State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0698

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jennifer Lynn Bardine,
Appellant.

Filed June 1, 2026
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69HI-CR-22-453

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s order revoking appellant’s probation and
following a stay and remand for postconviction proceedings, appellant raises four issues.
Appellant argues that (1) her guilty pleas were invalid and therefore her convictions for
indecent exposure and first-degree driving-while-impaired (DWI) test refusal must be
vacated; (2) the district court violated her right to due process by imposing a
conditional-release term after it imposed her sentence and stayed execution; (3) the district
court abused its discretion by revoking her probation without finding that rehabilitation
had failed; and (4) the district court erred by denying her request for a
mental-illness-defense examination during the probation -revocation proceedings. We
conclude that appellant’s conviction for indecent exposure is not properly before us,
appellant’s guilty plea to first-degree DWI test refusal was valid, appellant had notice of
the conditional-release term before she was sentenced, and the district court’s decisions to
revoke probation and deny a mental-illness- defense examination were well within its
discretion. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
The following summary derives from the district court’s written factual findings in
its postconviction order and the relevant procedural history. In July 2022, respondent State
of Minnesota charged appellant Jennifer Lynn Bardine with two offenses, including
3
first-degree DWI test refusal under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1) (2020).1 The district
court consolidated Bardine’s test-refusal matter (file 453) with two other criminal files— a
second-degree DWI charge (file 378) and an indecent-exposure charge (file 354).2
During pretrial proceedings on the consolidated cases, the district court granted a
motion by Bardine’s attorney for competency and mental-illness-defense examinations
under Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure 20.01 and 20.02.3 In November 2022, the
district court found Bardine competent to proceed to trial.
At a plea hearing in January 2023, Bardine informed the district court that she had
entered into an agreement with the state on the consolidated criminal files. She agreed to
plead guilty to one count in each of the criminal files, and the state agreed to dismiss all
other pending charges and to “abide by the pre-sentence investigation”; Bardine was “free
to argue for a departure.”

1 The state’s complaint alleged that Bardine’s first-degree DWI test-refusal offense
occurred “within ten years of the first of three or more qualified prior impaired driving
incidents.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1) (2020).

2 In each of the three criminal files, the state charged Bardine with additional counts that
the state dismissed as part of a plea agreement with Bardine. For simplicity’s sake, we
identify only the three charges to which Bardine pleaded guilty.

3 To ensure that a defendant is competent to understand and participate in criminal
proceedings, the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure require a medical examination
when competency is in doubt. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3. The district court may also
order the defendant’s mental examination if “the defendant offers evidence of mental
illness or cognitive impairment at trial.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.02, subd. 1(c). At the time
of Bardine’s motion, Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.04 allowed simultaneous examinations under
rules 20.01 and 20.02. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.04 (2022).
4
Bardine pleaded guilty to (1) first-degree DWI test refusal in file 453,
(2) second-degree DWI in file 378, and (3) indecent exposure in file 354. Bardine also
testified, waived her constitutional rights, and gave a factual basis for her guilty plea to
each charge.4 Bardine did not submit a written plea petition. The district court found that
an adequate factual basis supported all three pleas, but deferred their acceptance, ordered
a presentence investigation, continued Bardine’s release pending sentencing, and
scheduled a sentencing hearing in March 2023.
Bardine failed to appear at the sentencing hearing. A probation officer reported that
Bardine “was supposed to be at outpatient treatment” but “she did not attend treatment
today.” After Bardine turned herself in, the district court released Bardine and reinstated
her release conditions.
At a June 2023 sentencing hearing on the three guilty pleas, Bardine appeared and
the district court imposed a sentence of 42 months in prison for first-degree DWI test
refusal (file 453) along with concurrent sentences for second-degree DWI (file 378) and
indecent exposure (file 354). The district court stayed execution of all three sentences and
imposed conditions including participation in and completion of mental-health court
programming, completion of a substance-use -disorder assessment, and abstinence from
alcohol and mood-altering substances.

