In Re the Custody of MIVB;

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0585

In Re the Custody of MIVB;

Dustin Allen Basting, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Heather Mae Grehn,
Respondent.

Filed March 2, 2026
Affirmed; motion denied
Bond, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-FA-21-1639

Dustin Allen Basting, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Sonja M. Nyberg, Collins, Buckley, Sauntry & Haugh, PLLP, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
Appellant father challenges a district court order granting respondent mother sole
legal and sole physical custody of their minor child and suspending father’s parenting time.
We affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant Dustin Allen Basting (father) and respondent Heather Mae Grehn
(mother) are the parents of a child (child) born in 2015. The parties never married, and
they executed a recognition of parentage shortly after child was born. In 2021, father
petitioned to establish custody and parenting time for child. Father filed several temporary
motions while the matter was pending, requesting, among other things, temporary joint
legal and temporary joint physical custody of child, temporary unsupervised parenting time
with child, and unlimited telephone contact with child. The district court denied father’s
temporary motions, maintaining mother’s sole physical and sole legal custody of child and
awarding father limited supervised parenting time with child for two hours, twice per
month.
In November 2023, the parties stipulated to the appointment of a neutral custody
and parenting-time evaluator (the evaluator). 1 The evaluator interviewed mother, father,
and child, and observed the parties interact with child. The evaluator also reviewed court
records, the parties’ medical records and psychological evaluations, and child’s medical,
mental health, and educational records. The evaluator submitted a report recommending
that the district court award mother sole physical and sole legal custody and limit father’s
parenting time to a supervised, therapeutic setting.
In June 2024, a court trial was held at which father appeared pro se. At trial, the
district court received testimony from mother, father, the evaluator, father’s sister, child’s

1 Father was represented by counsel at the time of the stipulation.
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maternal grandmother, and child’s paternal grandmother. At the close of trial, the district
court issued a verbal order suspending father’s parenting time for 60 days based on
concerns that child’s mental health and behavioral outbursts may be linked to child’s visits
with father. The district court subsequently issued amended findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and an order for custody, parenting time, and child support. 2 The district court
found the testimony of mother, child’s maternal grandmother, and the evaluator credible.
After conducting a detailed analysis of the statutory best-interests factors, the district court
determined it was in child’s best interests for mother to retain sole physical and sole legal
custody. As to parenting time, the district court found that, based on affidavits from child’s
daily caregivers and a note from child’s therapist, child’s “behavior and mental health ha[d]
improved since visits with [father] were suspended” and therefore it was in child’s best
interests for father’s parenting time to remain suspended.
Father appeals.
DECISION
Father, a pro se litigant, assigns numerous errors to the district court’s order granting
mother sole legal and sole physical custody of their minor child and suspending father’s
parenting time. We begin by setting out certain principles that govern our review.
On appeal, a reviewing court does not presume error; instead, the party seeking
relief must identify error and show that it was prejudicial. Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway
Ctr., Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975); Braith v. Fischer, 632 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Minn.

2 The order was amended to include the previously reserved issue of child support, which
father does not dispute on appeal.
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App. 2001) (applying this aspect of Midway in a family-law appeal), rev. denied (Minn.
Oct. 24, 2001). While “some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court
has repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as
attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115,
119 (Minn. App. 2001).
An assignment of error based on mere assertion, unsupported by argument or
authority, is forfeited and need not be considered unless prejudicial error is obvious on
mere inspection. Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135
(Minn. 1971); see also State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558
N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address an inadequately briefed question);
Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a family-
law appeal). Furthermore, we generally only consider issues presented to, and considered
by, the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988); see also Lewis-
Miller v. Ross, 710 N.W.2d 565, 570 (Minn. 2006) (applying this aspect of Thiele in a
family-law appeal).
Finally, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.02, subd. 1(c), requires that in a formal brief,
“[e]ach statement of a material fact shall be accompanied by a reference to the record.”
Citations to the record “are particularly important where . . . the record is extensive.”
Hecker v. Hecker , 543 N.W.2d 678, 681 n.2 (Minn. App. 1996), aff’d, 568 N.W.2d 705
(Minn. 1997). A failure to cite to the record violates Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.03 and “[a]
flagrant violation of the rules to fail to provide citations to the record may lead to non-
consideration of an issue or dismissal of an appeal.” Brett v. Watts, 601 N.W.2d 199, 202
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(Minn. App. 1999) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 1999). Father’s brief
provides no citations to the record, even though the record consists of ten volumes of
documents totaling more than 1,440 pages and 3 volumes of transcripts totaling over 400
pages. Although we do not conclude that father’s failures to cite to the record are flagrant,
we note that the failure to comply with the rules diminishes the persuasiveness of his brief.
See id. (noting that a party’s failure to comply with procedural rules can “diminish a brief’s
persuasiveness”).
With those principles in mind, we turn to father’s claims of error.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by suspending father’s parenting
time.

