Kimberly Hamson, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0502

Kimberly Hamson, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

The Foothills Christian Academy Society of Backus, MN, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed October 20, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Harris, Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-CV-24-475

Edward R. Shaw, Ed Shaw Law, Brainerd, Minnesota (for appellants)

Jeremy A. Klinger, Drahos, Kieson & Christopher, P.A., Bemidji, Minnesota (for
respondents)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant student challenges the summary-judgment dismissal of her defamation
claim against respondents, a private school and its principal, contending that the principal’s
statements were not protected by qualified privilege as a matter of law. Because there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the qualified privilege operates to defeat the
2
defamation claim, we determine that the district court erred by granting summary judgment
in favor of respondents. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
This case concerns the summary-judgment dismissal of a complaint by appellant-
student Rebecca-Kay Hamson 1 against her former school, respondent The Foothills
Christian Academy Society of Backus (Foothills), and its principal, respondent Blair Ecker,
for defamation. Hamson asserted that Ecker made defamatory statements about her during
a school meeting 2 related to grade-changing incidents, which she did not attend. The
district court granted summary judgment, determining that, although there were genuine
issues of material fact concerning whether the statements were defamatory, Foothills and
Ecker were protected by a qualified privilege as a matter of law. The following facts derive
from the evidence in the summary-judgment record and are framed in the light most
favorable to the appellants as the nonmoving parties.3
Hamson was enrolled as a student at Foothills, a private school, for the 2021-2022
academic year. At that time, Foothills used a password-protected computer grading system
to track student assignments and grades. Some teachers and administrators could only

1 Appellant Kimberly Hamson is the student’s mother. References to “Hamson” refer to
the student.

2 In the record, this gathering is referred to by multiple terms including “group sessions,”
“assembly,” “disciplinary assembly,” and “assembly of students.” For ease of reading, we
will refer to it in this opinion as a “school meeting.”

