State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0558

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joseph Patrick Martin, II,
Appellant.

Filed March 16, 2026
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-24-6402

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael T. Walters, Olmsted County Attorney, James E. Haase, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
This is an appeal from final judgments of conviction for two counts of felony
domestic assault. Appellant argues that, because the probative value of evidence of his
similar conduct against the victim— which the district court admitted under Minnesota
2
Statutes section 634.20 (2024)—is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, and because there is a reasonable possibility that the challenged evidence
substantially influenced the jury to convict him, the court prejudicially abused its discretion
in admitting the evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Joseph Patrick Martin II with two
counts of felony domestic assault, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242,
subdivision 4 (2024), and two counts of domestic assault by strangulation, in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 609.2247, subdivision 2 (2024). 1 According to the amended
complaint, Martin committed multiple acts of physical assault against the victim, a woman
with whom he had been in a relationship, on September 14 and 15, 2024. The matter
proceeded to a jury trial. The following factual summary stems from the record of the
pretrial and trial proceedings.
Under Minnesota Statutes section 634.20, the state filed pretrial notice of its intent
to introduce “evidence of prior acts of domestic abuse by the defendant against the victim.”
The district court heard arguments on this issue during a hearing before jury selection on
the first day of trial. The state explained that it sought to admit evidence of incidents
involving Martin and the victim that occurred in the days before and after the charged
conduct. Moreover, the state maintained that the evidence “shows the context of their
relationship and how [Martin] treats the people close to [him]” and that the evidence

1 The state initially charged Martin with only one count of felony domestic assault, but later
filed an amended complaint charging all four offenses described above.
3
concerned “intertwining offenses . . . in relation to the [charged] offenses.” Martin
objected, asserting that it was “very prejudicial” and that “the prejudice significantly
outweighs . . . the probative value” of the evidence. The district court ruled that the
evidence was admissible, reasoning that it meets “the definition of 634.20” and “just
explains the relationship,” and that “the probative value . . . is [not] substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”
At trial, the victim testified about the charged incidents, which she said occurred on
September 14 and 15, 2024, at Martin’s apartment. More specifically, the victim stated
that, on September 14, Martin “got aggressive with [her] by putting his hands on [her], on
[her] throat, [her] arms, [her] legs,” and by “pulling [her] hair.” The victim testified that,
as Martin grabbed her throat, “[h]e was just tossing [her] like a rag doll” and “hitting [her]
head on his nightstand.” And the victim said that “the same thing happened again” on
September 15—Martin was “aggressive” and “grabb[ed] [her] throat, . . . yank[ed] [her]
hair, [and] grabb[ed] [her] by the arms[] [and] legs.”
The victim also provided the following testimony, which the district court admitted
under Minnesota Statutes section 634.20, with a limiting instruction.
2 According to the

2 Each time the district court admitted testimony about the Minnesota Statutes section
634.20 evidence, the court provided the jury a limiting instruction. For example, the first
limiting instruction that the district court gave the jury provides in relevant part:

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are about to hear
evidence of conduct by . . . Martin on one or more separate
occasions. This evidence is being offered for the limited
purpose of demonstrating the nature and extent of the
relationship between . . . Martin and [the victim] in order to
assist you in determining whether . . . Martin committed those
4
victim, on September 13, 2024, she and Martin had “an eight-hour [phone] conversation”
that involved “[a] lot of paranoia” and accusations that the victim “was having sex with
multiple other men.” The victim said that, the next day (i.e., before the incident at Martin’s
apartment), Martin “picked [her] up” and “put [her] in the car,” after which they began to
argue, Martin “kept on accusing [her] of things,” and they “both got physical with each
other.” And the victim described an incident that occurred on September 18, in which
Martin said something that made the victim angry, the victim started walking away, and
Martin “grabbed [her] by the hair,” pulled her toward his car, “grabbed [her] by the neck,”
“hit [her] up against the car,” and told her “how he was [going to] kill [her] by throwing
[her] into [a] river.”
Aside from these statements by the victim, the victim’s probation officer testified
that the victim told the probation officer in text messages that Martin had “threatened to
kill her, . . . was verbally, mentally, and emotionally abusive to her, and . . . had grabbed
her by the arms . . . on September 14th, 15th, and 18th.” Martin’s supervised-release officer
also testified that the victim told her that “there [were] three inciden[t]s of domestic
violence that she was the victim of with . . . Martin on the 14th and 15th
of . . . [September,]” as well as “a third incident that happened out of county.” And a law

acts with which he’s charged in the complaint. This evidence
is not to be used to prove the character of . . . Martin or that he
acted in conformity with such character. . . . Martin is not
being tried for, and may not be convicted of, any behavior other
than the charged offense[s]. You’re not to convict . . . Martin
on the basis of conduct on these separate occasions.

