State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0488

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Jacquelin Carreno,
Respondent.

Filed October 13, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-24-653

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for appellant)

Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In appellant State of Minnesota’s pretrial appeal from the district court’s order
suppressing the state’s evidence against respondent and dismissing driving-while-impaired
(DWI) charges, the state argues that the district court erred when it concluded that the
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officer impermissibly expanded the scope of a traffic stop to include a DWI investigation.
Because the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic
stop into a DWI investigation, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
In September 2024, the state charged respondent Jacquelin Carreno with driving
while impaired in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2024); driving while
impaired with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 within two hours in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2024); and failing to drive in a single lane in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1) (2024). The following facts derive from the contested omnibus
hearing.
On September 22, at approximately 2:00 a.m., an officer was traveling southbound
on Highway 23 in Spicer when she observed a gray Ford Explorer weaving within its lane
and, at times, the tires touching the fog and center lines. The vehicle was averaging 55
miles per hour in a 65- mile-per-hour zone. The officer initiated a traffic stop. When the
officer approached the passenger side of the vehicle, she identified Carreno as the driver
and observed a front-seat passenger. After the passenger-side window opened, the officer
observed “a very strong odor of alcohol -- or an alcoholic beverage coming from the
vehicle.” Carreno explained to the officer that she and the passenger were traveling from
a local bar and restaurant. The officer asked Carreno how much alcohol she had consumed,
and Carreno replied that she had one drink at the bar.
The officer ran Carreno’s driver’s license information in her patrol car. Upon
returning to the vehicle, the officer approached the driver’s side and requested that Carreno
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exit the vehicle to complete field sobriety tests. Carreno agreed to complete the tests. The
officer administered three different field sobriety tests and determined that Carreno
demonstrated indicators of impairment on each test. The officer then requested that
Carreno complete a preliminary breath test, to which Carreno agreed. The officer placed
Carreno under arrest for probable cause that she was driving while impaired.
Following an omnibus hearing, the district court issued an order suppressing the
evidence obtained from the expansion of the stop, due to an unlawful expansion of the
initial traffic stop, and dismissing the DWI counts.1 The district court reasoned that, at the
time the officer expanded the stop by asking Carreno if she drank any alcohol and to exit
the vehicle to submit to field sobriety testing, the officer was unable to identify the source
of the alcohol odor between Carreno and her passenger. The district court therefore
concluded that the officer unlawfully expanded the stop to investigate if Carreno was
driving while impaired.
The state appeals.
DECISION
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
[appellate courts] review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster, 752
N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). A district court’s determination of

1 The officer’s report was admitted as an exhibit at the omnibus hearing. The report
indicated that Carreno provided a breath sample for a DataMaster DMT test at the jail,
which resulted in an alcohol-concentration reading of 0.10. However, that test is not part
of the record on appeal.
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reasonable suspicion of illegal activity is a legal determination that this court reviews de
novo. State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012). Appellate courts accept a district
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.
When appealing a pretrial suppression order, the state “must clearly and
unequivocally show both that the [district] court’s order will have a ‘critical impact’ on the
state’s ability to prosecute the defendant successfully and that the order constituted error.”
State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted). Here, the DWI
charges against Carreno are based entirely on the evidence that the district court’s order
suppressed, and Carreno concedes that the state has satisfied the critical -impact
requirement. Thus, we turn to the merits of the suppression issue.
Before the district court, the parties stipulated that the officer had a legal basis to
conduct the traffic stop based upon Carreno’s failure to drive in a single lane. The primary
issue before us is whether the officer lawfully expanded the stop when she investigated
Carreno for driving while impaired. The state argues that the district court erred when it
concluded that the expansion was not supported by reasonable suspicion of driving while
impaired. A determination as to the existence of reasonable, articulable suspicion is
reviewed de novo. State v. Thiel, 846 N.W.2d 605, 610 (Minn. App. 2014), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 5, 2014).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Temporary detention of an
individual during a traffic stop is a seizure. Thiel, 846 N.W.2d at 610.
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As noted, the parties do not dispute that the initial traffic stop was justified. But
“[a]n initially valid stop may become invalid if it becomes intolerable in its intensity or
scope.” State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). “An
intrusion not closely related to the initial justification for the search or seizure is invalid
under article I, section 10 [of the Minnesota Constitution] unless there is independent
probable cause or reasonableness to justify that particular intrusion.” Id. To be reasonable,
the basis of the officer’s suspicion must satisfy “an objective, totality-of-the-circumstances
test.” Smith, 814 N.W.2d at 351. This test asks whether “the facts available to the officer
at the moment of the seizure [would] ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’
that the action taken was appropriate.” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364 (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). The test for appropriateness, in turn, is based on a
“balancing of the government’s need to search or seize and the individual’s right to
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” State v. Burbach, 706
N.W.2d 484, 488 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Henning, 666 N.W.2d
379, 384 (Minn. 2003). The factors we may consider when applying this test include “the
officer’s experience, general knowledge, and observations; background information,
including the nature of the offense suspected and the time and location of the seizure; and
anything else that is relevant.” State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012).
Although the reasonable-suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause
or a preponderance of the evidence,” it still “requires at least a minimal level of objective
justification.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)); see also State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn.
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2007) (explaining that reasonable suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated
hunch” (quotations omitted)). Additionally, “the basis for the intrusion must be
individualized to the person toward whom” the police officer directs the intrusion.
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365.
Here, the parties dispute the officer’s expansion of the vehicle stop to questioning
her about her alcohol consumption. Therefore, the issue we must resolve is whether any
expansion was reasonable. The following circumstances were observed by the officer at
the time of the expansion: (1) Carreno’s vehicle weaving within its lane; (2) Carreno’s
vehicle crossing both the center and fog line; (3) Carreno’s vehicle traveling at 2:00 a.m.,
shortly after a local bar closed; (4) Carreno’s vehicle moving at ten miles under the speed
limit; and (5) a strong odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle. The officer testified
that these circumstances led her to believe that Carreno may be driving while impaired and,
hence, to further investigate.
We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the
officer’s position would believe that expanding the seizure to investigate Carreno for
driving while impaired was lawful. See Klamar, 823 N.W.2 d at 696 (concluding that
officer’s observations of odor of alcohol emanating from vehicle, coupled with other
circumstances indicating that driver may be impaired, is sufficient to justify further
intrusions); see also State v. Vonderharr, 733 N.W.2d 847, 854 (Minn. App. 2007). The
officer’s observation of multiple indicia of intoxication reasonably justified further
intrusion in the form of inquiring about Carreno’s alcohol consumption. Because the
officer had independent, reasonable suspicion to expand the seizure, it was a
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constitutionally valid seizure. We therefore reverse the district court’s suppression of the
evidence and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.