State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0571

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Aaron James Beaulieu,
Appellant.

Filed December 1, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Larkin, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CR-10-1656

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Corey J. Haller, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Timothy S. Kilgriff, Assistant County
Attorney, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his second preliminary application
to vacate his convictions for aiding and abetting second-degree felony murder. We reverse
and remand.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Aaron James Beaulieu with
aiding and abetting second -degree intentional murder; aiding and abetting second -degree
felony murder (first-degree assault); and aiding and abetting second-degree felony murder
(kidnapping). The matter proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury was permitted to consider
two lesser offenses, third- and fifth-degree assault. The jury found Beaulieu not guilty of
aiding and abetting second-degree intentional murder, guilty of both counts of aiding and
abetting second-degree felony murder, and guilty of third- and fifth-degree assault.
We affirmed Beaulieu’s conviction s on appeal , and the supreme court denied
Beaulieu’s petition for review. State v. Beaulieu, No. A12-0977, 2013 WL 4779016, at *5
(Minn. App. Sept. 9, 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 26, 2013).
Our opinion described the evidence supporting the jury’s guilty verdicts as follows.
In July 2010, the victim was at Nathan Bugg ’s residence with Bugg, Joshua Boyd, and
Beaulieu. Bugg testified that Beaulieu became angry , yelled at the victim , and later
charged at the victim, knocked him to the ground, and began punching him in the head.
Bugg testified that the victim was down on the ground trying to protect himself and that
Beaulieu stood over the victim and punched him in the head more than five times . Bugg
3
testified that, when Beaulieu stopped punching the victim, Boyd dragged the victim into
the garage. Boyd then began kicking the victim in the body and head. Bugg testified that
he kicked the victim as well because he was afraid of Boyd, and that he and Beaulieu tried
to pull Boyd away from the victim. At trial, Bugg could not recall whether Beaulieu kicked
the victim in the garage . But a few days after the offense , Bugg told another individual
that Boyd and Beaulieu were stomping on the victim’s head.
Bugg testified that, when they stopped assaulting the victim, they left him moaning
on the garage floor and went inside the house. Bugg and Boyd later loaded the victim into
the back of Boyd’s Suburban. Bugg testified that the victim was snoring and unconscious
at that time. Bugg testified that Beaulieu told Boyd to take the victim home, but no one
called the police, an ambulance, or the victim ’s mother or girlfriend. A search party later
found the victim’s burned body in the woods.
Beaulieu’s cousin M.J. testified that Beaulieu told him about the assault. M.J.
testified that Beaulieu said he beat the victim up, knocked the victim to the ground, and
then helped the victim back up. According to M.J., Beaulieu stated that Boyd then started
beating on the victim, knocked him to the ground, stomped on his head, and that Bugg
helped Boyd kick the victim. M.J. acknowledged giving a prior statement indicating that
Beaulieu kicked the victim in the body and back. Beaulieu told M.J. that Be aulieu and
Boyd talked to potential witnesses and told them not to say anything.
4
In April 2024, Beaulieu filed a preliminary application to vacate his felony-murder
convictions1 under a newly enacted law that provides a process to vacate a conviction of
aiding and abetting second-degree felony murder under certain circumstances. 2023 Minn.
Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, at 864 -68. The district court summarily denied Beaulieu’s
application.
In January 2025, Beaulieu filed a second preliminary application for relief. 2 In his
application, Beaulieu asserted that he “did not cause the death of a human being and did
not act with extreme indifference to human life” because , “after [his] initial fight with the
victim, [he] helped the victim off the ground, tried to stop his codefendant from harming
the victim, and asked his codefendant to bring the victim home.” The district court denied
Beaulieu’s second preliminary application.
Beaulieu appeals from the denial of his second preliminary application for relief.
DECISION
In 2023 and 2024, the legislature enacted a process that allows a person convicted
of aiding and abetting second-degree3 felony murder to petition the district court to vacate

