In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0575

In re the Marriage of:

Jamie Natalie Gore, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Seth Patrick Gore,
Appellant.

Filed February 9, 2026
Affirmed
Frisch, Chief Judge

Wabasha County District Court
File No. 79-FA-21-891

Jamie Natalie Gore, Zumbrota, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

John T. Burns, Jr., Burns Law Office, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Chief Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s amended findings of fact, conclusions of law,
order for judgment, and dissolution judgment and decree, appellant-father argues that the
district court abused its discretion by (1) awarding respondent-mother sole legal custody
2
of the parties’ children; (2) making an inequitable division of the parties’ property; and
(3) overstating appellant’s income for purposes of child support. Because the district
court’s findings are supported by the record and we discern no abuse of discretion by the
district court, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-father Seth Patrick Gore and respondent-mother Jamie Natalie Gore,
n/k/a Jamie Natalie Kennedy, were married in August 2008. The parties had two children
during the marriage, a son born in 2010 and another son born in 2012 (the children). The
parties also shared ownership of two dogs—Judge and Karma.
1
In November 2021, mother served a petition for dissolution of the marriage, and
father filed an answer and counterpetition. That month, the parties stipulated to the entry
of a harassment restraining order (HRO) that was to be in effect until the dissolution was
finalized. Pursuant to the HRO, among other things, the parties were only permitted to
communicate by email or text message for the sole purpose of coordinating parenting time
and father could otherwise have no contact with mother; mother had exclusive access to
the marital home, with father to make all mortgage payments beginning in December 2021;
and the parties agreed to not dispose of marital assets during the pendency of the dissolution
proceedings—including the family dogs—absent an agreement between the parties. The
HRO did not address custody or parenting time.

