In re the Matter of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0675

In re the Matter of:

Femi Joseph Daramola,
Appellant,

vs.

the Commissioner of Human Services, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed December 29, 2025
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CV-27-17647

Femi Joseph Daramola, Champlin, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Brian M. Card, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges a district court order dismissing his appeal of a maltreatment
determination for failure to timely serve respondent commissioner, arguing that equitable
tolling should apply. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting
equitable relief, we affirm.
FACTS
Self-represented appellant Femi Jo seph Daramola appeals from the district court’s
order granting respondent Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services’s motion to
dismiss Daramola’s appeal for untimely service. Daramola submitted an informal brief
pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.01, subd. 1.
In January 2023, Daramola was working an overnight shift as a mental-health
specialist at a group home in Scott County. A vulnerable adult resident required
supervision at all times to ensure her safety. During a shift when Daramola was assigned
as her overnight staff, the vulnerable adult ingested windshield-washer fluid, requiring
subsequent hospitalization and dialysis treatment.
Respondent Minnesota Department of Human Services determined that Daramola
failed to conduct proper checks and provide proper supervision of the vulnerable adult, and
it informed him that it had determined he maltreated a vulnerable adult by neglect as
defined in Minn. Stat. § 626.5572, subd. 17 (2024). Daramola requested reconsideration,
and the department upheld its determination. Daramola appealed, and a fair hearing was
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held before a human-services judge (HSJ) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 3(a)
(2024).
The HSJ recommended that the commissioner affirm the department’s
determination. Daramola requested reconsideration and, at the same time, filed a certiorari
appeal in this court. In a special term order filed on August 6, 2024, this court dismissed
the certiorari appeal, stating that, because judicial review was available in the district court,
Daramola could not seek review by certiorari appeal. Daramola v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,
No. A24-1105 (Minn. App. Aug. 6, 2024) (order).
On October 3, 2024, the commissioner issued its final denial of Daramola’s request
for reconsideration. The denial included a page titled , “FURTHER APPEAL RIGHTS,”
which stated, “If you disagree . . . you may start an appeal in the district court . . . within
30 days of the date of this decision.” Instead of filing in the district court, Daramola filed
a second certiorari appeal in this court. This court then issued an order dismissing the
second certiorari appeal, again explaining that the appropriate place for review was in the
district court. Daramola v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., No. A24-1765 (Minn. App. Nov. 14,
2024) (order).
Daramola then filed an appeal in the district court on December 5, 2024, and
delivered notice of the appeal to the commissioner. The commissioner filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal as untimely because notice was not served within the statutorily
prescribed 30 days. See Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7 (2024). Pursuant to the
commissioner’s motion, a hearing was held in the district court. At the hearing, Daramola
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briefly addressed the timeliness issue, indicating he was confused about where to file his
appeal.
The district court granted the commissioner’s motion to dismiss, concluding that,
under Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7, Daramola was required to serve the commissioner
within 30 days of the final denial but failed to do so. Therefore, the appeal was untimely
and subject to dismissal.
In its order, the district court stated that Daramola’s explanation for the untimely
service was not reasonable because Daramola previously had filed an improper certiorari
appeal and the court of appeals had explained at that time that he was required to file in the
district court. It found that the commissioner’s final denial also provided clear guidance
on filing with the district court.
Daramola appeals.
DECISION
As a threshold matter, the parties do not dispute that Daramola failed to serve the
commissioner within the 30-day period or that dismissal was proper on that basis. See
Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7; see also Rued v. Comm’r of Hum. Servs., 13 N.W.3d 42,
44 (Minn. 2024) (holding that, when the 30-day statutory deadline for service is not met,
the respondent may either waive its defense as to the limitations period or move for
dismissal on that basis). Instead, Daramola asserts that the district court erred by
dismissing his appeal without properly considering equitable tolling. 1 Equitable tolling is

1 Daramola raises the issue of equitable tolling for the first time on appeal. We generally
consider an argument forfeited when it is not raised in the district court. See Thiele v. Stich,
5
warranted, he argues, because of his confusion about the correct procedure for filing his
appeal. Daramola argues that his case falls squarely within an equitable exception because
he (a) is pro se, (b) diligently sought review, and (c) relied on “procedural advice” from
the court of appeals and the department, and (d) no prejudice has been demonstrated by the
commissioner. We address each argument in turn.
“Granting equitable relief is within the sound discretion of the [district] court. Only
a clear abuse of that discretion will result in reversal.” Nadeau v. County of Ramsey,
277 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Minn. 1979); Citizens State Bank v. Raven Trading Partners, Inc.,
786 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Nadeau) (alterations omitted). Minnesota
courts have not explicitly determined whether the limitations period in Minn. Stat.
§ 256.045, subd. 7, is subject to equitable tolling, but we need not make that determination
here because Daramola is not entitled to relief under the doctrine, even if it is available.
See Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 560 -61 (Minn. 2012) (declining to reach the
question when the appellant did not establish entitlement to the equitable relief).
“The doctrine of equitable tolling allows a court to consider the merits of a claim
when it would otherwise be barred.” Id. at 560. This standard is “necessarily a high one.”
Id. at 561. The supreme court has identified circumstances in which equitable tolling may
be permitted: when the plaintiff can show that they were prevented from timely filing by
“paramount authority” or circumstances completely out of the plaintiff’s control; or when