1 The record indicates that judgment of conviction was entered on each of the felony-
murder guilty verdicts. In his preliminary applications in district court and in his brief to
this court, Beaulieu referenced a single conviction. We use the term “convictions” without
determining whether multiple convictions were appropriate. See Minn. Stat. § 609.04
(2008) (“Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either the crime
charged or an included offense, but not both.”).
2 2024 amendments to the law authorized reapplication after clarifying that an applicant
must establish either that he was not a major participant or that he did not act with extreme
indifference to human life. See 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 4, §§ 19-21, at 2268-71.
3 The Act also authorizes relief from a conviction of aiding and abetting first-degree felony
murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2024). 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, at
864.
5
that conviction. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, at 864-68, amended by 2024 Minn.
Laws ch. 123, art. 4, §§ 19-21, at 2268-71. We refer to these 2023 and 2024 session laws
collectively as “the Act.”4 The legislature passed the Act “to narrow the scope of liability
for aiding and abetting . . . second-degree felony murder.” See Raisch, 8 N.W.3d at 239
(discussing the 2023 session law).
Under Minnesota’s aiding and abetting statute, “[a] person is criminally liable for a
crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or
conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05,
subd. 1 (2008). A person liable under that standard “is also liable for any other crime
committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by the person as a
probable consequence of committing or attempting to commit the c rime intended.” Id.,
subd. 2 (2008). In 2023, the aiding and abetting statute was amended to restrict liability as
follows: “A person may not be held criminally liable for [second -degree felony murder]
for a death caused by another unless the person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with extreme indifference to human life.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art.
4, § 3, subd. 2a(b), at 850.

4 The Act is not codified in the Minnesota statutes, likely because the application procedure
for seeking relief from an aiding and abetting felony -murder conviction is time -limited.
See Raisch v. State, 8 N.W.3d 237, 242 n.3 (Minn. App. 2024) (discussing the 2023 session
law), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 19, 2024); see also 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 4, § 21, at
2271 (extending the deadline for certain persons seeking relief to October 1, 2026).
Overview of the Act
The Act provide s that a person convicted of second -degree felony murder “under
the theory of liability for crimes of another and who is in the custody of the commissioner
of corrections or under court supervision is entitled to petition to have the person’s
conviction vacated pursuant to this section.” Id., § 24, subd. 1, at 864. The Act states:
Subd. 3. Notification. (a) By September 1, 2024, the
commissioner of corrections shall notify individuals convicted
[of second -degree felony murder] of the right to file a
preliminary application for relief if:

. . . .

(2) the person was convicted [of second -degree felony
murder], and the person:
(i) did not cause the death of a human being; and
(ii) was not a major participant in the underlying
felony or did not act with extreme indifference to human life.

. . . .

(c) The commissioner of corrections may coordinate
with the judicial branch to establish a standardized notification
form.

2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 4, § 19, subd. 3, at 2268-69.

To obtain relief under the Act, a convicted person must first submit a preliminary
application. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, subd. 4, at 865. Next, the district court
must determine whether to approve the preliminary application; if the district court does
so, the applicant may file a petition to vacate the conviction. Id., subds. 5 -6, at 865 -67.
The relevant part of the Act provides:
7
Subd. 4. Preliminary application. (a) An applicant shall
submit a preliminary application . . . . The preliminary
application must contain:
(1) the applicant’s name and, if different, the name
under which the person was convicted;
(2) the applicant’s date of birth;
(3) the district court case number of the case for which
the person is seeking relief;
(4) a statement as to whether the applicant was
convicted following a trial or pursuant to a plea;
(5) a statement as to whether the person filed a direct
appeal from the conviction, a petition for postconviction relief,
or both;
(6) a brief statement, not to exceed 3,000 words,
explaining why the applicant is entitled to relief under this
section from a conviction for the death of a human being
caused by another; and
(7) the name and address of any attorney representing
the applicant.

(b) The preliminary application may contain:
(1) the name, date of birth, and district court case
number of any other person charged with, or convicted of, a
crime arising from the same set of circumstances for which the
applicant was convicted; and
(2) a copy of a criminal complaint or indictment, or the
relevant portions of a presentence investigation or life
imprisonment report, describing the facts of the case for which
the applicant was convicted.

(c) The judicial branch may establish a standardized
preliminary application form, but shall not reject a preliminary
application for failure to use a standardized form.

Id., subd. 4, at 865.
The Act directs the district court’s review of a preliminary application as follows:
Subd. 5. Review of preliminary application. (a) Upon
receipt of a preliminary application, the court
administrator . . . shall immediately direct attention of the
filing thereof to the chief judge or judge acting on the chief
judge’s behalf who shall promptly assign the matter . . . .
8
. . . .