1 We refer to the two dogs collectively as the “family dogs.” When referring to a particular
dog, we use the dog’s name.
3
In February 2022, both parties filed motions for temporary relief. After hearing
arguments on the motions in March 2022, the district court filed an order in May 2022
(May 2022 order) . Among other things, the district court awarded temporary sole legal
custody to mother and temporary joint physical custody to the parties, and the district court
set a temporary parenting-time schedule. The district court also ordered that mother
maintain temporary use and possession of the marital home, and father continue making
all mortgage payments for the marital home. The district court reserved the issue of child
support. The May 2022 order also required mother to “keep and be responsible” for the
family dogs. Mother had requested that father either take the family dogs or that she be
allowed to surrender them, but father indicated he could not care for the dogs at that time.
The district court determined that it was in the children’s best interests, at least for the time
being, for mother to keep possession of and be responsible for the family dogs.
Both parties again brought motions for temporary relief in June 2022. In part, both
requested that the other party be held in constructive civil contempt for violating the May
2022 order. The district court filed an order in October 2022 (October 2022 order) which,
among other things, required father to immediately sign up for Soberlink Level 1 Plus Plan,
Parenting Time Only Testing (Soberlink); granted mother compensatory parenting time for
father’s violation of the May 2022 order regarding parenting time; granted in part mother’s
motion for attorney fees, ordering father to pay fees associated with his failure to follow
through on discovery; and reserved all other attorney-fee requests . The district court
denied mother’s motion to hold father in constructive civil contempt for failing to follow
the parenting-time order, as it instead granted mother compensatory parenting time, and it
4
also denied father’s motion to increase his parenting time. At that time, the district court
stated that it had “serious concerns about F ather’s lack of follow through on the
parenting-time schedule and failure to set proper boundaries with the children during
Mother’s parenting time.” The district court also denied father’s motion to pay temporary
child support instead of the mortgage payments on the marital home.
In November 2022, mother moved the district court again for temporary relief and
to hold father in contempt for failing to follow the parenting-time order and failing to utilize
Soberlink during his parenting time. The district court issued an order in March 2023
(March 2023 order), which among other things, ordered father to have parenting time every
Wednesday evening and every other weekend. Father was also ordered to make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the children are in mother’s care during her parenting time, including
but not limited to father communicating to the children that they are not to visit him, not to
go to his residence, and not to enter his apartment during mother’s parenting time. The
district court also ordered father to take appropriate steps to ensure that the children
followed these rules, including by changing the entrance code to his apartment.
Following an evidentiary hearing in January and March 2023 on mother’s motion
to hold father in contempt, the district court filed an order in June 2023, in which it found
father in contempt for failing to follow the parenting-time order and failing to utilize
Soberlink during his parenting time. Father was ordered to serve 30 days at the Wabasha
County Jail, which was stayed for one year.
In March 2023, mother surrendered the family dogs to the Animal Humane Society
(Humane Society). Mother did not consult with father prior to surrendering the family
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dogs, nor did she inform the children that she was going to surrender them. Mother
informed the Humane Society that one of the dogs, Judge, had previously bitten someone.
Mother did not list father as a contact person in the event the Humane Society determined
Judge would be euthanized, nor did she disclose that the family dogs were marital property
or that father was the co-owner of the dogs . Judge was euthanized a few days after
surrender. Father later learned that mother had surrendered the family dogs and retrieved
the surviving dog, Karma, on March 29. Father has cared for Karma since that date. The
children witnessed father crying over the death of Judge, and they blamed mother for the
dog’s death.
The district court held a six-day trial on May 22-24, 2024, and July 22-24, 2024.
The district court heard testimony from 17 witnesses, including both parties. T he district
court also received testimony from the children in chambers with parties’ counsel—but not
the parties—present. The district court received over 100 exhibits into evidence. The
parties stipulated to a valuation date of June 1, 2022.
In the resulting findings of fact, conclusions of law, order for judgment, and
dissolution judgment and decree filed in October 2024, the district court awarded sole legal
custody to mother and joint physical custody to the parties, and it ordered a parenting-time
schedule. The May 2022 order had reserved child support, and the district court calculated
the amount of previously reserved child support to which mother was entitled from
February 15, 2022, the date of mother’s initial request for temporary child support, through
November 1, 2024, the date a new parenting-time schedule would commence pursuant to
the district court’s dissolution judgment and decree.
6
Father moved the district court for amended findings in early December 202 4, and
mother filed a responsive motion. Following a hearing, the district court filed an order on
March 19, 2024, which granted in part two of father’s requests for amended findings, and
denied father’s remaining 38 requests. On the same day, the district court entered an
amended dissolution judgment and decree (judgment and decree). The district court’s
determinations on custody, parenting time, and child support were unaltered.
Father appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding sole legal custody of
the children to mother.

Father challenges the district court’s award of sole legal custody of the children to
mother, arguing that the district court abused its discretion because (1) mother has
demonstrated an inability to make decisions in the interests of the children’s emotional
well-being, and (2) the district court’s custody award was based on the clearly erroneous
finding that father works in Wisconsin.
A district court dissolving a marriage is authorized to address the legal custody,
physical custody, parenting time, and support of minor children. Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 3 (2024). For purposes of determining issues of custody and parenting time, a district
court must evaluate the best interests of the children. See id., subd. 1 (2024). In evaluating
the best interests of the children, a district court “must consider and evaluate” 12 factors
(collectively, the best-interests factors). Id., subd. 1(a).
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“District courts have broad discretion on matters of custody and parenting time.”
Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018).
To the extent that a party challenges a district court’s
findings on factual issues relevant to custody, this court applies
a clear-error standard of review. If the facts are not in dispute,
we apply an abuse-of discretion standard of review to a district
court’s award of child custody. A [district] court has broad
discretion in making custody decisions; there is scant if any
room for this court to question a district court’s balancing of
best-interests considerations.