4 Bardine entered a Norgaard plea to the test-refusal and indecent-exposure charges. In a
Norgaard plea, a defendant pleads guilty “even though he or she claims a loss of memory,
through amnesia or intoxication, regarding the circumstances of the offense.” State v.
Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716-17 (Minn. 1994); see State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash,
110 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1961).
5
Between 2023 and 2025, the district court conducted probation-revocation
proceedings and found Bardine violated conditions of her probation many times, but
continued her on probation each time. For example, in July 2023, Bardine admitted to three
probation violations, including failure to complete a substance-use- disorder assessment.5
The district court stated that Bardine had been “unable to establish residency in St. Louis
County” and was therefore rejected by the mental-health court. As an interim sanction, the
district court imposed a 30-day jail sentence and 30 days of electronic home monitoring.
At a March 2024 hearing, Bardine admitted to five probation violations, including
failure to complete a substance-use-disorder assessment and failure to start electronic home
monitoring as ordered. The district court imposed jail sentences as interim sanctions. Over
several hearings in January 2025, Bardine admitted that she did not successfully serve the
jail sentences imposed in March 2024. Also, Bardine’s attorney moved for a
mental-illness-defense examination under rule 20.02, which the district court denied. The
district court continued the disposition hearing until Bardine completed other assessments
to determine her eligibility for mental-health court.
Two weeks later, at the continued hearing in January 2025, Bardine’s attorney
confirmed that Bardine lacked residency in St. Louis County and was thus not eligible for
mental-health court. Bardine’s attorney requested a continuance to explore whether

5 The parties and district court refer to a “rule 25 assessment,” “chemical assessment,”
“comprehensive assessment,” “comprehensive use assessment,” and “chemical use
assessment.” This opinion refers to the assessment ordered as a condition of Bardine’s
probation as the substance-use-disorder assessment.
6
alternative treatment programs were available. The district court denied the continuance,
revoked Bardine’s probation, and executed the sentences for all three offenses.
In March 2025, the district court held a hearing to discuss the omission of a
mandatory five-year conditional-release term of Bardine’s sentence for first-degree DWI
test refusal. The district court stated that, while it had not imposed a mandatory
conditional-release term at Bardine’s sentencing hearing in June 2023, it would now amend
Bardine’s sentence and impose the mandatory term. Neither party objected. The warrant of
commitment was amended to reflect a five-year conditional-release term.
In April 2025, Bardine appealed from the district court’s probation-revocation
decision on her conviction for first-degree DWI test refusal (file 453). In July 2025, this
court granted Bardine’s motion to stay her appeal while she pursued postconviction relief
in district court. Bardine petitioned for postconviction relief related to all three files, and
the district court denied her request without an evidentiary hearing. This court dissolved
the stay.
DECISION
“When a defendant initially files a direct appeal and then moves for a stay to pursue
postconviction relief, we review the postconviction court’s decisions using the same
standard that we apply on direct appeal.” State v. Beecroft , 813 N.W.2d 814, 836 (Minn.
2012).6

6 The state did not file a respondent’s brief. We nonetheless decide the appeal on the merits.
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03 (“If the respondent fails or neglects to serve and file its brief,
the case shall be determined on the merits.”).
7
I. Bardine’s appeal does not include her indecent-exposure conviction.

On appeal, Bardine argues that her guilty plea to indecent exposure (file 354) was
invalid and must be vacated. But Bardine’s notice of appeal identified only the district
court’s decision to revoke probation for her first-degree DWI test-refusal conviction (file
453).
The notice of appeal in probation-revocation proceedings must specify the judgment
or order from which the appeal is taken. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 3(4)(b)
(incorporating the notice-of-appeal requirements set out in Minn. R. Crim. P. 28). Because
Bardine appealed only as to her first-degree DWI test-refusal conviction (file 453), her
indecent-exposure conviction (file 354) is not before us.7
II. Bardine’s guilty plea to first-degree DWI test refusal was valid.

Bardine contends that, because she was not “informed there would be a mandatory
conditional-release term added to her sentence” before she pleaded guilty to first-degree
DWI test refusal, the district court erred in denying her postconviction petition to withdraw
the plea.
A district court “must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea” if “necessary to
correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. 8 When a guilty plea is not
constitutionally valid, a manifest injustice occurs. State v. Theis , 742 N.W.2d 643, 646

