Accredited Electrical Solutions, LLC, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0522

Accredited Electrical Solutions, LLC, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Gold Path Real Estate, LLC, et al.,
Respondents,

KPG Real Estate Holdings, LLC, et al.,
Defendants,

Ankit Bhakta,
Respondent.

Filed March 2, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Schmidt, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-20-15753

Ryan R. Dreyer, Fafinski Mark & Johnson, P.A., Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for appellants)

Paul E. Darsow, Peter E. Lind, Tewksbury & Kerfeld, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondents Gold Path Real Estate, LLC, et al.)

David J. McGee, Natalie R. Walz, McGee Walz PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent Ankit Bhakta)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Schmidt, Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellants argue that the district court erred by dismissing its mechanics’ lien and
challenges the district court’s rulings on its defamation claim. We affirm in part, reverse
in part, and remand.
FACTS
A. The Parties
Appellant Accredited Electrical Solutions, LLC, an electrical contractor, provides
residential and commercial electrical services. Appellant Matthew McGill is Accredited’s
co-owner and vice president.
Respondent Hena Govindji-Bhakta is the sole owner of respondent Gold Path Real
Estate, LLC, which purchases, repairs, and sells houses. Respondent Ankit Bhakta initially
co-owned Gold Path but ended his ownership after getting his real estate license. 1
B. Electrical Services, Billing, and Billing Disputes
Gold Path contacted McGill about performing electrical work on a property in
Edina. After McGill and the Bhaktas walked through the property, they discussed pricing.
The Bhaktas believed the total price of the project would not exceed $10,000 if it was billed
on a time-and-materials basis. McGill believed that he never committed to a firm price.

1 Given their same last names, we refer to Hena Govindji-Bhakta and Ankit Bhakta by their
first name for clarity. Collectively we refer to them as the Bhaktas.
3
Accredited performed work at the property. A few weeks later, Accredited sent a
$10,342.07 invoice to “Ankit Bhakta” at a P.O. Box in Apple Valley. Accredited noted
that a separate invoice would be sent for additional work that was being performed.
Ankit contacted Accredited because the invoice exceeded $10,000. Gold Path
issued Accredited a $2,200 check labeled “paid in full,” which Accredited cashed and
credited to the work on the property. Ankit also sent McGill an electronic payment for
$2,200 labeled “Final Lien Waiver.”
Accredited later performed the trim-out work at the property and sent an invoice for
an additional $8,255.15 to “Ankit Bhakta” at the same Apple Valley P.O. Box. At Hena’s
request, Accredited provided material receipts and itemized breakdowns for the invoice.
Gold Path then issued two checks to Accredited for $2,500 and $5,000, both including
“paid in full” language. Accredited did not cash the checks.
C. Mechanics’ Lien
On August 12, 2020, Accredited filed a mechanics’ lien statement on the property
with the county recorder. That same day, Accredited’s attorney attempted to serve Gold
Path with Accredited’s mechanics’ lien by sending it by certified mail to the property.
The Bhaktas did not live at the property, so they did not receive the lien statement.
Instead, Hena learned about the mechanics’ lien while researching Accredited. Hena then
emailed Accredited’s attorney and disputed the mechanics’ lien.
In November 2020, Accredited sued Gold Path. Accredited alleged claims for
breach of contract, foreclosure of the mechanics’ lien, and unjust enrichment.
4
D. Online Reviews
On December 2, 2020, Hena posted a review of Accredited to Porch.com —a
website that allows users to review and rate businesses and contractors—that read:
WARNING: DO NOT WORK WITH THIS COMPANY

Used this company for 2 remodels. On both projects they sent
a final invoice double the amount initially quoted without
communication along the way that the project is drastically
going over. When asked for detailed accounting to make sense
of it, they state that they do not have time to do so. At the same
time, threatening to file a lien on the property, which if not paid
they will proceed to file suit to foreclose.

Here is how they CON you: They say that providing a written
bid will cost 25% more than if they simply billed for “time &
materials” because they have to account for possible overages
so have to build that buffer into their estimate, BUT if it was
billed for time & materials, it will definitely come in under “X”
amount. So obviously you are going to choose the more
economical option. Who wouldn’t?!

I ended up paying on one projects as it was an extra $3,000 as
the property was due to close and it would have cost more to
fight their frivolous lien. The 2nd project, I did not pay, as they
billed an extra $12,000 which has been a headache to deal with
because I was unable to sell or refinance it due to them actually
filing a frivolous mechanics’ lien and filing suit to foreclose.

