State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0521

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Rashad Lavonte Lenear,
Appellant.

Filed February 2, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CR-24-1556

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian A. Lutes, Wright County Attorney, Jennifer K. Buske, Assistant County Attorney,
Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for threats of violence, appellant
Rashad Levonte Lenear argues that (1) his guilty plea was not accurate because the factual
basis did not establish two elements of the offense, (2) the district court abused its
discretion in denying his presentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea as involuntary,
and (3) the district court erred by assigning three criminal-history-score points for offenses
committed as part of a single course of conduct involving multiple victims. We reject
Lenear’s challenges to his plea and thus affirm his conviction, but we reverse his sentence
and remand for fact-finding on his criminal-history score.
FACTS
Lenear was charged with felony threats of violence—reckless disregard and felony
domestic assault. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Lenear plea ded guilty to threats of
violence—reckless disregard in exchange for dismissal of the felony domestic-assault
charge and imposition of a stayed sentence with five years of probation.
At the plea hearing, defense counsel first explained the plea. The plea petition was
discussed and, Lenear authorized his counsel to electronically sign it on his behalf. Lenear
asked if he would be released from jail that day, and his counsel said that it would be up to
the district court. The district court emphasized that there was no guarantee that Lenear
would be released that day and asked whether he was pleading guilty just to get out of jail.
Lenear assured the district court this was not the case. The district court stated that it was
important that Lenear not feel forced into pleading guilty, and Lenear responded, “No I
3
don’t feel forced at all.” Lenear agreed that he had “a clear mind today,” and the district
court noted he “seemed very confident” in his answers. The district court then reviewed
Lenear’s trial rights, and Lenear said he understood them and that he waived them.
Thereafter, Lenear pleaded guilty, and the district court turned to the factual basis for his
plea.
In response to questions from the prosecutor and the district court, Lenear admitted
to the following facts. On the day of the offense, Lenear was at the victim’s residence. The
victim was his significant other at the time. They “had a disagreement” and “were both
arguing and yelling and cussing and stuff like that.” During the argument, Lenear “[c]alled
her some B words” and said, “I will end you.” He “didn’t say it in a kind way.” He thought
that, when he said those things, the victim was “[p]robably hurt and stuff like that and just
scared.” Lenear believed that “people might feel that they’re at risk of harm” because of
him saying “I will end you” during an argument. He agreed that “a reasonable
interpretation” of what he said to the victim was “that [he] would end her life.”
The district court accepted Lenear’s plea and adjudicated him guilty of felony
threats of violence—reckless disregard. Before sentencing, Lenear moved to withdraw his
plea on the ground that it was involuntary . After a hearing at which Lenear testified, the
district court denied the motion. The district court sentenced Lenear to 21 months in prison,
stayed for five years.
This appeal follows.
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DECISION
Lenear makes three arguments on appeal. First, he argues that his plea was invalid
because it was inaccurate. Second, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to withdraw his plea as fair and just because it was involuntary. Third,
and in the alternative, he argues that his sentence should be reversed because it was based
on an incorrect criminal-history score. We address each argument in turn.
I. Lenear’s plea was valid because it was accurate.

“Once a guilty plea has been entered, there is no absolute right to withdraw it.” State
v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017). But a defendant must be permitted to
withdraw a plea if the plea was constitutionally invalid. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180,
183 (Minn. 1989). An appellant may challenge the constitutional validity of their guilty
plea in the first instance on direct appeal. Id. at 182. To be valid, a guilty plea must be
accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). A
defendant bears the burden to show his plea was not valid. Id. A plea’s validity is question
of law reviewed de novo. Id.
Lenear challenges the accuracy of his plea. A plea is accurate if it has an adequate
factual basis, meaning there are sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that
the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn.
2003). “Even if an element to an offense is not verbalized by the defendant, a district court
may nevertheless draw inferences from the facts admitted to by the defendant.” Rosendahl
v. State, 955 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. App. 2021) (emphasis omitted). “The main purpose
of the accuracy requirement is to protect a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious
5
offense than he could be convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.” State v. Trott,
338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). In determining whether the factual basis is adequate,
a reviewing court “must examine a defendant’s admissions in light of all surrounding
circumstances and in the context of an entire plea colloquy.” State v. Jones, 7 N.W.3d 391,
396 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).
The offense at issue is felony threats of violence—reckless disregard. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2022). A person commits reckless threats of violence when
(1) through words or actions, [the person] communicates an
intention to injure another or their property;
(2) the threat is to commit a statutorily defined crime of
violence;
(3) in context, those words or conduct create a reasonable
apprehension that [the person] will follow through with or act
on the threat; and
(4) [the person] makes the violent threat in conscious
disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [their]
words or conduct will cause extreme fear.

