State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0642

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Cody Lynn Duncan,
Appellant.

Filed March 2, 2026
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-24-815

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, First Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
In this appeal from a judgment of conviction, appellant argues that he should be
granted a new trial because the district court erred in admitting improper hearsay evidence
2
and because the state failed to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence related to a search
of one of his electronic devices. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Cody Lynn Duncan with felony
engaging in electronic communication with a child relating or describing sexual conduct
in violation of Minn esota Statutes section 609.352, subdivision 2a(2) (2022). The
complaint alleged that Duncan engaged in sexually explicit messaging and exchanged nude
photographs and videos with his 15-year-old sibling, Child A, in November 2023.
At the time of this offense, Duncan was on supervised release from prison following
a 2014 conviction in Minnesota for criminal sexual conduct in the first degree involving
penetration or contact with a person under 13 years of age. Duncan was first released from
prison for that conviction in August 2020, and he was assigned a supervised-release agent
in Minnesota (Minnesota agent), but at some point around 2021, he moved to Las Vegas
to live with his mother and the State of Nevada took over supervision of his release.
When the state filed the complaint charging Duncan with the offense at issue in this
appeal, it caused Duncan to be in violation of the conditions of his release for his 2014
conviction. He was subsequently transported to Minnesota and committed to the
Minnesota Department of Corrections . Pursuant to a detainer agreement, Duncan
requested a speedy disposition of the charge. 1 He waived his right to a jury trial, and the

1 The Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), Minn. Stat. § 629.292
(2024), requires all untried complaints to be brought to trial within six months of the request
unless good cause is shown. State v. Miller, 525 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Minn. App. 1994). The

3
case proceeded to a court trial. The following facts are derived from the evidence presented
at trial.
Investigator M.J. of the Red Lake County Sheriff’s Office received a request from
Child A’s father, who is also Duncan’s father, to conduct a welfare check on Child A.
Child A’s father was contacted by Child A’s mother, J.H., who informed him that Child A
had been receiving sexually explicit messages on Child A’s Facebook account.
Investigator M.J. spoke with J.H., who said she had access to Child A’s Facebook account
and saw messages between Child A and Duncan. J.H. took screenshots of the messages,
which totaled 78 pages, and investigator M.J. took photographs of the messages. All of
the messages were admitted into evidence as exhibit 1. J.H. also downloaded several
videos and photo graphs and provided them to the investigator; these were also admitted
into evidence as exhibits 2-4.
Later, J.H. brought Child A to the Polk County Sheriff’s Office to provide a
statement. Child A sat in the lobby while J.H. gave a statement to a different investigator,
J.S. While speaking with investigator J.S., J.H. logged into Child A ’s Facebook account
and observed Facebook messages being sent in real time between Child A and a person
whose account was identified as “Brotha.” Child A sent a picture of the sheriff’s office
logo, and Brotha responded, “if they ask u pls say it wasn’t me,” and told Child A several