In re Welfare of C.F.N., 923 N.W.2d 325, 334 (Minn. App. 2018) (quotation and citations
omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2019). “A district court abuses its discretion by
making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or
delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey ,
975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). When reviewing factual findings
for clear error, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, do not find
facts, do not reweigh evidence, and do not reconcile conflicting evidence. In re Civ.
Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021); see also Ewald v.
Nedrebo, 999 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Minn. App. 2023) (citing Kenney in a family-law appeal),
rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2024). “ We will not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred
unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221 (quotation omitted).
The district court awarded sole legal custody to mother. In the judgment and decree,
the district court made detailed findings regarding each of the best- interests factors and
explained whether each factor was neutral or weighed in favor of granting sole legal
8
custody to one of the parties. The district court found that four best-interests factors
favored or slightly favored awarding sole legal custody to mother ; one factor favored
awarding sole legal custody to father; and the remaining factors were neutral as to awarding
sole legal custody to one party or the other. After balancing the best-interests factors, the
district court concluded that “it is in the best interests of the children for Mother to be
granted sole legal custody of the minor children,” primarily because it is in the children’s
best interests to stay enrolled in the same school district—Mazeppa/Zumbrota School s—
and mother had testified at trial regarding her plans to continue living in the area given the
importance of keeping the children in this school district.
2 T he district court was also
“persuaded that Mother will make suitable decisions serving the best interests of the
children and not use legal custody as a means of retribution to Father.” The district court
explained that since mother was awarded temporary sole legal custody, she “has made
appropriate decisions relating to their education, health care, and religious training.” The
district court noted that it “also considers the children’s religious training,”3 and that since
the dissolution proceedings, “[i]t appears that Father has undermined the children’ s
religious training, possibly as retribution to Mother.” The district court concluded that

2 One of the best-interests factors the district court must consider is “the effect on the child’s
well-being and development of changes to home, school, and community.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1(a)(8).

3 The district court must consider “a child’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and
other needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangements on the child’s needs and
development,” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(1), and “the willingness and ability of each
parent to provide ongoing care for the child; to meet the child’ s ongoing developmental,
emotional, spiritual, and cultural needs; and to maintain consistency and follow through
with parenting time,” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(7).
9
“[a]s a result, and in review of all the best interest factors,” it was finding that “granting
Mother sole legal custody is more probable to result in stability that will serve the
children’s best interests.” Against this backdrop, we consider father ’s two challenges to
the district court’s legal custody determination.
A. Mother’s Ability to Provide for the Children’s Emotional Well-Being
Father challenges the district court’s award of sole legal custody to mother, asserting
that mother “has demonstrated an inability” to make decisions in the interests of their
children by acting in “disregard” for their emotional well- being. Father identifies three
examples which he claims demonstrate mother’s disregard for the emotional well-being of
the children: (1) that the children’s time spent with mother is characterized by arguments
and fighting, and mother’s “go-to reaction is to call the police”; (2) that mother surrendered
the family dogs without informing father or the children; and (3) that when one of the
family dogs was euthanized, mother “attempted to keep the children from finding out, and
lied abo ut their counselor’s advice about telling the children.” These arguments are
unavailing.
As a threshold matter, father does not identify any specific best- interests factor he
claims the district court failed to consider or apply correctly, does not identify any evidence
in the record the district court failed to consider in its best- interests analysis, and does not
dispute any of the district court’s best-interests findings relating to mother’s ability to
consider and provide for the children’s emotional needs. When assessing several
best-interests factors, the district court considered both the children’s strained emotional
relationship with mother during her parenting time and mother’s “lapse in her willingness
10
to consider the children’s developmental/emotional needs” by surrendering the family
dogs.4 And father does not identify any factual findings in the judgment and decree or any
evidence in the record to support the allegation that mother “attempted to keep the children
from finding out” about Judge being euthanized and “lied about their counselor’s advice
about telling the children.” Thus, father argues neither that the district court made findings
of fact that are unsupported by the record nor that the district court misapplied the law. As
a result, the crux of his argument is that the district court abused its discretion by deciding
the question of legal custody in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record.
See Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506 (defining an abuse of discretion). Because we do not
engage in fact -finding, reweigh the evidence supporting the district court’s best-interests
findings, or resolve competing evidence, we reject father’s arguments. C.F.N., 923 N.W.2d
at 334; Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22.