This company has made a business out of using the lien rights
given to them by the law to legally extort consumers.

Hena posted this same review, using pseudonyms, to Buildzoom.com, Houzz.com, and
Google. Hena later posted an additional review of Accredited that read:
Steer Clear

Delayed the project resulting in losses for us, [McGill] has no
sense of accountability when it came to getting the project done
within budget and within timeframe given. Excuses galore as
5
if he had a pre-written list for all sorts of scenarios. Never
again. I don’t understand how companies like this even stay in
business. You should be ashamed of yourselves!

Within a day of her posts, Hena removed the negative reviews. Hena, instead,
posted positive reviews of Accredited.
Accredited amended their complaint, adding a defamation claim based on the
published internet reviews. Gold Path answered the complaint, and alleged counterclaims,
including removal of cloud of title, and slander of title.
E. Summary Judgment
Ankit moved for summary judgment on Accredited and McGill’s defamation claim,
arguing that the statements were not actionable because they were either true or were
opinions. The district court granted Ankit’s summary judgment motion in part as to some
portions of the first online-review statement concerning Accredited. The district court also
granted Ankit’s motion as to all of the second online-review statements concerning McGill.
F. Pretrial and Trial
At a pretrial hearing, the district court informed the parties that it intended to change
its summary judgment decision because, upon further research, the district court believed
that certain statements were opinions. Neither party had requested that the district court
reconsider its summary judgment order or moved to exclude additional online-review
statements that the district court ruled would be considered by a jury.
The dispute proceeded to trial. At trial, Accredited’s defamation claim was
submitted to the jury. Accredited’s mechanics’-lien claim was tried to the district court
during the same trial.
6
For the defamation claim, the district court submitted the alleged ly defamatory
reviews to the jury in four separate statements:2
• Statement 1: Used this company for 2 remodels. On both
projects they sent a final invoice double the amount initially
quoted without communication along the way that the project
is drastically going over.

• Statement 2: When asked for detailed accounting to make
sense of it, they state they do not have time to do so. At the
same time, threatening to file a lien on the property, which if
not paid they will proceed to file suit to foreclose.

• Statement 3: Here’s how they CON you: They say that
providing a written bill will cost 25% more than if they simply
billed for ‘time & materials’ because they have to account for
possible overages so have to build that buffer into their
estimate, BUT if it was billed for time & materials, it will
definitely come in under ‘X’ amount.

• Statement 5: I ended up paying on one project as it was an extra
$3,000 as the property was due to close and it would have cost
more to fight their frivolous lien. The 2nd project, I did not
pay, as they billed an extra $12,000 which has been a headache
to deal with because I was unable to sell or refinance it due to
them actually filing a frivolous mechanics’ lien and filing suit
to foreclose.3

While finalizing the special verdict form and jury instructions, the district court
ruled, over Accredited’s objection, that Accredited was a limited-purpose public figure and
that the reviews were a matter of public concern. As such, the jury was required to find

2 In its summary judgment order, the district court analyzed the reviews posted as six
separate statements. The jury reviewed the posts as four statements. The whole substance
of each statement, however, were the same.

3 The strikethrough font indicates words that the district court ruled constituted a non-
actionable opinion and were, thus, redacted and removed from the jury’s consideration.
7
that Hena acted with actual malice before Accredited could recover presumed damages.
G. Special Verdict and Posttrial Proceedings
The jury returned a unanimous special verdict, finding that Hena, not Ankit, made
the online statements and that she did not act with malice. The jury found Hena made two
statements that were defamatory and false (Statement 1 and Statement 5), but the other two
statements were not defamatory or false (Statement 2 and Statement 3). The jury awarded
no actual damages on the defamation claims , but did award Accredited $875 in presumed
damages for Statement 1 and $875 in presumed damages for Statement 5.
The jury also found that the parties had a contract, which Gold Path breached. The
jury awarded $18,530.05 in damages on Accredited’s breach-of-contract claim.
After the jury verdict, the parties submitted proposed findings, and the district court
heard closing arguments on the mechanics’-lien claim. The district court issued its order
for judgment, dismissing Accredited’s mechanics’-lien claim because, among other
reasons, Accredited did not properly serve the lien on Gold Path or its agents. The district
court also dismissed Accredited’s defamation claim because Gold Path’s statements were
on a matter of public concern, Accredited was a limited-purpose public figure, and the jury
found that Hena had not acted with actual malice.
Accredited appeals.
8
DECISION
I. The district court properly dismissed Accredited’s mechanics’-lien claim.

