In Re the Matter of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0591

In Re the Matter of:

Nick Emilio Gherardi, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Anna Elizabeth Ayres,
Respondent.

Filed December 22, 2025
Affirmed; motion granted
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-22-3767

Nick Emilio Gherardi, Plymouth, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Susan A. Daudelin, Amy M. Yanik, Henschel Moberg, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this legal-custody dispute over where the parties’ child will attend school,
appellant father Nick Emilio Gherardi argue s that the district court erred in its findings
regarding the child’s best interests and otherwise abused its discretion in choosing the
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school requested by respondent mother Anna Elizabeth Ayres. Because the district court
did not abuse its discretion, we affirm. We also grant mother’s motion to strike portions of
the addenda that father filed in this court with his principal and reply briefs.
FACTS
Father and mother are the parents of one child, born in 2019. The child was five
years old at the time of the district court’s order at issue in this appeal.
The parents never married. By a judgment entered in February 2023 based on
stipulated findings of fact and order, the district court established joint legal and joint
physical custody. It also established a parenting-time schedule granting mother
approximately 60% of the overnights with the child and father approximately 40% of the
overnights. The judgment directs the parties to discuss school selection at least 12 months
before the child begins kindergarten. And it directs the parties to mediate any disputes
before scheduling a motion.
In May 2024, following an unsuccessful mediation, father filed a motion to modify
parenting time. At the time, father was living with his parents in Plymouth. Mother had
been living in her own home in Minneapolis since October 2023. In August 2024, the
district court denied father’s motion, deciding that it was in the child’s best interests to
maintain the existing parenting-time schedule. In its order, the district court noted that
while the issue of school choice is not before the Court, the
parties should be aware that if such a motion comes before the
Court in the future, the Court will need to see a demonstrated
effort by [father] to parent without the daily assistance of
grandparents and in a home that has been established for
[father] and [the child] to develop a relationship independent
of grandparents.
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Father did not appeal the order.
The parties then turned to the question of where the child would attend kindergarten
starting fall 2025. When they did not reach agreement, the parties attended mediation,
which was also unsuccessful.
In December 2024, mother filed a motion asking the district court to order that the
child attend Kenny Elementary (Kenny) from kindergarten through fifth grade. Kenny is
in the Minneapolis School District and is the neighborhood elementary school for mother’s
residence. The child was already attending a preschool located at Kenny through a
Minneapolis Public Schools program. Shortly thereafter, father filed a responsive motion
requesting that the district court order that the child attend school at Gleason Lake
Elementary (Gleason Lake) instead. Gleason Lake is in the Wayzata School District and is
located near father’s home in Plymouth, which he had purchased in November 2024. The
parties filed affidavits in support of their respective choices, and the district court held a
hearing. In April 2025, the district court filed its order granting mother’s motion and
determining that child will attend Kenny from kindergarten through fifth grade, starting
fall 2025.
Father appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its school-choice decision.
The choice of school for a child is a matter of legal custody. Novak v. Novak, 446
N.W.2d 422, 424-25 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 1, 1989). Custody
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determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d
279, 281-82 (Minn. 2008). A district court abuses its discretion by “making findings
unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law.” Id. at 282. Appellate
courts must give “great deference” to a district court’s custody determinations due to its
superior familiarity with the parties. Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 796 (Minn.
2019) (citing Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) ). A district court’s
factual findings are reviewed for clear error. In re Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d
214, 221 (Minn. 2021). In reviewing the findings, appellate courts must view the evidence
in a light favorable to the findings. Id. Appellate courts must defer to a district court’s
credibility determinations, Vangness v. Vangness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App.
2000), and cannot reweigh the evidence, reconcile conflicting evidence, or engage in new
fact-finding, Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22. “When the record reasonably supports the
findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable
basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. (quotation omitted).
When parents with joint legal custody disagree on the choice of school for their
child, the district court must resolve the dispute by evaluating the child’s best interests.