4 For example, the district court considered mother’s emotional bond with the children in
assessing the first best-interests factor, the “child’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual,
and other needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangements on the child’s needs and
development”; the third best-interests factor, “the reasonable preference of the child, if the
court deems the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to express an
independent, reliable preference”; the seventh best-interests factor, “the willingness and
ability of each parent to provide ongoing care for the child; to meet the child’s ongoing
developmental, emotional, spiritual, and cultural needs; and to maintain consistency and
follow through with parenting time”; and the tenth best-interests factor, “the benefit to the
child in maximizing parenting time with both parents and the detriment to the child in
limiting parenting time with either parent.” See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a). The
district court also explicitly addressed mother’s surrendering of the family dogs in
assessing the seventh best-interests factor.
11
B. Father’s Location of Employment
Father also contends that the district court abused its discretion by basing its legal
custody decision on the clearly erroneous factual finding that father was working in
Wisconsin. Father argues that the district court inferred from this erroneous factual finding
that he was more likely to try to change the children’s school in the future than mother, and
thus he contends the district court’s best-interests findings “are in doubt.” We agree that
the record evidence does not support the district court’s factual finding that father is
employed in Wisconsin. However, because this error is harmless, we disagree that reversal
of the district court’s determination on legal custody is necessary. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61
(requiring reviewing court to disregard harmless error); see also Sinda v. Sinda, 949
N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. App. 2020) (stating that “errors require reversal only if they
resulted in prejudice”). As the appellant, father has the burden to demonstrate prejudice.
Sinda, 949 N.W.2d at 176. He has not done so.
First, the district court’s determination on the eighth best-interests factor, requiring
the district court to consider “the effect on the child’s well-being and development of
changes to home, school, and community,” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(8), did not
hinge on the erroneous factual finding. On this factor, the district court found that it is in
the best interests of the children to continue to attend school in the Mazeppa/Zumbrota
School District. Because the district court found that both parties’ residences were likely
to change after the issuance of the judgment and decree , it considered this factor to be
“generally neutral.” However, the district court stated that because mother testified it was
her intention to remain in the same school district after moving out of the marital home
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“because she believes it is best for the children to remain there,” it found this factor “favors
granting Mother sole legal custody because her testimony expressed the importance of not
uprooting the children from their home community.” And in balancing the best-interests
factors to reach its ultimate legal custody determination, the district court reiterated:
Mother has lived in Mazeppa throughout the pendency of these
proceedings. Father is employed in Wisconsin and has begun
living with his significant other in Hager City, Wisconsin.
Although Mother’s residence will change after the property
division in this matter, she testified her plan is to stay in the
area because she does not want to move the children from the
Mazeppa/Zumbrota School District.

Thus, the district court’s determination that the importance of continuity in the children’s
schooling favored awarding mother sole legal custody is not based on the location of the
parties’ employment, but rather on the testimony received at trial regarding the parties’
intentions for the children’s schooling.
Father asserts that he also “expressed his belief that the children should continue to
reside in Mazeppa.” But on appeal, father does not identify any evidence in the record to
support this assertion. Indeed, our review of the record reveals no evidence of where father
intended to live after the marital dissolution or of his belief that the children should
continue to attend the Mazeppa/Zumbrota School District. See Eisenschenk v.
Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003) (“On appeal, a party cannot
complain about a district court’s failure to rule in [their] favor when one of the reasons it
did not do so is because that party failed to provide the district court with the evidence that
would allow the district court to fully address the question.”), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25,
2003).
13
Second, the district court did not base its legal custody determination exclusively
on the continuity of the children’s schooling. In concluding that it is in the best interests
of the children for mother to be awarded sole legal custody, the district court noted another
reason for its determination—that mother will “make suitable decisions serving the best
interests of the children and not use legal custody as a means of retribution to Father,” and
that father appears to have undermined the children’s religious training, possibly in
retribution to mother. The district court concluded that “[a]s a result, and in review of all
the best interest factors,” it was finding that “ granting Mother sole legal custody is more
probable to result in stability that will serve the children’s best interests.” The district
court’s analysis is consistent with its statutory obligation to “not use one factor to the
exclusion of all others” in reaching a custody determination. Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(b)(1). On appeal, father does not address the district court’s second stated reason
for awarding sole legal custody to mother.
Therefore, even though the district court clearly erred in finding that father is
employed in Wisconsin, such error is harmless because father has failed to demonstrate
any resulting prejudice. Viewing the record as a whole, the district court’s best- interests
findings are supported by evidence in the record, father does not assert that the district
court otherwise misapplied the law, and the district court’s grant to mother of sole legal
custody is contrary to neither logic nor the facts it found regardin g the children’s best
interests. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion. See Woolsey, 975
N.W.2d at 506 (defining an abuse of discretion).
14
II. The district court did no t abuse its discretion in dividing the parties’ marital
property.

