Simon Christopher Mueller, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0564

Simon Christopher Mueller, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 8, 2025
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Goodhue County District Court
File Nos. 25-CR-11-1377; 25-CR-11-3205

Simon Christopher Mueller, Rush City, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Stephen F. O’Keefe, Goodhue County Attorney, Erin L. Kuester, Assistant County
Attorney, Red Wing, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s treatment of his sentence-correction
request as a petition for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2024), and the
postconviction court’s subsequent denial because of procedural bars. Appellant argues that
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he properly filed a motion for a corrected sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9,
which is not subject to the same procedural bars. We conclude that the postconviction
court erred by construing appellant’s request as a petition for postconviction relief. But
because the issues raised by appellant do not provide a basis for relief, we affirm.
FACTS
In a 2012 court trial, the district court convicted appellant Simon Christopher
Mueller of 12 counts of criminal sexual conduct: seven counts in the first degree in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342 (2008), and five counts in the second degree in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.343 (2008). Appellant committed these offenses against three
juveniles.
At the time of sentencing, appellant had a criminal-history score of zero. As a result,
his presumptive sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct under section 609.342
was 144 months, with a range of 144 months to 172 months. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
IV (Supp. 2009). Respondent State of Minnesota requested three permissive consecutive
sentences of 172 months, for a total of 516 months. The state argued that the district court
should sentence appellant for three of the 12 counts, “one count for each victim
consecutively.” Appellant requested a downward dispositional departure, a down ward
durational departure, or concurrent sentences totaling between 306 and 360 months.
The district court sentenced appellant to three permissive consecutive sentences of
160 months for a total of 480 months in prison. Each sentence corresponded to one
conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct against one individual victim. In a direct
appeal in 2012, appellant argued that the district court erred by admitting certain testimony
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at trial. We affirmed, and the supreme court denied his petition for further review. See
State v. Mueller, No. A12-1353, 2013 WL 3155412, at *4 (Minn. App. June 24, 2013), rev.
denied (Minn. Sep. 17, 2013).
In 2014, appellant filed a letter with the postconviction court requesting a reduced
sentence and then moved for a reduced sentence. The postconviction court denied each
request. In 2023, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, disputing his guilt with
respect to one of the victims. Despite the applicable procedural bars, appellant argued that
his petition should be heard based on the “interests of justice.” The postconviction court
disagreed and denied the petition as procedurally barred.
Most recently, in 2025, appellant filed what he framed as a motion for correction or
reduction of sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 (the “rule 27.03 motion”).
Appellant argued that his sentence was unlawful because it relied on an improper criminal-
history score and inapplicable statutes.
The postconviction court interpreted appellant’s rule 27.03 motion as a “petition for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 590.01 et seq.” (the “postconviction
petition”). Applying the procedural bars relevant to a postconviction petition, the
postconviction court denied appellant’s request.
This appeal follows.

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DECISION
I. The postconviction court erred by construing appellant’s rule 27.03 motion as
a postconviction petition.