We understand father’s first challenge to be to the district court’s determination to
suspend his parenting time. “District courts have broad discretion on matters of custody
and parenting time.” Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). We will not
reverse a district court’s parenting-time decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Olson
v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 1995). “A district court abuses its discretion by
making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or
delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Bender v. Bernhard,
971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). Further, we will uphold a district
court’s findings of fact underlying a parenting-time decision unless they are clearly
erroneous. Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009). “A finding is clearly
erroneous if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000)
6
(quotations omitted). In determining whether findings are clearly erroneous, we defer to
the district court’s credibility determinations and view the record in the light most favorable
to the district court’s findings. Id.
“[U]pon the request of either parent,” a district court shall “grant such parenting
time . . . as will enable the child and the parent to maintain a child to parent relationship
that will be in the best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(a) (2024). “In
the absence of other evidence, there is a rebuttable presumption that a child must receive a
minimum of at least 25 percent of the parenting time with each parent.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.175, subd. 1(g) (2024). But this presumption does not guarantee equal parenting
time. See Manthei v. Manthei, 268 N.W.2d 45, 45 (Minn. 1978) (“[Parenting-time] rights
are not absolute and are to be exercised only when in the best interest of the child.”). The
parenting-time statute allows restrictions on parenting time if the district court finds that
“parenting time is likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health or impair the
child’s emotional development.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(c)(1) (2024).
Here, the district court suspended fa ther’s parenting time with child because it
concluded that father’s “parenting time endangers [child’s] mental and emotional health
and well-being and is not in [child’s] best interest.” The district found that child’s ongoing
psychological distress and behavioral outbursts were “directly related to visits with
[father]” and that, “[a]fter a break from supervised visits with [father,] [child’s] behaviors
have started to improve.” The district court also made extensive factual findings relevant
to child’s best interests, including those pertaining to: mother’s role as child’s primary
caregiver since child’s birth; the history of domestic abuse perpetrated by father against
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mother; father’s reluctance to facilitate child’s relationship with mother; child’s expressed
fear of father; father’s mental-health struggles and apparent unwillingness to remain
medication compliant; father’s repeated violation of an order for protection and criminal
domestic-abuse no-contact order; and child’s expressed preference not to have supervised
parenting time with father. The district court’s findings are supported by the record.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that parenting time
would endanger child’s “physical or emotional health or impair [child’s] emotional
development” and by restricting father’s parenting time. Minn. Stat. § 518.175,
subd. 5(c)(1).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding father’s exhibits.

Father argues that the district court improperly excluded most of his exhibits at trial.
“We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we
will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch,
872 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015).
A district court may exclude evidence when a party fails to comply with a
scheduling order. Rule 16.06 provides in part: “If a party or party’s attorney fails to obey
a scheduling or pretrial order, . . . the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may
make such orders with regard thereto as are just, including any of the orders provided in
Rule 37.02(b)(2), (3), (4).” Minn. R. Civ. P. 16.06. Rule 37.02 allows the court to file an
order “prohibiting [the disobedient] party from introducing designated matters in
evidence.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.02(b)(2).
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Before trial, the district court issued a scheduling order requiring the parties to
upload their proposed exhibits to the Minnesota Digital Exhibit System (MNDES) within
three days of trial and provide copies of their exhibits to the opposing counsel or pro se
party within 14 days of trial. The scheduling order provided that “[f]ailure to do so may
result in exclusion of an exhibit from evidence.” While father uploaded multiple exhibits
to MNDES, he failed to provide physical copies of his exhibits to mother’s attorney as
required by the scheduling order. The district court provided father with additional time to
print and provide his exhibits to opposing counsel by the first day of trial, but father did
not do so. Mother stipulated to the admission of four of father’s exhibits but objected to
the remaining exhibits. The district court excluded father’s remaining exhibits for failure
to comply with the scheduling order. On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in
the district court decision to exclude father’s exhibits. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 16.06, 37.02.
III. The district court did not make clearly erroneous credibility determinations.

Father appears to argue that the district court made erroneous credibility
determinations. We will “set aside a district court’s findings of fact only if clearly
erroneous, giving deference to the district court’s opportunity to evaluate witness
credibility.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008). Under the
clear-error standard, we will not reweigh evidence, engage in fact- finding, or reconcile
conflicting evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221- 22 (Minn.
2021); see also Ewald v. Nedrebo, 999 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Minn. App. 2023) (citing Kenney
in a family-law appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2024). Accordingly, we “need not go
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into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness” of the
district court’s findings. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotation omitted).
Father first argues that the district court clearly erred in accepting the evaluator’s
“biased” recommendation “without review or scrutiny.” The record reflects that the district
court found the evaluator credible and assigned “substantial weight” to the evaluator’s
recommendation only after the court extensively reviewed the evaluator’s findings,
education, and professional experience, which included 20 years working as a neutral
custody and parenting-time evaluator. We defer to the district court’s credibility
determination. See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (“Deference
must be given to the opportunity of the [district] court to assess the credibility of the
witnesses.”); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (stating that “due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the [district] court to judge the credibility of the witnesses”).
Second, father argues that the district court erred in disregarding paternal
grandmother’s testimony. Paternal grandmother testified that she had never seen child
afraid of father, father was an excellent parent, and mother was vindictive and “an actress.”
The district court heard the testimony of paternal grandmother and found it was not
credible, a determination to which we must defer. See id.
Third, father argues that the district court erred finding credible mother’s attorney’s
statement that father never provided her physical copies of his exhibits as required by the
scheduling order. The district court credited mother’s attorney’s statement “as an officer
of the [c]ourt” that she never received father’s trial exhibits. Again, we must defer to the
district court’s credibility determination. See id.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not make clearly erroneous
credibility determinations.
IV. The district court did not violate the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct.