Father also challenges the district court’s valuation and division of marital property,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by (1) attributing no value to the family
dogs and (2) misapplying the credit from father’s mortgage payments made on the marital
home pursuant to the May 2022 order.
“[T]he court shall make a just and equitable division of the marital property of the
parties without regard to marital misconduct, after making findings regarding the division
of the property.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2024). In making a just and equitable
division, the district court must “consider the contribution of each [party] in the acquisition,
preservation, depreciation or appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property.”
Id. “A [district] court has broad discretion in evaluating and dividing property in a marital
dissolution and will not be overturned except for abuse of discretion.” Antone v. Antone,
645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2002). “We will affirm the [district] court’s division of
property if it had an acceptable basis in fact and principle even though we might have taken
a different approach.” Id. “We defer to the [district] court’s findings of fact and will not
set them aside unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. The party challenging a finding on
appeal has the burden to show that the finding is clearly erroneous. Vangsness v.
Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000).
With these principles in mind, we address both of father’s arguments.
15
A. Valuation of the Family Dogs
Father first challenges the district court’s decision to award no value to the family
dogs, which were marital property that mother was responsible for keeping and caring for
pursuant to the HRO and the May 2022 order.
“Under Minnesota law, dogs are personal property.” Zephier v. Agate, 957 N.W.2d
866, 871 n.2 (Minn. 2021). A district court’s valuation of an item of property is a finding
of fact, and we do not set aside a district court’s factual finding unless it is clearly erroneous
viewing the record as a whole. Maurer v. Maurer, 623 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 2001).
The valuation of an asset “should be supported by either clear documentary or testimonial
evidence or by comprehensive findings issued by the [district] c ourt.” Ronnkvist v.
Ronnkvist, 331 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 1983). We will sustain the fact-finder’s property
valuation “if it falls within the limits of credible estimates made by competent witnesses
even if it does not coincide exactly with the estimate of any one of them.” Hertz v. Hertz,
229 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. 1975) ; see also Lehman v. Hansord Pontiac Co., 74 N.W.2d
305, 310 (Minn. 1955) (“It is, however, the rule in this state that a [district] court is not
bound by the opinion of any witness concerning values and that its findings will ordinarily
be sustained if within the limits of the evidence as to values.”).
In the judgment and decree, the district court awarded no value to the family dogs.
The district court stated:
Equity follows the law, and a court of equity will not disregard
statutory law or grant relief prohibited thereby. Kingery v.
Kingery, 185 Minn. 467, 470, 241 N.W. 583, 584 (1932).
While this Court is sympathetic to the loss of a family pet, it is
inclined to decide the issue consistent with the law. Father has
16
not provided any evidence as to the replacement value of the
euthanized dog or its fair market value. As for the remaining
dog, Father has also not demonstrated to the Court any property
value for purposes of asset distribution. The Court has
reviewed the veterinarian bill provided by Father for the dog,
but Father’s testimony did not establish particular amounts that
were caused by Mother’s lack of care for the dog. For these
reasons, the Court awards no value to the dogs.