The district court’s other limiting instructions are worded similarly.
5
enforcement officer testified about his recorded conversation with the victim regarding the
various incidents; a copy of the recording was admitted into evidence, along with
photographs of the victim’s right arm—which showed a small bruise —and her legs.
Noting that the evidence was “for the limited purpose of demonstrating the nature
and extent of the relationship between” Martin and the victim, and “whether [Martin]
committed . . . the acts that happened on September 14th and 15th,” the state referenced
the Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 evidence during its opening statement and closing
arguments. The district court’s final charge to the jury included an instruction that the
section 634.20 evidence was “admitted for the limited purpose of demonstrating the nature
and extent of the relationship between . . . Martin and [the victim] in order to assist [the
jury] in determining whether . . . Martin committed those acts with which he [was] charged
in the complaint.”
And the instruction informed the jury that the section 634.20 evidence
was “not to be used to prove the character of . . . Martin or that he acted in conformity with
such character,” that Martin was “not being tried for, and [could] not be convicted of, any
behavior other than the charged offense[s],” and that the jury was “not to
convict . . . Martin on the basis of similar conduct on a separate occasion.” Martin did not
object to any of the district court’s limiting instructions about the section 634.20 evidence.
The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts of felony domestic assault and not-
guilty verdicts on both counts of domestic assault by strangulation. The district court
sentenced Martin to 39 months’ imprisonment for one count of felony domestic assault and
a consecutive term of 12 months’ imprisonment for the second count, for a total of 51
months’ imprisonment. Martin appeals.
6
DECISION
Martin contends that, because the probative value of the evidence of his similar
conduct against the victim is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
and because there is a reasonable possibility that this evidence substantially influenced the
jury to convict him, the district court prejudicially abused its discretion in admitting the
evidence under Minnesota Statutes section 634.20. In particular, Martin maintains that the
section 634.20 evidence has minimal probative value— which he claims is limited to
showing his bad character—and that there is a significant danger of unfair prejudice. The
state counters that, among other things, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the section 634.20 evidence. We agree with the state.
“Appellate courts review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Boswell, 20 N.W.3d 640, 651 (Minn. App. 2025) (citing State v. Ali,
855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014)), rev. denied (Minn. June 25, 2025). “A district court
abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Fernandez Sorto , 12 N.W.3d 207, 214 (Minn.
App. 2024) (quoting State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019)), rev. denied
(Minn. Dec. 17, 2024). “Even if the evidence was erroneously admitted, appellate courts
generally will not reverse a verdict ‘unless there is a reasonable possibility that the
wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.’” Boswell, 20 N.W.3d at
651 (quoting State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024)). “The appellant bears the
burden to show that evidence was erroneously admitted and that it prejudiced him.” Id.
(citing State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2006)).
7
Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 provides in relevant part:

Evidence of similar conduct by the accused against the
victim of domestic abuse . . . is admissible unless the probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

“‘Similar conduct’ includes, but is not limited to, evidence of domestic abuse . . . .” Minn.
Stat. § 634.20. “‘Domestic abuse’ . . . ha[s] the meaning[] given under section 518B.01,
subdivision 2.” Id. As relevant here, domestic abuse includes (1) “physical harm, bodily
injury, or assault,” (2) “the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or
assault,” or (3) “terroristic threats, within the meaning of section 609.713, subdivision 1.”
Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a) (2024). For present purposes, “ terroristic threats” is
defined as “threaten[ing], directly or indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with
purpose to terrorize another . . . or in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2024). And as pertains to this case, the definition of “crime
of violence” includes first- and second-degree murder and manslaughter under Minnesota
Statutes sections 609.185, .19, .20, and .205 (2024). Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 1(d)
(2024); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (“As used in this subdivision, ‘crime of
violence’ has the meaning given ‘violent crime’ in section 609.1095, subdivision 1,
paragraph (d).”).
Under Minnesota Statutes section 634.20, district courts may admit “evidence of
prior conduct between the accused and the alleged victim . . . to illuminate the history of
the relationship, that is, to put the crime charged in the context of the relationship between
8
the two.” State v. Zinski, 927 N.W.2d 272, 278 (Minn. 2019) (quoting State v. McCoy, 682
N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2004)). 3 The Minnesota Supreme Court has “on numerous
occasions recognized the inherent value of evidence of past acts of violence committed by
the same defendant against the same victim.” State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn.
2006) (quotation omitted). Thus, “evidence of similar conduct in domestic abuse trials is
relevant and admissible unless the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“When balancing the probative value against the potential prejudice, unfair
prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even severely damaging evidence; rather,
unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair
advantage.” Id. (quotation omitted). Persuasion by illegitimate means includes “leading the
jury to improperly conclude that [the defendant] has a propensity to behave criminally and
should now be convicted, and punished, for the charged offenses.” State v. Hormann, 805
N.W.2d 883, 891 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012). But unfair
prejudice does not mean “damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate
probative force of the evidence.” State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 797 (Minn. 2014)