Appellant argues that his rule 27.03 motion focused solely on his sentence and the
postconviction court erred by construing the motion as a postconviction petition. We agree.
“The standard for reviewing a district court’s decision to treat a motion to correct a
sentence under Rule 27.03 as a postconviction petition . . . remains an open question. ”
Bolstad v. State, 966 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Minn. 2021). If the arguments on appeal require
statutory interpretation, as they do here, the standard of review is de novo. Id. at 242-43.
Following a direct appeal, an appellant has two potential pathways for relief: a
petition for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. § 590.01 or a motion to correct or
reduce sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. See Washington v. State, 845
N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn. App. 2014). These pathways differ in scope and restrictions. See
id. at 212.
A postconviction petition challenges a conviction. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 1. A statutory time bar applies, prohibiting a litigant from filing the postconviction
petition after two years from when the claim arises. Id., subd. 4(a). A second procedural
bar also applies after a litigant makes a direct appeal, prohibiting the litigant from raising
(1) issues already raised in a direct appeal, (2) any “claims known but not raised,” or
(3) any claims that “should have been known but were not raised in the direct appeal.”
State v. Knaffla , 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 ( Minn. 1976); Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616,
626 (Minn. 2015).
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These procedural bars do not apply to a rule 27.03 motion. Washington, 845
N.W.2d at 211. A rule 27.03 motion is permissible “at any time.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03,
subd. 9. But it is “limited to sentences”: a proper rule 27.03 motion must allege that a
sentence is “contrary to law or applicable statutes.” State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477, 480
(Minn. 2015); State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2015). Similarly, the
postconviction court’s authority under rule 27.03 “is restricted to modifying a sentence.”
Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 480.
To assess whether a rule 27.03 motion is properly presented, postconviction courts
“look to the pleadings and the relief sought.” Id. If a request implicates “more than simply
the sentence,” even if framed as a rule 27.03 motion, the postconviction court should treat
it as a postconviction petition. Munt v. State, 920 N.W.2d 410, 415 (Minn. 2018)
(quotation omitted). Postconviction courts treat certain types of requests in this way,
including those that challenge an underlying conviction, challenge a sentence that is part
of a plea agreement, or request a new trial. See, e.g., Wayne v. State, 870 N.W.2d 389, 392
(Minn. 2015) (treating request as postconviction petition because it “questioned the validity
of [appellant’s] first- degree murder conviction” and would require “a new trial, not a
reduced sentence”); Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 481 (discussing interrelated nature of
convictions and sentences in plea agreements).
The state argues that appellant’s submission is properly treated as a postconviction
petition because his claims “implicated more than the criminal sentence.” For support, the
state points to appellant’s statements about ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
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counsel. The state contends that including this claim transformed appellant’s request from
a rule 27.03 motion into a postconviction petition. We are not persuaded.
Appellant’s request included pages of detailed arguments about why his sentence
was unlawful under both Minnesota law and the sentencing guidelines. Appellant also
included a two-sentence paragraph stating that his prior counsel was ineffective.
Appellant’s brief included no other statement, heading, or request for relief relating to a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The paragraph centered on appellant’s
frustration with counsel solely in the context of sentencing , providing context for his rule
27.03 motion.
Appellant’s motion focused on his view that his sentence was unauthorized by law
and, if the postconviction court granted the request, the relief would be a reduction in his
sentence. Appellant also specifically indicate d that the request “does not involve more
than a simple sentence correction.” When viewed as a whole, the request did not implicate
anything outside of appellant’s sentence. It is properly considered a rule 27.03 motion,
which is not subject to the same procedural bars as a postconviction petition. Washington,
845 N.W.2d at 211. The postconviction court therefore erred by construing appellant’s
request as a postconviction petition and determining that it was procedurally barred.
II. We affirm the postconviction court’s denial because appellant’s claims do not
provide a basis for relief.

In his rule 27.03 motion, appellant argued that his sentence relied on an improper
criminal-history score and inapplicable statutory provisions. We disagree.
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Appellate courts review a postconviction court’s denial of a rule 27.03 motion for
an abuse of discretion,1 reviewing legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear
error. Townsend v. State, 834 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn. 2013). Appellant bears the burden
to prove that he received an unlawful sentence. Williams v. State, 910 N.W.2d 736, 742-
43 (Minn. 2018). We may affirm the district court’s decision “on any ground, including
one not relied on by the [postconviction ] court.” State v. Fellegy, 819 N.W.2d 700, 707
(Minn. App. 2012), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2012).
A. Criminal-History Score
Appellant appears to argue that the district court improperly included prior offenses
in his criminal-history score, aggravating his second and third sentences.
Appellate courts review a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn.
July 20, 2010). But “[o]nly in a rare case” will a reviewing court reverse a district court
that imposes a presumptive sentence. Id. (quotation omitted). An unlawful sentence “must
have been illegal at the time it was imposed.” Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125, 133
(Minn. 2016). Whether a sentence conforms to the sentencing guidelines is a question of
law that appellate courts review de novo. See State v. Williams, 771 N.W.2d 514, 520
(Minn. 2009).