UMDDA was amended in 2024. 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 8, § 26, at 2321-22. We
cite the most recent version because the amendment and the UMDDA are not relevant to
the issues in this appeal.
4
times not to say anything. Child A responded, “It’s hard when they got ur face.” Brotha
then said, “Well yea but they gotta prov[e i]t was really me.”
At trial, J.H. testified that she knew Child A was messaging Duncan while she and
Child A were at the sheriff’s office because J.H. previously had messaged with Duncan on
Facebook, Duncan’s Facebook name was “Thor Randall,” and Child A had changed the
name attached to the Thor Randall account to “Brotha” in her Facebook account. During
previous conversations with J.H., Duncan had confirmed to her that the Thor Randall
account belonged to him. In those messages, they also discussed Duncan’s and Child A’s
father and J.H. informed Duncan that Child A was his younger sister. These messages
were also admitted into evidence.
Duncan’s Minnesota agent, who had supervised him briefly in Ramsey County after
he was released in August 2020, also testified. She stated that Duncan had violated his
release conditions by possessing an undisclosed device and had created a Facebook account
under the name “Cyler Randall” using the email address Vegaskingz6969@gmail.com.
Duncan’s Nevada supervised-release agent (Nevada agent) also testified. The
Nevada agent explained that Duncan was subject to random searches as a condition of his
supervised release and that, on November 29, 2023, she visited Duncan at his mother’s
home in Las Vegas equipped with a body-worn camera. Several screenshots from the
body-worn camera footage were received in evidence. The Nevada agent testified that the
screenshots depicted Duncan’s bedroom, bathroom, and kitchen, as well as Duncan inside
his bedroom and a tattoo on Duncan’s right hand.
5
The Nevada agent was then shown several of the videos and photographs that
Child A received. She testified that, based on her observations and the body-worn camera
screenshots from the November 2023 visit, the nude videos and photographs sent to
Child A were of Duncan and were taken in various rooms in his mother’s house.
Specifically, the Nevada agent identified that, in one of the videos sent to Child A from the
Thor Randall Facebook account, the bathroom was the same room she observed during her
visit to Duncan based on the layout of rooms in the home, the flooring, and two shower
curtains. She further testified that, in the videos sent to Child A from the Thor Randall
Facebook account, a tattoo that was visible on the nude man’s right hand matched a tattoo
Duncan has on his right hand that extends down onto his right thumb. She also identified
Duncan’s bedroom from photograph s sent to Child A from the Thor Randall Facebook
account, explaining that she could tell it was Duncan’s bedroom because the window
covering, the picture on the wall, the TV, the gaming system, an “orange item,” and the
dresser were the same as those she had seen in the Las Vegas home. Additionally, she
identified photograph s sent to Child A from the Thor Randall Facebook account as
depicting Duncan’s kitchen because she recognized the stovetop and a “green Christmas
tree spoon holder” from her visit to the Las Vegas home.
J.S. testified about his investigation, including the search warrants for which he
applied and the trial exhibits—exhibits 14, 15, and 16—that resulted from the search
warrants. In the search warrant J.S. sent to Meta (Facebook), he requested information
from the accounts depicted in J.H.’s screenshots of the Facebook pages and their URLs.
6
In the search warrant J.S. sent to T-Mobile, he requested information on the IP addresses
listed in the Facebook records.
During his testimony, J.S. stated that the Nevada agent mentioned to him that Las
Vegas authorities searched a cell phone in Duncan’s possession and found nothing on it.
This information previously had not been disclosed to either the prosecutor or Duncan’s
counsel. The district court asked if Duncan would like a continuance to see if more
information could be gathered about the phone that was searched. Duncan declined and
argued that only a mistrial would be appropriate at that point due to the failure to disclose
that information. The district court denied Duncan’s motion for a mistrial.
The district court found Duncan guilty , convicted him, and imposed a sentence of
39 months’ imprisonment.
Duncan appeals.

DECISION
Duncan asserts that he must be granted a new trial for two reasons. First, he argues
that the district court erred by admitting Facebook and T-Mobile records into evidence at
trial over his hearsay objection without determining that a hearsay exception applied.
Second, he argues that the district court erred when it denied his request for a mistrial after
7
testimony was elicited at trial containing information that had not previously been
disclosed to him. We address each argument in turn.
I. Any error in the admission of the challenged exhibits is harmless because
Duncan was not prejudiced.