3 In McCoy, the Minnesota Supreme Court “expressly adopt[ed] Minn. Stat. § 634.20 as a
rule of evidence for the admission of evidence of similar conduct by the accused against
the alleged victim of domestic abuse.” 682 N.W.2d at 161. “In State v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d
615, 627 (Minn. 2015), [the Minnesota Supreme Court] explicitly extended that adoption
to the amended version of Minn. Stat. § 634.20.” Zinski, 927 N.W.2d at 274 n.4. And in
McCoy, the supreme court further held “that Minn. Stat. § 634.20 provides for the
admission of similar conduct in domestic abuse cases without requiring the heightened
standard that the evidence be clear and convincing,” as is required for the admission of
evidence under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b). 682 N.W.2d at 158–59.
9
(quotation omitted). “A district court’s limiting instruction lessens the probability of undue
weight being given by the jury to the evidence.” State v. Ware, 856 N.W.2d 719, 729
(Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted).
In admitting the challenged evidence, the district court reasoned that the evidence
meets “the definition of 634.20” and “just explains the relationship,” and that “the
probative value . . . is [not] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling.
The district court acted within its discretion in determining that the Minnesota
Statutes section 634.20 evidence illuminated Martin’s relationship with the victim in the
days before and after the charged offenses, thereby contextualizing Martin’s conduct. See
Zinski, 927 N.W.2d at 278. The challenged evidence had “inherent value” because it
concerned “acts of violence committed by the same defendant against the same victim.”
Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 641 (quotation omitted). And the section 634.20 evidence had
probative value as to the victim’s credibility, inasmuch as it helped the jury evaluate the
victim’s account. See Boswell, 20 N.W.3d at 653 (concluding “the testimony about [the
defendant’s] abuse of a past romantic partner had significant probative value because it
helped the jury evaluate the credibility of [the victim’s] account of abuse”).
At the same time, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the
Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 evidence was not unfairly prejudicial because it neither
persuaded by illegitimate means nor gave the state an unfair advantage. See Mosley, 853
N.W.2d at 797; Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 641; Hormann, 805 N.W.2d at 891. Moreover, the
district court’s repeated limiting instructions “lessen[ed] the probability of undue weight
10
being given by the jury to the evidence.” Ware, 856 N.W.2d at 729 (quotation omitted).
Although Martin asserts that the district court’s final, unobjected -to jury instructions
“exacerbated rather than lessened the potential for unfair prejudice by virtually ensuring
the jury would consider the improperly admitted evidence when deciding Martin’s guilt,”
binding precedent required the court to “instruct the jurors on the proper use of [the section
634.20] evidence.” Zinski, 927 N.W.2d at 278 (footnote omitted) (holding that, “w hen a
district court admits relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20, over a defendant’s
objection that the evidence does not satisfy section 634.20, the court must sua sponte
instruct the jurors on the proper use of such evidence, unless the defendant objects to the
instruction by the court”). Because the district court’s unobjected-to limiting instructions
accurately informed the jury about the proper use of the section 634.20 evidence and
discharged the court’s duty under Zinski to sua sponte instruct the jury, we reject Martin’s
argument that the court’s instructions “exacerbated rather than lessened the potential for
unfair prejudice.”
In sum, because the probative value of the Minnesota Statutes section 634.20
evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the district court
acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence.
4
Affirmed.

4 In light of our conclusion, we need not address whether “there is a reasonable possibility
that the . . . admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” Boswell, 20 N.W.3d at
651 (quotation omitted).