Novak, 446 N.W.2d at 423. By statute, in evaluating a child’s best interests for purposes of
determining a custody issue, a district court “must consider and evaluate all relevant
factors,” including 12 specifically listed factors. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2024).
The district court here addressed the 12 best -interests factors in its school-choice
order. First, citing its August 2024 parenting-time order, the district court found that factors
3, 4, 5, 7, 10, and 11 were “neutral on school choice” because of the “parents’ equal
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involvement and concern for the child.” The district court then evaluated the remaining six
factors in detail, finding that factors 1 and 9 were neutral and that factors 2, 6, 8, and 12
favored the child attending Kenny. The district court found that the best-interests factors
therefore weighed in favor of the child attending Kenny and ordered that the child be
enrolled at Kenny starting academic year 2025-26.
Father asserts multiple arguments challenging the district court’s decision. We
organize our analysis by considering, first, father’s challenges to the district court’s
findings on the best-interests factors and, second, his other challenges to the district court’s
decision.
A. Best-Interests Factors
Father argues that the district court erred by making findings that are unsupported
by the record, failing to consider material evidence, and making defective credibility
determinations with respect to seven best-interests factors. We address his arguments factor
by factor.
Factor 1: Child’s physical, emotional, cultural, or spiritual needs
Factor 1 addresses the “child’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and other
needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangements on the child’s needs and development.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(1). The district court found this factor neutral based on
uncertainty about whether the child would be guaranteed enrollment at Gleason Lake, the
performance statistics of Kenny and Gleason Lake, and the fact that the child would likely
have neighborhood or sports friends at both Kenny and Gleason Lake.
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Father argues the court erred in finding that the child would have to open-enroll at
Gleason Lake. Confusion around Gleason Lake enrollment was caused by a redrawing of
district lines while the parties were filing affidavits. Father represented that, despite the
redistricting, he could use the child’s grandparents’ address, rather than his own, to enroll
the child at Gleason Lake because father is listed as the taxpayer on the grandparents’
home. Father also submitted emails with the school district that seem ed to establish that
child could enroll and indeed was already enrolled in Gleason Lake . Mother, on the other
hand, submitted affidavit testimony stating that, based on her inquiry of Wayzata Public
Schools, the child would have to attend the school assigned to the address of the child’s
legal guardian unless a transfer request was approved. The district court apparently credited
mother’s evidence in determining that there was uncertainty about the child’s guaranteed
enrollment at Gleason Lake, and we defer to a district court’s credibility determinations.
See Vangness, 607 N.W.2d at 472.
Father also argues that the district court failed to fully consider comparative
statistical information that he argues establishes Gleason Lake as the superior school,
including rankings of Kenny and Gleason Lake, student-teacher ratios at the two schools,
and performance and outcome statistics more broadly in the Minneapolis and Wayzata
school districts. He also notes the district court’s failure to mention the child’s need for
greater academic challenge and argues that the district court did not adequately consider
the child’s existing friendships and other social benefits in the Plymouth/Wayzata area. But
the record contains ample evidence that would support either of the two elementary schools
as a good choice for the child. Father’s arguments ask us to reweigh that evidence, which
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we will not do. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221. The district court’s finding that factor 1 is
neutral is supported by the record.
Factor 2: Child’s special medical, mental health, developmental
disability, or educational needs
Factor 2 addresses “any special medical, mental health, developmental disability, or
educational needs that the child may have that may require special parenting arrangements
or access to recommended services.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(2). For this factor,
the district court noted the child’s diagnosis of a learning disability and observed that both
schools offered special -education services. But, because the child struggles with
transitions, the district court found that factor 2 weighed in favor of the child continuing
his education at Kenny since he was already attending preschool there.
Father argues that the child’s difficulty with transitions cannot be considered under
this factor because the issue does not involve “special parenting arrangements” or “access
to recommended services.” This argument is unconvincing. The focus of this factor is on
the child’s special needs. The district court found that the child’s trouble with transitions
weighed in favor of the child continuing at Kenny, which, as the court found, offers special-
education services. We discern no error in this determination.
