In the Matter of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0655

In the Matter of:

Marineisy Jimenez Rosario, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Robert Eliazar Villanueva,
Appellant.

Filed December 15, 2025
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-DA-FA-24-6122

Emma Dunphy Smith, Central Minnesota Legal Services, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Robert Eliazar Villanueva, Minneapolis, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
Appellant Robert Eliazar Villanueva challenges the district court’s order for
protection (OFP) and orders denying his motions to vacate the OFP. We conclude that the
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district court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err with respect to any of Villanueva’s
challenges. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
Villanueva was in a relationship with respondent Marineisy Jimenez Rosario in
2022 and 2023, during which time Rosario became pregnant. After her relationship with
Villanueva ended, Rosario filed a child support case against him. She then began receiving
threatening text messages from different numbers, which she believed came from
Villanueva. Rosario consequently filed a petition for an OFP against Villanueva on
October 14, 2024, alleging he committed numerous instances of domestic abuse in their
relationship, including physical violence and threats. The district court granted an ex parte
OFP and scheduled an evidentiary hearing before a referee.
At the evidentiary hearing, Rosario testified about the allegations in her petition and
offered several exhibits to corroborate her claims. The first exhibit was a photo of her
swollen face taken after Villanueva allegedly “grabbed [her]” and “threw [her] to the
ground.” She also presented a medical report from March 2023, which she claimed related
to lingering pain in her abdomen after she was struck by Villanueva while she was pregnant
with their child. She testified that she did not tell the doctor about the abuse because she
felt “very afraid and very vulnerable” and had received “a lot of threats from [Villanueva].”
She similarly testified that she “never dared to call the police” because Villanueva would
threaten her. Both exhibits were admitted over Villanueva’s objection.
Rosario also testified to an incident at her home in June 2023, when Villanueva
threatened to kill her with a knife during an argument. Rosario’s only witness, B.P., was
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present during this incident. B.P. testified that “[Villanueva] came in to talk to
[Rosario]. . . . And they were arguing. And he had a knife. And he was threatening her. He
was telling her that he was going to kill her, and we were there.” B.P. emphasized that he
did not call the police to report the incident because Rosario asked him not to and because
B.P. was “afraid.”
Villanueva testified that he “never struck [Rosario] in [his] entire life.” As support,
he introduced text messages from Rosario that he said showed that she was not afraid of
him because she was “still communicating with [him]” and “still inviting [him] over to see
[their] son.” He also claimed that he did not recognize B.P. and that the knife incident never
occurred.
Following the hearing, the district court made factual findings and granted Rosario’s
petition for an OFP with a two-year duration. The district court found that Rosario credibly
testified to multiple incidents that qualify as domestic abuse under Minnesota Statutes
section 518B.01 (2024). The court further found that B.P. corroborated Rosario’s testimony
regarding the knife incident. As for Villanueva, the court found that he had not
demonstrated that he did not commit acts of domestic abuse. Instead, the court found that
he focused on “attempting to discredit [Rosario] and her witness” and his arguments were
not “consistent with the realities of domestic abuse, where victims do frequently remain in
abusive relationships and even attempt to work on those relationships.”
Villanueva moved to vacate the OFP under Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 60.02 on the grounds that there was newly discovered evidence and that Rosario
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had misrepresented information at the hearing. 1 In the motion, he stated that he had
obtained a 2023 police report showing that Rosario had lied about her lack of contact with
police. The court denied this motion.
Villanueva filed two more motions soon after, again requesting the OFP to be
vacated because of newly discovered evidence. The evidence included the 2023 police
report from the previous motion and a new 2025 police report made by Villanueva , in
which he claimed that Rosario violated the OFP by texting him. Throughout both motions,
he also alleged that judicial bias had improperly affected the proceedings and that his due-
process rights were violated because the district court did not give him a meaningful
opportunity to present evidence. The district court denied both motions.
Villanueva appeals.
DECISION
Villanueva presents three main issues on appeal. First, he challenges the OFP on
multiple grounds and asks that we reverse. Second, h e challenges the district court’s
rejection of evidence offered in his motions to vacate the OFP. And third, he argues the
district court violated his due process rights. We address each argument in turn.