Duncan challenges the district court’s admission of three exhibits: exhibit 14
containing Child A’s Facebook account records; exhibit 15 containing the Thor Randall
Facebook account records; and exhibit 16 containing T-Mobile records. He argues that the
exhibits contain inadmissible hearsay, no hearsay exception applies, and the district court
failed to address the hearsay objection.
Facebook provided all the documents in exhibits 14 and 15 in response to a search
warrant J.S. sent; T-Mobile provided all the documents in exhibit 16 in response to another
search warrant from J.S. Facebook and T- Mobile each provided a certificate for the
documents it produced stating that the certificate is intended to comply with the state
equivalents of Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6), 902(11), 902(13), and 902(14).
Exhibit 14 confirms J.H.’s testimony that Child A changed the name “Thor Randall”
to “Brotha” in her Facebook account. Exhibit 15 provides circumstantial evidence that
Duncan is “Thor Randall” because it shows that the Thor Randall Facebook account was
exchanging messages with an individual to whom Duncan had referred as his wife, as well
as messages and comments involving another individual that tie Duncan’s wife and a
vehicle Duncan owned to “Thor Randall.” Exhibit 16 confirms that the T-Mobile customer
associated with the IP address listed for the Thor Randall Facebook account is Duncan’s
mother and that the T-Mobile account was registered to Duncan’s mother’s street address
8
in Las Vegas, which was Duncan’s home at the time the Thor Randall Facebook account
sent sexually explicit messages, photographs, and videos to Child A.
At trial, Duncan objected to the admission of each of these exhibits on the basis of
hearsay,2 asserting that the state failed to satisfy the business-records exception because
the documents were prepared for litigation and the certificates were insufficient to lay
foundation with out a testifying witness from Facebook or T- Mobile. See Minn. R.
Evid. 803(6) (setting forth the business-records hearsay exception). The state responded
that the certifications properly authenticated the documents and that the documents were
“nontestimonial.” The district court did not address hearsay; instead it agreed that the
documents were nontestimonial and admitted them into evidence.
Duncan argues that the district court erred by admitting all three exhibits because
they contain hearsay and no hearsay exception applies. We need not decide whether any
error occurred, however, because any alleged error was harmless.
An evidentiary error to which an appellant objected is reviewed under the
harmless-error standard. State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 633 (Minn. 2011). This
standard requires that “a defendant who alleges an error that does not implicate a
constitutional right must prove there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully
admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” Id. (quotations omitted). “We
generally will not reverse a verdict even when improper [evidence] is presented to the
[fact-finder] unless there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence

2 Although Duncan objected to the admission of all three exhibits based on his
confrontation rights at trial, he does not raise this argument on appeal.
9
significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Jaros, 932 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted).
Factors that assist our determination of whether this reasonable possibility exists
include “(1) the manner in which the party presented the evidence, (2) whether the evidence
was highly persuasive, (3) whether the party who offered the evidence used it in closing
argument, and (4) whether the defense effectively countered the evidence.” State v. Smith,
940 N.W.2d 497, 505 (Minn. 2020). Strong evidence of guilt undermines the persuasive
value of wrongly admitted evidence. See Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 634 (noting that the
wrongfully admitted testimony was brief and not persuasive on the question of the
defendant’s guilt and that other strong evidence of guilt overshadowed that testimony).
“This analysis is fact-specific, and not all the factors are relevant or persuasive in
every case.” State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54-55 (Minn. 2024). The question is not
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Id. at 54. Instead, “to assess
harmless error we must consider all the evidence introduced as well as other illuminating
factors (including the non-exclusive factors set forth earlier) and ask whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the error significantly affected the verdict.” Id. at 55. In some
cases, these factors may not lead to a clear conclusion, but we may be aided in a court trial
by the district court’s findings. See State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 568 (Minn. 2008)
(holding that any error in admitting testimony under the hearsay rules was harmless when
the district court indicated in its findings that the testimony did not affect its verdict).
Here, Duncan did not analyze these factors in his brief, and we do not find them
conclusive in determining whether any error was harmless. However, Duncan’s argument
10
rests on the rationale that exhibits 14, 15, and 16 were the most impactful and conclusive
evidence that Duncan was the individual who messaged Child A from the Thor Randall
Facebook account. We note, however, that the photographs and messages sent to Child A
from the Thor Randall Facebook account in exhibits 14 and 15 were also admitted through
(1) a different exhibit that contained screenshots of those same communications and many
more sexually explicit communications—exhibit 1 and (2) testimony from Child A ’s
mother and investigator M.J. And Duncan does not argue that exhibit 1 or the testimony
were erroneously admitted. See Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 634; State v. Weaver,
733 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating that evidence was highly persuasive
when it was not merely cumulative of other evidence presented at trial), rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 18, 2007). The strength of other evidence that Duncan does not challenge greatly
undermines the persuasive value of exhibits 14, 15, and 16. The diminished persuasive
value of the challenged exhibits and the fact that much of their content was admitted via
other unchallenged evidence compel a conclusion that the evidence in those exhibits did
not significantly affect the verdict.
In addition, we have the benefit of the district court’s written findings. See Holliday,
745 N.W.2d at 568 (determining that any error was harmless because the district court
explained the evidence did not affect its verdict but noting that the resolution might have
been different had the appellant been convicted by a jury). As to the district court’s
determination that Duncan was the user of the Thor Randall Facebook account, there is no
11
reasonable possibility that exhibits 14, 15 and 16 affected it because the district court said
as much:
There is no mistaking the identity of the Defendant and the
Child; the messages, images, photographs, and videos fully
support the Court’s findings and conclusions in this regard.
This is especially true in relation to the Defendant; all of the
backgrounds in the relevant images are of the Defendant’s
shower, bathroom, bed, bedroom and kitchen at his residence
in Las Vegas, Nevada. There is no mistaking that the
individual in the images is the Defendant.