Father also argues that the information that he provided about special-education
resources in the Wayzata school district favored Gleason Lake. Again, his argument asks
us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221.
Moreover, t he district court found that both Gleason Lake and Kenny offered special-
education services and focused instead on the continuity of keeping the child in the same
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building. It was not an abuse of discretion to find that Kenny would present less of a
transition and that factor 2 therefore favored Kenny.
Factor 6: History and nature of parents’ care
Factor 6 addresses “the history and nature of each parent’s participation in providing
care for the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(6). For this factor, the district court
incorporated its findings from its August 2024 order regarding father’s historical parenting
participation. It also calculated and compared the commute time that the child would
experience, finding that the child would experience about 90 more minutes of commute
time every two weeks if the child if attended Gleason Lake rather than Kenny. It found that
factor 6 weighed in in favor of Kenny.
Father argues that the court mischaracterized his historical care of the child and
erroneously relied on its prior findings from the earlier order. He lists 13 of mother’s claims
about his parental involvement that the district court relied on—either in the prior order or
in the order under review—despite evidence to the contrary. We conclude that the district
court was well within its discretion to rely on its best-interests findings from a recent order.
See Grein v. Grein, 364 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that district court may
rely on court files to discern history in connection with modification of custody).
Furthermore, we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. See Thornton, 933
N.W.2d at 791.
Father also asserts that the district court erred in comparing commute times, because
his evidence shows that the parents’ “drop-off commute times, including travel to each
parent’s workplace,” are nearly identical. Although the district court generally described
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the parents’ commutes from home, to school, to work, it properly calculated and compared
the amount of time that the child would spend in the car under the current parenting
schedule. Father has not asserted any error in the district court’s findings about the child’s
car time. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s finding that factor 6
favored Kenny.
Factor 8: Effect of changes to home, school, and community
Factor 8 addresses “the effect on the child’s well-being and development of changes
to home, school, and community.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(8). Regarding this
factor, the district court evaluated the child’s behavioral needs and past schooling. The
district court noted that the child had already attended four different school or care
environments and, focusing on the child’s difficulty with transitions, found that this factor
favored Kenny.
Father argues that the district court erred regarding the history of the child’s
enrollment in the preschool program at Kenny. The district court found that the parents had
disagreed on where to send the child for preschool and that mother unilaterally enrolled the
child in the program at Kenny. But the district court found that mother’s unilateral decision
was a “necessity” for her to continue working and rejected father’s assertion that it was a
tactic to influence future schooling decisions. Father argues that this finding was erroneous.
But the finding is supported by the evidence and represents a credibility determination to
which we defer. See Vangness, 607 N.W.2d at 472.
Father makes other arguments regarding this factor, including that father’s
preschool choices were superior, that the child does not struggle with transitions, that
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Kenny would still constitute a transition since the child will be starting kindergarten, and
that Gleason Lake is familiar to the child due to the child spending time at the school’s
playgrounds and fields. But each of these arguments asks us to reweigh the evidence, which
we will not do. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that factor 6 favored Kenny.
Factor 9: Effect on significant ongoing relationships
Factor 9 addresses “the effect of the proposed arrangements on the ongoing
relationships between the child and each parent, siblings, and other significant persons in
the child’s life.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(9). Here, the district court weighed the
value of maintaining friendships at Kenny against proximity to hockey teammates and
grandparents at Gleason Lake and found factor 9 neutral.
Father argues that the district court erred in not finding that this factor favored
Gleason Lake because it failed to consider that attending school in the Wayzata school
system would let the child remain close to extended family and to receive after-school care
from his grandparents . But the district court did consider these benefits of attending
Gleason Lake, along with the benefits that attending Kenny would offer, including
continuing in the same school environment with current friends. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in weighing these considerations and finding that factor 9 was neutral.