1 Villanueva titled each motion as a motion for reconsideration, but in the text of the
motions he argued for the OFP to be vacated under rule 60.02. The district court determined
that the motions invoked rule 60.02 and understood the filings as motions to vacate, not for
reconsideration. We agree that the motions are more accurately understood as motions to
vacate under rule 60.02.
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I
Villanueva argues that the district court abused its discretion when it determined
that Rosario established by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic abuse occurred.
He also challenges several of the court’s factual findings and evidentiary decisions in its
consideration of the OFP petition.
We review the decision to grant an OFP for an abuse of discretion. Thompson v.
Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. 2018). “A district court abuses its discretion
when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts
in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). We review the district court’s construction and
application of statutes de novo. Braend ex rel. Minor Child. v. Braend, 721 N.W.2d 924,
927 (Minn. App. 2006). And we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error.
Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 2004).
Minnesota Statutes section 518B.01 governs the circumstances under which a
district court may grant an OFP petition. A petition for an OFP requires allegations of
“specific facts and circumstances” of domestic abuse. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 4(b).
“Domestic abuse” is defined as including “(1) physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” or
“(2) the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(1)-(2). In determining whether an OFP may be granted, courts
consider “the timing, frequency, and severity of any alleged instances of domestic abuse,
along with the likelihood of further abuse.” Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 500 (quotation
omitted).
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We first address Villanueva’s argument that the district court included clearly
erroneous findings in its order. We then consider his argument that the court abused its
discretion in deciding several evidentiary rulings. And finally, we reach the argument that
the evidence of domestic abuse was insufficient to meet the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard.
A
We begin with Villanueva’s arguments that the district court clearly erred in its
factual findings. In reviewing facts for clear error, we will reverse only if the findings are
“manifestly contrary” to the weight of the evidence as a whole. Gada, 684 N.W.2d at 514
(quoting Rogers v. Moore, 603 N.W.2d 650, 656 (Minn. 1999)). We will “neither reconcile
conflicting evidence nor decide issues of witness credibility.” Aljubailah ex rel. A.M.J. v.
James, 903 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. App. 2017) (quoting Gada, 684 N.W.2d at 514).
First, Villanueva argues that it was clear error for the district court to find Rosario
credible, particularly because she misrepresented that she had not contacted the police
about Villanueva’s abuse. Rosario testified in detail to several alleged acts of abuse,
referencing specific dates and providing context. She also offered exhibits corroborating
her claims and a witness who testified to seeing Villanueva threaten Rosario with a knife.
Although she testified that she “never dared to call the police or anything like that” during
her relationship with Villanueva, she later clarified that she spoke to the police after their
relationship ended. Because we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations and
the district court’s finding is not manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence, we are
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unpersuaded by Villanueva’s argument that the district court clearly erred in crediting
Rosario’s testimony. See Gada, 684 N.W.2d at 514.
Second, Villanueva disputes that B.P. witnessed Villanueva threaten Rosario, and
he argues that the district court clearly erred in crediting B.P.’s testimony. But B.P.’s
testimony was clear— he stated that he was with Rosario and Villanueva, that the two began
arguing, and that “[Villanueva] had a knife” and “[h]e was telling [ Rosario] that he was
going to kill her.” On cross-examination, B.P. was unable to answer Villanueva’s questions
about details like the clothing Villanueva was wearing that day , but the district court still
credited B.P.’s testimony as being corroborative of Rosario’s allegations. Because
credibility issues are “exclusively the province of the factfinder,” we conclude that the
court’s findings as to the corroborative value of B.P.’s testimony were not clearly
erroneous. Gada, 684 N.W.2d at 514.
Third, Villanueva argues that the court should have included Rosario’s mental-
health history in its factual findings. We are not persuaded that the district court clearly
erred because the only evidence relating to Rosario’s mental health was her testimony that
she suffered from certain diagnosed conditions and her confirmation that she was
hospitalized for mental -health treatment at one point. There was no evidence admitted at
the hearing that demonstrated the relevance of her mental-health history to the underlying
OFP allegations. For that reason, we do not find that the district court clearly erred by not
referring to her mental health in its findings.
In sum, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in its factual findings.
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B
We next turn to Villanueva’s evidentiary challenges. We review the district court’s
evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Aljubailah, 903 N.W.2d at 644. Villanueva
argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting two exhibits: Rosario’s
medical record relating to abdominal pain and a photo she took of facial bruising.
Beginning with the medical record, Villanueva argues that the record was irrelevant
