomer constituted a hidden danger at the time and
location of the collision, rendering Driftskippers liable under the duty of care it owes to
trespassers. Link is correct that landowners are liable to trespassers for hidden dangers.
Lishinski v. City of Duluth, 634 N.W.2d 456, 458–5 9 (Minn. App. 2001) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 335 (Am. L. Inst. 1965)), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 15,
2002). And the relevant part of the Municipal Tort Claims Act does not preclude liability
that would entitle a trespasser to relief. Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e. But Driftskippers
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has invoked the protections of Minnesota Statutes section 604A.25. See Kastner v. Star
Trails Ass’n, 658 N.W.2d 890, 895–96 (Minn. App. 2003) (applying section 604A to a
snowmobile-trail association similar to Driftskippers), rev. denied (Minn. June 30, 2003).
That statute limits trespasser causes of action for those who enter land for recreational trail
use:
Except for [willfully taking action to cause injury], a
person may not maintain an action and obtain relief at law for
conduct [which, at law, entitles a trespasser to maintain an
action and obtain relief for the conduct complained of] if the
entry upon the land is incidental to or arises from access
granted for the recreational trail use of land dedicated, leased,
or permitted by the owners for recreational trail use.

Minn. Stat. § 604A.25. “Recreational trail use” is “use on or about a trail,
including . . . snowmobile riding.” Minn. Stat. § 604A.21, subd. 6. The undisputed facts
establish that JD’s entry onto the land arose from the access he and the public were
generally granted to ride snowmobiles. He therefore may not maintain an action and obtain
relief from Driftskippers for the alleged hidden danger that could create trespasser liability.
Link argues also that neither Driftskippers nor Hidde is immune from liability for
Hidde’s allegedly negligent postcollision conduct leading to the delay in removing the
groomer from pressing on JD. The provision of the Municipal Tort Claims Act that applies
is the section concerning parks and recreation areas, which immunizes a municipality
against the following:
Any claim based upon the construction, operation, or
maintenance of any property owned or leased by the
municipality that is intended or permitted to be used as a park,
as an open area for recreational purposes, or for the provision
of recreational services, or from any claim based on the
8
clearing of land, removal of refuse, and creation of trails or
paths without artificial surfaces, if the claim arises from a loss
incurred by a user of park and recreation property or services.

Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e. Link maintains that this provision does not apply here
because Hidde’s alleged postcollision negligence was not a “recreational” activity under
the statute. The argument is not convincing. Both the collision that injured JD and the
removal of the groomer after the collision involved “the . . . operation, or maintenance of
[a] property owned . . . by [a] municipality that is . . . permitted to be used . . . as an open
area for recreational purposes” and also involved the “creation of trails or paths without
artificial surfaces” while JD was using the recreational property. Link’s claim of negligence
arising from the groomer’s use therefore fails under the plain reading of the statute.
Link concedes that his claim arose “in the general context of recreational activity,”
but he asserts that Hidde’s negligent attempts to reverse the groomer did not constitute
“construction, maintenance, operation, creation, or grooming” of snowmobile trails. See
id., Minn. Stat. §84.83, subd. 4(a); see also Kastner, 658 N.W.2d at 894 (interpreting
“creation of trails or paths” to encompass “signage, maintenance, and other ongoing acts
required to keep the trails open and in use.”). He bases this assertion on the theory that
Hidde became burdened with a distinct common-law duty once his trail-grooming activities
had ceased and a “new intervening emergency had come into existence.” But the groomer
was atop JD only because Hidde collided with him while he was grooming the trai l. The
emergency unquestionably arose from and commenced during Hidde’s trail maintenance.
Link’s claim is precisely “based upon the . . . operation[] or maintenance” of recreation-
intended property. Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e. His argument is therefore not convincing.
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We add that Link’s argument is also unconvincing because recreational property in
the context of subdivision 6e includes “fixtures to real estate, movable equipment, or safety
equipment.” See Prokop v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 754 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. App.
2008). The Prokop court applied our previous cases to conclude that a movable pitching
screen designed to protect people from baseballs constituted “recreational property”
because it “facilitate[d] use of recreational [real] property.” See id. Similarly here, the claim
is “based upon the . . . operation . . . of any property”—namely, the grooming machine as
the instrument of JD’s injuries—that is “used . . . for the provision of recreational services.”
See Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e. Because the groomer qualifies as property under the
statute, the distinction between Hidde’s grooming activities and his attempts to move the
groomer does not determine whether the statute’s immunity protection applies.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Link’s appeal to precedent. Link points to Ayers
v. Kalal, which involved a city snowplow that was not plowing snow when it collided with
a van. 925 N.W.2d 291, 293–94 (Minn. App. 2019). We concluded that the city was not
immune under the then-effective (and identical) version of Minnesota Statutes section
466.03, subdivision 4(a), which offered immunity for “[a]ny claim based on snow or ice
conditions on any highway or public sidewalk . . . except when the condition is
affirmatively caused by the negligent acts of the municipality.” Id. at 295–96 (quotation
omitted). Ayers is inapposite because subdivision 6e, unlike subdivision 4(a), contains
language granting immunity for “[a] ny claim” based on operation or maintenance of
recreational property, without an exception for “affirmatively caused” negligence, and is
not limited to a claim based on land conditions. Compare Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 4(a),
10
with Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6e. More apt authority analyzing subdivision 6e supports
this distinction. In Lloyd v. City of St. Paul, a city worker injured park patrons when he
jumped onto a paddle boat to disengage it from a dock, first jumping on one side, then
leaping to the other as the boat began to tip. 538 N.W.2d 921, 922 (Minn. App. 1995), rev.
denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1995). We held that the employee was “engaged in the operation
of a municipal park at the time he was allegedly negligent” and the city was therefore
immune. Id. at 924. In Habeck v. Ouverson, a county worker ran over a child with a trailer
used for a hayride, and we held that the county board was entitled to subdivision 6e
immunity. 669 N.W.2d 907, 908, 911 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 23,
2003). We rejected the argument that subdivision 6e immunity covers only claims
regarding “the real property itself and items intricately connected to realty” and instead
held that “[r]ecreational-use immunity under subdivision 6e covers claims arising from
alleged negligence based on the provision of recreational services and unrelated to the
condition of the recreational property.” Id. at 910 (quotation marks omitted). Link tries to
distinguish these cases, arguing that they “involved injuries arising directly out of immune
recreational conduct, rather than the breach of a duty that arose independently of and
subsequent to such recreational conduct.” Link’s premise is flawed: any postcollision duty
of Hidde’s to JD arose directly from, and not “independently” of, his trail-grooming
activity.
Link also argues that holding Driftskippers immune under subdivision 6e does not
further the purpose of the immunity doctrine, because “responding to emergency situations
following trail groomer collisions was [not] addressed or implicated by any policy,
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decision-making, planning, or deliberative process of or by the Driftskippers.” But “[w]hen
the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all
ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the
spirit.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2024). By its plain language, subdivision 6e protects
Driftskippers from Link’s negligence claim. And we observe that the policy objectives of
statutory immunity are advanced here because Hidde’s performa nce in an emergency
relates directly to Driftskippers’ decisions on how much to vet or train trail groomers.
Because we hold that the statute immunizes Driftskippers from suit, we do not analyze the
parties’ arguments on the application of Minnesota Statutes section 604A.22. We also need
not address respondents’ argument that Hidde should be entitled to immunity under chapter
466 because we determine in the following section that he is shielded by official immunity.
III
We believe that Hidde may invoke official immunity for his alleged negligent
conduct following the collision. Our review is, again, de novo. Kariniemi, 882 N.W.2d at
599. Official immunity is intended to protect “public officials from the fear of personal
liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their
duties.” Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn. 1988). Common-law
official immunity extends to individual government actors, and a contract alone does not
necessarily transform an independent commercial actor into a public official. Kariniemi,
882 N.W.2d at 599–600. But the supreme court in Kariniemi extended official immunity
to a contractor (a private engineering firm), determining that it was a “public official” due
to its special relationship with a city and the public function of its duties. Id. at 601–03. We
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follow similar reasoning to conclude that Driftskippers, and Hidde as its agent, may assert
official immunity.