(c) Within 90 days of . . . receiving the preliminary
application, the reviewing judge shall determine whether, in
the discretion of that judge, there is a reasonable probability
that the application is entitled to relief under this section.

(d) In making the determination under paragraph (c), the
reviewing judge shall consider the preliminary application and
any materials submitted with the preliminary application and
may consider relevant records in the possession of the judicial
branch.

Id., subd. 5(a)-(d), at 865-66 (emphasis added).
The Act provides that the district court may “summarily deny” an application if:
(1) the application does not contain the information
required under subdivision 4, paragraph (a);
(2) the applicant is not in the custody of the
commissioner of corrections or under court supervision;
(3) the applicant was not convicted of [second -degree
felony murder] for crimes committed before August 1, 2023;
or
(4) the issues raised in the application are not relevant
to the relief available under this section or have previously
been decided by the court of appeals or the supreme court in
the same case.

Id., subd. 5(e), at 866. A subsequent preliminary application may also be “summarily”
denied in some instances. Id., subd. 5(f), at 866.
If the district court “determines that there is not a reasonable probability that the
applicant is entitled to relief,” then it must provide the applicant with a brief statement
explaining how it reached its determination. Id., subd. 5(h), at 866. If that occurs, “the
applicant cannot proceed to the second step” of the application process, which is the filing
of a petition to vacate the conviction. Raisch, 8 N.W.3d at 240.
9
If, however, the reviewing judge determines that there is a reasonable probability
that the applicant is entitled to relief, the district court “shall send notice” to the applicant
and the applicant’s attorney, if any, the prosecuting attorney, and if the applicant is without
counsel, to the state public defender. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, subd. 5(g), at
866. Next, “the individual seeking relief shall file and serve a petition to vacate the
conviction.” Id., subd. 6(a), at 866-67. The petition must contain the information required
in a preliminary application, and it may contain “other relevant information,” such as
“police reports, trial transcripts, and plea transcripts involving the petitioner or any other
person investigated for, charged with, or convicted of a crime arising out of the same set
of circumstances” underlying the petitioner’s conviction. Id.
The Act requires the prosecuting attorney to “respond to the petition by answer or
motion.” Id., subd. 6(c), at 867. The prosecuting attorney’s response may “serve notice of
the intent to support the petition or include a statement explaining why the petitioner is not
entitled to relief along with any supporting documents.” Id. The petitioner “may file a
reply” to the prosecutor’s response. Id., subd. 6(d), at 867. Next, the district court must
do one of three things: (1) if the prosecutor supports the petition, “schedule the matter for
sentencing or resentencing,” (2) deny the petition “if additional information or submissions
establish that there is not a reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to relief,” or
(3) “schedule the matter for a hearing and issue any appropriate order regarding submission
of evidence or identification of witnesses.” Id., subd. 6(e), at 867. Any hearing “shall” be
“conducted pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section 590.04,” which governs hearings on
10
petitions for postconviction relief. Id., subd. 6(f), at 867; see Minn. Stat. § 590.04 (2024)
(governing hearings on a postconviction petition).
Ultimately, a petitioner who was convicted of aiding and abetting second -degree
felony murder is entitled to relief if he shows the following circumstances by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) he did not cause the death of a human being and (2) he
either was not “a major participant in the underlying felony” or he did not “act with extreme
indifference to human life.” 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 4, § 20, subd., 7(b), at 2269.
As used in the Act, “‘major participant’ has the meaning given in Minnesota Statutes,
section 609.05, subdivision 2a, paragraph (c).” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, subd.
2, at 864. Thus, a major participant includes a person who “caused substantial bodily harm
to another during the commission of the underlying felony .” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd.
2a(c)(2) (2024). The Act does not define “extreme indifference to human life.”
Standard of Review
Denial of a preliminary application under the Act is appealable as a denial of
postconviction relief. Raisch, 8 N.W.3d at 242. We review the denial of a preliminary
application under the Act for an abuse of discretion. State v. Griffin, 24 N.W.3d 247, 254
(Minn. 2025). An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision “is based on an erroneous
view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Id. at 255 (quotation
omitted). We review findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Id.
We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt.,
Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 169 (Minn. 2021). In that review, we try to “effectuate the intention
of the legislature, reading the statute as a whole.” Id. (quotation omitted). We look at the
11
plain and ordinary meaning of a statute ’s words and phrases to see if the language is
ambiguous, that is, whether it is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id.
(quotation omitted). If the language is unambiguous, we enforce it as written. Id.
Beaulieu’s Arguments
Beaulieu raises three arguments in support of his claim that the district court abused
its discretion in denying his second preliminary application. As discussed below, this court
previously addressed the same arguments in a recent nonprecedential opinion, Kimbrough
v. State, which is persuasive here. No. A24-1810, 2025 WL 2318008 (Minn. App. Aug.
11, 2025); see Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions and
order opinions are not binding authority except as law of the case, res judicata or collateral
estoppel, but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
Legislative Intent
Beaulieu argues that the legislature’s intent under the Act was “to allow any
individual who is in custody or on supervision, and [who] was convicted of aiding and