because it related to a scheduled prenatal-care appointment, and he disputes whether the
reported pain was attributable to injuries from domestic abuse. Evidence is relevant if it
has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. Rosario
offered these records to corroborate allegations that Villanueva punched her in the
abdomen and caused lasting pain. The district court found that the record was relevant and
probative because “near the end of the report, there is a brief section . . . detailing that the
reason for the visit is [Rosario] reporting pain in the right lower quadrant of her abdomen.”
This note had a tendency to make it more probable that Rosario experienced pain in her
abdomen significant enough to lead her to visit a doctor and, in turn, adds credence to her
allegation that Villanueva struck her in the abdomen. This meets the standard for relevance,
and we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in its ruling.
Villanueva also argues that Rosario’s offered photo showing bruises to her face
lacked authentication. Evidence may be authenticated by testimony of a witness with
knowledge. Minn. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). At the hearing, Rosario testified that she took the
photo in December 2022, after Villanueva hit her, grabbed her by the hair, and threw her
9
to the ground. Because she took the photo and has personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the time it was taken, her testimony is sufficient to authenticate the photo.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting either
exhibit that Villanueva challenges.
C
Finally, Villanueva argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting the
OFP because Rosario failed to present evidence sufficient to meet the preponderance-of -
the-evidence standard of proof. This standard requires that, “to establish a fact, it must be
more probable that the fact exists than that the contrary exists.” Oberg v. Bradley, 868
N.W.2d 62, 65 (Minn. App. 2015) (quoting City of Lake Elmo v. Metro. Council, 685
N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2004)). To determine whether sufficient evidence supports the district
court’s decision to grant an OFP, we “review the record in the light most favorable to the
district court’s findings” and we reverse “only if we are left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99
(Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted).
Villanueva relies on Bjergum v. Bjergum, 392 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. App. 1986, to
support his argument. In Bjergum, we held that evidence of abuse from several years earlier
was insufficient to support an OFP because it did not show the respondent’s present intent
to harm. 392 N.W.2d at 606-07. But that holding was later abrogated in Thompson. There,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that “a petitioner need only show that ‘physical harm,
bodily injury, or assault’ has actually occurred, regardless of when it occurred, to satisfy
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the first definition of ‘domestic abuse.’” Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 500. Villanueva’s
reliance on Bjergum is therefore misplaced.
Reviewing the evidence as a whole, we are not persuaded that the trial court made
a mistake in determining that Rosario proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she
experienced domestic abuse. The district court credited the testimony of Rosario and her
witness and considered exhibits corroborating her allegations. We have found similar or
lesser showings by OFP petitioners to be sufficient to meet the preponderance standard.
See Aljubailah, 903 N.W.2d at 644 (finding that the petitioner’s allegations of being
shoved, corroborated by photographs of bruising, were sufficient to support the district
court ordering an OFP, despite the respondent denying he harmed the petitioner). Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings, we are persuaded
that the district court did not err by concluding that Rosario met the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing
the OFP against Villanueva.
II
Villanueva next argues that the district court improperly rejected the evidence he
offered in his motions to vacate the OFP . Both motions were brought under Minnesota
Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Because the decision to grant such relief is “based on all
the surrounding facts of each specific case,” the district court has broad discretion when
ruling on a rule 60.02 motion, and we review for abuse of that discretion. Gams v.
Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Minn. 2016).
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Rule 60.02 provides that a court may relieve a party from a judgment, order, or
proceeding for reasons including “[n]ewly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.03.”
Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(b). Newly discovered evidence must be relevant and admissible;
more than “merely collateral, impeaching, or cumulative; ” and likely to “have a probable
effect” on the ultimate result. Frazier v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 811 N.W.2d 618,
631 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
The evidence Villanueva presents in his motions consisted of a Hopkins Police
Department incident report from 2023 and a Bloomington police incident report number
from February 2025.2 As for the Hopkins report, the district court denied that it was newly
discovered evidence because it was available prior to the hearing. We agree. The report,
made over a year prior to the OFP evidentiary hearing, was available with reasonable
diligence at the time of the hearing and therefore plainly does not meet the rule 60.02
requirements. See Frazier, 811 N.W.2d at 631 (“[T]he moving party must show that the
new evidence was not discovered until after trial, and could not have been discovered
before trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence.” (quotation omitted)); Swanson v.

