In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0612

In re the Marriage of:

Dawn Deana Rutzke King, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Danny Scott King,
Appellant.

Filed December 8, 2025
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-FA-24-2475

David C. Gapen, Gapen, Larson & Johnson, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Bridget R. Landry, Cordell Law, LLP, Edina, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Segal,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Respondent-wife Dawn Deana Rutzke King petitioned to dissolve her marriage with
appellant-husband Danny Scott King. Husband moved to dismiss the petition for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, based on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. The district court denied husband’s motion to dismiss. We affirm.
FACTS
Husband and wife were married in 1992. In 2006, husband graduated from nurse-
anesthesia school , and the couple— along with their son and daughter—moved to
Minnesota. In 2007, they built a home in Faribault, Minnesota.
In 2008, husband and son moved to a rental apartment in Texas so that son could
attend a military academy. Husband got a job as a nurse anesthetist in Texas. Wife and
daughter remained in Minnesota. After son moved back to Minnesota, husband remained
in Texas because he made more money, but he returned to Minnesota once a month.
In 2010, husband got a job with a new company in Texas and began earning a higher salary.
In 2014, husband sustained injuries in a motorcycle accident and was unable to work
for six months. During this time, wife went to Texas to care for husband. Wife later
obtained a Texas driver’s license, registered to vote in Texas, and changed their mailing
address to the Texas apartment. The couple later bought a townhome in Texas.
In 2022, daughter had a baby while living and attending graduate school in North
Dakota. Wife would travel to North Dakota to help take care of the baby.
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In late 2023 or early 2024, husband told wife that he wanted a divorce. On
September 26, 2024, w ife served husband with a summons and a petition for dissolution
of marriage. On October 24, 2024, husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in
Texas state court. Husband’s petition asserted that he and wife “have lived apart without
cohabitation for at least three years.” On October 25, 2024, wife filed the dissolution
petition in Minnesota state court. In the petition, wife asserted that she had “been a resident
of the State of Minnesota not less than 180 days immediately preceding the commencement
of [the] proceeding for dissolution.”
Husband moved to dismiss the Minnesota proceedings for a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and, alternatively, based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Following
a hearing, the district court denied husband’s motion to dismiss. Regarding subject-matter
jurisdiction, the district court found that wife was “a resident and domiciled in the State of
Minnesota for at least the 180 days preceding the commencement of the dissolution action
in the State of Minnesota, as required by statute.” Regarding forum non conveniens, the
district court determined that “Texas appear[ed] to be an available forum,” that the private-
interest factors weighed against dismissal, and that the public-interest factors were neutral.
The district court concluded that husband failed to overcome the strong presumption in
favor of Minnesota as the proper forum.
Husband appeals.
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DECISION
I. The district court did not err by denying husband’s motion to dismiss for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Husband argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the
dissolution petition for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. “Subject-matter jurisdiction
refers to a court’s “authority to hear and determine a particular class of actions and the
particular questions which the court assumes to decide.” Robinette v. Price, 8 N.W.2d 800,
804 (Minn. 1943). For a Minnesota court to have subject-matter jurisdiction to dissolve a
marriage, one party must—for at least 180 days immediately preceding the commencement
of the dissolution action—reside in, or be a domiciliary of, Minnesota. Minn. Stat.
§ 518.07, subd. 1. A dissolution action is commenced in Minnesota when a party is served
with a summons and a petition for dissolution of marriage. Minn. Stat. § 518.09 (2024).
We review challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Daniel v. City of
Minneapolis, 923 N.W.2d 637, 644 (Minn. 2019). But a party’s residence and domicile
are questions of fact. Jones v. Jones, 402 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Minn. App. 1987) (residence);
Berc v. Berc, 407 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Minn. App. 1987) (domicile). We will not reverse a
district court’s findings unless they are “palpably contrary to the evidence.” Davidner v.
Davidner, 232 N.W.2d 5, 7 (Minn. 1975). When we review a district court’s factual
findings, we do not weigh or reweigh the evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney,
963 N.W.2d 214, 223 (Minn. 2021). If the record supports the findings of fact that the
district court made, it is “immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis
for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Id. (quotation omitted).
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A. The district court’s finding that wife was a resident of Minnesota is not
palpably contrary to the evidence.

