Presbyterian Family Foundation On Behalf of Vulnerable Adult, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0635

Presbyterian Family Foundation On Behalf of Vulnerable Adult,
Respondent,

vs.

Joan Dobbert Wachs,
Appellant,

Sherburne County Health and Human Services,
Respondent.

Filed February 23, 2026
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CV-24-986

Melania N. Mrozek, Chad M. Roggeman, RGP Law Ltd., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for
respondent Presbyterian Family Foundation)

Nicole Nejezchleba, Sharon R. Osborn, Osborn Law Office, LLC, Princeton, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Dawn Nyhus, Sherburne County Attorney, Benjamin J. Sime, Assistant County Attorney,
Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent Sherburne County Health and Human Services)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order denying her motion to dismiss a
temporary ex parte harassment restraining order (HRO), arguing that the county
social-services agency that filed the HRO petition on behalf of appellant’s
stepmother-in-law, a vulnerable adult, lacked standing. Because any error in substituting
the vulnerable adult’s guardian for the county social-services agency as the petitioner for
the HRO under Minn. R. Civ. P. 25.03 was harmless, we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2024, respondent Sherburne County Health and Human Services (the
county) filed a petition for an HRO on behalf of vulnerable adult Janice Wachs against
Janice’s stepdaughter-in-law, appellant Joan Dobbert Wachs.
1 The petition alleged that
Joan “[m]ade harassing phone calls or sent harassing text messages to” Janice and “[s]tole
property from” her. The petition further alleged as follows: Janice used to live with Joan
in Joan’s home, but left on July 12, 2024, due to “unsanitary and cluttered conditions” and
moved in with her sisters on a temporary basis; Janice attempted to revoke a power of
attorney (POA) in which she named Joan as her attorney-in-fact ; and Janice’s sisters
reported that Joan repeatedly contacted Janice, pressuring Janice to reinstate her as the POA

1 Because Janice Wachs and Joan Dobbert Wachs share a last name, we refer to them by
their first names.
3
and return to Joan’s home. 2 The petition also alleges that Joan withdrew approximately
$16,000 from Janice’s bank account, ostensibly based on her authority under the POA.
On the same day , the county also filed a petition for emergency appointment of a
guardian and conservator on behalf of Janice. The district court granted both petitions,
issuing a temporary ex parte HRO against Joan and appointing respondent Presbyterian
Family Foundation (PFF) as Janice’s emergency guardian and conservator. 3 In October
2024, the district court converted the appointment from temporary to permanent.
Joan requested a hearing to contest the HRO. At the hearing, Joan argued that
evidence of financial misconduct is beyond the scope of an HRO proceeding and that the
district court should therefore not consider Joan’s alleged actions related to Janice’s bank
account. The district court requested briefing on the issue and continued the hearing. Joan
subsequently moved to dismiss the HRO petition entirely, arguing that the county lacked
standing to petition for an HRO on behalf of a vulnerable adult under Minn. Stat. § 609.748
(2024) (the HRO statute). In response, the county moved to substitute PFF as petitioner in
the HRO action pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 25.03, arguing that PFF has statutory standing
as Janice’s guardian to maintain the HRO action on Janice’s behalf and rule 25.03 allows
for substitution in the case of a transfer of interest. The district court denied Joan’s motion

2 The petition states that it is unclear whether J anice’s original POA to Joan was properly
revoked when Janice attempted to revoke it.

3 The record does not contain the actual petition for emergency guardianship or the
subsequent order granting it, but the parties reference the order in their briefing to this court
and to the district court, and no one disputes that the appointment of PFF as Janice’s
emergency guardian and the grant of the temporary ex parte HRO against Joan occurred
on the same day.
4
to dismiss for lack of standing, granted the county’s motion to substitute PFF as petitioner,
and ruled that it would consider evidence of financial misconduct at the HRO hearing.
Joan appeals the district court’s order denying her motion to dismiss for lack of
standing.4
DECISION
The parties’ main dispute is over whether the county had statutory authority to
petition for an HRO on behalf of a vulnerable adult.5 The HRO statute provides authority
for “[a] person who is a victim of harassment or the victim’s guardian or conservator” to
petition for an HRO, but it does not expressly authorize a county social-services agency to
do so on behalf of a victim. Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 2(a). The county contended that
it had authority to file the HRO petition pursuant to a different statute, Minn. Stat.
§ 626.557 (2024), which provides that a county social -services agency may take certain
actions to protect vulnerable adults.
Both respondents contend that the standing issue is moot because the district court
substituted PFF as petitioner in place of the county pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 25.03, and
Joan does not dispute that PFF, as guardian, has standing to petition for an HRO on Janice’s

