State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0622

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Dylan Alexander Domino,
Appellant.

Filed April 6, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Ross, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-24-4493

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Patrick Monnens, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Dylan Domino appeals from his convictions of felony stalking, violating a
harassment restraining order, and threats of violence, arguing that the jury found him guilty
by relying on other-acts evidence that the district court improperly admitted and that the
prosecutor improperly emphasized. The state acknowledges that the district court
“mistakenly” admitted the evidence and argues only that the improper admission was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because, among other things, the jury received an
instruction on the use of the evidence. Because we conclude that the instruction aggravated
rather than mitigated the error and that other circumstances establish a reasonable
possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict, we
reverse Domino’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
The state charged Dylan Domino with one count of stalking, one count of violating
a harassment restraining order (HRO), and one count of threats of violence after police
investigated a woman’s June 2024 report that Domino had made unsolicited, unwanted
communications to her. We will call this woman “April,” a name that we have randomly
chosen in the interest of protecting her privacy. April had reported that a Facebook user
named “Kenzie D omino” had repeatedly contacted her on social media with threats of
sexual violence against her and her children. April recognized the profile as belonging to
her former brother-in-law, Dylan Domino, against whom she had obtained a 50-year HRO
in 2018. The social-media messages included, among other statements, “I need you and
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your kids to come over so I can rape you all!” and “I love you and I am going to make you
my personal fuck puppet sex slave.”
At the beginning of Domino’s consequent criminal trial, the state moved in limine
to admit four incidents of Domino’s alleged HRO violations as statutorily admissible
relationship evidence under Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 (2024). Domino objected
to the admissibility of two of them—a 2017 incident and a 2020 incident in which he had
sent sexually explicit messages to April by phone and to her daughter by mail. He argued,
among other things, that the relationship-evidence statute does not apply because none of
the subjects protected by the violated HRO qualify as a “victim of domestic conduct” or as
a “family or household member[] ,” which are the only classes of victims covered by the
statute. Minn. Stat. § 634.20. The prosecutor countered, telling the district court that a
family or household relationship “is not required” under the statute, and the district court
overruled Domino’s objection.
The prosecutor then elicited testimony from April about the communications for
which Domino was on trial. And she also elicited April’s testimony about the contested
evidence of Domino’s prior harassing communications.
Regarding the communications that formed the basis of the charges in the current
case, April testified that Domino had “liked” several of her Facebook posts, called her
husband multiple times on the platform, and sent her messages describing graphic sexual
acts. He messaged, “I need you and your kids to come over so I can rape you all!” He
wrote, “I love you and I am going to make you my personal fuck puppet sex slave.” Domino
also sent a “friend request” to April on Snapchat. April did not respond to Domino’s
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communications, but she preserved them as evidence of his misconduct. Her husband
testified that Domino attempted to call him multiple times through Facebook. He said he
answered one of these calls, during which Domino apologized but claimed that he could
not resist contacting April. Domino then sent sexually suggestive images of himself to
April’s husband, who identified Domino by his profile picture, by his voice, and by a brief
appearance on video.
Regarding Domino’s prior communications that the state had introduced as
“relationship evidence,” April testified that Domino had sent her text messages during two
months in 2017 after he became the subject of an HRO prohibiting him from contacting
her. She said that in those messages, Domino called her a “fuck puppet slave,” a “whore,”
and a “slut.” She said that his text messages included threats that he would kidnap and
torture her in her basement, rape her, impregnate her, and then rape her offspring. The
prosecutor also elicited testimony from April that Domino had contacted her daughter by
mail in 2020 with sexually explicit letters, referring to her daughter as a “whore” and,
possibly, a “prostitute.” April testified that she had been “beyond frightened” by Domino’s
messages.
One of the two trial prosecutors asked an investigating Lino Lakes police officer to
testify as to whether Domino’s communications violated the HRO:
Q: So the type of conduct that you observed through [April]
on her cell phone, can you describe if and why those would be
violations of that Order through your training and experience?

A: Yes. They were electronic communications with messages
sent from the account, from the Domino account to hers, which
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would be a violation of contact via means of a social
networking site.
The prosecutor then had the officer explain why, in his police report, he had recommended
the state charge Domino with a felony-level HRO violation. The prosecutor asked, “Can
you explain what a qualified domestic-related offense is and how that relates to that
comment in your report?” Then he followed by eliciting the officer’s testimony that
Domino’s prior convictions “would qualify as prior domestic-related convictions,” as well
as the officer’s affirmative response to, “So no doubt the conviction and sentencing dates
match and these two convictions qualify for enhancement?”