Accredited’s challenge to the district court’s mechanics’-lien ruling presents mixed
questions of law and fact. Langford Tool & Drill Co. v. Phenix Biocomposites, LLC,
668 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Minn. App. 2003). “We will correct erroneous applications of law,
but accord the [district] court discretion in its ultimate conclusions and review such
conclusions under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Accredited argues that the district court erred in determining that Accredited failed
to serve the mechanics’ lien statement properly. In Minnesota, a lienor must file a lien
statement with the county before the mechanics’ lien time-period expires. Minn. Stat.
§ 514.08, subd. 1 (2024). The lienor must then serve—either personally or by certified
mail—the lien statement on the owner or an authorized agent. Id. Service by certified mail
is complete upon mailing so long as it is “properly directed to the intended recipient, even
though not actually received by them.” Har-Ned Lumber Co. v. Amagineers, Inc.,
436 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Minn. App. 1989).
The district court dismissed Accredited’s mechanics’-lien claim because the lien
statement was not properly served upon Gold Path or its authorized agents when it was sent
to the property by certified mail. We disrecen no error.
The district court’s determination was premised upon six factual findings. First, the
Edina property was neither Gold Path’s registered business address, nor the Bhakta’s home
address. Second, Accredited knew that the Bhaktas did not live at the Edina property
because it had performed work at the Bhaktas ’ actual residence in the past. Third, Gold
9
Path and the Bhaktas never represented that mail could be received at the Edina property.
Fourth, Accredited mailed invoices to Gold Path at an Apple Valley P.O. Box. Fifth, Gold
Path’s checks list the Apple Valley P.O. Box. Finally, emails between Hena and
Accredited show Gold Path’s address in Apple Valley. These findings are supported by
the record and, therefore, are not clearly erroneous. Langford Tool & Drill , 668 N.W.2d
at 446 (“Factual determinations are reversible only if they are clearly erroneous.”). Based
on these findings, the district court correctly determined that sending the lien statement to
the Edina property did not effectuate service upon Gold Path or its authorized agents. See
Minn. Stat. § 514.08, subd. 1.
Accredited contends that our decision in Carolina Holdings Midwest, LLC v.
Copouls, 658 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. App. 2003) requires reversal. We disagree. In Carolina
Holdings, we held that, because the property owners had contracted to build a house on a
work site and had listed that address on their mortgage documents, the lienor properly
served a statement of claim via certified mail to the work site even though no one lived
there. Id. at 237-40. But unlike the two individual property owners in Carolina Holdings,
Gold Path—as a business that buys, renovates, and re-sells property—never listed the
Edina address on a mortgage as a place that the business could receive mail. Instead, Gold
Path only had a business address in Apple Valley. Carolina Holdings does not apply.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Accredited’s
mechanics’-lien claim failed.
4

4 Because we affirm on this basis, we need not consider Accredited’s arguments related to
the district court’s determination that service of the lien statement was untimely.
10
II. The district court’s erroneous defamation rulings require a new trial.

Accredited and McGill argue that the district court erred by (1) dismissing McGill’s
defamation claim, (2) excluding certain statements as non-actionable opinions, and
(3) determining—after the close of evidence —that the statements were matters of public
concern and that Accredited was a limited- purpose public figure. We address each
argument in turn. But we must first clarify our scope of review.
A. Our scope of review is not limited by the lack of a posttrial motion.

Respondents contend that our scope of review is narrow because Accredited and
McGill failed to move for a new trial. We disagree.
We will only review issues involving trial procedure, evidentiary rulings, and jury
instructions “if there has been a motion for a new trial in which such matters have been
assigned as error.” Sauter v. Wasemiller, 389 N.W.2d 200, 201 (Minn. 1986) (citation
omitted). But we may review a district court’s denial of summary judgment after a jury
verdict if the ruling is based on a legal conclusion. Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp.,
766 N.W.2d 910, 918 n.9 (Minn. 2009); see also Schmitz v. Rinke, Noonan, Smoley, Deter,
Colombo, Wiant, Von Korff & Hobbs, Ltd., 783 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. App. 2010), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010).
On appeal, Accredited and McGill challenge the district court’s purely legal rulings
at summary judgment and at the close of evidence during trial. Since these challenges are
purely legal issues, our scope of review is not limited.5