Given this explicit finding, Duncan cannot meet his burden of demonstrating that a
reasonable possibility exists that the challenged exhibits significantly affected the verdict.
See Smith, 940 N.W.2d at 505. We therefore conclude that any error in the admission of
the challenged exhibits was harmless.
II. Any discovery violation was harmless.
Duncan argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for
a mistrial and asserts that, because the state committed a discovery violation when it failed
to disclose the results of a search of his phone, he must be granted a new trial. Investigator
J.S. testified that he recalled that the Nevada agent was going to search Duncan’s phone.
He also stated that the Facebook records indicated that the Thor Randall Facebook account
was associated with a Samsung device and that his recollection was that the device seized
was a different electronic device. The Nevada agent then testified that she had seized
Duncan’s phone as part of the investigation and that a forensic investigator searched the
phone, but as far as she knew, “[t]here wasn’t anything useful” obtained and no evidence
of the Thor Randall Facebook account was found. She further testified that, in her
12
experience supervising sex offenders, they may have more than one cell phone and may
not disclose to the agent their possession of other cell phones. She also said the information
from the search of the phone was sent to Minnesota. However, neither the prosecutor’s
office nor Duncan’s counsel recalled receiving that information.
After J.S.’s testimony about Duncan’s phone, Duncan’s counsel moved for a
mistrial, arguing that the information from the phone was exculpatory and never disclosed
to Duncan. The district court denied the motion but said it would consider the issue again
in its overall consideration of the case. In written closing argument, Duncan’s counsel
argued that, under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01,
subd. 1(6), which addresses a prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory information, the
state violated its duty to disclose material evidence favorable to Duncan and again
requested a mistrial. In its final order, the district court determined that there did not appear
to be a discovery violation and that it could not identify any facts that would support the
request for a mistrial.
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.01 sets out the state’s discovery
obligations. “Under Brady, the suppression by the State, whether intentional or not, of
material evidence favorable to the defendant violates the constitutional guarantee of due
process.” Walen v. State, 777 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010) (addressing Brady).
Evidence is material under Brady “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. 2000).
13
Whether a discovery violation occurred is an issue of law that appellate courts
review de novo. State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 489 (Minn. 2005). “Generally,
without a showing of prejudice to the defendant, the state’s violation of a discovery rule
will not result in a new trial.” Id. We review the district court’s ultimate decision to deny
a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 262
(Minn. 2016). “The trial judge is in the best position to determine whether an error is
sufficiently prejudicial to require a mistrial or whether another remedy is appropriate.” Id.
A district court’s determination of whether a prosecutor’s discovery violation warrants a
new trial will be reversed only when the discovery violation, “viewed in the light of the
whole record, appears to be inexcusable and so serious and prejudicial that [the]
defendant’s right to a fair trial was denied.” Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d at 489.
Duncan modifies his argument on appeal, and based on investigator J.S.’s failure to
disclose the verbal statements that the Nevada agent made to him about searching the
phone, he asserts that the discovery violation occurred under Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01,
subd. 1(2), which addresses a prosecutor’s duty to disclose statements.
3 Assuming,
without deciding, that a discovery violation occurred, we conclude that, under either of
subdivision 1’s disclosure requirements, any violation was harmless because Duncan has