4 The district court has not yet issued an order granting or denying a permanent HRO.

5 Joan also raised the issue of whether evidence of financial misconduct is outside the scope
of an HRO proceeding. We decline to review this issue because the district court has not
yet issued a final order on the HRO and appellate review is therefore premature. See Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g) (providing that, generally, we review appeals “from a final order,
decision or judgment affecting a substantial right” in a special proceeding). But we may
review Joan’s challenge to the district court’s order denying her motion to dismiss for lack
of standing because it is immediately appealable. See Stone v. Invitation Homes , Inc.,
986 N.W.2d 237, 247 (Minn. App. 2023), aff’d, 4 N.W.3d 489 (Minn. 2024).
5
behalf.6 Joan disagrees that the issue is moot and maintains that, because the county lacked
standing under either statute, the district court was unable to substitute PFF pursuant to
rule 25.03 and the substitution was void at the outset. Followin g oral argument, we
requested supplemental briefing on the applicability of Minn. R. Civ. P. 17.01, which
provides, in part:
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a
reasonable time has been allowed after objection for
ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification,
joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the
action had been commenced in the name of the real party in
interest.

We asked the parties to address whether rule 17.01 would allow the district court to
substitute PFF as the petitioner in the HRO proceedings and, if so, whether any error by
the district court in substituting PFF under rule 25.03 was therefore harmless. We conclude
that the district court could substitute PFF as the petitioner in the HRO action pursuant to
rule 17.01, even if the county had no standing to bring the action when it was commenced,
and that substitution would “have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in
the name of the real party in interest.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 17.01.

6 There has been no indication that PFF has filed a new HRO petition, though it could do
so; respondents’ mootness theory is predicated on only the district court’s substitution of
PFF as petitioner.
6
A. Rule 17.01 allows for substitution when a petition is initially brought by
the wrong party.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing de
novo. See Stone, 4 N.W.3d at 493 (“We review issues of standing de novo.” (Quotation
omitted.)). Rule 17.01 provides that a district court should not dismiss an action that is not
brought “in the name of the real party in interest” without allowing for ratification by or
substitution of the real party in interest upon objection. Respondents contend that PFF, as
Janice’s guardian with legal authority to seek an HRO on her behalf, is a real party in
interest for purposes of the rule. We agree.
“The traditional test to determine whether an entity is a real party in interest is
whether the party has the legal right to bring the claim under the applicable substantive
law.” Austin v. Austin , 481 N.W.2d 884, 886 (Minn. App. 1992) (concluding that, if a
mother were the legal custodian of her child, she would be a real party in interest and her
assignee could sue for child support in her name). PFF has the legal right to seek an HRO
on Janice’s behalf pursuant to the HRO statute and is therefore a rea l party in interest. A
plain reading of rule 17.01, then, indicates that the district court could properly substitute
PFF in this action despite it having not been brought by PFF initially. The purpose behind
rule 17.01 also supports this application.
Rule 17.01 was adopted to prevent a defendant from being subjected to “further
demands by other claimants for the same relief.” Norby v. Bankers Life Co. of Des Moines,
231 N.W.2d 665, 667 -68 (Minn. 1975). This concern is implicated here because PFF
would have to file a new HRO petition against Joan for the same relief if substitution were
7
denied. And the supreme court has implied that rule 17.01 can be used to cure standing
defects as well. See id. (holding that a third-party defendant could ratify an action brought
by a plaintiff pursuant to rule 17.01 when the defendant claimed that the plaintiff suffered
no loss and therefore had no standing).
Persuasive caselaw further supports the application of rule 17.01 in the HRO
context. We have twice determined that rule 17.01 can be used to substitute a party with
standing to bring an HRO in cases in which the HRO petition was initially filed by a party
that lacked standing. In Naumann v. Zimmer, the appellant argued that an HRO filed
against him by a parish-council chairperson on behalf of a church was void because the
real party in interest was the church and the chairperson therefore lacked standing to bring
the HRO personally. No. C2-96-1066, 1997 WL 10520, at *2 (Minn. App. Jan. 14, 1997),
rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 1997).
7 We nonetheless concluded that, if this were a defect,
it was cured pursuant to rule 17.01 because the church subsequently ratified the HRO. Id.
We implied the same in Steps of Success Homes, LLC v. Dowell, in which we concluded
that a limited-liability company that operated a foster home lacked standing to bring an
HRO petition on behalf of the foster home’s minor residents because the HRO statute did
not include a foster home in the list of parties who may bring an HRO on behalf of a minor
child. No. A09-587, 2009 WL 5091936, at *2-3 (Minn. App. Dec. 29, 2009). We further
stated that subsequent ratification of the HRO by the president of the foster home also could
not cure the defect pursuant to rule 17.01 because she was not the minors’ guardian and