3 See Schroeder v. Simon, 985 N.W.2d 529, 535-36 (Minn. 2023) (“In evaluating a grant
of summary judgment, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” (quotation omitted)).
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unlock assignments, review student progress, and grade work, while other teachers and
administrators could also change or override grades.
During the school year, a teacher’s aide learned that students were logging into the
system using a teacher’s credentials and changing their grades. Hamson’s former teacher
also noticed that Hamson’s assignments were being modified in the system. The teacher’s
aide “conducted an in -depth investigation on every student within [the] high school
classroom” to discover when the grades were being overridden, and by whom. This
investigation took place on April 4, 9, and 11, 2022. During this investigation, the teacher’s
aide gathered “strong evidence” that several students, including Hamson, used a former
teacher’s account to access the system and change their grades. Ecker confronted Hamson,
and she admitted that she altered her grades.
On April 5, before the investigation was complete, Ecker held a school meeting to
confront some of the students suspected of being involved in changing their grades. The
group included students and faculty members of the school, but it did not include Hamson
because her parents had removed her from Foothills. Hamson estimated that approximately
17 people were present at the school meeting. Ecker characterized this gathering as a
“group session” that is “a normal session as part of the [school’s] process and is designed
in the form of discipline/assembly.”
During this school meeting, Ecker made several statements that Hamson asserts
were defamatory. Hamson claims that “[t]he entire speech” was defamatory and included
several illustrative examples in the summary-judgment record. Among other statements,
Ecker said:
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We can be mad at [Hamson]. I would be mad at myself if I
were you guys for being a part of a scheme with somebody
with a poor IQ. Okay? And that’s what I mean. Sitting around
the table planning a bank heist, and you’ve got . . . a special ed
[student] sitting across the table. Maybe it’s time to get up and
go, pick a new crew. Okay?
Ecker also referred to Hamson as one of the “ringleaders” of the grade-changing scheme
and insinuated that she had been expelled for her conduct. Ecker does not dispute that he
made these statements.
In March 2024, Hamson filed a defamation complaint against Foothills and Ecker.
She asserted that Ecker made these statements “knowing they were false.” And she further
alleged that the statements were “repeated throughout the community,” and had a “severe
and negative impact” on her wellbeing.
Foothills and Ecker filed an answer generally denying her claims and asserting as
an affirmative defense that they were “immune from [Hamson’s] claims” or, in the
alternative, that their statements were protected by qualified privilege. Foothills and Ecker
subsequently moved for summary judgment, asserting that there were no genuine issues of
material fact and that Hamson’s claims should be dismissed as a matter of law.
Following a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Foothills and Ecker. The district court acknowledged Hamson’s argument that Ecker, due
to his position as the principal of the school, “knew or should have known that the
statements regarding [Hamson] having a low IQ and special education were false.” And it
further reasoned that Ecker’s accusations against Hamson “could certainly harm [her]
reputation regarding her intelligence among her peers” and were “therefore capable of a
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defamatory meaning.” Based on this reasoning, the district court expressly determined that
Hamson raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Ecker’s statements
were false and defamatory. But the district court also determined that Ecker’s statements
were protected by qualified privilege and that, without a showing of actual malice, Hamson
could not prevail on her defamation claim. The district court dismissed Hamson’s
complaint. Hamson appeals.
DECISION
Hamson argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment against
her on her defamation claim. Summary judgment is proper if the moving party shows, by
citing to specific parts of the record, including depositions, documents, affidavits,
admissions, and interrogatory answers, that “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01,
56.03(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists “when reasonable persons might draw
different conclusions from the evidence presented.” Hanson v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 972
N.W.2d 362, 372 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted ). “[O]n a motion for summary
judgment, the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts must be
resolved in [the nonmoving party’s] favor.” Staub v. Myrtle Lake Resort, 964 N.W.2d 613,
620 (Minn. 2021) (emphasis omitted). Summary judgment is a “blunt instrument,” and
“should be employed only where it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved.”
Donnay v. Boulware, 144 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 1966). As such, “[a]ny doubt as to
whether issues of material fact exist is resolved in favor of the party against whom
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summary judgment was granted.” Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn.
1995).
On appeal, we “review a grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether
there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its
application of the law.” Minnesota Laws. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw & Bryant L. Off.
PLLC, 19 N.W.3d 206, 215 (Minn. App. 2025) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn.
June 17, 2025). In doing so, we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Schroeder, 985 N.W.2d at 535-36.
To prevail on a defamation claim, the complainant “must prove that the defendant
made: (a) a false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff; (b) in an unprivileged
publication to a third party; (c) that harmed the plaintiff’ s reputation in the community.”
Johnson v. Freborg, 995 N.W.2d 374, 384 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted), cert. denied,
144 S. Ct. 819 (2024). The plaintiff alleging defamation must prove each element to
succeed on a defamation claim. Bebo v. Delander, 632 N.W.2d 732, 739 (Minn. A pp.
2001), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2001).
Here, Ecker acknowledged in his affidavit that he made statements about Hamson,
as referenced in her complaint, to a group of students and faculty members at Foothills
when Hamson was not present. These statements included, among other things, that
Hamson had “a poor IQ,” was a “special ed [student],” acted as the “ringleader” of the
cheating scheme, and was expelled for cheating. The district court reasoned that based on
Ecker’s position as the principal of the school, his statements regarding Hamson’s
intelligence could “certainly harm [h]er reputation regarding her intelligence among her
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peers.” Cf. McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Minn. 2013) (noting that t rue
statements are not defamatory). The district court determined that there were “genuine
issues of material fact as to whether or not these statements are defamatory,” but
determined that qualified privilege attached to the statements.
I. The district court erred in granting summary judgment as a matter of law
based on qualified privilege.