Driftskippers receives funding from a trail-assistance program administered by the
DNR through a contractual relationship with Itasca County. The contract expresses the
county’s desire to establish a public trail to further its public recreation program, and
Driftskippers agreed to construct and maintain the trail. The contract also requires any work
Driftskippers does to the trail to be in accordance with an agreement between the state and
the county. See Minn. Stat. § 84.83, subd. 3(a)(1) (2024) (setting restrictions for
snowmobile grant-in- aid fund recipients). In return, the county agreed to insure
Driftskippers. Cf. Kariniemi, 882 N.W.2d at 602 (“The particular relationship and close
coordination between the City and [the contractor] here convince us that official immunity
should apply to [the contractor].”). Driftskippers performs a function that is undoubtedly
public in nature: maintaining recreational trails open to the public at no cost. See Stevens
v. N. States Motor, Inc., 201 N.W. 435, 436 (Minn. 1925) (implying that official immunity
applied to officials charged with maintaining highways). And the work is public in nature,
allowing statutory immunity for Driftskippers akin to a municipality under section 84.83,
subdivision 4(a), for activities associated with maintaining snowmobile trails. It is true, as
Link argues, that the Kariniemi court recognized the “long afforded official immunity to
engineers and other similar officials for public infrastructure work.” Id. at 601. But we
conclude that trail-grooming work is also public infrastructure work, and that snowmobile-
trail groomers are akin to road graders and snowplow operators, which are positions that
appellate courts have afforded official immunity. Schroeder v. St. Louis County , 708
13
N.W.2d 497, 506 (Minn. 2006); In re Alexandria Accident of Feb. 8, 1994, 561 N.W.2d
543, 549 (Minn. App. 1997), rev. denied (Minn. June 26, 1997). Under these
circumstances, we conclude that Driftskippers operated as “an extension” of Itasca County
in its maintaining snowmobile trails rather than as an independent commercial actor, and
Hidde as its agent therefore may assert official immunity. See Kariniemi, 882 N.W.2d at
602. We determine next if Hidde’s challenged conduct is the sort of conduct protected by
official immunity.
Link argues that Hidde was performing a merely ministerial duty after the collision
and therefore should not be entitled to official immunity. Official immunity applies only if
the official’s allegedly negligent conduct involved a discretionary act rather than a
ministerial duty. See Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. II, 678 N.W.2d 651,
655 (Minn. 2004). A ministerial duty is “absolute, certain, and imperative, involving
merely the execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Vassallo
by Brown v. Majeski, 842 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted). A
discretionary act, by contrast, requires the exercise of individual professional judgment that
reflects the professional goal and factors of a situation. Id. The existence of some degree
of individual judgment alone is insufficient to confer immunity. Shariss v. City of
Bloomington, 852 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Minn. App. 2014). In this framework, we must decide
whether Hidde’s allegedly negligent postcollision conduct implicated a ministerial duty or
involved a discretionary act.
We hold that Hidde’s challenged postcollision acts were clearly discretionary rather
than ministerial. “Official immunity typically protects the conduct of public officials
14
responding to emergencies on the grounds that emergency conditions offer little time for
reflection and often involve incomplete and confusing information so that the situation
requires the exercise of significant, independent judgment and discretion.” Vassallo, 842
N.W.2d at 462 (quotations omitted). The undisputed facts here portray an emergency of
this sort. Hidde was attempting to respond to the crisis with little time to assess where JD
was positioned and to attempt to move the groomer. When he realized he was unable to
reverse the groomer, he took steps to restart the machine, to lift the groomer using its blade,
to respond to questions posed by a 9-1-1 dispatcher, and to phone for help. The emergency
prompted Hidde to use his independent judgment to evaluate the confusing circumstances
and choose a course of action. And although “[t]he existence of a government policy that
sets a sufficiently narrow standard of conduct will make a public employee’s conduct
ministerial if he is bound to follow the policy,” id. at 463 (quotation omitted), Link
identifies no evidence of any specific Driftskippers policy establishing certain steps that a
trail-grooming worker needed to follow in response to the emergency that Hidde faced.
Hidde’s postcollision activity was discretionary. While Link focuses mostly on Hidde’s
postcollision conduct, we add that his precollision decision to groom on the left side of the
trail was also a discretionary one based on the record. Cf. Schroeder, 708 N.W.2d at 506–
08 (applying immunity to a road grader’s discretionary decision to grade against traffic).
Our decision also stands against Link’s reference to Shariss, where we held that a
“snowplow driver’s decision to drive his snowplow in reverse, when not actively engaged
in snow -removal operations, involves the execution of a ministerial duty that is not
protected by common- law official immunity.” 852 N.W.2d at 279. We determined in
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Shariss that the driver’ s decision to reverse was following a simple and definite task:
backing up his snowplow to make room for a school bus. Id. at 283. Link argues that this
case is like Shariss because Hidde needed to take only “reasonable action to reverse the
trail groomer off [JD] ” based on “fixed and designated facts.” But unlike in Shariss, the
chaotic situation here demanded that Hidde rapidly evaluate new information to figure how
to quickly get JD out from under the groomer. And reversing was not Hidde’s only option.
He in fact tried to lift the groomer with its blade. He also could have, as suggested by the
9-1-1 dispatcher, tried to dig JD out from beneath the groomer. Shariss is inapposite
because it did not involve circumstances that arose from an emergency or determine a
course from discretionary options.
Affirmed.