7 We may cite nonprecedential opinions of this court for their persuasive value. See Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
8
not the real party in interest. Id. at *4. Our analysis suggested, though, that a legal
guardian— such as PFF —who is statutorily authorized to bring an HRO on behalf of
another person may subsequently ratify an HRO pursuant to rule 17.01, even if the HRO
proceeding was initiated by someone who lacked standing to bring it. See id. at *4-5. And
because rule 17.01 allows for either ratification by or substitution of a real party in interest,
substitution would be available, as well. Therefore, the district court would have been able
to substitute PFF under rule 17.01.
To convince us otherwise, Joan points to Ortiz v. Gavenda. 590 N.W.2d 119 (Minn.
1999). In Ortiz, the supreme court held that rule 17.01 would not allow a widow to revive
a void wrongful-death action after she failed to become duly appointed as trustee for the
next of kin of her deceased husband within the statutory limitations period because the
initial action was a “legal nullity” and therefore could not be cured by later substitution.
Id. at 122-23 (quotation omitted). Joan argues that Ortiz stands for the proposition that a
district court may not rely on rule 17.01 to cure a standing defect resulting from an action
brought by the wrong party. But Ortiz is distinguishable. The result in Ortiz turns on the
unique requirement that courts strictly construe the wrongful-death statute because it is in
derogation of the common law. Id. Accordingly, later cases have limited the holding in
Ortiz to the wrongful-death context. In Haugland v. Mapleview Lounge & Bottleshop, Inc.,
the supreme court held that a complaint that included claims under the Minnesota Civil
Damages Act and was initially brought in the name of the wrong party could be corrected
after the statute of limitations had run , notwithstanding the holding in Ortiz. 666 N.W.2d
9
689, 692-95 (Minn. 2003). 8 The supreme court distinguished Ortiz because “ the
appointment of a trustee to commence a wrongful death action was a condition precedent
to bringing such an action . . . [and t]hat is not the case here.” Id. at 695. Thus, it appears
that the supreme court has limited Ortiz to its facts and the wrongful-death context.
This court has since also reasoned that the defect in Ortiz was a function of the lack
of an entity with the capacity to sue absent appointment of a trustee —a condition unique
to wrongful-death actions. In Metro Building Cos. v. Ram Buildings, Inc., we held that a
corporate entity that failed to sue in its accurate registered name could later correct the
complaint. 783 N.W.2d 204, 207-08 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 10,
2010). We distinguished Ortiz, stating:
The fundamental difference between the
wrongful-death cases and this case is that in wrongful-death
cases, it is the appointment of the trustee that forms the legal
capacity for a successor of the deceased to bring or to continue
the action for wrongful death. Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subds. 1,
3 (2002). A corporation, in contradistinction, is an existing
entity with a legal capacity to sue and be sued. Minn. Stat.
§ 302A.161, subd. 3 (2002).
Id. at 208 (quoting Save Our Creeks v. City of Brooklyn Park, 682 N.W.2d 639, 648 (Minn.
App. 2004), aff’d, 699 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2005)). We therefore held that, because the
corporate entity existed, Ortiz did not preclude the defect from being cured. Id. We
conclude that the case here is similar to Metro Building—a real party in interest existed at
the commencement of the action, but the action was brought in the name of the incorrect

