Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0629
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Robbie Garnet Johnson,
Appellant.
Filed July 27, 2026
Affirmed
Ross, Judge
Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-23-8697
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Kyle R. Triggs, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Jesson ,
Judge.
∗
∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
The state ’s criminal complaint accused Robbie Johnson of theft by swindle for
having misled three victims into lending him a total of $870,000 using fraudulent promises
of a massive, rapid payoff. After Johnson entered an Alford guilty plea, the district court
sentenced him to serve 46 months in prison. He unsuccessfully petitioned the district court
for postconviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was unintelligent and involuntary and
therefore invalid and , alternatively, that the sentencing court erroneously failed to
dispositionally depart from the presumptive prison sentence. On appeal from the decision,
we affirm because Johnson’s plea was voluntary and intelligent and he never requested a
downward sentencing departure, and because, concerning Johnson’s supplemental
argument, the district court had financial evidence that he did not qualify for court -
appointed legal counsel.
FACTS
According to the state’s criminal complaint, Robbie Johnson fraudulently induced
three investors in 2022 to lend him $350,000, $500,000, and $20,000, respectively, to
develop software for his options-trading firm and to invest in other lucrative opportunities.
He duped t he $350,000 lender into expecting a $700,000 return within six months, the
$500,000 lender into expecting a $1,000,000 return within six months (with an additional
$4,000,000 bonus) , and the $20,000 lender into expecting a $200,000 return in just one
month. The lenders got nothing, but Johnson got real estate and vehicles, serviced his
personal debt, and completed various home-improvement projects.
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The lenders complained and the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
(BCA) investigated , discovering that Johnson had invested less than 5% of the funds as
promised. The BCA learned that Johnson had altered a screenshot of his $312.00 brokerage
account by adding four digits (3866) to misrepresent to the lenders that it was worth
“$3,866,312.00.” The state charged Johnson with three counts of theft by swindle in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.52, subdivision 2(a)(4) (2022). The district
court continued the case three times to allow Johnson to retain counsel, but Johnson chose
instead to represent himself.
The parties reached a plea agreement. Johnson would enter an Alford guilty plea on
each count and, if he paid $991,973.93 in restitution before his first sentencing date, the
state would join him in requesting a downward dispositional departure . Johnson agreed
that, if he failed to fully pay restitution, the state would argue instead for a 34-to-46-month
executed prison sentence.
At Johnson’s October 4, 2024 plea hearing, the district court seemed stunned by his
promise to pay the restitution in full, given his apparent financial struggle to retain legal
counsel. After t he court asked, “Who can come up with $900,000?” the prosecutor
informed the court , “This is something that Mr. Johnson had proposed to us . . . . This is
what he told us he’s willing to do.” The district court pressed directly, “Mr. Johnson, do
you honestly think that you can get access to $900,000?” Johnson answered, “I do,” and
he assured the court that he was working with his employer to secure t he funds and could
pay the restitution if the district court postponed sentencing for “[l]ike six months.” The
district court judge advised Johnson that she would not delay sentencing for that long, but
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added, “I’m going to put sentencing on in three months or four months. And if you’ve paid
a substantial portion, I ’m very likely to give you another three months. Because my goal is
[to] try and have the alleged victims made whole. ”
The district court and the prosecutor engaged Johnson in a colloquy during which
he testified in a manner indicat ing he was pleading guilty knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily, acknowledging and waiving his multiple trial rights , and admitting that the
state would present evidence in far greater detail of the facts summarized above. The
district court accepted Johnson’s guilty plea. It then scheduled sentencing to occur on
January 29. And it cautioned, “ Mr. Johnson, I strongly encourage you, even if you can’ t
come up with all the money, to make at least monthly payments because that will be a
significant factor whether we go to sentencing on January 29th or not.” The district court
immediately observed, “And for the record, Mr. Johnson is nodding in the affirmative.”
Johnson appeared for sentencing as scheduled at the end of January 2025. He
implied vaguely to the district court that a Colorado county court had sold real estate that
he owned and released the proceeds —$225,000—to one of his victims. But he gave t he
district court no documentary support for the assertion. The district court summarized ,
“This is the first I’m hearing, Mr. Johnson, that you owned any land anywhere.” Johnson
gave no details of the alleged payment, and the record at the time of his sentencing contains
no evidence that Johnson directed any funds toward restitution.
The state requested a n executed prison term of 46 months, the top of the
presumptive-sentence range. The district court sentenced Johnson accordingly. Johnson
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later unsuccessfully petitioned for postconviction relief, arguing that his Alford guilty plea
was invalid.
Johnson appeals.
