, A25-1164

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0552,
A25-1164

In re the Estate of Jacob A Alderink, Deceased.

Filed March 30, 2026
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-PR-19-609

John C. Lillie, III, Lillie, Glodosky, Long & Anderson, PLLC, Forest Lake, Minnesota (for
appellant Donna Wickstrom)

Mark V. Steffenson, Henningson & Snoxell, Ltd., Maple Grove, Minnesota (for respondent
Brenda Shaw)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In these consolidated appeals arising out of a disputed probate matter, appellant
challenges decisions of the district court regarding the award of attorney fees and costs.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding respondent
attorney fees pursuant to the parties’ partial settlement agreement and further abused its

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
discretion by denying her motion for attorney fees pursuant to Minnesota Statutes
section 524.3-720 (2024). Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm
the award of attorney fees to respondent and the denial of attorney fees to appellant.
FACTS
Appellant Donna Wickstrom and respondent Brenda Shaw are sisters. Their father,
Jacob Alderink, passed away in September 2019. While he was alive, Alderink signed two
wills: the first will was signed December 1, 2015 (2015 will) and the second was signed
July 18, 2019 (2019 will). The 2015 will named Shaw as his personal representative. The
2019 will named Ivan Alderink, his son, and Wickstrom as personal representatives. When
Alderink signed the 2019 will, he was a resident in the memory care unit of a senior living
facility. The 2019 will was drafted by Wickstrom’s attorney at her request.
The distributions under the 2019 will were similar to those under the 2015 will
except that the 2019 will did not include distributions to Alderink’s grandchildren or certain
charities that were provided for in the 2015 will. Under the 2019 will, all distributions
went to Alderink’s children.
Following Alderink’s death, Shaw filed a petition for formal probate of the 2015
will. In the petition, Shaw stated that the 2015 will is Alderink’s last will. She further
stated that “[a] document purporting to be ‘The Last Will of Jacob A. Alderink’ dated
July 18, 2019, is invalid as I believe it was executed while [Alderink] was incompetent and
under duress.”
Wickstrom filed an objection to the probate of the 2015 will and a counter petition
for formal probate of the 2019 will. In her petition, Wickstrom stated that the 2015 will
3
was revoked by the 2019 will. Wickstrom also opposed the appointment of Shaw as a
personal representative, alleging that “there have been many large withdrawals from
[Alderink’s] accounts by [Shaw].” Shaw had power of attorney for Alderink until 2019,
when Alderink signed the 2019 will and gave Wickstrom power of attorney.
The probate matter of Alderink’s estate proceeded to discovery, and mediation was
ordered. Under the district court’s amended scheduling order, discovery closed on July 15,
2020. During the discovery period, the parties took depositions, made requests for
documents, and served interrogatories.
On August 18, 2020, shortly before the scheduled start of trial, the parties entered a
Partial Settlement Agreement (PSA) . The PSA nominates a third party to act as the
personal representative of Alderink’s estate. The PSA also includes provisions governing
the distribution of the estate’s assets and specifies that the PSA “resolve[s] the differences
between the [w]ills and therefore any contest about which will controls is concluded and
resolved.” Relevant to this appeal, paragraph 6 of the PSA also provides “[t]he remaining
issues are any investigation into the assets of Jacob Alderink and the payment of [e]state
expenses and the distribution of the remainder in equal shares to [Alderink’s children].”
Paragraph 3 of the PSA governs that investigation and the award of associated
attorney fees and costs. It provides, in relevant part, that:
Wickstrom or Ivan Alderink may raise questions regarding the
actions taken by [Shaw ] in handling the assets of Jacob A.
Alderink, . . . for the period during which [Shaw ] was
appointed as Power of Attorney for Jacob Alderink through the
date of death of Jacob Alderink. Any such issues will be raised
and diligently pursued, and subject to any court orders that may
be entered in this action.
4