8 The supreme court in Haugland did not analyze the application of rule 17.01; however,
it reversed in favor of the appellant, who argued that Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01, 15.03, and
17.01 should allow her to cure the defect. Id. at 692, 696.
10
party.9 That is precisely the situation contemplated by rule 17.01, which allows for
substitution of the real party in interest. The substitution of PFF was therefore appropriate.
Joan further argues that rule 17.01 conflicts with the HRO statute and should not be
applied here, citing authority for the proposition that substantive statutes control over
procedural rules when they are inconsistent. We do not discern any inconsistency. Nothing
in the HRO statute precludes a court from correcting a procedural defect when an action
was initially brought by the wrong party. This argument is therefore without merit.
Joan finally argues that, because the county sought substitution seven months after
PFF was initially appointed, it was beyond the “reasonable time” set forth in the rule and,
thus, rule 17.01 does not allow substitution here. This argument is unavailing because
rule 17.01 states, “No action shall be dismissed . . . until a reasonable time has been
allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest.” (Emphasis added.) The record indicates that the
county informally sought PFF’s substitution via correspondence to the district court before
Joan objected to the county’s lack of standing by moving to dismiss and that the county
formally sought PFF’s substitution via motion shortly after Joan moved to dismiss.
Because rule 17.01 requires only that substitution or ratification occur within a reasonable

9 Though the record is not clear whether, on the day it received the filings, the district court
signed the order appointing PFF emergency guardian and conservator before or after it
signed the HRO, it is clear that Janice was a real party in interest with standing to bring the
petition at the time it was filed. This is because, when a suit is “brought by a guardian on
behalf of an adult ward, the cause of action belongs to the ward.” State v. Nodes ,
538 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Minn. App. 1995).
11
time from a party’s objection to the lack of a real party in interest, the substitution here
occurred within a reasonable time.
In sum, substitution is proper based on a plain application of rule 17.01.
B. Any error by the district court is harmless.
Because substitution of PFF is proper under rule 17.01, any error by the district
court in substituting PFF for the county pursuant to rule 25.03 caused no prejudice to Joan
and was thus harmless. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 provides:
[N]o error . . . in anything done or omitted by the court or by
any of the parties is ground for . . . disturbing a judgment or
order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage
of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.
This rule dictates that “the mere existence of [an] error is, by itself, insufficient to require
a grant of relief; the appellant must also show the district court’s error prejudiced them.”
Cambria Co. v. M&M Creative Laminants, Inc., 995 N.W.2d 426, 439 (Minn. App. 2023),
aff’d, 11 N.W.3d 318 (Minn. 2024). “An appellate court will not reverse a correct decision
of the district court because the district court based that decision on the wrong reasoning.”
Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. M.B., 563 N.W.2d 326, 329 n.1 (Minn. App. 1997), rev. denied
(Minn. July 28, 1997).
Joan has not demonstrated that she was prejudiced. She argues that it is improper
as a matter of public policy to allow PFF to benefit from the taxpayer-funded county’s
litigation efforts by being substituted in this matter. But that argument has no bearing on
whether the district court’s error—its reliance on an incorrect procedural rule—caused her
12
prejudice. These concerns would presumably be implicated even if the district court had
substituted PFF under the correct procedural rule. Nor does Joan dispute that PFF has—
and has had since the day it was appointed —the authority to petition for an HRO on
Janice’s behalf. Joan has therefore not shown that the district court’s error prejudiced her.10
Any error was therefore harmless.
Because any error in substituting PFF, Janice’s guardian, for the county as the
petitioner for the HRO under rule 25.03 was harmless, we affirm.
Affirmed.

10 Joan asserts that the county and PFF never raised the harmless-error argument “in their
briefs to this court” and therefore waived it. However, both PFF and the county addressed
the harmless-error issue in their supplemental briefs as requested by this court. And
although appellate courts “[o]rdinarily . . . rely on the parties to frame the issues for
decision,” a court may “resolve [a] case on the supplemental issues and briefing” when the
parties fail to identify “relevant issues in [the] case.” Hoskin v. Krsnak, 25 N.W.3d 398,
404 n.3 (Minn. 2025) (quotations omitted). Further, it is the appellant’s burden to
demonstrate that the district court’s error caused prejudice. See Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d
170, 176 (Minn. App. 2020) (stating that the burden to show prejudice under Minn. R. Civ.
P. 61 is on the appellant). And rule 61 itself states that we “must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”
(Emphasis added.)