abetting felony murder, to petition the district court to vacate a felony murder conviction.”
Essentially, Beaulieu contends that an applicant is entitled to proceed to the petition stage
if he has the required custody or supervision status and a qualifying conviction.
As noted in Kimbrough, Beaulieu’s assertion is “refuted by the plain language of
the Act.” 2025 WL 2318008, at *7. The Act states that although certain individuals are
“entitled to petition” to have their convictions vacated, the district court must first authorize
the petition. 2023 Minn. Laws. ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, subds. 1, 5-7, at 864-68. And the district
court cannot authorize a petition unless it determines—based on its review of a preliminary
12
application—that “there is a reasonable probability that the [applicant] is entitled to relief.”
Id., subds. 5(c), (g), 6, at 865 -67. Finally, the Act clearly states that a person is “entitled
to relief” from a conviction of aiding and abetting second-degree felony murder only if the
person “shows by a preponderance of the evidence” that the person “did not cause the death
of a human being” and either was “not a major participant in the underlying felony” or “did
not act with extreme indifference to human life.” 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 4, § 20,
subd. 7(b), at 2269.
“[A] statute should be read and construed as a whole so as to harmonize and give
effect to all its parts.” State v. Johnson , 995 N.W.2d 155, 160 (Minn. 2023). When the
relevant provisions of the Act are read together and construed as a whole, they establish
that a person is “entitled to petition” to have a conviction vacated only if the district court
determines that the person ’s preliminary application shows a reasonable probability that
the person is “entitled to relief.” See 2023 Minn. Laws. ch. 52, a rt. 4, § 24, subds. 1, 5-6,
at 864-67. And a person is “entitled to relief” only if he shows that he did not cause a death
and that he was not “a major participant in the underlying felony” or that he “did not act
with extreme indifference to human life.” 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 4, § 20, subd.
7(b), at 2269. Contrary to Beaulieu’s assertion, an applicant is not entitled to petition to
vacate a conviction based only on the assertions that he has been convicted of aiding and
abetting second-degree felony murder and that he has the necessary custody or supervision
status. See Raisch, 8 N.W.3d at 240 (“A petition to vacate can be filed only if the district
court makes an affirmative determination on the preliminary application.”).
Summary Denial
Beaulieu also argues that the district court did not justify “summarily” denying his
second preliminary application with a finding that one of the articulated statutory grounds
for a summary denial existed. Again, the Act generally provides that a preliminary
application may be “summarily” denied for the following reasons: (1) the application does
not include statutorily required information, (2) the applicant is not in custody or under
court supervision, (3) the applicant was not convicted of an applicab le felony -murder
offense, or (4) the issues raised are irrelevant or have been previously determined by an
appellate court. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, subd. 5(e), at 866. What occurred
here was not a summary denial, as defined in the Act. See Kimbrough, 2025 WL 2318008,
at *6. Instead, the district court denied Beaulieu’s second preliminary application based
on its reasonable-probability determination.
Improper Ruling on the Merits
Finally, Beaulieu argues that the district court improperly ruled on the merits of his
request for relief . Beaulieu contends that during the application stage, a district court is
not permitted “to make factual and legal determinations.” But, as discussed in Kimbrough,
the Act requires the district court to make a reasonable -probability determination at the
application stage. 2025 WL 2318008, at *6. The applicant is “entitled to petition” to have
a conviction vacated only if the district court determine s that the preliminary application
shows a reasonable probability that the applicant is “entitled to relief.” See 2023 Minn.
Laws. ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, subds. 1, 5-6, at 864-67. And an applicant is “entitled to relief”
only if he shows that he did not cause a death and either that he was not “a major participant
14
in the underlying felony” or that he “did not act with extreme indifference to human life.”
2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 4, § 20, subd. 7(b), at 2269. Thus, the district court’s ruling
on a preliminary application requires some assessment of the particular facts of a case.
In Griffin, the supreme court affirmed a district court’s denial of a preliminary
application, which was based on the district court’s determination that Griffin caused the
death of the victim, which in turn was based on Griffin’s application, supporting materials,
and the supreme court’s decisions in Griffin’s prior appeals. 24 N.W.3d at 255 -56. The
supreme court noted, “The facts established at trial and described in Griffin’s prior appeals,
as well as our prior holding that the trial evidence supported a reasonable inference that
Griffin shot [the victim] with an intent to kill him, support the district court’s rejection of
Griffin’s apparent claim that he did not cause the death of a human being. ” Id. at 255-56
(quotation and citation omitted).
Griffin indicates that a district court is, to some degree, empowered to make legal
and factual determinations when ruling on a preliminary application. But Beaulieu argues
that the degree to which a district court may do so should be limited. Two circumstances
are relevant here.
First, when making a reasonable -probability determination at the preliminary -
application stage, the district court does not have the benefit of a fully developed record.
See 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, subd. 5(c), (d), at 865-66. But an opportunity to
more fully develop the record does not result unless the district court approves a
preliminary application and authorizes the applicant to file a petition. Id., subds. 5(g), 6,
at 866-67. When an applicant is authorized to do so, the petition may:
15
contain any other relevant information, including police
reports, trial transcripts, and plea transcripts involving the
petitioner or any other person investigated for, charged with,
or convicted of a crime arising out of the same set of
circumstances for which the petitioner was convicted.