State v. Mrozinski, 971 N.W.2d 233, 240 (Minn. 2022) (citing Minn. Stat. § 609.713,
subd. 1 (2022)). Lenear argues that the third and fourth elements lack an adequate factual
basis.
Element Three: Reasonable Apprehension
The third element of the offense requires that Lenear’s words created a reasonable
apprehension that he would follow through with or act on his threat. See id.
Lenear argues that his plea colloquy never established actual reasonable
apprehension on the part of the victim. But “[t]he effect of a terroristic threat on the victim
is not an essential element.” State v. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1975). Rather,
6
the requirement is that “the communication in its context would have a reasonable tendency
to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.” Id. at 613
(quotations omitted).
Lenear’s communication in its context satisfies that requirement. Lenear admitted
to saying, “I will end you,” while he was engaged in an argument with his significant other.
He admitted that she was probably scared and hurt by this. He also agreed that a reasonable
interpretation of what he said to the victim was that he would end her life and that, in the
same circumstances, a person might feel at risk of harm. Based on these admissions, i t is
reasonable to infer that Lenear’s threat created a reasonable apprehension that he would
follow through with the threat. There is therefore an adequate factual basis for the third
element.
Element Four: Reckless Disregard
The fourth element requires that Lenear made the threat in conscious disregard of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that his words or conduct would cause extreme fear. See
Mrozinski, 971 N.W.2d at 240.
Lenear argues that this element is not satisfied because, during his plea colloquy, he
never admitted that he was aware of a risk of causing extreme fear or that he consciously
disregarded that risk. But explicit verbalization of the offense elements is not necessary for
a factually sufficient plea. Rosendahl, 955 N.W.2d at 299. And “a defendant may not
withdraw his plea simply because the court failed to elicit proper responses if the record
contains sufficient evidence to support the conviction.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. The
7
question is whether “facts exist from which” awareness of the risk and conscious disregard
of it “can be reasonably inferred.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 2016).
The facts that Lenear admitted during the colloquy provide the context necessary to
reasonably infer that Lenear was aware of the risk and consciously disregarded it. He
admitted that he threatened to “end” his significant other. He admitted that his words
probably scared the victim and that she might have felt at risk of harm. And he
acknowledged that it was reasonable to interpret this as a threat to the victim’s life. From
these admissions, it is reasonable to infer that he was aware of the risk and consciously
disregarded it.
Lenear cites to this court’s nonprecedential opinion in Isensee v. State, in which we
held the factual basis insufficient to establish the fourth element when the appellant
admitted to making statements that could cause fear, but not extreme fear. No. A22-0572,
2022 WL 17086757, at *4 (Minn. App. Nov. 21, 2022). As an initial matter, we note that
Isensee is not a precedential decision and is therefore not binding. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). In any event, Isensee is factually distinct and is not persuasive here.
Isensee’s threat occurred in a bar. Isensee, 2022 WL 17086757, at *1. In his plea colloquy,
Isensee admitted that he threatened to kill people, but he did not identify a specific person
to whom his threat was directed. Id. Isensee stated that the threat was probably heard by
only the bartender —w hom he had known for years —and that she would not have been
afraid that he would act on the threat. Id. Isensee’s statement contradicted an inference that
he consciously disregarded a risk of causing extreme fear. Here, there are no such
contradictory statements. Instead, the facts admitted by Lenear consistently create a context
8
that permits the reasonable inference that he acted in conscious disregard of the risk of
causing extreme fear when he threatened to end his significant other’s life.
Lenear also argues that his admissions that the victim was “[p]robably hurt and
scared” and “might feel” at risk of harm are insufficient to show a “level of certainty” that
his words would cause “extreme fear.” This argument is not compelling for two reasons.
First, there is no certainty required by the element. There must only be a “substantial and
unjustifiable risk” of causing fear or terror. Mrozinski, 971 N.W.2d at 240. Second, “[t]he
test of whether words or phrases are harmless or threatening is the context in which they
are used.” Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d at 613. The facts that Lenear admitted—threatening to
end his significant other’s life in the context of an argument with her—permit the
reasonable inference that his words risked causing “extreme fear.” Mrozinski, 971 N.W.2d
at 240; see Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 861.
Because the facts admitted by Lenear during his plea colloquy support reasonable
inferences sufficient to prove the third and fourth elements of the threats-of -violence
offense, his plea has an adequate factual basis and withdrawal is not warranted on the
ground of inaccuracy.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lenear’s presentence
motion to withdraw his plea as involuntary.