DECISION
Johnson argues on appeal that the postconviction court erroneously denied his
petition, contending that his guilty plea was constitutionally invalid because it was neither
voluntary nor intelligent. He argues also that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure. H e argues too that the district
court erroneously failed to appoint him counsel. These arguments are uncompelling.
I
Johnson first challenges the decision dismissing his petition for postconviction
relief, asserting that his Alford guilty plea was invalid because it was neither voluntary nor
intelligent. A defendant has the right to withdraw his guilty plea when allowing withdrawal
is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest
injustice exists when, among other things, the plea was not voluntary or intelligent. Dikken
v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 876–77 (Minn. 2017). We review an appellant’s plea -validit y
challenges de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). Our de novo review
of the record of the district court’s thorough proceeding raises no apparent concerns about
whether Johnson’s plea was voluntary and intelligent, and, fatal to his appeal, Johnson
presents no actual legal argument as to why we might reach a different conclusion.
Under the heading asserting that Johnson should have been allowed to withdraw his
plea because it was not voluntary or intelligent, Johnson’s appellate brief spends about two
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pages outlining the legal standard for valid plea agreements and nearly another page
recounting the proceedings in the postconviction court . He then presents his legal
argument:
The court’s decision to deny the request without a hearing was
an abuse of the court’s discretion when Johnson wanted private
counsel but could not afford to hire any, did not qualify for the
public defender, and “needed” counsel. Johnson told the court
that he understood the information presented to him, but he did
not. Johnson felt misled as to the results of the plea deal, in that
he was told by the court that if he paid a sizeable sum toward
the restitution the court would very likely allow him more time
to pay. But that was not what happened. And rather than
reconsider the issue on post -conviction when Johnson was
finally able, with counsel, to provide documentation that there
had indeed been a land sale in Colorado, the court denied his
post-conviction petition without even a hearing at which
Johnson could have offered explanation. Accordingly, Johnson
asks this Court to reverse and remand his case with instructions
to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea to theft by swindle to
prevent a manifest injustice.
We pluck from this passage several representations, but no actual legal argument
supporting his assertions bearing on the voluntariness or intelligence of his guilty plea .
Johnson says here that he needed an attorney but was stuck between having too few
means to afford one and too many to have one appointed. This says nothing about the
voluntariness or intelligence of his guilty plea. He represents also that, although he told the
district court that he understood the information in his plea agreement and plea colloquy,
he really didn’t understand it. This is merely an unsupported assertion rather than a legal
argument. And he implies that the district court reneged on its promise to allow him more
time to pay the restitution in full “if he paid a sizeable sum toward the restitution,”
asserting, “[T]hat was not what [later] happened.” The accusation against the district court
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is not an argument supporting his legal assertions, and it is also factually flawed. The record
at the sentencing hearing included no evidence establishing that Johnson had paid any
restitution at all in the four preceding months despite his representation during the plea
hearing that he had arranged with a current employer to pay the restitution. Although he
claimed at sentencing that property he owned in Colorado had been sold with the proceeds
seized by one or more of the victims, he did not provide any evidence of this until months
later, during his postconviction proceedings. None of this bears on the voluntariness or
intelligence of his guilty plea. In sum, because Johnson presents no legal argument
supporting his invalid-plea assertions, the assertions fail.
II
Johnson’s contention that the district court erroneously denied his motion for a
downward sentencing departure fails also, but for an even more fundamental deficiency:
he never made a motion to depart. The record establishes that the plea agreement
contemplated that Johnson would make a departure motion and that the state would join it
if Johnson paid the restitution in full by the scheduled sentencing date. The agreement also
recognized that if Johnson failed to pay the restitution, he could still unilaterally move for
a downward departure unsupported by the state. But not only did Johnson fail to pay his
restitution in full and thereby secure the state’s support for his departure motion, he failed
to even make the motion. At most, he urged the district court at his sentencing to be lenient
and allow him more time to pay the restitution. We will not assign error to the district
court’s having failed to grant a motion it never received.
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III
Johnson implies in his supplemental brief that the district court erred by not
appointing legal counsel to represent him. The federal and state constitutions guarantee a
defendant the right to assistance of counsel in his criminal proceedings. U.S. Const. amend.
VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. Court-appointed counsel is limited to defendants financially
unable to find representation, State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2009), meaning
that he receives means-tested government benefits or that any combination of liquid assets
and income would be insufficient for retaining private counsel, Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04,
subd. 3 (citing Minn. Stat. § 611.17 (2024) ). We review the denial of a defendant’s
application for appointed counsel for an abuse of discretion. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 502.
The district court found that Johnson did not qualify for appointed counsel based on his
means. It had information that Johnson earned $3,500 monthly, held liquid assets valued
at $185,000, and received no public assistance. Given the information about Johnson’s
financial circumstances, the district court acted within its discretion by not appointing
counsel to represent him.
Affirmed.