Paragraph 3 further provides, to the extent that any such “claims are found substantiated
by the [district court], ” Shaw is responsible for the expenses of such an “investigation,
including reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” But, “[t]o the extent that such claims are
found to be not substantiated by the [district c]ourt, . . . the reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs incurred by [Shaw] relating to her defense to such claims, will be paid by Ivan
[Alderink] and [Wickstrom].”
After the parties entered into the PSA, Wickstrom pursued such an investigation and
retained a forensic accountant, Value Consulting Group, to review Alderink’s financial
accounts. Ivan Alderink did not participate in the investigation. In June 2021, Value
Consulting Group produced a preliminary report. The report recommended seeking
additional documentation of transactions in Alderink’s accounts, but the report reached no
conclusions about any potentially improper withdrawal of funds from Alderink’s account
by Shaw.
In July 2022, over a year after receiving the report and approximately two years
after the close of discovery, Wickstrom petitioned the district court to reopen discovery to
obtain “additional discovery, including subpoenas and [an] additional deposition of” Shaw.
Shaw opposed the motion, emphasizing that Wickstrom had already deposed Shaw and
had made substantial discovery requests. Shaw also objected on the grounds that
Wickstrom “had an obligation to diligently pursue any claims” under the terms of the PSA
but failed to do so.
5
Following a contested hearing, the district court denied Wickstrom’s motion to
reopen discovery. The district court concluded that Wickstrom failed to meet her burden
to show good cause to reopen discovery and failed to act with due diligence. Specifically,
the court found that “[t]he testimony and evidence offered did not show that any missing
financial records were likely to show financial impropriety.” The court further found that
“Wickstrom knew of the purported missing financial records at least by June 29, 2021 (the
date of the preliminary report) and waited almost a year to bring this request to extend
discovery (two years after close of discovery).” And “[n]o explanation was provided for
this delay in requesting an extension after [Wickstrom] knew of the claimed missing
records identified by the preliminary report.”
In November 2024, Shaw filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to the PSA.
Shaw requested that the district court order Wickstrom to pay Shaw’s attorney fees that
had been incurred since entering into the PSA. Shaw argued that Wickstrom was liable for
Shaw’s fees under paragraph 3 of the PSA because Wickstrom “asserted baseless
allegations against [Shaw] nearly five years ago, then categorically failed to substantiate
her claims.” Shaw also argued that Wickstrom failed to diligently pursue her claims as
required by the PSA. Wickstrom opposed the motion, arguing that Shaw was not entitled
to attorney fees under the PSA because there had not been “a final contested hearing on the
merits” of Wickstrom’s claims and consequently the district court had not made a finding
that Wickstrom’s claims were “not substantiated”—a precondition to an award of attorney
fees under paragraph 3 of the PSA. Wickstrom also argued that Shaw’s request included
inappropriate fees.
6
Following a hearing, the district court granted Shaw’s motion for $44,819.04 in
attorney fees and costs and ordered that the requested attorney fees and costs be paid out
of Wickstrom’s distributive share of Alderink’s estate. In a written order, dated February 5,
2025, the district court found that Wickstrom “has failed to diligently pursue any
allegations against [Shaw].” The district court further found that Wickstrom “has failed to
substantiate any claim against [Shaw], and as such is liable for [Shaw’s] reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs.” Wickstrom filed a notice of appeal from this order.
Prior to filing the appeal, Wickstrom moved the district court for an award of
attorney fees and costs from Shaw. Wickstrom sought attorney fees pursuant to
section 524.3-720, rather than the PSA, arguing that she was entitled to statutory attorney
fees because her actions challenging Shaw’s conduct and the 2015 will were “for the
benefit of the estate.” Shortly thereafter, Shaw moved for additional fees pursuant to the
PSA, seeking fees incurred in bringing the November 2024 motion for fees.
By an order dated May 20, 2025, the district court granted Shaw’s motion and
denied Wickstrom’s motion. The district court ordered Wickstrom to pay an additional
$6,684.50 in attorney fees and costs. Wickstrom filed a notice of appeal from this order
on July 17, 2025, and we consolidated the appeals.
DECISION
Wickstrom raises four arguments on appeal. The first three arguments relate to the
district court’s decision to grant Shaw’s motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to
paragraph 3 of the PSA. The fourth argument relates to the district court’s decision to deny
Wickstrom’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to section 524.3-720.
7
“We review the district court’s award of attorney fees or costs for abuse of
discretion.” Brickner v. One Land Dev. Co., 742 N.W.2d 706, 711 (Minn. App. 2007), rev.
denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2008). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings
of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision
that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506
(Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). We consider each argument and discern no abuse of
discretion by the district court.
I. The district court’s award of attorney fees pursuant to paragraph 3 of the PSA
is consistent with the plain language of the PSA.