Before a defendant is sentenced, the district court has discretion to allow a plea
withdrawal “if it is fair and just to do so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. Under this
standard, the district court must consider “reasons advanced by the defendant” in their
motion and “any prejudice” to the prosecution for “actions taken in reliance” on the plea.
9
Id. The defendant has the burden to show a fair and just reason, and the state bears the
burden of showing prejudice. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97.
Denial of a motion for plea withdrawal as fair and just is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, and reversal is warranted “only in the rare case.” Id. A district court abuses its
discretion if it improperly applies the law or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.
Gilbert v. State, 2 N.W.3d 483, 487 (Minn. 2024).
Lenear argues that he established that his plea was involuntary for two reasons:
(1) when he pleaded guilty, he was taking medication that affected his decision-making
and (2) he was pressured into pleading guilty so that he could be released from jail. The
district court found to the contrary and denied the motion. Its findings are supported by the
record.
As the district court observed, during the evidentiary hearing on his plea-withdrawal
motion, Lenear testified that, while he was in custody, including when he pleaded guilty,
he was taking a medication for anxiety. But, the district court found that, although
medications can interfere with a person’s decision-making ability, this “was not the case
here.” During his plea colloquy, Lenear agreed that he had “a clear mind.” The district
court even noted that Lenear “seemed very confident” in his answers. And the district court
found Lenear’s contrary testimony in the motion hearing not credible because Lenear was
“uncertain and evasive,” and we give this credibility finding “due regard.” Minn. R. Civ.
P. 52.01. The record supports the district court’s finding that Lenear’s plea was not
involuntary due to the effect of medication.
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The record also supports the district court’s finding that Lenear did not plead guilty
just to get out of jail. During the plea colloquy, the district court went out of its way to
make sure this was the case, explaining that it was important that Lenear not plead guilty
because he thought he would be released from custody. Lenear responded to the district
court’s concern, stating, “I’m not pleading just to get out of jail. . . . I’m not doing it just to
get out at all.” Lenear also confirmed in his plea petition that he did not “make the claim
that the fact that [he had] been held in jail since [his] arrest and could not post bail caused
[him] to decide to plead guilty in order to get the thing over with rather than waiting for
[his] turn at trial.”1 And while Lenear testified to the contrary at his motion hearing, again,
the district court did not find that testimony credible. The record supports the district
court’s finding that Lenear’s plea was not involuntary based on the pressure of continued
custody.
In his reply brief, Lenear makes two new arguments why the district court abused
its discretion in denying plea withdrawal. Even assuming this court should consider these
arguments, see Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 887 (Minn. 2010)
(explaining that raising issues for appeal in a reply brief is not proper practice), they are
unavailing.
First, he asserts that the district court “did not conduct a full voluntariness inquiry”
during the plea hearing, citing Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.01,

1 Lenear challenges the state’s reliance on the plea petition. He argues that “the record does
not establish that [he] had read the full plea petition document,” citing the transcript of the
plea hearing. But the transcript of the hearing on Lenear’s plea-withdrawal motion reflects
that, at that hearing, Lenear acknowledged having read the petition prior to his plea.
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subdivision 1(5). Rule 15.01, subdivision 1, lays out questions that must be asked of the
defendant before the district court can accept a plea. Subdivision 1(5) states that the judge
must determine whether the defendant is under the influence of drugs or intoxicating liquor,
has a mental disability, or is undergoing medical or psychiatric treatment. Minn. R. Crim.
P. 15.01, subd. 1(5). Lenear argues that the district court merely asked whether he had a
“clear mind” and that that inquiry was insufficient. But failure to follow Rule 15.01 does
not necessarily make a guilty plea invalid. State v. Doughman, 340 N.W.2d 348, 351
(Minn. App. 1983), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 1984). Lenear has the burden of showing
that his plea was involuntary, and he does not explain how the claimed deficiency by the
district court shows that his plea was involuntary in light of the record as a whole.
Second, Lenear argues that the state failed to show prejudice if he were permitted
to withdraw his plea. The district court found that the state had demonstrated prejudice,
noting that Lenear had put pressure on the victim to “fix this” when communicating with
her in violation of a domestic-abuse no-contact order. As an initial matter, we need not
reach this issue because a district court may deny plea withdrawal even if there is not
prejudice to the state when, as here, a defendant has failed to advance a valid reason why
plea withdrawal would be fair and just. Raleigh, 838 N.W.2d at 224. In any event, we are
not persuaded by Lenear’s argument. He contends that his contact with the victim had no
bearing on whether the prosecution would be prejudiced during a retrial. But we see no
error in the district court’s determination that the concerning pressure on the victim could
have prejudiced the state if the plea was withdrawn.
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In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Lenear’s
motion to withdraw his plea.
III. Lenear’s sentence must be reversed and remanded for fact-finding on his
criminal-history score.