We address the district court’s valuation of each dog in turn.
The Euthanized Dog—Judge
Father argues that the district court erred by awarding no value to the euthanized
dog, Judge, because father estimated the value of the dog at $20,000. While, like the
district court, we are sympathetic to the loss of a family dog, we are not persuaded on this
record that the district court clearly erred in its valuation.
At trial, father testified that the value of Judge was “[p]riceless,” and the district
court stated that father “indicate[d] that he would like $20,000 as compensation for the dog
that was euthanized.” Father provided no other valuation evidence. Mother testified that
the family dogs had no fair market value. In finding father produced no evidence as to the
replacement value or fair-market value of Judge, the district court thus implicitly
determined that father’s valuation of $20,000 was not credible valuation evidence or a
reasonable valuation. The credibility of witness testimony and the weight to be given to it
is a function of the fact-finder, and we “accord great deference” to the district court’s
determinations. State v. King, 990 N.W.2d 406, 420 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). On
this record, we cannot conclude that the district court’s fact-finding is clearly erroneous.
17
Father’s reliance on Ferguson v. Ferguson is misplaced. 357 N.W.2d 104 (Minn.
App. 1984). Father contends that because a property owner in Minnesota is “presumptively
knowledgeable about its value” pursuant to Ferguson, id. at 107, the district court erred in
implicitly rejecting father’s valuation. We agree that a property owner is presumptively
competent to testify to the value of their property, but we disagree that a district court must
afford any particular weight to the property owner’s testimony. Id. at 107; see also Lehman,
74 N.W.2d at 309-10 (“[I]f there is an apparent lack of knowledge on the part of the owner
as to value of his property, the same goes to the weight of the testimony given but not to
the competency of that testimony.”). Again, we defer to the district court’s determinations
on the credibility and weight of witness testimony. King, 990 N.W.2d at 420.
In sum, the district court properly based its valuation determination on available
evidence in the record and its credibility determinations.
The Living Dog—Karma
Father also contends that the district court did not properly evaluat e or divide the
parties’ marital property because it awarded no value to the living dog, Karma. He claims
that because the district court ordered mother to keep and be responsible for the family
dogs, she necessarily is responsible for paying costs incurred by father after he recovered
Karma from the Humane Society, including veterinarian bills and daily costs of care. On
this record, we are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in not requiring
mother to pay for the veterinary bills or daily cost of caring for Karma.
In the judgment and decree, the district court explained that father’s testimony did
not establish any value of Karma for purposes of property division, nor did it establish any
18
amounts of the veterinary bills for Karma that were caused by mother’s lack of care for the
dog. In other words, father did not establish any value for Karma for purposes of property
division or that mother failed to preserve or otherwise depreciated Karma’s value.
Although father produced evidence at trial about Karma’s condition after he retrieved the
dog from the Humane Society, that evidence did not establish that mother caused the dog’s
condition or otherwise depreciated the dog’s value. We again conclude that the district
court’s valuation is supported by the record, it is within the district court’s discretion to
determine whether to award relief even if mother did not comply with the May 2022 order,
and it is not our role to find our own facts, reweigh the evidence, or reconcile conflicting
evidence. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22.
In sum, because the district court’s valuation of the family dogs has “an acceptable
basis in fact and principle,” Antone, 645 N.W.2d at 100, and father failed to provide the
district court with any credible evidence supporting his claims, we will not disturb the
district court’s findings.
B. Father’s Mortgage Payments on Marital Home
Father also challenges the district court’s property division and calculation of an
equalizer payment, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the
credit for father’s payment of the mortgage on the marital home.
In the judgment and decree, the district court credited father for the mortgage
payments he made on the marital home from June 1, 2022, the valuation date, to the time
of trial. The district court stated:
19
Father has paid for the mortgage on the home from June
1, 2022 (the valuation date) to the present time. The Court
previously ordered that F ather pay for the mortgage in lieu of
temporary child support in this matter. The Court is now
permitting the back payment of child support and it is thus
appropriate to reimburse Father for his payments toward the
mortgage. Said payments preserved the value of the marital
homestead and were paid using F ather’s non-marital money
which he earned after the valuation date.

