Nona Chubboy, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0683

Nona Chubboy,
Respondent,

vs.

Brian Chubboy,
Appellant.

Filed January 26, 2026
Affirmed
Segal, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-25-2060

Benjamin J. Hamborg, Dylan J. Wallace, Henson & Efron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Brian Chubboy, Eden Prairie, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Segal,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to stay docketing of a
Florida judgment. Because we conclude that the district court did not err in its

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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determination that the Florida judgment is entitled to docketing and enforcement in
Minnesota under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, we
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Brian Chubboy is the son of respondent Nona Chubboy, who is in her 90s
and resides in Florida.1 In 2024, Nona filed a petition in a Florida circuit court, seeking an
injunction against Brian for protection against exploitation of a vulnerable adult under the
Florida statutes. The background facts are taken from the record in the Florida
proceedings.
After suffering a stroke in 2022, Nona executed a power of attorney, appointing
Brian as her attorney-in -fact. She later revoked Brian’s power of attorney and filed the
petition for protection against him. Nona alleged, as relevant here, that Brian had flown
down to Florida while Nona was hospitalized and withdrew from her accounts a total of
$310,726.95. He then deposited the money “into accounts held in his personal name” and
refused to return the funds.
The Florida circuit court issued a temporary injunction for protection and a notice
for a virtual hearing on the petition. Brian, who was in Minnesota at the time, appeared
remotely and represented himself at the hearing. At the outset of the hearing, Brian argued
that service of process was defective, stating:
I was served a nine-page document six working days ago.
Your order is unsigned, no attachments. It’s nine pages. I can

1 Because the parties share the same surname, we refer to the appellant and respondent by
their first names.
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show you the document if you’d like. I (unintelligible)
[Nona’s] attorney and provide the Court a phony affidavit of
service and now has a three-month advantage in this case. I
believe it’s actually violated the due- process doctrine.
[Nona’s] attorney has an oath of candor, the attorney refused
to provide evidence and now provided ineffective service of
process.

Brian acknowledged the existence of an affidavit of service that stated he was “served on
March 20th at 6:02 p.m. [with] the temporary injunction” at his address in Eden Prairie.
But he asserted that he “received a blank, unsigned copy” and did not receive a copy of the
petition.
On cross-examination, Brian invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. The
Florida court warned Brian that “in a civil proceeding,” it could “infer that [Brian] did in
fact take wrongfully the $310,726.95,” based on his refusal to testify. Brian responded, “I
don’t wish to participate anymore. I don’t have any evidence to take to an attorney. I’ve
been asking for it for three months and received nothing.” The Florida court told Brian
that he “may want to get a Florida lawyer so that they know about this particular law, which
is a civil remedy as opposed to a criminal remedy.” When the Florida court said, “You’re
free to stay or you’re free to go,” Brian responded “I’ll be leaving. Thank you, Your
Honor,” and disconnected from the hearing.
After Brian left the hearing, the Florida court heard testimony from Nona and
another witness. Based on the evidence presented, the Florida court found that
“exploitation ha[d] occurred” and ordered Brian to, among other things, “return [to Nona]
the assets of $310,726.95,” plus interest and costs. As to Brian’s challenge to service of
process, the Florida court determined that Brian was timely served with a copy of the
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petition and temporary injunction, and that he “was afforded reasonable notice and an
opportunity to be heard in a manner that protected [his] right to due process.”
Brian appealed the Florida judgment to a Florida court of appeals. Brian raised five
issues in his brief to the Florida appellate court, including a challenge to the adequacy of
service and notice, an argument that the findings of the circuit court were not supported by
the record, and that his civil rights and constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection were violated. The Florida appellate court issued a per curiam decision
affirming the Florida judgment without opinion. See Chubboy v. Chubboy, 401 So.3d 1213
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2025). Brian did not seek review of this decision by the Florida
Supreme Court.
After completion of the Florida appellate proceeding, Nona filed an affidavit
requesting entry and docketing of the Florida judgment against Brian in Hennepin County
District Court. The district court administrator issued a notice on February 4, 2025,
informing Brian that docketing of the Florida judgment “[would] occur on February 24,
2025, unless [Brian presented] proof to the district court on or before February 24, 2025,
any ground upon which docketing of the judgment should be stayed.” The court
administrator filed a notice of docketing of the Florida judgment on the morning of
February 24. Later that same day, Brian filed a motion to stay docketing of the Florida
judgment and submitted an affidavit and memorandum in support of his motion. About
three weeks later, Brian filed a motion to dismiss and strike the notice of docketing of
judgment, arguing that the district court did not comply with its own filing deadline. In
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response, the district court issued an order temporarily staying enforcement of the Florida
judgment until Brian’s motion could be heard and decided.
In his motion papers, Brian argued that the district court should “deny the
recognition and stay” docketing of the Florida judgment because, among other things, the
Florida court (1) lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to impose the judgment; (2) violated his
due-process rights; and (3) “fabricated evidence.” At the hearing on his motion, Brian also
argued that he was entitled to relief from the Florida judgment under Minnesota Rule of
Civil Procedure 60.02(c) and (d). In her opposition to Brian’s motion to stay, Nona
contended, among other things, that the Florida judgment is entitled to full faith and credit
and that Brian is precluded from relitigating these issues in Minnesota.
The district court denied Brian’s challenge to the docketing of the Florida judgment.
The district court determined that the “arguments raised by [Brian] in the present Motion
concerning Florida’s jurisdiction, the adequacy of notice and service, due[-]process
violations, and alleged fraud are substantively identical to the arguments that [Brian] raised
during the Florida circuit court and appellate proceedings.” The district court concluded
that, because Brian’s arguments “are substantively identical to those arguments that were
raised, or that could have been raised, in the Florida proceedings,” they are “barred from
relitigation” under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution and
under the doctrine of res judicata. The district court added that, “even if [Brian] could
relitigate these issues (which he cannot), he has failed to satisfy his burden of establishing
a ground for non-recognition of the Florida judgment.”

