Damien Lepoutre, et al., Respondents,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0482

Damien Lepoutre, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

City of North Oaks,
Appellant.

Filed September 15, 2025
Reversed
Reyes, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-22-5473

Jack Y. Perry, Scott M. Flaherty, Brayanna J. Smith, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)

Paul Donald Reuvers, Andrew A. Wolf, Jason J. Kuboushek, Iverson Reuvers,
Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying its motion for summary
judgment and granting respondents’ motion for partial summary judgment on an alternative
writ of mandamus and setting the issue of damages for trial because respondents’ claim
was moot. We reverse.
2
FACTS
In May 2021, respondents Damien Lepoutre and the Lepoutre Family Revocable
Trust (Lepoutre) purchased two undeveloped lots located in appellant City of North Oaks
(the city) at 15 and 17 North Deep Lake Road (the properties). Lepoutre submitted a letter
to the city on July 7, 2021, requesting that it “approve the connection of a pressure line for
sanitary sewer from [his] proposed home at 17 North Deep Lake Road to the existing 2
[inch] diameter line at the North property line,” which would connect his property “to the
existing sanitary sewer line stub versus installing an underground septic system.” The city
did not respond to Lepoutre’s request. Around the same time, the city granted a similar
request made by the North Oaks Golf Club.
Lepoutre applied for an amendment to the city’s comprehensive plan on April 22,
2022, requesting that the city approve his request to connect the properties to the city sewer
system. After extending the 60-day review period for appellant’s application, the city
denied Lepoutre’s application.
Lepoutre petitioned the district court for an alternative writ of mandamus and filed
a complaint for declaratory judgment, arguing that, because the city did not respond to his
July 2021 sewer request within 60 days, it resulted in automatic approval under Minn. Stat.
§ 15.99, subd. 2(a) (2024) (“Failure of an agency to deny a request within 60 days is
approval of the request .”). Lepoutre also argued that the city’s denial of his April 2022
application was arbitrary and capricious. The district court issued an alternative writ of
mandamus, and the city answered.
3
On February 9, 2023, the city approved a comprehensive plan amendment granting
Lepoutre’s requested sewer connection for the properties. A few days later, the parties
agreed to stay the proceedings pending our decision in 14 Cherrywood, which both parties
agreed would determine whether Lepoutre’s claim for mandamus damages was moot. See
14 Cherrywood, LLC v. City of North Oaks, 993 N.W.2d 287 (Minn. App. 2023), rev.
granted (Minn. Sept. 19, 2023), and ord. granting rev. vacated (Minn. July 9, 2024). This
court published its decision in 14 Cherrywood on June 26, 2023, and held that “[a]n
alternative writ is not a judgment and cannot form the basis for a mandamus damages
award.” Id. at 294. The city subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on August
13, 2024, arguing that Lepoutre’s claim was moot because the city granted Lepoutre’s
requested relief when it approved the sewer connection request and there was no basis for
damages under an alternative writ. Id. Lepoutre filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on mandamus liability and damages, arguing that the supreme court’s 2024
decision in Ly v. Harpstead, 7 N.W.3d 560 (Minn. 2024), controlled and that there was still
a live controversy between the parties because the question of damages remained at issue.
The district court heard oral argument on the parties’ motions and granted
Lepoutre’s motion for partial summary judgment on mandamus liability, set a trial for
damages, and denied the city’s motion for summary judgment because Lepoutre’s claim
was not moot. The district court denied the city’s request for permission to file a motion
for reconsideration.
This appeal follows.

4
DECISION
The district court erroneously denied the city’s motion for summary judgment
because Lepoutre’s claim was moot.