A prosecutor also called investigating Lino Lakes Police Sergeant Katie Kraemer to
testify. Sergeant Kraemer testified that she obtained subpoenaed Facebook records
establishing that Domino had sent April the reported messages. Sergeant Kraemer said that
she also forensically examined Domino’s cellphone, confirming that Domino had used the
device to communicate with April on Snapchat. During Sergeant Kraemer’s testimony
about her investigation into the trial allegations of Domino’s sexually harassing conduct
toward April, the prosecutor directed the sergeant also to testify about Domino’s sexually
harassing conduct toward the sergeant. Following the prosecutor’s lead, Sergeant Kraemer
testified, “At one point [during my investigation], he asked me for nudes, and then he asked
for my badge number and full name, I believe, and then he also sent me pictures of an erect
penis.”
The prosecutor made a closing argument to the jury, emphasizing Domino’s prior
convictions and contending that Domino used the same “unique terminology” as before
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and that the jury had “heard the history” between them. The prosecutor maintained, “This
wasn’t the first time. This isn’t the first time he’s threatened to rape her, to kidnap her, to
torture her.”
The jury found Domino guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to
serve 21 months in prison.
Domino appeals.
DECISION
Domino raises two arguments to challenge his conviction. He argues first that the
district court erroneously admitted evidence of his prior conduct as relationship evidence
and that the improper evidence substantially affected the jury’s verdict. He argues second
that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by leading one investigator to opine as to
whether Domino’s conduct met the elements of the offense charged and another to testify
about Domino’s misconduct toward her. Because it is clear that Domino is entitled to a
new trial based on the highly prejudicial nature of the impermissibly admitted evidence of
his previous HRO violations, we reverse without addressing the other allegedly unfair
aspects of Domino’s trial.
The district court, without dispute on appeal, erroneously admitted evidence of
Domino’s prior convictions for twice violating the HRO because that evidence does not
qualify as relationship evidence under the relationship-evidence statute. The district court
has broad discretion on matters of evidence admissibility. State v. Reese, 692 N.W.2d 736,
740 (Minn. 2005). We will not consider reversing a conviction based on improper
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admission of evidence unless the district court abused that discretion. Id. For the following
reasons, we concluded that the district court abused its discretion here.
That the district court abused its discretion here is not in doubt. The district court
admitted the evidence of Domino’s 2017 and 2020 HRO violations against April and her
daughter as relationship evidence over Domino’s objection. Although evidence of a
defendant’s prior bad acts is generally inadmissible with limited exceptions, see Minn. R.
Evid. 404(b)(1), the legislature has directed district courts to treat a certain category of
prior bad acts, known as relationship evidence, as admissible unless unduly prejudicial, see
Minn. Stat. § 634.20. This generally admissible evidence is “[e] vidence of domestic
conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or
household members[.]” Minn. Stat. § 634.20. And “[d]omestic conduct” includes, among
other things, “evidence of domestic abuse, violation of an order for protection . . . [and]
violation of a harassment restraining order[.]” Id. We say that the district court’s abuse of
discretion is not in doubt here because, as the state correctly concedes, Domino was clearly
correct when he urged the district court to exclude the evidence because neither April nor
her daughter were a “victim of domestic conduct” or a member of Domino’s family or
household under the relationship-evidence statute. Domino was April’s former brother-in-
law, and no one had suggested that he and the two ever resided in the same household. The
prosecutor wrongly advised the district court that being a member of the same household
was not a prerequisite under the statute, and the district court wrongly accepted the
prosecutor’s advice.
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The state asks us not to reverse, arguing that the improper admission of Domino’s
2017 and 2020 convictions for violating the HRO constitutes only harmless error. We do
not reverse convictions based on errors that are harmless, meaning that we disregard “[a]ny
error that does not affect [a criminal defendant’s] substantial rights.” Minn. R. Crim. P.
31.01. An appellant can prevail under harmless-error review by demonstrating that there is
a “reasonable likelihood” that the erroneous admission of prior-bad-acts evidence
substantially affected the verdict. State v. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263, 274 (Minn. 2017). We
consider four factors in this review: the manner in which the prosecutor presented the
evidence; whether the evidence was highly persuasive; whether the prosecutor used it in
the state’s closing argument; and whether the defense effectively countered the evidence.
State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn. 2024). Our careful review of the record leads
us to conclude that the error was not harmless.
Regarding the first factor, the state presented the inadmissible evidence of Domino’s
prior convictions in a prominent manner. We focus our analysis on the state’s use of the
prior-bad-acts evidence throughout the case and the number of transcript pages that it
occupies. Id. at 56. The prosecutor emphasized the “long history” between Domino and the
subjects of his harassment in her opening statement and closing argument. The prosecutor
also relied on Domino’s prior convictions in her examinations of April to demonstrate “the
nature and extent of the [parties’] relationship” and in her examinations of a police officer
to explain the enhancement of Domino’s charges. The prosecutor’s references to the
inadmissible bad-acts evidence spans 12 pages of the more than 200-page trial transcript,
excluding the voir dire portions. This reflects the prominent manner of its presentation.