6
DECISION
On appeal, Brian asserts a variety of theories why the district court erred in granting
full faith and credit to the Florida judgment. 2 Generally, “F ull Faith and Credit shall be
given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.”
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1; see also Minn. Stat. § 548.27 (2024) (“A certified copy of any
foreign judgment may be filed in . . . any district court of this state” and, once “so filed,
has the same effect . . . as a judgment of any district court or the supreme court of this state
and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.”).
There are, however, exceptions to the grant of full faith and credit to a foreign
judgment, including cases involving: (1) “lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction of
the rendering court”; (2) “fraud in procurement (extrinsic)”; (3) “satisfaction”; (4) “lack of
due process”; or (5) “other grounds that ma [k]e a judgment invalid or unenforceable.”
Matson, 333 N.W.2d at 867. But these exceptions are narrow and do not allow a party
opposing the docketing and enforcement of a foreign judgment to relitigate the merits.
See id. at 868 (noting that the mere “existence of an error or irregularity in the law or facts
of the foreign judgment, . . . does not constitute grounds on which a court of the enforcing

2 In his brief, Brian maintains that he is entitled to relief from the Florida judgment under
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(c) and (d). Rule 60.02 allows a court to relieve
a party from a final judgment if there is “[f]raud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic
or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party,” or if the
“judgment is void.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(c)-(d).
But the “power of a state to reopen or vacate a foreign judgment” under rule 60.02
is limited by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Matson v. Matson, 333 N.W.2d 862, 867
(Minn. 1983) (rejecting application of rule 60.02 “to foreign judgments in the same manner
it is applied to judgments of the courts of this state”). Our analysis is thus focused on the
arguments available under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and not rule 60.02.
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state may reopen and modify [a] foreign judgment”). Moreover, “a judgment is entitled to
full faith and credit—even as to questions of jurisdiction —when the second court’s inquiry
discloses that those questions [were] fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the
court which rendered the original judgment.” Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963).
A jurisdictional question is fully and fairly litigated if the record shows that there
was substantive discussion of the issue in the foreign court.
Cf. Lyon Fin Servs., Inc. v. Waddill, 625 N.W.2d 155, 159-60 (Minn. App. 2001)
(concluding that a California judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit, despite a
conclusory ruling on personal jurisdiction, because the record revealed “no substantive
discussion” of the jurisdictional issue in the California proceeding), rev. denied (Minn.
June 19, 2001); In re Welfare of S.R.S., 756 N.W.2d 123, 128 (Minn. App. 2008)
(concluding that an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction was not fully and fairly litigated
because it “was summarily addressed by the Colorado court in response to respondent’s
request for a status conference” on the issue), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2008).
“Whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires Minnesota courts to enforce” a
foreign judgment “involves a question of law which we review de novo.” Blume Law
Firm PC v. Pierce, 741 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19,
2008).
A. Merits of the Florida Judgment