The city argues that the district court erred when it denied its motion for summary
judgment because the action was moot, either under the 60-day automatic-approval statute,
Minn. Stat. § 15.99, as applied to Lepoutre’s July 2021 request or by the city’s February
2023 approval of a comprehensive plan amendment granting Lepoutre’s connection
request. Lepoutre argues that a live controversy still existed between the parties because
of his pending claim for mandamus damages, which he estimates to be approximately
$775,000. We agree with the city.
When reviewing a summary-judgment decision, which we review de novo, we
analyze “whether the district court properly applied the law and whether there are genuine
issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.” Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v.
JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010). “[I]n doing so, we consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was granted.”
14 Cherrywood, 993 N.W.2d at 292.
Appellate courts similarly review issues of justiciability de novo. Snell v. Walz, 985
N.W.2d 277, 283 (Minn. 2023). “It is an axiomatic legal principle that courts in Minnesota
may only hear actual cases and controversies.” Ly, 7 N.W.3d at 568. ‘‘Generally, an issue
may be dismissed as moot if an event occurs that resolves the issue or renders it impossible
to grant effective relief.’’ 14 Cherrywood, 993 N.W.2d at 292 (quotation omitted).
5
The district court, relying on Ly , determined that there was still a live controversy
between the parties because mandamus damages were at issue. But Ly is readily
distinguishable from this case. First, Ly is a civil-commitment case. 7 N.W.3d at 564.
Second, the Ly supreme court never considered or discussed Minn. Stat. § 15.99, the
automatic-approval statute. Id. at 562-63.
Third, Ly involved a peremptory writ, not an alternative writ, which is the type of
writ at issue in the case at hand. Id. at 566. Lepoutre argues that the distinction between
an alternative writ and a peremptory writ is one without a difference and that, accordingly,
Ly’s holding that, under a peremptory writ, an issue is not moot if mandamus damages are
outstanding after liability is determined should similarly apply here. Id. at 568-69. This
argument fails. Minnesota law differentiates between alternative and peremptory writs, as
the supreme court explained in Ly. Ly, N.W.3d at 564 n.2 (differentiating alternative writs
from peremptory writs); see also Minn. Stat. § 586.03 (2024). Ly is not apposite to this
case because it deals with a different kind of writ. As the Ly court noted, “[t]he district
court’s peremptory writ determined the Commissioner’s liability but reserved the issue of
damages for decision at a fact trial.” 7 N.W.3d at 568. In contrast, “[a]n alternative writ
is not a judgment and cannot form the basis for a mandamus damages award.” 14
Cherrywood, 993 N.W.2d at 29 4. Ly and 14 Cherrywood are consistent with each other.
In addition, the supreme court granted review of 14 Cherrywood while it considered Ly
and then denied review of 14 Cherrywood on July 9, 2024, after it had issued its decision
on June 12, 2024, in Ly.
6
Our decision in 14 Cherrywood is binding precedent that is directly on point. In 14
Cherrywood, we were presented with a nearly identical set of facts as here. There,
appellant Cherrywood sought a conditional use permit from the respondent City of North
Oaks, but the city did not reply to Cherrywood’s request within 60 days. 14 Cherrywood,
993 N.W.2d at 288. Cherrywood argued that its request was automatically approved under
section 15.99 and petitioned the district court for an alternative writ of mandamus to order
the city to grant Cherrywood’s application and award mandamus damages. Id. The district
court issued the alternative writ, the city answered, and the city approved Cherrywood’s
application. Id. The district court then dismissed Cherrywood’s petition as moot because
it received the relief it requested. Id. at 288-89. Cherrywood argued on appeal that the
city’s approval of its application did not make its claim for mandamus damages moot. Id.
at 289. We disagreed, noting that the finality required for mandamus damages under Minn.
Stat. § 586.09 (2024) is not satisfied by an alternative writ because an alternative writ is
not a final judgment and instead operates like a summons. Id. at 293 (“An alternative writ
is not a judgment and cannot form the basis for a mandamus damages award.”). We
affirmed the district court’s judgment. Id. at 292 (“We confidently conclude that the
district court did not err because Cherrywood did not receive a judgment in its favor and
the district court did not otherwise improperly preclude Cherrywood from seeking
damages.”).
14 Cherrywood is both directly on point and binding precedent. See State v.
Chauvin, 955 N.W.2d 684, 695 (Minn. App. 2021) (“[A] precedential opinion of this court
has immediate precedential effect . . . . Although parties, attorneys, district court judges,
7
and the public may disagree with this court’s precedential decisions, district courts are
bound to follow them.”). Here, Lepoutre made a written request to the city, like
Cherrywood, that his property be connected to the existing sewer system at his own cost.
The city did not respond to Lepoutre’s request within the statutorily required 60 days under
section 15.99. Lepoutre again asked the city to consider his request, this time via an official
city application, several months after his first request. The city denied Lepoutre’s request.
Lepoutre, like Cherrywood, petitioned for a n alternative writ of mandamus and, as in 14
Cherrywood, the district court issued an alternative writ to the city. In 14 Cherrywood, the
city filed an answer and subsequently approved Lepoutre’s sewer request. As in 14
Cherrywood, Lepoutre’s mandamus claim was moot before the district court ruled on the
parties’ summary-judgment motions because Lepoutre received the relief he requested,
namely, city approval to connect the properties to the city sewer system.
1 There is no
additional relief which Lepoutre can obtain based on an alternative writ because, as this
court explained in 14 Cherrywood, he did not obtain a judgment under section 586.09. See
14 Cherrywood, 993 N.W.2d at 293 (“The finality required for a judgment to be ‘given’
[under section 586.09] does not accompany an alternative writ.”). The district court
therefore erroneously denied the city’s motion for summary judgment because there was

1 We need not decide when Lepoutre’s mandamus claim became moot, either in September
2021, when the 60-day review period expired without word from the city, or in February
2023, when the city passed a resolution granting Lepoutre’s sewer request. Importantly,
Lepoutre’s claim was moot when the district court granted summary judgment in January
2025.
8
no longer a justiciable controversy. See Snell, 985 N.W.2d at 283 (“A moot case is
nonjusticiable.”).
Reversed.