5 Respondents also assert that McGill is precluded from challenging the district court’s
summary-judgment ruling on appeal because he withdrew his claims before trial.
11
B. The district court erred in dismissing McGill’s defamation claim.
McGill argues that the district court erred by dismissing his defamation claim on
summary judgment because the challenged statements were capable of being proven true
or false.6 “We review a district court’s summary judgment decision de novo.” Riverview
Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010).
To establish defamation, McGill needed to prove: “(1) the defamatory statement
was communicated to someone other than [McGill]; (2) the statement is false; (3) the
statement tends to harm [McGill]’s reputation and to lower [McGill ] in the estimation of
the community; and (4) the recipient of the false statement reasonably understands it to
refer to a specific individual.” McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725, 729-30 (Minn. 2013)
(quotations omitted). “[S]tatements of opinion . . . are not actionable.” Lund v. Chi. & Nw.
Transp. Co., 467 N.W.2d 366, 370 (Minn. App. 1991), rev. denied (Minn. June 19, 1991).
A statement is an opinion when it cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts
about an individual or relates to a matter of public concern and is incapable of being proven
true or false. Id. at 368-69.
The contested statement provides:
Steer Clear

Delayed the project resulting in losses for us. [McGill] has no

Respondents rely upon a pretrial statement in which McGill’s counsel agreed that the
summary-judgment ruling precluded McGill from presenting his defamation claim to the
jury. Acknowledging the effect of a district court’s order is not the same as withdrawing
the claims. McGill’s argument is properly before this court.

6 At oral argument, appellants’ counsel clarified that appellants do not challenge the jury’s
finding that Ankit did not make any of the allegedly defamatory statements.
12
sense of accountability when it came to getting the project done
within budget and within timeframe given. Excuses galore as
if he had a pre-written list for all sorts of scenarios. Never
again. I don’t understand how companies like this even stay in
business. You should be ashamed of yourselves!7

The district court determined that this statement could not be reasonably interpreted as one
of fact and that it was incapable of being proven true or false. We disagree.
To determine if a defamatory statement is fact or opinion, we consider “1) the
statement’s precision and specificity; 2) the statement’s verifiability; 3) the social and
literary context in which the statement was made; and 4) the statement’s public context.”
Lund, 467 N.W.2d at 368. Whether a statement’s language reasonably conveys an opinion
or a fact is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 369.
First, describing McGill as having “no sense of accountability” is sufficiently
precise because it quantifies his accountability. “[E]xcuses galore” specifies how McGill
handles budget and time constraints. The statement is sufficiently precise and quantifiable.
Second, whether McGill was responsive to budget needs and time constraints is
verifiable by the parties’ communications, which could disprove the statement that McGill
lacked accountability or made excuses. The statement is verifiable.
Third, the social and literary context of the statement demonstrates that it was fact-
based. The statement was posted online days after Accredited and McGill filed the lawsuit.
The statements were also posted to four websites where consumers specifically seek
insights, recommendations, and assess the public reputation of contractors.

7 The district court’s analysis split this statement into two separate parts.
13
Finally, the “public context” also weighs against a determination that it is an
opinion. The statements concerned McGill, a private citizen, and Accredited, a privately
owned company. As such, there is no public context about McGill that ties him to the
online reviews such that the statements could be characterized as opinion.
The district court erred by determining that the statement was a nonactionable
opinion and by dismissing McGill’s defamation claim on summary judgment.
C. The district court erred in excluding certain statements as nonactionable
opinions immediately before trial.

Accredited argues that the district court erred by determining that portions of the
statements were non-actionable opinions right before the start of the trial. We agree.
In its summary-judgment order, the district court ruled that the following statements
were not opinion and that a jury must determine whether the statements were defamatory:
• Statement 3: Here’s how they CON you: They say that
providing a written bill will cost 25% more than if they
simply billed for ‘time and materials’ because they have to
account for possible overages so have to build that buffer
into their estimate, BUT if it was billed for time &
materials, it will definitely come in under ‘X’ amount.

• Statement 5: I ended up paying on one project as it was an
extra $3,000 as the property was due to close and it would
have cost more to fight their frivolous lien. The 2nd
project, I did not pay, as they billed an extra $12,000 which
has been a headache t o deal with because I was unable to
sell or refinance it due to them actually filing a frivolous
mechanics’ lien and filing suit to foreclose.