3 A party cannot “obtain review by raising the same general issue litigated below but under
a different theory.” State v. Bailey, 732 N.W.2d 612, 623 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Thiele v.
Stitch, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988)). However, a reviewing court “may affirm the
district court on any ground, including one not relied on by the district court.” State v.
Martens, 996 N.W.2d 249, 261 n.5 (Minn. App. 2023), aff’d, 18 N.W.3d 752 (Minn. 2025).
14
not established prejudice. And because there was no prejudice, w e conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Duncan’s request for a mistrial.
To establish prejudice under Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, an appellant must show a
reasonable probability that, had he been afforded access to the evidence in question, the
outcome of the trial would have been different. State v. Radke, 821 N.W.2d 316, 326
(Minn. 2012). A discovery violation may be harmless whe n the evidence is not “of great
importance” and other evidence weighs strongly against the defendant. State v. Greenleaf,
591 N.W.2d 488, 506 (Minn. 1999). When the testimony of the witness sought to be
impeached by undisclosed evidence “was not the only damning evidence against
defendant,” the likelihood of prejudice decreases. State v. Jackson, 346 N.W.2d 634, 638
(Minn. 1984); see also State v. Hathaway, 379 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. 1985) (“[I]n light
of the other available evidence with which the defendants were able to impeach, this error
[of withholding discoverable evidence from the defense] is harmless.”). “Nondisclosure
of evidence that is merely impeaching may not typically result in the kind of prejudice
necessary to warrant a new trial.” Hunt, 615 N.W.2d at 300-01. Appellate courts may also
consider whether, if a new trial were granted, the new trial would be any different than the
first one. State v. Holmes, 325 N.W.2d 33, 35 (Minn. 1982).
Duncan asserts prejudice in general terms, positing that his counsel could have more
fully and completely prepared, cross-examined differently, and tailored a different strategy
because the information “was potentially helpful.” But he does not explain how having
this information in a timely manner would have changed his defense strategy. Duncan’s
strategy at trial was to persuade the fact-finder that the state could not prove it was Duncan
15
who used the Thor Randall Facebook account to engage in communications of a sexual
nature with and send nude photographs and videos to Child A, and he elicited testimony at
trial about the phone to support that strategy.
The Nevada agent confirmed that the phone contained nothing incriminating and
that the Thor Randall Facebook account was not found on it. On recross-examination, she
confirmed that, prior to obtaining the phone, she did not have reason to believe that Duncan
had two phones. At the most, obtaining the phone data merely would have corroborated
what was already elicited—that nothing was found on the phone. The district court also
found that the issue was “sufficiently fleshed out and made clear,” and therefore, the court
was able to consider Duncan’s position that the phone provided no evidentiary support
against him. This is the most Duncan would have been able to elicit if he had been provided
the information prior to trial.
Further, the district court inquired about whether Duncan would like time to expand
the record to see if more could be learned about the phone. Duncan responded that he did
not want to sit around for months while it was investigated further and argued that a mistrial
was the appropriate remedy. This further indicates that the data on the phone was not of
“great importance.”
Duncan points to the value of the information to impeach the Nevada agent about
the type of device searched, arguing that it “might have caused the court to conclude that
the evidence as to Duncan had not been proven.” We are not persuaded because the district
court explicitly concluded that the phone provided no evidentiary support for, and was
therefore irrelevant as to, the charges against Duncan. Moreover, evidence that is merely
16
impeaching does not “typically result in the kind of prejudice necessary to warrant a new
trial.” See Hunt, 615 N.W.2d at 300-01. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Duncan’s motions for a mistrial.
To support his argument that a new trial should be granted on appeal, Duncan relies
on opinions in which the supreme court, in exercising its supervisory powers over the
district courts, granted new trials even though prejudice in the usual sense could not be
shown. State v. Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d 384, 386 (Minn. 1992) (explaining that this line of
cases includes State v. Zeimet, 310 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1981), and State v. Schwantes,
314 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 1982)). But as an error-correcting court, it is not our role to
exercise a “supervisory power” in the manner the supreme court does. See In re Welfare
of M.K., 805 N.W.2d 856, 865 (Minn. App. 2011) (“[T]his court, as an
intermediate-appellate court, does not exercise supervisory powers reserved to the supreme
court.”).
Because there is no reason to believe that a new trial would be any different than
the first one, Duncan has not demonstrated the prejudice necessary for this court to grant a
new trial, see Holmes, 325 N.W.2d at 35, and we discern no error in the district court’s
decision to deny Duncan’s request for a mistrial as a sanction for the alleged discovery
violation.
Affirmed.