The district court awarded attorney fees and costs to Shaw pursuant to paragraph 3
of the PSA. Wickstrom challenges the awards made in both the February and April 2025
orders on the same basis, arguing the awards are not consistent with the language of
paragraph 3 of the PSA.
Paragraph 3 of the PSA provides in relevant part:
Donna Wickstrom or Ivan Alderink may raise questions
regarding the actions taken by Brenda Shaw in handling the
assets of Jacob A. Alderink, either through the personal
representative or by their own continuing investigation, for the
period during which Brenda Shaw was appointed as Power of
Attorney for Jacob Alderink through the date of death of Jacob
Alderink. Any such issues will be raised and diligently
pursued, and subject to any court orders that may be entered
in this action. To the extent Donna or Ivan raise such questions
regarding the actions taken by Brenda Shaw handling the assets
of Jacob A. Alderink, if the claims are found substantiated by
the Court against Brenda, such expenses for the Personal
Representative investigation, including reasonable attorneys’
fees and costs to the Personal Representative and the
reasonable attorney’s fees [and] costs incurred by Donna or
Ivan related to those claims, will be paid by Brenda. To the
8
extent that such claims are found to be not substantiated by the
Court, such expenses for the Personal Representative
investigation, including reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to
the Personal Representative and the reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs incurred by Brenda relating to her defense to such
claims, will be paid by Ivan and Donna. Such expenses will
first be offset against any individual’s distribution from the
Estate.

(Emphasis added.)
“The construction and effect of a settlement agreement is governed by the rules
of contract construction and presents a question of law, which we review de novo.”
Graff v. Robert M. Swendra Agency, Inc., 800 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Minn. 2011) (citations
omitted). Further, “[w]hen interpreting a contract, we must determine if the language is
clear and unambiguous, meaning it has only one reasonable interpretation.” Halla Nursery,
Inc. v. City of Chanhassen, 781 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Minn. 2010). “[W]e assign
unambiguous contract language its plain meaning.” Savela v. City of Duluth,
806 N.W.2d 793, 796– 97 (Minn. 2011). But, as noted above, we review the ultimate
decision to award attorney fees for abuse of discretion. Brickner, 742 N.W.2d at 711.
Characterizing the PSA’s language as “clear” and “unambiguous,” Wickstrom
argues the district court erred by awarding Shaw attorney fees and costs pursuant to
paragraph 3 of the PSA. Specifically, she contends that Shaw is not entitled to attorney
fees and costs under paragraph 3 because the conditions for an award were not met. We
are not persuaded.
Under the terms of paragraph 3, Wickstrom is permitted to raise questions and
investigate Shaw’s alleged financial impropriety, but such claims must be “diligently
9
pursued.” And, “[t]o the extent that such claims are found to be not substantiated by the
[c]ourt,” then Shaw is entitled to her reasonable attorney fees and costs related to the
defense of such claims.
Here, the record reflects that Wickstrom alleged in 2019 that Shaw withdrew funds
from Alderink’s bank accounts and further alleged that it did “not appear that the
withdrawal was [for] any legitimate purpose to meet any existing need for [Alderink].”
These allegations are sufficient to constitute “raising claims” under the terms of the PSA.
The record also reflects, and the district court found, that Wickstrom did not diligently
pursue these claims after entering into the PSA.
The central issue before us is then whether the district court found Wickstrom’s
claims were “not substantiated” within the meaning of the PSA thereby entitling Shaw to
her attorney fees and costs under paragraph 3 . Wickstrom argues that the district court
never made a ruling “on the merits” of her claims regarding Shaw’s alleged financial
misdealings, and therefore there was no finding that her claim was “not substantiated.”
This argument is unavailing.
In its order denying Wickstrom’s motion to reopen discovery, the district court
found, in relevant part, that (1) Wickstrom’s forensic accountant, Value Consulting Group,
“denied any finding of financial impropriety” by Shaw based on the records it reviewed,
and (2) there was no indication that the additional records being sought by Wickstrom
would show financial impropriety. Additionally, in its February 2025 order, the district
court specifically found that Wickstrom “has failed to substantiate any claim against”
10
Shaw. Likewise, in its May 2025 order, the district court found that Wickstrom “has failed
to substantiate any claim against” Shaw.
At oral argument, Wickstrom argued that the PSA required the district court to make
a more detailed ruling on the merits of Wickstrom’s claims of financial impropriety before
the claims could be “found to not be substantiated” within the meaning of paragraph 3 of
the PSA. No such language exists in the PSA, and Wickstrom effectively asks us to read
language into the agreement. We decline her invitation.
In reviewing the language of the PSA, “we review the language of the contract to
determine the intent of the parties.” Dykes v. Sukup Mfg. Co. , 781 N.W.2d 578, 582
(Minn. 2010). We must construe the agreement “as a whole” with “attempt[s] to
harmonize all of its clauses.” Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 883 N.W.2d 772, 776
(Minn. 2016). As noted above, if “the language is clear and unambiguous, [this court]
enforce[s] the agreement of the parties as expressed in the language of the contract.”
Dykes, 781 N.W.2d at 582 (citations omitted). “Courts may not . . . add provisions
upon which the parties have not agreed.” Knudsen v. Transp. Leasing/Cont., Inc.,
672 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 25, 2004).
Here, the language of the PSA is clear. The terms of the PSA do not require a
detailed ruling on the merits; paragraph 3 simply requires a finding by the district court
that Wickstrom’s claims were “not substantiated.” The district court made that precise
finding in both of its February and May 2025 orders awarding attorney fees and costs to
Shaw. In both orders, the district court found Wickstrom “has failed to substantiate any
claim against” Shaw. These findings are sufficient to support the district court’s award of
11
attorney fees and costs to Shaw. Accordingly, we reject Wickstrom’s argument that the
award of attorney fees and costs to Shaw was not consistent with the terms of the PSA.
II. Wickstrom’s impossibility argument lacks legal support.

