State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0630

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joshua Horst Wurzbacher,
Appellant.

Filed May 26, 2026
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-CR-24-1029

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Ryan Hansch, McLeod County Attorney, Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Rasmusson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
On appeal from his convictions for impaired driving and fleeing a peace officer in
a motor vehicle, appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress evidence discovered by law enforcement during a traffic stop of his vehicle.
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Because the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant committed a
traffic violation before initiating the traffic stop, we affirm the district court’s denial of
appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence.
FACTS
Following a traffic stop, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Joshua
Horst Wurzbacher with fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.487, subdivision 3 (2022). The state alleged that, on July 18, 2024, at
approximately 11:00 p.m., a sheriff’s deputy was on patrol in McLeod County. According
to the complaint, the officer saw a vehicle turn onto the eastbound lane of a highway
without stopping for a stop sign. The deputy attempted to stop the vehicle but, according
to the state, Wurzbacher “rapidly accelerated” away from the deputy, fled to a building,
and ran inside where he was ultimately arrested. The complaint stated that Wurzbacher
was held at the county jail and was later taken to a detoxification facility.
Wurzbacher moved to suppress the evidence “discovered as the result of an
unlawful [traffic] stop” and to dismiss the complaint. The district court held a contested
evidentiary hearing on the motion at which it heard testimony from the McLeod County
sheriff’s deputy who conducted the traffic stop. No other witnesses testified. The district
court received two exhibits: (1) video footage from the deputy’s squad-car video, which
captured about one and a half minutes of Wurzbacher’s driving conduct; and (2) the
deputy’s written incident report.
At the hearing, the deputy testified that, on July 18, 2024, he was on patrol in his
squad car in McLeod County. At about 11:00 p.m., he was approaching the intersection of
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Highway 212 and McLeod Avenue South when he saw a vehicle driven by Wurzbacher
traveling southbound on McLeod Avenue. The deputy observed that Wurzbacher “slowed
for the intersection” but “did not stop for a stop sign while entering the roadway onto the
highway.” The deputy then observed Wurzbacher make “a wide turn” into the far lane of
the divided highway before “overcorrecting” and moving into the lane closest to the center
median. The deputy noticed that one of the headlights on the vehicle was not operational.
The deputy began following the vehicle and saw Wurzbacher “weaving” between the lanes.
After observing this driving conduct, the deputy activated his lights and attempted to stop
the vehicle. According to the deputy, Wurzbacher initially fled but was ultimately arrested.
Following the hearing, the district court denied Wurzbacher’s motions to suppress
evidence and dismiss the complaint. The district court determined that the deputy had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory traffic stop. The district court
credited the deputy’s testimony that he “observed a number of traffic infractions” by
Wurzbacher, including: (1) failing to stop at an intersection, (2) entering the far lane when
making a left turn, (3) changing lanes without signaling, and (4) operating a vehicle with a
malfunctioning headlight. Based on these findings, the district court concluded that the
deputy had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing that supported the
traffic stop and denied Wurzbacher’s motion to suppress on that basis.
1