• Statement 6: This company has made a business out of
using the lien rights given to them by the law to legally
extort consumers.

14
But at a hearing on the eve of trial—and with no motion pending—the district court
announced that it intended to change its summary-judgment decision, rule that the above
statements were opinion, and exclude part of each statement from the jury’s consideration.
In doing so, the district court struck the phrase “Here is how they CON you” from
Statement 3. But either Accredited did or did not “CON” its customers with its billing
practices. Thus, this is a factual statement that can be proven true or false. Therefore, the
district court erred, and the statement should have been submitted to the jury.
From Statement 5, the district court omitted the use of the word “frivolous” both
times it appears as well as the phrase “which has been a headache to deal with because[.]”
But whether a mechanics’ lien is frivolous is a question that is capable of being proven true
or false. Therefore, it is not an opinion and could convey a defamatory meaning. As such,
the entirety of Statement 5 should have been presented to the jury.
For Statement 6, the district court ruled that the entire statement “really seem[ed] to
be opinion.” But whether Accredited has “made a business” of using its lien rights to
“legally extort consumers” is a factual assertion because it can be proven true or false.
Statement 6 should have been submitted in its entirety to the jury.
D. The district court erred in determining that the statements were of
public concern and that Accredited was a limited-purpose public figure.

Accredited argues that the district court erred when it determined that the statements
involved a matter of public concern and that Accredited was a limited-purpose public
figure. Accredited also raises issues with the timing of the district court’s rulings on these
issues. We begin by addressing the procedural irregularities.
15
1. The procedural irregularities require a new trial.
Two weeks before trial was set to begin, the district court denied respondents’
motion to amend their answer, noting that granting the motion would require Accredited
to show that Hena acted with actual malice 8 and “[r]equiring Accredited to be prepared to
make this additional higher showing of actual malice less than two weeks before trial is
highly prejudicial and should not be allowed.” (emphasis added). But after the close of
evidence, the district court determined that the statements were a matter of public opinion
and that Accredited was a limited-purpose public figure. Based upon those rulings,
Accredited needed to prove actual malice to recover damages.
Accredited learned it needed to prove actual malice after it closed its case-in-chief.
When the district court made this ruling, Accredited had no opportunity to present any
evidence to meet this higher standard, much less do discovery to prove “actual malice.”
This procedural irregularity, alone, requires reversal.
2. The court erred in requiring Accredited to prove actual malice.

We must next decide the scope of the remand. If Accredited does not need to prove
actual malice, then our remand will be limited to a new trial. If Accredited does need to
prove actual malice, our remand will be to re-open discovery and then proceed to a new
trial—if discovery reveals facts that could support a finding of actual malice.

8 “Actual malice” is a term of art that focuses on a party’s subjective state of mind regarding
the truth or falsity of a statement. Chafoulias v. Peterson , 668 N.W.2d 642, 654
(Minn. 2003). By contrast, common-law malice focuses on “ill will or improper motive.”
Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Trib. Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, n.5 (Minn. 1985).
16
a. The challenged statements were not of public concern.

Accredited challenges the district court’s ruling that the statements were on a matter
of public concern. The district court reasoned that the statements were on a matter of public
concern because they were made on public websites designed to share business reviews
and warned potential customers of “fraudulent business practices, a lack of communication
and transparency, overbilling and improper use of mechanics’ liens by Accredited.”
Whether defamatory speech involves a matter of public or private concern is based
on a totality of the circumstances, taking into consideration the content, form, and context
of the speech, “including what was said, where it was said, and how it was said.” J&D
Dental v. Hou, 26 N.W.3d 491, 499 (Minn. App. 2025) (quotation omitted). To do this,
we “make an independent examination of the whole record.” Id. (quotation omitted). We
review the ruling de novo. Johnson v. Freborg, 995 N.W.2d 374, 384 (Minn. 2023).
Our recent opinion in J&D Dental is instructive.9 In J&D Dental, respondent wrote
a Google review about a dental practice: “[a]nyone who cares about their dental health
should avoid this practice!” 26 N.W.3d at 495. We rejected the argument that the content
of the speech was on a matter of public concern because “the ‘overall thrust and dominant
theme’ of [the] speech was to discuss [the speaker’s] personal grievance with J&D Dental
and not to speak ‘to broader public issues’ or discuss ‘a matter of public import.’” Id. at
501 (quoting Freborg, 995 N.W.2d at 387). We agreed that the form of the speech—using