2 In the briefing for this appeal, Villanueva also provided evidence of a second
Bloomington police report from March 2025. Because this report was not considered by
the district court, it is not part of the record, and we cannot properly consider it on appeal.
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582- 83 (Minn. 1988) (“An appellate court may not base
its decision on matters outside the record on appeal, and may not consider matters not
produced and received in evidence below.”) ; see Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (defining
the record on appeal).
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Williams, 228 N.W.2d 860, 862 (Minn. 1975) (stating that newly discovered evidence
under rule 60.02 must not have been “known to the party at [the] time” of the hearing).
With respect to the 2025 Bloomington Police incident report number, the district
court again found it was not newly discovered evidence under rule 60.02 because
Villanueva provided too little information to establish its relevance to the allegations in the
OFP. Although post decision evidence can be admitted as newly discovered evidence, it
still must meet the Frazier standard. See Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d 257, 265- 66
(Minn. 2022). Without any evidence detailing the police encounter, we agree with the
district court that the incident report number is not sufficiently relevant to be considered
new evidence. And even if a more complete report had been submitted to the district court,
Frazier requires that newly discovered evidence be more than “impeaching.” 811 N.W.2d
at 631. Villanueva stated that the evidence contradicts Rosario’s claims that she fears
Villanueva and instead shows that she engages in “ongoing harassment” against him. Such
attacks on a party’s credibility are not a proper purpose for receiving newly discovered
evidence under Frazier. Id.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motions to vacate.
III
Finally, Villanueva argues that the district court violated his due-process rights. He
maintains that the district court referee who conducted the hearing was biased against him
and that he was denied the right to a fair hearing. We address both arguments in turn.
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Minnesota judges are required to perform their duties “without bias or prejudice.”
Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.3(A). To be disqualifying, such bias or prejudice “must
stem from an extrajudicial source,” resulting in an opinion “on some basis other than what
the judge learned from [their] participation in the case.” In re Est. of Lange, 398 N.W.2d
569, 573 (Minn. App. 1986). Adverse rulings alone do not constitute bias. Olson v. Olson,
392 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986). Potential violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct are reviewed de novo. State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 246 (Minn. 2005).
Villanueva argues that the referee rushed through the evidentiary hearing and was
dismissive about the impact of the OFP, particularly regarding the ban on owning firearms.
We disagree with his characterization of the record. With regard to the pace of the
proceedings, the referee attempted to refocus Villanueva’s questioning of a witness, saying,
“Mr. Villanueva, it is 11:30. We have a hearing at noon. How much time do you want to
spend asking [the witness] these types of questions?” This comment does not demonstrate
bias or prejudice. Rather, it reflects the court performing its role in “exercis[ing] reasonable
control over the mode . . . of interrogating witnesses” so as to “avoid needless consumption
of time.” Minn. R. Evid. 611.
As to the loss of firearm rights, the court was professional and measured in its
comments. The following discussion on the record reveals that the referee was simply
explaining the terms of the OFP.
THE COURT: If we do issue the order for protection,
Mr. Villanueva, there is a prohibition for firearms and
ammunition. Do you own any firearms?
MR. VILLANUEVA: No, I do not.
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THE COURT: All right. So if you don’t own any, we have
your sworn testimony under oath today that you don’t own any.
If the order does get issued, it will be in place until 2027. So
make sure that you don’t go out and acquire any firearms or
ammunition during that time if the order gets issued.

Although these terms are unfavorable to Villanueva, an adverse outcome is not sufficient
to show bias or prejudice. See Olson, 392 N.W. 2d at 341. Because the examples Villanueva
points to do not demonstrate that the district court was biased in its decision-making, we
decline to reverse the OFP on these grounds.
Villanueva also argues that he did not receive a fair hearing because he did not have
a meaningful opportunity to be heard and did not receive neutral treatment as a self-
represented litigant. We discern no basis in the record to support his claims. Villanueva
defended his position at an OFP evidentiary hearing where he testified, presented evidence,
and cross-examined witnesses. He also received assistance from the district court
throughout the proceedings. For example, the district court instructed him on how to make
a proper objection and offer evidence and helped him locate his exhibits. Although we
acknowledge the difficulties that self-represented litigants face in navigating the justice
system, self-represented litigants are still subject to the same standards as attorneys. See
Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). The district court
accommodated Villanueva without depriving him of due process. We therefore decline to
reverse the OFP on due process grounds.
Affirmed.