Wickstrom next argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding
attorney fees and costs pursuant to the PSA because the district court’s denial of her motion
to reopen discovery made it legally “impossible” for her claims to be found “substantiated
or unsubstantiated.” We are not persuaded.
Under Minnesota law, the doctrine of impossibility can excuse a party’s
nonperformance of a contractual duty when “due to the existence of a fact or circumstance
of which the promisor at the time of the making of the contract neither knew nor had reason
to know” renders performance impossible or “impracticable in the sense that performance
would cast upon the promisor an excessive or unreason ably burdensome hardship, loss,
expense, or injury.” Powers v. Siats, 70 N.W.2d 344, 348 (Minn. 1955).
Wickstrom has not demonstrated that the district court’s denial of her motion to
reopen discovery rendered her performance under paragraph 3 of the PSA legally
impossible. The record shows that Wickstrom had every reason to know whether she
would act diligently in bringing her claims at the time that she entered into the PSA. And
she knew when her financial consultant’s report was complete. Yet without explanation,
she waited over a year after receiving that report before moving to reopen discovery. In
other words, it was Wickstrom’s own conduct that led to the district court denying her
motion to reopen discovery. Wickstrom’s nonperformance was not due to the existence of
a fact or circumstance of which Wickstrom neither knew nor had reason to know at the
12
time she entered into the PSA. The district court’s denial of her motion to reopen discovery
did not render compliance with paragraph 3 legally impossible. We therefore conclude
that Wickstrom’s impossibility argument fails.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Wickstrom’s reliance on the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. Specifically, Wickstrom relies on the “frustration of purpose”
language from the Restatement to support her argument. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts states in relevant part:
Where, after a contract is made, a party’s principal purpose is
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of
an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption
on which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render
performance are discharged, unless the language or the
circumstances indicate the contrary.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 265 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (emphasis added). But as
discussed above, to the extent that Wickstrom’s principal purpose was frustrated, it was
frustrated by her own failure to raise her claims against Shaw in a timely manner. In other
words, the doctrine of “frustration of purpose” is inapplicable because Wickstrom’s
inability to further pursue her claims is her own fault.
The only other legal authority that Wickstrom cites to support her argument is In re
Hennepin Cnty. 1986 Recycling Bond Litig., 540 N.W.2d 494, 503 (Minn. 1995).
Wickstrom contends that this case stands for the proposition that “equitable principles bar
a party from capitalizing on a condition’s failure where performance was frustrated.” But
here, Shaw did not frustrate Wickstrom’s performance. Rather, Wickstrom’s performance
was frustrated by her own failure to diligently pursue her claims. Wickstrom’s reliance on
13
Hennepin County is misguided. We therefore conclude that Wickstrom has failed to
demonstrate the impossibility doctrine requires reversal of the district court’s award of
attorney fees and costs to Shaw pursuant to paragraph 3 of the PSA.
III. Section 524.3-720 does not apply to the district court’s award of attorney fees
and costs to Shaw.