The district court reviewed various exhibits to determine the minimum payment amounts
on the mortgage owed during certain time periods, and it found that father was entitled to
a $43,243.44 credit toward the homestead. The district court included this sum in
calculating the combined total of father’s nonmarital interest in the homestead,5 which the
district court then subtracted from the appraised value of the home stead to arrive at its
marital value. This marital value was then used to calculate a preliminary property
equalization payment.
Father does not contend that the district court failed to credit him for the mortgage
payments that he made after the valuation date pursuant to the May 2022 order. Instead,
without citation to any authority, father appears to contend that the district court should
have accounted for the $43,243.44 in mortgage payments as an offset to his retroactive
basic child-support obligation rather than as a nonmarital contribution to the marital home.

5 Father’s nonmarital interest in the homestead was derived from three sources: (1) a
$134,000 lump-sum payment toward the mortgage from a personal-injury settlement father
received; (2) $34,000 in improvements to the home made from nonmarital accounts; and
(3) $42,243.44 for mortgage payments made after the valuation date through the date of
trial.
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Even assuming that father is correct, any error is harmless. Father received credit
for his mortgage payments on the marital home. Therefore, any alleged error in this regard
is harmless and does not warrant reversal. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61; see also Midway Ctr.
Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975) (stating that error without
prejudice is not grounds for reversal).
In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion in any of the district court ’s
determinations regarding property division.6
III. The district court’s finding on father’s gross income is not clearly erroneous.
Finally, father summarily asserts that the district court erred in calculating his gross
income for purposes of establishing child support.
The district court must determine a parent’s gross income under Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.29 (2024) in setting the basic child-support obligation of a parent. Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.34(b)(1) (2024); see also Minn. Stat. § 518A.37 (2024) (requiring a district court
to make written findings in every case in which it computes child -support obligations,
including, among other things, a parent’s gross income). We will affirm a district court’s
findings on gross income “if those findings have a reasonable basis in fact and are not

6 Father also asserts that he should be reimbursed for all mortgage payments he made
pursuant to the May 2022 order, including those prior to the valuation date. Father does
not identify whether he made any mortgage payment(s) between the May 2022 order and
the June 2022 valuation date nor the value of any such purported mortgage payments.
Further, it appears that father did not present this argument to the district court. Therefore,
father has forfeited this issue. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988)
(stating that appellate courts generally address only those questions previously presented
to and considered by the district court); see also Thomas A. Foster & Assocs., Ltd. v.
Paulson, 699 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. App. 2005) (“An appellate court ordinarily may not
consider matters outside the record.”).
21
clearly erroneous.” Ludwigson v. Ludwigson, 642 N.W.2d 441, 446 (Minn. App. 2002)
(quotation omitted).
In the judgment and decree, the district court found:
Father is employed full-time by Northern States Power
Company - Minnesota. His paystub indicates he was paid a
gross amount of $46,769.63 through April 13, 2024. The
period from January 1, 2024 through April 13, 2024 is 103
days. Thus, Father earns an average of $454.07 per day.
Assuming a year is 365 days, Father’s gross yearly earnings
are therefore $165,735.55, or $13,811.30 per month.

Father contends that the district court erred in calculating his gross income, arguing
that the overtime included in the paystub exceeds father’s historic overtime, so the district
court should have calculated father’s gross income using his hourly wage and the average
number of hours a year he works overtime instead. Father agrees that overtime is properly
included in his gross income. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(b) (providing that gross income
does not include overtime pay if a parent demonstrates the overtime began after the filing
of the petition for dissolution and shows other factors are met). But he argues that the
paystub used by the district court to calculate his gross income is not reflective of the
average amount of overtime he works, asserting that he “has worked an average of 5 hours
a week at time and a half.” On this record, we disagree that the district court’s finding was
clearly erroneous.
Father asserts that the paystub used by the district court is not reflective of the
“number of days or hours or overtime” that he works over a full year, directing us only to
his 2023 tax return. While this document may reflect father’s total annual income in 2023,
it does not clearly set forth a basis from which we may independently determine the average
22
overtime worked by father. In any event, we do not engage in fact- finding, reweigh the
evidence, or reconcile conflicting evidence. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22.
The district court’s calculation is reasonably grounded in the record. The district
court calculated father’s gross income using father’s paystub indicating his gross pay over
a period of about three months. Because the district court based its decision on record
evidence, we cannot conclude that the district court’s fact-finding is clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.