If a plaintiff proves the elements of defamation, a defendant may argue that a
privilege “operate[s] to defeat a defamation claim.” Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929
N.W.2d 868, 873 (Minn. 2019); see also Frankson v. Design Space Int’l, 394 N.W.2d 140,
143 (Minn. 1986) (noting that qualified privilege may be raised as an affirmative defense).
Minnesota law recognizes two types of privileges as defenses against defamation claims:
absolute privilege and qualified privilege. Minke v. City of Minneapolis, 845 N.W.2d 179,
182 (Minn. 2014). Only the existence of a qualified privilege is at issue in this case.
Whether a privilege applies is a question of law that we review de novo. Kuelbs v.
Williams, 609 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. June 27, 2000).
For qualified privilege, a statement “must be made in good faith, on a proper
occasion, with a proper motive, and upon reasonable or probable cause.” Larson v. Gannett
Co., 940 N.W.2d 120, 131 (Minn. 2020). Qualified privilege is based on the premise that
“statements made in particular contexts or on certain occasions should be encouraged
despite the risk that the statements might be defamatory.” Abdul-Haqq v. LaLiberte, 985
N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. App. 2023) (quoting Bol v. Cole, 561 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Minn.
1997)), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2023). The supreme court has identified a number of
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circumstances in which an otherwise defamatory statement is protected by qualified
privilege. Id. These instances include:
an employer’s good-faith statements about a former employee
in a requested character reference, statements made in relation
to an employer’s investigation into employee misconduct, an
employer’s communication to a former employee of the
reasons for the employee’s discharge, bad credit references
from lending institutions, and [certain statements made in
relation to child-abuse allegations].
Id. (citations omitted). Qualified privilege also extends to “a good faith report of suspected
criminal activity to law enforcement officials,” Smits v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 525 N.W.2d
554, 557 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1995), and statements made by
local governing bodies such as city councils or county boards, Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d
58, 63 (Minn. 2010). The party asserting qualified privilege bears the burden to establish
its applicability. Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980)
(“[O]nce the defendant has demonstrated the existence of a conditional privilege, the
burden shifts to plaintiff to prove that the privilege has been abused, which is generally a
question for the jury.”).
Hamson argues that Ecker’s statements were not made in good faith, on a proper
occasion, with a proper motive, and upon reasonable or probable cause. Hamson’s
complaint does not allege that the school acted improperly by holding a school meeting but
argues that the comments made about her at the school meeting were defamatory. Foothills
contends “that Ecker had more than a good faith reason to confront the students at an
assembly regarding their and Hamson’s cheating at the school.” The district court
determined that qualified privilege attached to Ecker’s statements because he was a school
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administrator making a statement based upon the school’s investigation into cheating
allegations, and reasonable grounds supported his statements. We conclude that there is a
genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment.
The statements made by Ecker to a group of students and faculty members at
Foothills fail to meet all the requirements to be protected by qualified privilege as a matter
of law. We acknowledge that Ecker contends that he made the statements in good faith
and with a proper motive. But at the summary-judgment stage of the proceedings, we
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all
doubts and factual inferences against the moving party. Staub, 964 N.W.2d at 620. At the
district court, Hamson maintained that Ecker’s motivation to accuse her of having a poor
IQ, receiving special-education services, being expelled, and being the ringleader of the
cheating scandal was not in good faith; rather it was a desire to cover up his wrongdoings
in a longstanding cheating scandal in an attempt to preserve Foothills’s integrity. She
seems to argue that t he negative light in which Hamson was cast in the statements,
combined with the timing and self-serving nature of the statements, create a genuine issue
of material fact regarding Ecker’s motive to defeat summary judgment in favor of Foothills.
Hamson presented evidence that: (1) Ecker knowingly made the false statements about her
to cover up a long-term cheating scandal; (2) Ecker had knowledge of cheating issues for
years before the current allegation; (3) Ecker knowingly gave students passwords and
access to grading; and (4) Ecker made the statements about Hamson after her mother
involved the school board. This is evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Hamson,
from which a fact-finder could conclude that Ecker’s statements were not made in good
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faith, on a proper occasion, with a proper motive, and upon reasonable or probable cause.
Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists, and the district court erred in granting
summary judgment as a matter of law on qualified-privilege grounds.
II. The district court erred in its determination that the record does not contain
evidence of common-law malice sufficient to overcome qualified privilege
because whether Ecker acted with common-law malice is fact -specific and
should be resolved by a jury.

Hamson next contends that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
whether she can prove Ecker acted with malice. Generally, “[o]ne who makes a defamatory
statement will not be held liable if the statement is published under circumstances that
make it qualifiedly privileged and if the privilege is not abused.” Bol, 561 N.W.2d at 149.
“A qualified privilege is abused and therefore lost if the plaintiff demonstrates that the
defendant acted with actual malice.” Lewis v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S., 389
N.W.2d 876, 890 (Minn. 1986). “Actual malice” in this context requires a showing “that
the defendant made the statement from ill will and improper motives, or causelessly and
wantonly for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff.” Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 257
(quotation omitted).
4 This is sometimes referred to in caselaw as “common-law malice.”
Id. at 256.