Wickstrom next argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding
attorney fees and costs to Shaw because the district court did not consider whether such an
award met the requirements of Minnesota Statutes section 524.3-720. Specifically, she
contends that section 524.3-720 requires a showing of a benefit to the estate before fees are
awarded and paid from the estate. This argument is unpersuasive because the district court
awarded attorney fees and costs to Shaw paid from the estate pursuant to the PSA, not
pursuant to section 524.3-720.
Under section 524.3-720, a personal representative who “defends or prosecutes any
proceeding in good faith” in estate litigation may recover “necessary expenses and
disbursements” from the estate. Minn. Stat. § 524.3-720. Additionally, section 524.3-720
provides that “any interested person” may be awarded reasonable attorney fees when the
services of the attorney for the “interested person contribute to the benefit of the
estate . . . as distinguished from the personal benefit of such person.” Id.
While section 524.3 -720 allows for an award of attorney fees in these specified
circumstances, it does not preclude a district court from making an award of attorney fees
pursuant to a settlement agreement entered into by parties to estate litigation. Id. Nor does
14
it require that a district court find that a party’s conduct “benefited the estate,” as argued
by Wickstrom, before such an award can be made pursuant to a settlement agreement. Id.
Rather, when a motion for attorney fees is made pursuant to a contract such as a
settlement agreement, the terms of the contract itself govern the award. Generally, “[t]he
American rule prevents a party from shifting its attorney fees to its adversary without a
specific contract or statutory authorization.” Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356,
363 (Minn. 1998). But if the parties agree to shift fees by contract, the contract controls;
indeed, if authorized by contract, a party need not prevail to be awarded attorney fees.
Oleisky v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Minneapolis, 398 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Minn.
App. 1986), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 1987). And, as Wickstrom herself notes at length,
she “bargain[ed] and negotiate[d]” for the PSA. Consequently, we reject Wickstrom’s
argument that the district court was required to consider section 524.3-720 in determining
whether to award attorney fees to Shaw pursuant to the PSA.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wickstrom’s motion
for attorney fees.

Lastly, Wickstrom argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her
motion for attorney fees and costs. This argument is unavailing.
Wickstrom petitioned for attorney fees pursuant to section 524.3-720, not the PSA.
As noted above, under section 524.3-720, a personal representative who “defends or
prosecutes any proceeding in good faith” in estate litigation may recover “necessary
expenses and disbursements” from the estate and an “interested person” may be awarded
reasonable attorney fees when the services of the attorney “contribute to the benefit of the
15
estate . . . as distinguished from the personal benefit of such person.” Minn. Stat. § 524.3-
720.
We review the district court’s denial of attorney fees under this statutory provision
for an abuse of discretion. See In re Est. of Torgersen, 711 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Minn.
App. 2006) (reviewing the denial of attorney fees under section 524.3-720 for an abuse of
discretion), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2006). And we have held in the past that “[t]he
public policy underlying this statute recognizes that an estate as an entity is benefited when
genuine controversies as to the validity or construction of a will are litigated and finally
determined.” Id. at 555 (quotation omitted). But where an interested person acts not for
the benefit of the estate, but for their own benefit, attorney fees are not proper. See In re
Est. & Tr. of Anderson, 654 N.W.2d 682, 688 (Minn. App. 2002) (affirming the denial of
attorney fees to a beneficiary because her legal actions “would have been to her personal
benefit as a beneficiary, for which section 524.3-720 does not allow reimbursement”), rev.
denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2003).
Wickstrom sought fees under Minnesota Statutes section 524.3-720 on the grounds
that the fees “correspond to the legal work necessary to protect [Alderink’s] estate and thus
should be paid from the estate.” In support of her motion for attorney fees, Wickstrom
argued that she conferred a “benefit to the estate” by coming forward with the 2019 will
and challenging the 2015 will. The district court denied Wickstrom’s motion for attorney
fees, concluding that the “agreed upon terms of the [PSA] identically follow the [2015
will]” and therefore Wickstrom’s litigation did not benefit the estate.
16
On appeal, Wickstrom argues that the district court abused its discretion when it
determined that Wickstrom’s litigation did not benefit the estate. She contends that her
accounting investigation, conducted by Value Consulting Group, benefited the estate
because it was “intended to identify and recover assets that may have been diverted before
death by” Shaw. But the accounting investigation never identified any assets that were
improperly diverted. And, as she acknowledges, the district court specifically found that
(1) Value Consulting Group did not identify any financial impropriety, and (2) there was
no indication that the additional records that Wickstrom sought would show financial
impropriety.
Moreover, Wickstrom never explains how the district court abused its discretion in
relying on these findings in denying her motion for attorney fees and costs beyond her bare
assertion that “[h]ad additional discovery been allowed to proceed . . . any improperly
diverted funds could have been restored, thereby increasing the estate’s benefit to all heirs.”
In effect, Wickstrom asks us to set aside the district court’s findings in favor of her
speculation about what would have happened had she prevailed on her motion to amend
the scheduling order. But it is not our role to reweigh the evidence or to speculate about
what might have occurred had the district court not denied her motion to amend the
scheduling order. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (explaining that
appellate courts typically only address issues that were presented to and considered by the
district court); see also In re Est. of Riggle, 654 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Minn. App. 2002) (“This
court does not reweigh the evidence presented to a district court.”).
17
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Wickstrom’s motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to
section 524.3-720. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees
and costs to Shaw pursuant to the PSA.
Affirmed.