9 J&D Dental was analyzed in the context of the Uniform Public Expression Protection
Act, but our analysis—regarding whether speech was a matter of public concern —was
consistent with the analysis performed when analyzing the statements in the common-law
defamation context. J&D Dental, 26 N.W.3d at 494. Thus, J&D Dental applies.
17
a digital public forum—supported a determination that the speech was on a matter of public
concern. Id. at 501-02. But we rejected the argument that the context of the speech
constituted a matter of public concern because the speech did not connect the speaker’s
experience to broader public issues or reflect any “discourse, conversation, or connection
between [the speaker’s] reviews and other business reviews.” Id. at 502. Based upon the
totality of the circumstances and balancing the content, form, and context of the speech,
we concluded that the dominant theme of the speech was a personal experience and a
complaint stemming from the speaker’s treatment at J&D Dental. Id. at 503. As such, we
held that the challenged speech was not “on a matter of public concern[.]” Id.
Like the respondent in J&D Dental, Hena posted reviews warning consumers to
“Steer Clear” of Accredited’s business. Like the review in J&D Dental, Hena’s post did
not impact a broader issue in the community at large because “the overall thrust and
dominant theme” of her speech recounted an “individual grievance” with Accredited and
McGill and it did not “speak to broader public issues” or “discuss a matter of public
import.” Id. at 499-503 (quotation marks omitted).
In addition, the content, form, and context of Hena’s speech weighs against a
determination that the statements were on a matter of public concern. The content of
Hena’s statements reflects an individual grievance and her personal experience with
Accredited’s communication, transparency, and alleged overbilling. Hena did not connect
her personal experiences to a community or broader movement, she does not speak to
broader public issues, and she is not discussing matters of public import. Id. at 500. This
factor weighs against determining that the speech was a matter of public concern.
18
The form weighs in favor of determining that Hena’s reviews were a matter of public
concern. As in J&D Dental, Hena’s statements were posted digitally in a “modern public
square . . . to reach as broad a public audience as possible.” Id. at 502 (quotation omitted).
The context weighs against determining that the reviews were a matter of public
concern. The reviews did not connect Hena’s experience to any broader public issues or
reflect any “discourse, conversation, or connection between [her] reviews and other
business reviews.” Id. at 502.
Considering the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that the district court
erred by determining that Hena’s reviews were on a matter of public concern. We
recognize that the district court did not have the benefit of the J&D Dental decision when
ruling on Accredited’s claims. But, in light of J&D Dental, we must reverse because the
challenged statements should have been submitted, in their entirety, to the jury.
b. Accredited is not a limited-purpose public figure.
Accredited also challenges the district court’s determination that it is a limited-
purpose public figure. A corporation is a limited-purpose public figure if the statement:
concerns matters of legitimate public interest in the geographic
area in which the defamatory material is published, either
because of the nature of the business conducted or because the
public has an especially strong interest in the investigation or
disclosure of the commercial information at issue.

Jadwin, 367 N.W.2d at 487-88. We review the determination of a plaintiff’s status as a
public figure de novo. Id. at 483.
In ruling that Accredited was a limited-purpose public figure, the district court relied
on Jadwin to reason that electrical work was “highly regulated” and that “fraudulent
19
business practices” were a matter of public concern. Id. at 487 (noting that corporations
engaged in highly regulated businesses with “public dependence and involvement . . . have
been found to be public figures”). But Jadwin is distinguishable.
In Jadwin, the supreme court analyzed cases involving insurance, finance, and
trade; all indisputably “highly regulated” industries that reflect the importance of
“disclosure and access to commercial information.” Although the work is subject to some
regulation, the electrical work that Accredited performed cannot be compared to the highly
regulated industries such as insurance, finance, or companies that provide energy to
consumers. There is also nothing to suggest that the public “has an especially stro ng
interest in the investigation or disclosure of commercial information” related to Accredited.
Id. at 487-88. And Hena’s reviews reflect her individual grievance with Accredited. Thus,
the district court erred in ruling that Accredited is a limited-purpose public figure.
Because Hena’s statements were not on a matter of public concern and Accredited
was not a limited-purpose public figure, Accredited did not need to prove actual malice to
be entitled to recover damages. Thus, we remand for a new trial. Consistent with our
decision in J&D Dental, the statements should be submitted to the jury in their entirety and
not in isolation as occurred in the first trial.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.