Father alleges that the district court violated various rules under the Minnesota Code
of Judicial Conduct. “Whether a judge has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct is a
question of law, which we review de novo.” State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 246 (Minn.
2005).
Father first contends that the district court violated rule 2.9(A) by engaging in
prohibited ex parte communications by “conferring with another judge.” See Minn. Code
Jud. Conduct Rule 2.9(A) (stating that generally, “[a] judge shall not initiate, permit, or
consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge
outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending or impending
matter”). Father fails to provide a citation to this alleged ex parte communication, and our
review of the record uncovered none. Thus, we do not address this argument. See Wintz,
558 N.W.2d at 480 (declining to reach an issue “in the absence of adequate briefing”).
Father next contends that the district court violated rules 2.2 and 2 .3(A), which
provide that “[a] judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of
judicial office fairly and impartially” and “without bias or prejudice.” Minn. Code Jud.
Conduct Rules 2.2, 2.3(A). Father argues that the district court exhibited bias against him
by: (1) excluding his exhibits on “technicalities”; (2) relying on “biased” expert testimony
from the evaluator; (3) referring to him as “the defendant,” suggesting “systemic bias and
a presumption of guilt”; and (4) disregarding his “reasonable arguments.” We have already
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determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding father’s exhibits
for failure to comply with the scheduling order and did not clearly err in its factual findings,
including its determination that the evaluator’s testimony and recommendations were
credible. Further, father does not cite to the record to support his assertion that the district
court referred to him as “the defendant,” and our review of the record fails to show any
such instance. As a result, we do not reach this issue. See Wintz, 558 N.W.2d at 480.
Finally, while father alleges that the district court erred in disregarding his
“reasonable arguments,” a mere adverse ruling is not proof of bias, Olson v. Olson, 392
N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986), and we presume that a district court judge “has
discharged her duties properly,” Hannon v. State, 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008).
Thus, father is not entitled to relief on his claims of judicial bias.
V. Father’s remaining arguments are forfeited.

Father raise s multiple constitutional arguments for the first time on appeal.
Specifically, father argues: (1) the district court failed to apply a “constitutional
presumption of equal parenting time” in suspending his parenting time; (2) Minn. Stat.
§ 257.541 (2024) is unconstitutional because it deprives biological, unwed fathers of equal
protection under the law; (3) the district court violated his First Amendment right to free
speech in admitting his social-media posts and videos at trial; (4) the district court violated
his procedural due-process right to be heard and present evidence by excluding his exhibits;
and (5) the district court denied him his constitutional right to confront his accusers by
relying on hearsay evidence. Father further argues that the district court made evidentiary
errors at trial, including by admitting a note that father contends was unauthenticated and
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contained hearsay and by admitting hearsay testimony from mother and a therapist. And
he asserts various claims related to the evaluator’s alleged bias and “history of dishonesty
and serious professional misconduct.”
We have carefully reviewed father’s remaining claims of error and conclude that
they are forfeited because they are unsupported by legal arguments or citation to legal
authority, were not raised in the district court or properly preserved for appellate review,
are not supported by the record, or because prejudicial error is not obvious on mere
inspection. See Wintz, 558 N.W.2d at 480 (concluding that inadequately briefed issues
need not be addressed when no prejudicial error was obvious on mere inspection); Thiele,
425 N.W.2d at 582 (stating that a reviewing court generally may not consider issues that
were not presented to, and considered by, the district court); In re Welfare of C.L.L., 310
N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981) (providing that an appellant cannot raise a constitutional
issue for the first time on appeal); In re Welfare of D.N., 523 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Minn. App.
1994) (“Evidentiary rulings are subject to appellate review only if there has been a motion
for a new trial in which such matters have been assigned as error.” (quotation omitted)),
rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 29, 1994). We therefore do not address them.
VI. Mother’s motion to strike is denied as moot.

Mother moved to strike portions of father’s addendum because it contains materials
that were not presented to the district court and are not part of the record on appeal. The
record on appeal is limited to “documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the
transcript of the proceedings, if any.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01. Generally, an
appellate court may not base its decision on materials outside the record on appeal and may
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not consider matters not produced and received into evidence in the district court. Thiele,
425 N.W.2d at 582. Because we have not relied on the portions of husband’s addendum
that mother is requesting we strike, we deny the motion to strike as moot. See Drewitz v.
Motorwerks, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 231, 233 n.2 (Minn. 2007) (denying motion to strike as
moot when court did not rely on challenged materials).
Affirmed; motion denied.