Id., subd. 6(a), at 866-67. Moreover, the prosecuting attorney is not allowed to participate
in the proceeding until the petition stage. See id., subd. 6(c), at 867 (requiring prosecutor
to respond to the petition). The prosecuting attorney may supplement the record only at
the petition stage. See id. (stating that the prosecuting attorney must respond to the petition
and that the response may “include a statement explaining why the petitioner is not entitled
to relief along with any supporting documents”).
Second, a district court is not generally allowed to resolve material factual disputes
based on an undeveloped record at the preliminary stage of a legal proceeding. For
example, under Minnesota’s postconviction statute, a person convicted of a crime may seek
relief by filing a petition claiming that the conviction “violated the person ’s rights under
the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.
1(1) (2024). An evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition must be held unless “the
petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is
entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1.
And the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated:
The postconviction court must hold an evidentiary
hearing to resolve factual disputes that are material to
determining the legal issues raised in the postconviction
petition when those factual disputes were not resolved in the
proceedings resulting in a conviction.

Thoresen v. State, 965 N.W.2d 295, 303 (Minn. 2021) (emphasis added).
16
In Raisch, we held that a denial of a preliminary application under the Act based on
a determination that there was not a reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to
relief “is an appealable order as from a denial of postconviction relief.” 8 N.W.3d at 238.
In reaching that conclusion, we noted the similarities between the Act and Minnesota ’s
postconviction statutes.5 Id. at 241. Based on those similarities, we were “persuaded that
the postconviction remedy is broad enough to encompass the preliminary application
procedure in the act.” Id. at 242; see Griffin, 24 N.W.3d at 254 (noting that, because denial
of a preliminary application had been treated as a denial of postconviction relief for
purposes of jurisdiction, the same standard of review should govern).
We are again influenced by our postconviction jurisprudence when reviewing the
district court’s application of the Act here. Under that jurisprudence and consistent with
Griffin, a district court may deny a preliminary application if the record conclusively shows
that the applicant is not entitled to relief. See Griffin, 24 N.W.3d at 256 (affirming denial
of preliminary application based on supreme court’s “ prior holding that the trial evidence
supported a reasonable inference that Griffin shot [the victim] with an intent to kill him ”
(quotation omitted)).
Again, a petitioner who was convicted of aiding and abetting second-degree felony
murder is entitled to relief if he shows the following circumstances by a preponderance of
the evidence: (1) he did not cause the death of a human being and (2) he either was not “a

5 Indeed, the Act states that a hearing on a petition “shall be . . . conducted pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes, section 590.04.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, subd. 6(f), at
867; see Minn. Stat. § 590.04 (governing hearings on a postconviction petition).