For his first argument, Brian maintains that he “did not exploit or abuse” Nona, that
his “actions were executed lawfully” pursuant to a power of attorney governed by
Minnesota law, and that, because “Florida adopted the Uniform Power of Attorney Act,”
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the Florida court erred by failing to recognize his right to be “reimbursed with the
$310,726.95 in funds by [Nona]” under Minnesota law. See Fla. Stat. §§ 709.2101-2402
(2025) (the Florida power-of-attorney act).
But as already stated , “a foreign judgment cannot be collaterally attacked on the
merits” in Minnesota. Matson, 333 N.W.2d at 867; see also Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S.
230, 237 (1908) (noting that a judgment “cannot be impeached either in or out of the state
by showing that it was based on a mistake of law”). Because Brian’s arguments go to the
merits of the Florida judgment—and not procedural defects—his arguments fail to offer a
valid basis under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to challenge enforcement of the
judgment.
B. The Florida Court’s Jurisdiction

Brian next argues that the Florida judgment should not be enforced because of
jurisdictional defects. He asserts a lack of personal, in rem, and subject-matter jurisdiction.
We discuss each ground below.
Personal Jurisdiction
Brian challenges the Florida court’s personal jurisdiction in two ways. First, Brian
argues that the Florida court lacked “in personam jurisdiction over [his] execution of the
Minnesota Power of Attorney,” including “real estate transactions, financing, and
payments” and “banking transactions” in Minnesota. (Emphasis omitted.) Second, he
argues lack of personal jurisdiction based on insufficient service of process. We are not
persuaded by either argument.
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As to his first argument—that the Florida courts lacked personal jurisdiction over
his actions in Minnesota under the power of attorney—Brian never asserted this argument
before the Florida courts. Thus, regardless of whether the issue was “fully and fairly
litigated” in the Florida courts, it appears that Brian waived this challenge to personal
jurisdiction by failing to assert it. See Blume, 741 N.W.2d at 925 (stating that “personal
jurisdiction—unlike subject matter jurisdiction—can be waived,” thereby barring
relitigation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
“The law of the forum determines whether an action constitutes a waiver of personal
jurisdiction.” Id. Under Florida law, a defense based on lack of personal jurisdiction is
waived if “a party does not challenge personal jurisdiction until after a general appearance
in the case.” Horton v. Horton, 179 So.3d 459, 462 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). This defense
is also waived if the defendant does not assert it on appeal. See City of Miami v. Steckloff,
111 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1959) (“An assigned error wil l be deemed to have been
abandoned when it is completely omitted from the briefs.”).
At the petition hearing, which was his first general appearance, Brian did not assert
the power-of-attorney argument. Instead, Brian argued that the Florida court lacked
jurisdiction due to defects in service and notice. And in the Florida appeal, Brian’s
jurisdictional arguments were similarly confined to defects in service and notice. Because
Brian did not argue in the Florida proceedings a lack of personal jurisdiction based on the
Minnesota power of attorney, we conclude that this argument was waived.
Turning to Brian’s argument concerning insufficient service- of-process, this issue
was fully and fairly litigated in the Florida proceedings. Brian made the same insufficient-
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service argument to both the Florida circuit and appellate courts. At the petition hearing,
Brian testified that he was served a “blank, unsigned copy” of the temporary injunction and
denied receiving “any petition or anything else.” The Florida circuit court, however,
rejected this argument and found that proper service was made. Brian also extensively
briefed the service issue to the Florida appellate court. And that court affirmed the circuit
court’s judgment.
Because the record shows that there was “substantive discussion” about service of
process in the Florida proceedings, the insufficient-service issue was “fully and fairly
litigated.” Blume, 741 N.W.2d at 925. Thus, Brian cannot relitigate it in Minnesota.
In Rem Jurisdiction
Brian argues that the Florida court lacks in rem jurisdiction based on his allegation
that the Florida action concerns “real-estate transactions” related to real property located
in Eden Prairie, Minnesota.
In rem jurisdiction is “jurisdiction over a thing or a piece of property” rather than a
person. Fradera v. Fradera, 350 So.3d 796, 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022) (quotation
omitted). But the record shows that the Florida action centered around Brian’s actions—
withdrawing funds from Nona’s accounts and depositing them into his personal accounts—
not real property. Because the Florida action did not implicate in rem jurisdiction, Brian
is not entitled to relief on this basis.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Brian argues that the Florida court “lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
Minnesota, Florida, and federal Law.” Brian makes this argument for the first time in his
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reply brief. Generally, issues not raised or argued in an appellant’s principal brief cannot
be raised in a reply brief. Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 887
(Minn. 2010). But challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction “may be raised at any time.”
Henderson v. Shinseki , 562 U.S. 425, 434-35 (2011). Therefore, we consider Brian’s
argument.
“Subject matter jurisdiction—the ‘power of the trial court to deal with a class of
cases to which a particular case belongs’—is conferred upon a court by constitution or
statute.” Strommen v. Strommen, 927 So.2d 176, 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting
Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So.2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1994)).
An examination of subject matter jurisdiction requires specific
focus on the authority of the court over a general class of cases,
rather than on the particular facts of an individual case. Stated
differently, a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is proper
only when the court lacks authority to hear a class of cases,
rather than when it simply lacks authority to grant the relief
requested in a particular case.