1 Because the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly authorize an appeal
from an order denying a rule 27.03 motion, we “treat[] such appeals as appeals from
postconviction orders if the motion was filed beyond the time for a direct appeal. ”
Washington, 845 N.W.2d at 211 n.1.
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The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines include grids with presumptive sentence
lengths based on the severity level of an offense and a person’s criminal-history score. See,
e.g., Minn. Sent’g Guidelines IV. Each cell in a grid “denote[s] the range within which a
judge may sentence.” Id. Any number within the range is an acceptable sentence. See
State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 359 n.2 (Minn. 2008).
The district court imposed consecutive sentences for appellant’s three convictions
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, 160 months per conviction. Each of appellant’s
160-month sentences falls within the acceptable sentencing range for an offense of first-
degree criminal sexual conduct with a criminal-history score of zero. See Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines IV (providing acceptable sentence range of 144 to 172 months). Appellant
points to no evidence that the district court used another criminal-history score to calculate
any of his sentences.
The district court sentenced appellant to serve these sentences consecutively. The
guidelines permit consecutive sentencing when there are “[m]ultiple current felony
convictions” based on certain eligible offenses. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines II.F.2.b (Supp.
2009). First-degree criminal sexual conduct is one of the eligible offenses. See Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines VI (Supp. 2009). The district court could therefore impose appellant’s
sentences consecutively. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines II.F.2 & cmt. II.F.202 (Supp. 2009).
Because the district court sentenced appellant within the guidelines, we conclude that it did
not abuse its discretion. See Delk, 781 N.W.2d at 428.

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B. Statutory Provisions
Appellant appears to argue that his total sentence exceeds the statutory maximum
set out in Minn. Stat. § 609.342, so the district court must have relied on another, incorrect
statute for sentencing. Appellant assumes that this other statute is Minn. Stat. § 609.3455
(2008), and he disputes its relevance based on statutory language.
A rule 27.03 motion may challenge a sentence as “unauthorized by law.” State v.
Cook, 617 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 21, 2000). A
sentence is “unauthorized by law” when it does not meet the requirements of the applicable
sentencing statute. Id. Interpretation of sentencing statutes is a question of law subject to
de novo review. State v. Amundson, 828 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. App. 2013).
Although appellant argues that the district court sentenced him based on Minn. Stat.
§ 609.3455, he points to no evidence to support this claim. We are not persuaded that the
district court considered the provisions appellant cites, which impose mandatory sentences
of life or double a presumptive sentence, to impose appellant’s 160-month sentences here.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subds. 3, 3a.
Rather, Minn. Stat. § 609.342 sets out the definition, penalties, and staying
procedures for first -degree criminal sexual conduct. The penalty section states, in
part: “(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 609.3455; or Minnesota Statutes 2004,
section 609.109, a person convicted under subdivision 1 may be sentenced to imprisonment
for not more than 30 years or to a payment of a fine of not more than $40,000, or both.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2(a) (emphasis added).
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In his rule 27.03 motion, appellant emphasizes the phrase “not more than 30 years.”
Appellant appears to argue that his total sentence of 480 months exceeds this statutory
maximum.
As discussed, the district court sentenced appellant to three 160-month sentences,
each based on one conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct against one individual
victim. The 30- year maximum penalty in section 609.342 applies to each sentenced
offense individually, not the three sentences taken together. See State v. Senske, 692
N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn. App. 2005) (“Consecutive sentencing concerns the relationship
between two sentences, separately imposed for different offenses.”), rev. denied (Minn.
May 17, 2005); Minn. Sent’g Guidelines II.H (Supp. 2009) (comparing statutory maximum
with acceptable sentencing range for one offense). We conclude that, for each of the three
sentences, the district court applied the appropriate statute and did not exceed the statutory
maximum. We therefore affirm the postconviction court’s decision to deny relief, although
on different grounds.
Affirmed.