425 N.W.2d 580, 582 -83 (Minn. 1988). However, because the district court’s order
construed Daramola’s explanation of being confused about where to file as a request for
equitable relief, we address his argument.
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the defendant engaged in fraudulent concealment of the cause of action such that even a
diligent plaintiff would not have known about their claim. Id. (outlining when equitable
tolling has been applied in civil cases).
“Innocent inadvertence” is not sufficient to toll a limitations period. Jones v.
Consol. Freightways Corp., 364 N.W.2d 426, 429-30 (Minn. App. 1985) (noting that the
appellant was provided with the relevant statutes and sufficient notice to apprise him of his
right to commence an action). Prejudice to the opposing party is one factor the district
court considers, but the court also examines the conduct of the party requesting equitable
tolling. Ochs v. Streater, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 858, 860 (Minn. App. 1997). In Ochs, this
court determined there was no basis for equitable tolling when the appellant offered no
evidence that circumstances beyond his control prohibited him from serving his complaint
in the statutory time period. Id.
Daramola does not assert that any fraud, circumstances beyond his control, or
“paramount authority” prevented him from timely serving the notice required. Sanchez,
816 N.W.2d at 561. At most, Daramola asserts “innocent inadvertence” due to “procedural
complexities and pro se status.” But this is not enough to establish entitlement to the
equitable relief he seeks. See Jones, 364 N.W.2d at 429 -30. Furthermore, although
Daramola asserts that he was reasonably confused because he is pro se, he offers no legal
argument as to how his pro se status prevented timely service of the notice of appeal.
2

2 Alternatively, Daramola argues public policy requires that we direct the district court to
hear his appeal. Because we conclude this argument was forfeited, we do not address it.
See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582-83.
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When reviewing the arguments of self-represented parties, appellate courts provide
“some leeway” to the self-represented party who is “attempting to comply with court
rules.” Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987). But this court
has also repeatedly emphasized that self-represented litigants are generally held to the same
standards as attorneys. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001).
Daramola provides no authority to support his argument that not complying with service
requirements falls within the leeway we allow for self-represented parties.
Daramola argues that filing a petition for certiorari with the court of appeals within
the statutory timeframe demonstrates that he diligently sought review. Daramola’s
argument misunderstands the reason the district court dismissed his appeal. The district
court dismissed his appeal because Daramola failed to serve the proper parties within
30 days.
3 Furthermore, the commissioner did not challenge the date of filing of Daramola’s
second certiorari appeal—November 7, 2024; rather, it argued that Daramola did not file
proof of service at that time.
Assuming the commissioner’s final denial was mailed and allowing an additional
three days for mailing, it appears that the last day of the 30-day period for Daramola to
serve his notice of appeal was November 7, 2024. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.01(a)(1), (e).
Accordingly, even if this court were to grant relief on the basis that he was confused about

3 This court has held that the 30-day time limit in Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7, does not
refer to filing with the district court. Chorolec v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Hum. Servs. ,
990 N.W.2d 474, 476-77 (Minn. App. 2023).
8
the correct court in which to file, it would not remedy his failure to serve the proper parties
within the statutory 30-day time period.
Next, Daramola says he relied on “procedural advice” from the court of appeals and
the department. The record reflects the opposite. The dismissal order this court issued in
his first certiorari appeal stated, “Daramola may seek review of the commissioner’s order
on reconsideration by appealing the order to the district court.” (Emphasis added.) The
dismissal order from his second certiorari appeal in this court contained a similar statement.
The commissioner’s final denial also directed Daramola to file any appeal in the district
court and stated that he must “start this proceeding by serving a written copy of a notice of
appeal upon the Commissioner.” It also identified the applicable statute.
Finally, Daramola asserts that the commissioner has not demonstrated prejudice.
But lack of prejudice alone does not warrant equitable tolling when, like here, the appellant
offered no evidence that circumstances beyond his control prohibited him from timely
serving the notice. See Ochs, 568 N.W.2d at 860.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
rejected Daramola’s equitable-relief argument to excuse his failure to timely serve the
notice of appeal as required by Minn. Stat. § 256.045, subd. 7.
Affirmed.