4 Caselaw distinguishes between “actual malice” and “common-law malice.” Actual
malice involves media defendants as articulated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). This standard “is proper only when a media defendant is
involved.” Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 258. The common -law understanding of actual
malice, by contrast, requires the plaintiff to demonstrate “that the defendant made the
statement from ill will and improper motives, or causelessly and wantonly for the purpose
of injuring the plaintiff.” Id. at 257 (quotation omitted). The common-law understanding
of actual malice is used here.
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Foothills argues that Ecker “had more than a good faith reason to confront the
students at an assembly regarding their and Hamson’s cheating at the school.” And it
argues that the record contains no evidence of malice. Hamson argues that the
determination of whether Ecker acted with common-law malice is fact-specific and should
be resolved by a jury. We agree with Hamson.
“While the initial determination of whether a communication is privileged is a
question of law for the court to decide, the question of whether the privilege was abused is
a jury question.” Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 890. However, the totality of the evidence must
support a finding of malice before the matter may be submitted to a jury. See Harvet v.
Unity Med. Ctr., Inc., 428 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Minn. App. 1988) (“[W]here the totality of
the evidence did not support a finding of malice, the matter should not have been submitted
to the jury.”); see also Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 922 (Minn. 2009)
(stating that malice becomes a jury question if the plaintiff’s evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, could lead a reasonable jury to conclude the defamatory
statements were made with malice).
Common-law malice may be proven “by evidence extrinsic to the statement or by
evidence intrinsic to the statement.” Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at 920 (quotations omitted).
Hamson argues that evidence in the summary-judgment record could support a finding of
malice. In her affidavit, Hamson maintained that Ecker made insensitive comments about
her intelligence, which led her peers to believe that she had a low-IQ. She also asserted
that Ecker told people she had been expelled for her actions, which he knew to be untrue
because she left the school by her own choice. As to a possible motive, Hamson asserted
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that cheating had been an “ongoing” problem for years and that the principal placed the
blame on her to avoid accountability. A former Foothills school-board member and athletic
director echoed this statement in her affidavit, noting that cheating had been a problem
almost from the beginning of her involvement with the school. The board member stated
that “[i]t was not just normal cheating where kids try to get answers from each other, but
students having passwords to see all of the online test answers.” Hamson claimed that the
“ordeal negatively impacted [her] mental health” and damaged her reputation among her
peers, the town, and her religious community.
It is true that unsupported allegations are not sufficient to demonstrate the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact. See Harvet, 428 N.W.2d at 579. However, evidence in
the summary-judgment record, when viewed in the light most favorable to Hamson,
presents a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to conclude that Ecker’s
statements that Hamson had a “poor IQ,” was a “special ed” student, and was expelled
were driven by an improper motive. Generally, “[m]alice cannot be implied from the
statement itself.” Bol, 561 N.W.2d at 150. Looking beyond the statements, the record
shows that Ecker made the statements during a school meeting in front of other students
and faculty, and that these statements were potentially damaging to the student’s
reputation. Here, Hamson presented sufficient evidence to raise a jury question regarding
whether the defamatory statements were made with common-law malice. See Buchanan
v. Minn. State Dep’t of Health, 573 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Minn. App. 1998) (recognizing that
a party’s motive in making a defamatory statement “is generally a question of fact”), rev.
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denied (Minn. Apr. 30, 1998). Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary
judgment because there is a genuine issue of material fact on common-law malice.
We conclude that the district court erred in ruling that a qualified privilege applied
as a matter of law to Ecker’s statements because, when viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Hamson, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Ecker’s
statements were made in good faith, on a proper occasion, with a proper motive, and upon
reasonable or probable cause. Moreover, the district court erred in its determination that
the record does not contain evidence of common-law malice sufficient to overcome
qualified privilege because based on the record in this case, whether Ecker acted with
common-law malice is fact-specific and should be resolved by a jury. We therefore reverse
the grant of summary judgment on Hamson’s defamation claim against Foothills and Ecker
and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 5
Reversed and remanded.

5 Hamson raised additional arguments in her reply brief related to the disclosure of
personal, non-public information at the school meeting. Because Hamson did not raise
these arguments in her complaint or to the district court, we do not consider them. See In
re Application of Otter Tail Power Co. , 942 N.W.2d 175, 181 n.5 (Minn. 2020) (noting
that an appellant may not raise an issue for the first time in a reply brief); Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (concluding that a reviewing court may only consider
issues that were presented to and considered by the district court).