1 The district court also denied Wurzbacher’s motion to dismiss the fleeing charge for lack
of probable cause. The district court determined that there was sufficient evidence to show
that Wurzbacher drove his vehicle “in a manner to evade” the peace officer and “traveled
at high rates of speeds” after the peace officer activated his squad car lights. Based on
these facts, the district court concluded that there was probable cause to believe
Wurzbacher intended to flee.
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After the district court denied Wurzbacher’s motion, the state added two additional
charges: second-degree operation of a motor vehicle under the influence of a controlled
substance in violation of Minnesota Statutes sections 169A.20, subdivision 1(2) (2022)
(count II), and operation of a motor vehicle with any amount of a controlled substance in
the driver’s system in violation of Minnesota Statutes sections 169A.20, subdivision 1(7)
(2022) (count III). Count I, which alleged that Wurzbacher fled from a peace officer in a
motor vehicle, remained. The case then proceeded to a two-day jury trial. The jury found
Wurzbacher guilty of counts I and III and acquitted him of count II. The district court
sentenced Wurzbacher to 17 months in prison on count I for fleeing a peace officer in a
motor vehicle and to a concurrent 364-day sentence on count III for impaired driving.
Wurzbacher appeals.
DECISION
Wurzbacher challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence, arguing that the deputy lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop his
vehicle. On review of a pretrial ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court reviews
the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its “legal determination that an officer
had reasonable, articulable suspicion de novo.” State v. Garding, 12 N.W.3d 697, 703
(Minn. 2024). In applying the clear-error standard, an appellate court views the evidence
in the light most favorable to the findings. In re Welfare of C.T.B., 24 N.W.3d 651, 657
(Minn. 2025) (citing In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn.
2021)). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it lacks evidentiary support in the record.
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Id. We also defer to the district court’ s credibility determinations. State v. Miller,
659 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. July 15, 2003).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Generally, “[w]arrantless
searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.” State v. Malecha, 3 N.W.3d 566, 572
(Minn. 2024). One exception to the warrant requirement allows a peace officer to “conduct
a brief, investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when the officer has a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752
(Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). “Reasonable suspicion must be ‘particularized’ and
based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968)). “[T]he bar for reasonable suspicion is low,” id. at 758, but it must be based on
“more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity,”
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123- 24 (2000) (quotations omitted). Generally, any
traffic violation, however slight, provides an objective basis for initiating a traffic stop.
State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). All that is required is that the officer
be able to articulate a reasonable suspicion. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752. When determining
whether this standard is met, courts examine the totality of the circumstances. Id.
Here, based on its factual findings about the deputy’s observations, the district court
determined that the deputy had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Wurzbacher
committed traffic violations by failing to stop at a stop sign, making a wide turn, changing
lanes without signaling, and operating a vehicle with a malfunctioning headlight. On
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appeal, Wurzbacher challenges the district court’s factual findings and argues that the
deputy lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he committed any of the four traffic
violations before stopping his vehicle. Because a single traffic violation can support an
officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion, George, 557 N.W.2d at 578, we begin our
analysis by considering the district court’s determination that the officer had reasonable,
articulable suspicion to stop Wurzbacher for failing to stop at a stop sign before driving
through the intersection.
Wurzbacher argues that the district court’s finding that he ran a stop sign is clearly
erroneous because the squad-car video contradicts the deputy’s testimony that he went
through the stop sign without stopping . He maintains that the squad-car video
“unambiguously shows that Wurzbacher did not commit any traffic or equipment
violations before the deputy seized him.” He asserts that the video does not show him fail
to stop at the intersection because, in his view, a truck blocks the deputy’s view and it was
“pitch dark.” On this basis, he argues that the district court’s finding that the deputy
observed Wurzbacher fail to stop is clearly erroneous.
In support of his argument, Wurzbacher relies on C.T.B., 24 N.W.3d at 651. In that
case, police officers responded to a report that a man was pointing a handgun at people at
a light rail station. C.T.B., 24 N.W.3d at 654. A few minutes later, officers saw the original
suspect standing with a group of several other people, including C.T.B., at a nearby
restaurant. Id. Officers found a handgun on C.T.B. during a pat-frisk and arrested him.
Id. C.T.B. moved to suppress evidence of the handgun, arguing that the officers lacked a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was armed based solely on his proximity to the
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original suspect. Id. at 654-55. The district court denied the motion. Id. The Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that C.T.B. was engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 656-57. In reaching this
determination, the supreme court reviewed footage from the police officer’s body- worn
camera. Id. at 657. After reviewing the testimony from the police officers and the
body-worn camera, the supreme court determined that there was no evidence in the
record—in the form of either testimony from the police officers or footage from the
body-worn camera— to support the district court’s factual finding that C.T.B. was
“huddled” with the original suspect. Id. at 657-58. For that reason, the supreme court
determined that the district court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous and reversed the
district court’s denial of C.T.B.’s pretrial motion to suppress. Id. at 658.
In his brief, Wurzbacher contends that C.T.B. stands for the principle “that when a
squad or body-cam video does not support an officer’s testimony about the events depicted,
a district court’s factual finding not supported by that video is clearly erroneous.” And he
further argues that courts show “deference in favor of video evidence.” However,
Wurzbacher overstates C.T.B.’s holding. The supreme court explained in C.T.B. that the
district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous because neither the officers’
testimony at the suppression hearing nor the video footage supported the district court’s
factual findings. Id. at 657-58. In other words, there was no evidentiary support for the
district court’s factual findings. Moreover, the supreme court did not create a presumption
in C.T.B. that video evidence is entitled to greater deference than witness testimony. See
id. And this court has recognized that a district court’s finding that a defendant committed
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a traffic violation “is not clearly erroneous simply because a videorecording does not
corroborate an officer’s observation of an event, so long as the videorecording does not
contradict the officer’s testimony.” State v. Mangen, 25 N.W.3d 52, 60 (Minn. App. 2025).
Based on our review of the record, we are satisfied that the district court’s finding
that Wurzbacher failed to stop at the stop sign is not clearly erroneous. Here, the deputy
testified that he saw Wurzbacher fail to stop at a stop sign when approaching the
intersection. Defense counsel asked the deputy on cross-examination if the deputy’s view
of the stop sign was obstructed by a tree line or a truck. The deputy confirmed that he saw
Wurzbacher’s vehicle for two to three seconds before the intersection as it approached the
stop sign, and that he “maintained visual observation of the vehicle at all times.” The
deputy further explained that the video did not capture Wurzbacher’s driving conduct as
clearly as what the deputy observed with his “naked eye.” The deputy testified, “The
dashcam has limitations based on its technology and based on the clarity and its position
in the vehicle, so it would not capture what I would directly be seeing.”
2
In its factual findings, the district court credited the deputy’s testimony that he
personally observed Wurzbacher fail to stop at the stop sign. Before the prosecutor played
the squad-car video, the district court stated, “I’ve now heard the officer testifying that