Factor 11: Parents’ support of the child’s relationship with the other
parent

Factor 11 addresses “the disposition of each parent to support the child’s
relationship with the other parent and to encourage and permit frequent and continuing
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contact between the child and the other parent.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(11). The
district court found that this factor was neutral, based on its findings in its previous order
and the “parents’ equal involvement and concern for the child.”
For the first time in his reply brief, father challenges the district court’s finding on
factor 11, arguing that the district court ignored “substantial, relevant evidence” in his
affidavit. Generally, an issue not raised in an appellant’s principal brief cannot be asserted
in a reply brief. Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 887 (Minn. 2010).
But, even if this issue were properly raised on appeal, father’s argument is unconvincing.
Father devoted several pages of his affidavit to claims about mother excluding him from
the child’s life. Mother provided affidavit testimony to the contrary. We defer to the district
court’s credibility determinations, see Vangness, 607 N.W.2d at 472, and discern no error
in the district court’s determination that this factor was neutral.
Factor 12: Willingness and ability of parents to cooperate
Factor 12 addresses “the willingness and ability of parents to cooperate in the
rearing of their child; to maximize sharing information and minimize exposure of the child
to parental conflict; and to utilize methods for resolving disputes regarding any major
decision concerning the life of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(12). The district
court considered father’s recent hostile text messages to mother, the recency of father’s
establishment in his own home, father’s decision not to purchase a home closer to mother’s
to reduce commute times and improve collaborative parenting, and father’s lack of
openness with mother regarding the enrollment issues at Gleason Lake and found that this
factor favored Kenny.
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Father makes several arguments that seem to address factor 12, including that the
district court over-relied on his text messages, unfairly scrutinized his success in his new
home, and mischaracterized the facts regarding his school preference and enrollment at
Gleason Lake. But these arguments again ask us to reweigh the evidence, which we will
not do. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that factor 12 favored Kenny.
B. Other Challenges
Father makes numerous other arguments that are not necessarily related to a specific
best-interests factor. These arguments include that the district court improperly
downplayed his affidavit testimony by attributing its persuasiveness to the skill of his
lawyer rather than the truth of the testimony, unfairly criticized his statements about mother
as reflecting a failure on his part to focus on the child’s best interests while finding mother’s
statements to be relevant and persuasive, was improperly dismissive of his commentary
about mother’s mental-health history, mischaracterized his cooperation regarding the
child’s therapeutic services, and improperly stated that he would view the district court’s
decision as mother “winning” rather than a decision based on the child’s best interests. We
need not explore each of these arguments in further detail because “an appellate court need
not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness
of the findings of the trial court.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotation omitted). Suffice
it to say that these arguments fail because they again challenge the district court’s
credibility determinations and weighing of evidence. See Vangness, 607 N.W.2d at 472;
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221.
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Father also complains that the district court improperly considered a supplemental
affidavit from mother that was submitted after the hearing. But father cites no law that bars
the district court from considering a supplemental affidavit containing new, relevant
evidence, especially when the district court is exercising its “broad discretion” to make a
custody determination in the best interests of the child. See Goldman, 748 N.W.2d at 282.
We see no error in the district court’s consideration of the supplemental evidence supplied
by mother, especially since the district court also considered the supplemental evidence
that father was permitted to submit in response.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the best interests
of the child and deciding that the child should attend Kenny for kindergarten through fifth
grade.
II. Respondent’s motion to strike portions of appellant’s addenda is granted.
Mother filed a motion to strike portions of father’s addenda. Father filed an
addendum with both his principal brief and his reply brief. The addenda contain what
appear to be edited excerpts from the record rather than copies of the actual record
documents. In addition, the addenda contain unredacted non-public information. We grant
mother’s motion to strike the addenda in their entirety, except for the district court order
under review. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (stating that record on appeal consists of
“the documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings,
if any”); Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 112.05 (addressing treatment of non-public information in
filings), 130.02(a) (describing required contents of addenda).
Affirmed; motion granted.