Husband argues that the district court’s finding that wife was a resident of
Minnesota in the 180 days immediately preceding the commencement of the dissolution
action is palpably contrary to the evidence in the record. We disagree.
In the dissolution context, “[r]esidence” is defined as “the place where a party has
established a permanent home from which the party has no present intention of moving.”
Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 9 (2024). The purpose of the residency requirement is to
prevent forum shopping. See Davis v. Davis, 210 N.W.2d 221, 227 (Minn. 1973).
We conclude that the district court’s finding that wife was a resident of Minnesota
is not palpably contrary to the evidence. Wife and husband maintained ownership of their
long-time Faribault home throughout the 180 days immediately preceding the
commencement of the dissolution action. In wife’s dissolution petition, she listed the
Faribault address as her address. And she attested, under oath, in an affidavit that although
she had spent time in North Dakota helping to raise her grandchild during the relevant
180-day period, wife continued to “go back to Minnesota on weekends and
holidays[,] . . . ha[s] always considered [herself] to be living in Faribault[,] and . . . ha[s]
every intention to continue to have [their] dream home remain [her] permanent home.” In
addition, it is undisputed that wife spent no time in Texas during the 180 days immediately
preceding the commencement of this dissolution action. This evidence supports the district
court’s finding that wife was a resident of Minnesota for at least 180 days immediately
preceding the commencement of the dissolution action.
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Much of the evidence that husband relies upon falls outside the relevant 180-day
statutory period. The evidence that h usband cites may have supported a reasonable basis
for inferences contrary to the district court’s findings of fact, but that does not make the
district court’s findings clearly erroneous. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 223. As this court
has repeatedly noted, albeit in nonprecedential opinions:
The question on appeal is not whether the record could support
the findings husband wanted the district court to make—it is
whether the evidence does support the findings that the district
court did make. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 223 (“When the
record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is
immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable
basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” (quotation
omitted)); [Vangsness v.] Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d [468,] 474
[(Minn. App. 2000)] (“That the record might support findings
other than those made by the [district] court does not show that
the court’s findings are defective.”). An argument that simply
cites evidence that could support findings that differ from those
made by the district court does not identify the evidence that
supports the findings that the district court made. Nor does it
explain why, when we are required to view that evidence in the
light most favorable to the findings of the district court, those
findings are clearly erroneous. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d
at 221. Thus, challenging a district court’s findings of fact by
simply marshalling evidence that could support findings that
differ from those made by the district court is an inadequate
way to challenge those findings. Here, there is evidence to
support the district court’s findings and husband has not
attempted to show how, given that evidence, . . . the district
court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Therefore, our inquiry
on this point is done. See id. at 222 (“[A]n appellate court need
not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or
demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the [district]
court.” (quotation omitted)).

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McDonald v. McDonald, No. A22-1421, 2023 WL 8361312, at *6 (Minn. App. Dec. 4,
2023).1
B. The district court’s finding that wife was a domiciliary of Minnesota is
not palpably contrary to the evidence.

Husband also contends that the court clearly erred in finding wife was a domiciliary
of Minnesota in the 180 days before commencing the dissolution action. We disagree.
Domicile is “the union of residence and intention.” Davidner, 232 N.W.2d at 7.
“[A] domicile, once shown to exist, is presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.”
Id. A change to residence does not necessarily mean domicile has changed. Id.
We conclude that the district court’s finding that wife was a domiciliary of
Minnesota is not palpably contrary to the evidence. Again, wife and husband retained
ownership of their 2007 marital home in Faribault during the relevant 180-day period.
Wife expressed to the district court that “[s]he has lived in Minnesota since 2006” and that
“[i]t [was] her intention to stay in Minnesota.” She characterized her time in Texas caring
for husband as visits during which she would “live[] out of a suitcase.” There is also
evidence in the record that wife and husband invested in improvements to the Faribault
property, including the installation of a new roof in April 2022 and a new driveway in
August 2023, which suggests an intent to remain. This evidence supports the district
court’s finding that wife was a domiciliary of Minnesota in the 180 days immediately
preceding the commencement of the dissolution action.

1 As a nonprecedential case, we cite McDonald for its persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
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Again, husband cites evidence that could have supported a contrary finding. We do
not reweigh the evidence when reviewing a district court’s factual findings, and thus “it is
immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings
to the contrary.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 223 (quotation omitted).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying husband’s motion to
dismiss the dissolution petition based on the forum non conveniens doctrine.