In re Adoption of D.P.P., 158 So.3d 633, 636-37 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Brian contends that the Florida court lacked subject- matter jurisdiction over the
Minnesota power of attorney “and the subsequent reimbursement for expenditures of
$310,726.95 related to the Minnesota property transactions by [Nona].” Because this is a
full-faith-and-credit challenge to enforcement of the Florida judgment in Minnesota, we
look only to the authority of the Florida court to hear the exploitation action itself, not the
merits of the court’s ruling. See Blume, 741 N.W.2d at 925. Here, the Florida statutes
grant the Florida courts jurisdiction over injunctions for protection against the exploitation
of vulnerable Florida residents. See Fla. Stat. § 825.1035(1) (2025) (“There is created a
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cause of action for an injunction for protection against exploitation of a vulnerable adult.”).
And the record shows that Nona, a Florida resident, petitioned for relief in the Florida
circuit court pursuant to this statute. Thus, the Florida circuit court had subject-matter
jurisdiction over the exploitation action.
C. Due Process

Brian appears to argue that the district court’s order denying his motion to stay
violated his due-process rights. Brian urges that the order “violates the Fourteenth
Amendment” and “results in the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of [his] protected
property interests.” Brian maintains that “the district court ignored and omitted the fact
that” (1) Brian’s “actions were executed lawfully” pursuant to the power of attorney, and
(2) the Florida court “lacks in personam and/or in rem jurisdiction” over the transactions
he initiated as Nona’s attorney-in-fact.
Brian does not explain how the Minnesota district court violated his right to due
process. The Minnesota district court could not decide issues related to the merits of the
Florida judgment, including whether Brian acted lawfully under the power of attorney or
exploited Nona as a vulnerable adult. See Matson, 333 N.W.2d at 867. And as discussed
above, Brian either waived or fully litigated his jurisdictional arguments in Florida. We
thus discern no deprivation of Brian’s due-process rights by the Minnesota district court.
D. Extrinsic Fraud

Finally, Brian contends that the Florida judgment “was procured by extrinsic fraud.”
In Florida, extrinsic fraud is defined as:
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prevention of an unsuccessful party from presenting his case,
by fraud or deception practiced by his adversary; keeping the
opponent away from court; falsely promising a compromise;
ignorance of the adversary about the existence of the suit or the
acts of the plaintiff; fraudulent representation of a party
without his consent and connivance in his defeat; and so on.

Parker v. Parker, 950 So.2d 388, 391 (Fla. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Brian appears to argue that insufficient service of the petition and related evidence
of exploitation amounted to “extrinsic fraud by [Nona’s] Florida attorney.” He maintains
that Nona and her attorney “willfully prevented” him “from defending against the Florida
Court actions . . . by deception.”
The record shows, however, that Brian made substantially the same argument before
the Florida courts. During the hearing before the Florida circuit court, Brian argued that
Nona and her attorney “refused to provide evidence” related to the exploitation action,
served him with a “blank, unsigned copy” of relevant documents, and provided the court
with “a phony affidavit of service.” And in his Florida appellate brief, Brian maintained
that Nona’s attorney “willfully violated” his due-process rights by failing to provide him
with the “petition or any evidence submitted in the case.” Brian argued that Nona’s
attorney “violated the oath of candor to the court” and “hid the ineffective service of
process” by submitting a fraudulent affidavit of service to the Florida court.
Because Brian asserted the elements of his extrinsic-fraud argument to the Florida
courts, we conclude that the question was “fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in
14
the court which rendered the original judgment.” Durfee, 375 U.S. at 111. Thus, Brian
cannot relitigate the issue in Minnesota.3
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying Brian’s motion
to stay docketing of the Florida judgment in Minnesota.
Affirmed.

3 Brian separately argues that the district court erred by finding that the Florida judgment
was final because Nona filed a verified petition to enforce the judgment in a Florida circuit
court on March 27, 2025. Brian maintains that the enforcement petition “effectively
reopened the case to contest” Brian’s status as Nona ’s attorney-in-fact and, thus, the
“Florida case is not final, and all issues have not been resolved.”
Appellate courts generally will not consider matters not argued to and considered
by the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Brian did not
make this final-judgment argument to the district court. Therefore, we conclude that this
argument is forfeited on appeal.