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Regarding the second factor, the inadmissible evidence was especially persuasive
in nature. Impermissible character evidence has a particularly high persuasive value. See
id. at 57. The inadmissible evidence here closely mirrored the charged conduct in its
manner, subject, audience, and language. It appears as extremely strong evidence of
Domino’s propensity to do the very thing he was here accused of doing. It erased any
potentially reasonable doubt as to whether he was the same self -named “Kenzie Domino”
who sent the messages. The state is correct, however, that its unchallenged, admissible
evidence of guilt was substantial and that strong evidence of guilt erodes the persuasive
effect of wrongly admitted evidence. Id. at 59. That April identified Domino from his
Facebook photo, that her husband recognized him from a captured video, and that Sergeant
Kraemer tied Domino to the sender using subpoenaed Facebook records convincingly
demonstrates that Domino was, in fact, the sender. The strength of the evidence lessens the
impact of the error.
Regarding the third factor, the prosecutor accentuated the improperly admitted
evidence three times in her concise closing argument. She drew specific attention to the
“unique terminology” that Domino used in those prior messages, implying a close
comparison to the terminology alleged in the charged conduct. She called the jury to
consider the “history” between Domino and April, which by inference included mainly the
harassment he previously committed against her. She spotlighted the evidence expressly to
invite the jury’s consideration of Domino’s prior convictions to persuade based on
propensity, suggesting that Domino acted in conformity with his character by violating the
HRO once again with the same graphic sexual messaging he previously delivered. Because
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the prosecutor emphasized the inadmissible evidence in her closing, this factor strongly
favors Domino’s position.
Regarding the fourth factor, Domino did not effectively counter the challenged
evidence. Unrebutted evidence weighs against a determination that the error was harmless
when the defendant challenges its admissibility but does not counter the evidence on its
merits. State v. Heller, 12 N.W.3d 452, 468 –69 (Minn. 2024). Domino challenged the
admissibility of his prior convictions as relationship evidence. And he also attempted to
cross-examine April about the April 2020 violation. But our reading of the cross-
examination convinces us that it was particularly ineffective and did little, if anything, to
mitigate the likelihood that the jury would rely on the improperly admitted evidence. This
factor also favors rejecting the state’s harmless-error argument.
The state offers two theories to convince us that the error was harmless. The first is
not persuasive, and the second is quite persuasive—but it persuades away from the state’s
preferred disposition.
The state’s first theory is that admitting Domino’s prior HRO violations as
relationship evidence is harmless because those convictions would have been admitted as
Spreigl evidence under rule 404(b)(2) to prove his knowledge, intent, and absence of
mistake. See Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). The first problem with this theory is that the state
did not attempt at trial to introduce the convictions as Spreigl evidence, and it could not
have, because it had failed to provide early notice of its intent to do so as required by the
applicable procedural rule. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.02(d) (requiring the district court to
hear a motion for Spreigl evidence at a defendant’s omnibus hearing). More difficult for
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the state’s argument, we have no basis on which to deem it likely that the district court
would have admitted the evidence had it been offered under a Spreigl premise. Unlike
relationship evidence, which is generally admissible, Spreigl evidence is presumptively
inadmissible. See Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (“Such evidence shall not be admitted in a
criminal prosecution unless” it is relevant, proved by clear and convincing evidence, and
its “probative value . . . is not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice to the
defendant”). How the district court might have analyzed the evidence had the state
provided proper notice, how Domino might have framed his objection, and how the district
court would have resolved the dispute and ultimately applied its discretion as to whether
to admit the evidence are, on appeal, matters of conjecture.
The state’s second theory actually works against its position. It maintains that
“introduction of the other-acts evidence to the jury was . . . harmless because the district
court properly gave cautionary instructions to the jury about the proper use of the other-
acts evidence.” The state correctly emphasizes that we ought to consider the effect of a
cautionary instruction as potentially mitigating the harmful effect of evidence. See State v.
Jaros, 932 N.W.2d 466, 474 (Minn. 2019). It is true that cautionary instructions can
provide a counterbalance to the prejudice caused by evidence that a jury might otherwise
rely on to show a defendant’s propensity to do a thing, because the instruction can focus
the jury only on the proper use. See State v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d 438, 441–42 (Minn.
App. 2017). But in this case, there is no proper use because the evidence was not properly
admitted for any purpose. By instructing the jurors as it did, reminding them that they “have
heard evidence of alleged conduct by the defendant on one or more separate occasions”
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and then telling them that the purpose of the evidence was to “demonstrat[e] the nature and
extent of the relationship between the defendant and [April] and her daughter in order to
assist you in determining whether the defendant committed those acts with which the
defendant is charged in the Complaint,” the district court inadvertently highlighted the
evidence that the jurors should not have considered for any purpose. The only accurately
limiting instruction in this case would have been a directive to dis regard the evidence
altogether. The cautionary instruction was self-defeating.
We have considered the harmless-error factors along with the parties’ related
arguments. Notwithstanding the state’s very strong factual case against Domino, we
believe justice requires a new trial. Because we believe that a reasonable possibility exists
that the wrongly admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict, we reverse the
conviction. Given our holding, we need not address Domino’s alternative argument that
the prosecutor engaged in reversible misconduct.
Reversed and remanded.