2 In its responsive brief, the state cites articles related to squad-car video recordings.
Wurzbacher urges us to exclude these articles, which are not part of the record on appeal.
See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (noting that the record on appeal consists of “documents
filed in the [district] court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any”). The
state filed a citation of supplemental authority, arguing that a reviewing court may consider
publicly available articles. B ecause we do not rely on the state’s articles or the
supplemental authority, we deem this issue moot.
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[Wurzbacher] failed to observe a complete stop at a stop sign,” which “[met] the standard
of reasonable, articulable suspicion.” The district court also credited the deputy’s
explanation that the video was not as clear as the deputy’s direct, eyewitness observations.
The district court stated: “[The deputy] testified that the dash camera . . . did not capture
the circumstances as well as his vision due to factors such as the camera footage quality
and his visual perspective.” We defer to the district court’s credibility determinations on
these matters. See Miller, 659 N.W.2d at 279 (deferring to the district court’s credibility
findings). And, under the clear- error standard of review, we are satisfied that the video
evidence did not contradict the eyewitness testimony. We therefore conclude Wurzbacher
has not met his burden to demonstrate the district court clearly erred in its factual findings
relating to Wurzbacher’s failure to stop.
We further conclude that the district court’s factual findings are sufficient to support
a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity based on a failure to stop at the stop
sign. Minnesota law directs that a driver “shall stop at a stop sign . . . before entering the
intersection.” Minn. Stat. § 169.30(b) (2024). The statute is violated “when the driver of
a vehicle drives past the stop sign or stop line before coming to a complete stop.”
State v. Gibson, 945 N.W.2d 855, 859 (Minn. 2020). Here, the deputy testified at the
suppression hearing to “specific, articulable facts” that provided him with “a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting [Wurzbacher] of criminal activity.” State v. Diede ,
795 N.W.2d 836, 842-43 (Minn. 2011) (quotations omitted). And the district court made
factual findings about the deputy’s observation of Wurzbacher’s failure to stop.
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We therefore conclude the district court properly determined that the deputy had
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Wurzbacher based on the deputy’s observation that
he failed to come to a complete stop before entering the intersection. The deputy’s
reasonable articulable suspicion of Wurzbacher’s failure to stop was enough, standing on
its own, to justify the traffic stop. Accordingly, we need not address whether the record
supports the district court’s determination that the deputy observed other traffic violations.
The district court did not err by denying Wurzbacher’s motion to suppress.3
Affirmed.

3 The parties also dispute whether Wurzbacher’s flight from the deputy was an intervening
circumstance that purged the taint of the allegedly unlawful stop. See State v. Engel,
18 N.W.3d 540, 550 (Minn. App. 2025) (recognizing that the commission of a new crime
by a defendant, including fleeing police, may purge the taint of a prior unlawful search or
seizure), rev. granted (Minn. June 17, 2025). Based on our determination that the traffic
stop was supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion, we do not reach this issue.