Husband next argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion to dismiss the dissolution petition based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Under that doctrine, “a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a cause of action
when it would be more equitable to have the case tried in another available court of
competent jurisdiction.” Ansello v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 900 N.W.2d 167, 173 (Minn. 2017)
(quotation omitted). There is a “strong presumption” in favor of the petitioner’s choice of
forum. Id. at 174. Th e presumption is especially strong when “the plaintiff is a resident
of the chosen forum.” Id. “A forum non conveniens determination is committed to the
sound discretion of the [district] court,” and we will not reverse that determination absent
an abuse of discretion. Paulownia Plantations de Pan. Corp. v. Rajamannan, 793 N.W.2d
128, 133 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). A district court abuses its discretion “when
[it] makes an erroneous legal conclusion or a clearly erroneous factual conclusion.” Id.
When conducting a forum non conveniens analysis, the district court must first
“establish the existence of an available and adequate alternative forum.” Id. An alternative
forum is “available” if “the foreign court has jurisdiction over the case and the parties” and
is “adequate” if “the party has an effective remedy in the alternative forum.” Id. at 134. If
9
the district court determines that an available and adequate alternative forum exists, the
court then “weigh[s] the private and public interest factors of both forums.” Id. at 137.
Private-interest factors include “the interests of litigants, ease of access to sources of proof,
and any obstacles to a fair trial.” Ansello, 900 N.W.2d at 173. Public-interest factors
include “administrative difficulties and the local interest in having localized controversies
decided at home.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In this case, the district court concluded that there appeared to be an alternative
forum: Texas. The district court did not determine whether Texas was an adequate forum
but instead found that the private-interest factors weighed against dismissal and that the
public-interest factors were essentially neutral.
Husband argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the
private-interest factors weighed against dismissal. Husband argues that: not all records for
trial can be obtained electronically ; the majority of the couple’s assets are in Texas; it
would be easier for wife to travel to Texas for hearings than for him to travel to Minnesota
because wife does not work; any witnesses called to testify would more likely be located
in Texas; and the affidavit stating that litigants generally cannot appear virtually in Texas
is “speculation.” Husband also argues that the district court abused its discretion in
determining that the public-interest factors are essentially neutral. He argues that Texas
could provide quicker relief and that, because of his and wife’s ties to Texas, there is a
local interest in having the dissolution decided in Texas.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
husband’s motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Husband fails
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to identify any erroneous legal conclusion or clearly erroneous factual finding in the district
court’s analysis. Beginning with the private-interest factors, Minnesota presents no major
obstacles to a fair trial or to access to sources of proof. As the district court reasoned,
“[a]ccess to the parties[’] records and other sources of proof are easily obtained through
electronic means” as demonstrated by the rec ords included in the parties’ filings in the
Minnesota dissolution proceeding. Additionally, hu sband can participate in Minnesota
district court proceedings virtually from Texas. In contrast, there is evidence in the record
that suggests that wife may not be able to participate in Texas hearings virtually from
Minnesota. And there is nothing in the record that suggests that Minnesota presents any
administrative delays or difficulties or conflicts of law. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying husband’s forum non conveniens motion.
III. The district court did not impose an anti-suit injunction.

Husband argues that the district court erred by effectively imposing an anti-suit
injunction
2 when the order noted that the dissolution action “will proceed in the State of
Minnesota.” We conclude that the district court did not impose an anti-suit injunction.
No motion for an anti-suit injunction was before the district court. And the language
used in the district court’s order did not sua sponte impose an anti-suit injunction because
the order does not prohibit a party from commencing or continuing an action in a different
jurisdiction, which is the defining characteristic of an anti-suit injunction. Instead, the

2 An anti-suit injunction is an “injunction[] that forbid[s] litigants from proceeding in
identical or related legal proceedings in sister states.” John Ray Phillips, III, A Proposed
Solution to the Puzzle of Antisuit Injunctions, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2007, 2007 (2002).

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court merely explained that the action already pending in Minnesota could proceed.3
Affirmed.

3 We take no position on the merits of any motion for an anti-suit injunction should such a
motion be filed. We also do not comment on whether the Minnesota or Texas court should
stay the proceedings to defer to the parallel litigation in the other state. Nor do we comment
on the merits of the dissolution proceeding currently pending in Minnesota.