Lenear argues that his sentence must be reversed because it is based on an incorrect
criminal-history score. Specifically, he argues that the score includes too many points
assigned for offenses that the state failed to prove were not part of a single course of
conduct. Although Lenear did not raise this issue in the district court, the argument is not
forfeited because “a defendant may not waive review of his criminal history score
calculation.” State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Minn. 2007).
Appellate courts review a district court’s criminal-history-score calculation for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Oreskovich, 915 N.W.2d 920, 926 (Minn. App. 2018). A
sentence based on an incorrect criminal- history score is an abuse of discretion. State v.
Woods, 945 N.W.2d 414, 416-17 (Minn. App. 2020). “When multiple offenses arising from
a single course of conduct involving multiple victims were sentenced,” the criminal-history
score should include “only the weights from the two offenses at the highest severity levels.”
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.1.d(2) (Supp. 2023). To determine whether offenses arose
from a single course of conduct, the court must consider (1) “whether the offenses occurred
at substantially the same time and place and (2) whether the conduct was motivated by an
effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” State v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264, 270 (Minn.
2016) (addressing whether offenses arose out of a “single behavioral incident”) (citation
and quotation omitted); see State v. Drljic, 876 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Minn. 2016) (applying
13
the “single behavioral incident” analysis to the question whether prior offenses involving
multiple victims arose from a “single course of conduct”). The state bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the offenses were not part of a single
course of conduct. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d at 270.
Here, Lenear’s sentencing worksheet noted three criminal-history points. It gave
him one point for violation of a no-contact order and two points for two violations of a
harassment restraining order. The disposition date and expiration date for all three offenses
matched on the worksheet. Lenear’s presentence investigation report listed the same
offense date, the same file number, and the same county for all three offenses. The report
also indicated that Lenear received stays of imposition and was discharged from probation
in 2020 for all three offenses. This is the extent of the record regarding the calculation of
Lenear’s criminal-history score. Lenear argues that the record shows that these offenses
“were part of a single course of conduct” and that he therefore only should have received
two criminal-history points for those offenses.
The state does not dispute the facts in the record but instead contends that the case
should be remanded to develop the record for fact-finding on the prior offenses. The state
argues that, because Lenear never raised the issue below, it never had a chance to meet its
burden of showing the offenses were not part of a single course of conduct and that it
should be permitted to do.
Lenear did not object to his criminal -history score in the district court, so the state
never presented evidence and the district court never made a factual determination on the
question of whether the three offenses arose out of a single course of conduct. The only
14
information in the record regarding the offenses are their dates, location, and dispositions.
“Determining whether multiple offenses are part of a single behavioral incident is not a
‘mechanical’ exercise, but rather requires an examination of all the facts and
circumstances.” Bakken, 883 N.W.2d at 270. We disagree with Lenear that the record
establishes that the offenses were part of a single course of conduct and that he should be
assigned only two criminal-history points for the offenses.
Instead, we agree with the state that the matter should be remanded for fact-finding
on the question. See State v. Outlaw, 748 N.W.2d 349, 356 (Minn. App. 2008) (reversing
and remanding for the state to develop the sentencing record regarding whether the
defendant’s out-of-state prior convictions could support an aggravated sentence), rev.
denied (Minn. July 15, 2008).
As a result, we reverse Lenear’s sentence and remand for fact-finding on whether
Lenear’s prior offenses arose from a single course of conduct. The state may present
evidence to meet its burden on remand.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.