17
major participant in the underlying felony” or he did not “act with extreme indifference to
human life.” 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 4, § 20, subd. 7(b), at 2269. In determining
that there was no reasonable probability that Beaulieu was entitled to relief on his second
preliminary application, the district court reasoned that the record showed that he was both
a “major participant” and that he acted with extreme indifference to human life.
There is no factual dispute regarding whether Beaulieu was a “major participant,”
which is defined to include a person who “caused substantial bodily harm to another during
the commission of the underly ing felony.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2a(c)(2). As the
district court properly reasoned, Beaulieu was found guilty of third-degree assault, and the
infliction of substantial bodily harm is an element of third-degree assault. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.223, subd. 1 (2008) (“Whoever assaults another and inflicts substantial bodily harm
may be sentenced to imprisonment . . . .”).
However, we cannot say that the record conclusively establishes that Beaulieu acted
with extreme indifference to human life.6 Although the Act defines “major participant,” it

6 The state argues that under the amended language of the Act, an applicant must show
both that he was not a major participant and that he did not act with extreme indifference
to human life. Originally, the Act required a person seeking relief to show both that he
“was not a major participant in the underlying felony” and that he “did not act with extreme
indifference to human life.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, subd s. 3(a)(2)(ii),
7(b)(2), at 864, 868. But the Act was amended to permit the right to seek relief if the
defendant “was not a major participant in the underlying felony” or “did not act with
extreme indifference to human life.” See 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 4, § § 19, 20, at
2268-69. It is clear that the major -participant and extreme -indifference showing are
alternatives. See State v. Loge, 608 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn. 2000) (“[I]n the absence of
some ambiguity surrounding the legislature ’s use of the word ‘or,’ we will read it in the
disjunctive and require that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order
for the statute to be satisfied.”). In sum, under the amended language, a petitioner may
obtain relief if he shows by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he did not cause the
18
does not define “extreme indifference to human life,” and the district court did not indicate
what definition it used to conclude that Beaulieu acted with extreme indifference. Also,
although the trial evidence was largely undisputed regarding some of the factual
circumstances on which the district court relied (e.g., Beaulieu was the initial assailant and
inflicted multiple punches to the victim’s head), the evidence was conflicting regarding a
significant circumstance on which the district court relied: whether Beaulieu stomped on
the victim’s head or body after the victim was rendered unconscious. Finally, there was
evidence that might suggest that Beaulieu did not act with extreme indifference (e.g., Bugg
and Beaulieu tried to pull Boyd away from the victim , and Beaulieu told Boyd to take the
victim home).
Because there is a factual dispute regarding whether or not Beaulieu acted with
extreme indifference to human life, and because the district court did not explain what
definition of extreme indifference it used for the purpose of its conclusion that Beaulieu
acted with extreme indifference —a necessary analytical step in determining which
disputed facts are material to that conclusion —the district court prematurely determined
that there was no reasonable probability of relief . We therefore reverse and reman d for
Beaulieu to file his petition under the Act.
That said, we do not suggest that Beaulieu must be allowed to advance to the hearing
stage. The Act authorizes the district court to assess whether a person should advance to a

death of a human being and that (2) he was not “a major participant in the underlying
felony” or he did not “act with extreme indifference to human life.” 2024 Minn. Laws ch.
123, art. 4, § 20, subd., 7(b), at 2269.
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hearing at two different stages: first, at the preliminary application stage, based on a limited
record submitted only by the applicant, and second, at the petition stage, based on a more
fully developed record submitted by the petitioner and the prosecutor . After receipt of all
submissions at the petition stage, the district court may deny the petition “if additional
information or submissions establish that there is not a reasonable probability that the
applicant is entitled to relief .” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, subd. 6(e), at 867 .
Thus, the district court retains discretion to deny Beaulieu’s request for relief once the
record is more fully developed through the filing of a petition and the parties have had an
opportunity to address whether Beaulieu acted with extreme indifference to human life.
Reversed and remanded.