7 On appeal, Bardine does not challenge the validity of her plea to second-degree DWI
(file 378).

8 During postconviction proceedings, Bardine did not move to withdraw her plea under a
specific subdivision of rule 15, but because she filed her motion after sentencing, we review
her motion under subdivision 1.
8
(Minn. 2007). To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be intelligent. Perkins v.
State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). “The intelligence requirement ensures that a
defendant understands the charges against [her], the rights [she] is waiving, and the
consequences of [her] plea.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. 2010). The
defendant bears the burden of showing that their plea was invalid. Id. at 94. Appellate
courts review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion.
Campos v. State, 816 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Minn. 2012). But the validity of a guilty plea is a
question of law that appellate courts review de novo. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. We
review the factual findings in support of a district court’s determination that a plea is valid
for clear error. State v. Brown, 896 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn.
July 18, 2017). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, we are left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State v. Andersen , 784
N.W.2d 320, 334 (Minn. 2010).
Bardine argues that “the post facto addition of a conditional release term that was
never discussed as part of the plea process” made her plea to first-degree DWI test refusal
“unintelligent” and therefore invalid. A district court sentencing a first-degree DWI
conviction must impose a five-year term of conditional release, which begins “after the
person has been released from prison.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.276, subd. 1(d) (2020).
Conditional release “is a period of supervision beyond the minimum term of
imprisonment” and is functionally “identical to supervised release.” Heilman v. Courtney,
926 N.W.2d 387, 394 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted); see Minn. Stat. § 244.05 (2024)
(governing periods of supervised release).
9
To determine whether Bardine’s plea was intelligent, we consider the facts and
procedural history in detail. At the plea hearing in January 2023, the district court
questioned Bardine about the plea agreement, including the penalty for first-degree DWI
test refusal. The district court referred to file 453 and stated , “[T]he maximum penalty is
seven years in prison and $14,000 fine or both. Do you understand that?” Bardine answered
yes. Bardine’s attorney stated that she and Bardine had discussed “what the plea agreement
[was]” and “what the possible consequences are.”
In January 2025, the district court revoked Bardine’s probation for first-degree DWI
test refusal and executed her sentence. In March 2025, the district court conducted a hearing
on the mandatory conditional-release term with Bardine, her attorney, and the prosecuting
attorney present. The district court read aloud a letter it had just received from the
Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) about Bardine’s sentence. The letter stated
that the sentencing record and the warrant of commitment “are silent as to the 5 year
conditional release period required by Minnesota Statutes § 169A.276, subd. 1.” The DOC
requested an amended warrant of commitment providing “that after the individual has been
released from prison, the Commissioner [of corrections] shall place a five-year conditional
release period on the sentence.”
The district court informed the parties that it would amend the warrant of
commitment to include the conditional- release term and asked the parties to “make a
record” of any issues. The district court asked Bardine’s attorney , “Is there anything you
want to say?” Bardine’s attorney replied, “No, I have no issue with that, Your Honor.” The
10
district court amended the warrant of commitment to add, “Conditional release after
confinement has been set at 5 years.”
During postconviction proceedings, Bardine moved to withdraw her guilty plea to
first-degree DWI test refusal, arguing that the plea was “unintelligent,” and therefore
invalid, “because she was not informed of” the mandatory conditional-release term before
entry of her guilty plea.9 The district court denied Bardine’s motion. Relying on statements
by Bardine’s attorney at the plea hearing , the district court found that Bardine “was
informed of the potential consequences of her plea.” The district court also found that,
because Bardine “did not agree to a specific or definitive sentence duration as part of her
plea,” the imposition of the conditional-release term did not render her plea unintelligent.
We affirm the district court’s decision for two reasons. First, we conclude that the
district court did not clearly err during postconviction proceedings when it found that
Bardine was informed of the conditional-release term before she pleaded guilty to
first-degree DWI test refusal. Bardine’s attorney confirmed before Bardine pleaded guilty
that she understood the “possible consequences” of her plea.
Bardine disagrees and contends this case is “wholly indistinguishable” from a
nonprecedential opinion in which this court concluded that an appellant did not have notice
of a conditional-release term before entering a guilty plea. We are unpersuaded and
distinguish the facts in this case from the facts in Smith v. State, No. A15-1740, 2016 WL

9 Bardine also argued that her guilty plea to first-degree DWI test refusal was “involuntary”
because the state violated its promise to abide by the recommendations in the
presentence-investigation report. Bardine does not raise that issue on appeal.
11
3223210, at *1, (Minn. App. June 13, 2016). 10 There, Smith “testified that he never saw
the prosecutor’s plea offer or the sentencing worksheet” and “that no one, including his
attorney, ever informed him of the conditional -release term prior to the
probation-revocation hearing.” Smith, 2016 WL 3223210, at *2. In contrast, this record
includes evidence that Bardine knew the consequences of her guilty plea and has no
evidence that Bardine was unaware of the conditional -release term. In postconviction
proceedings, Bardine merely asserted, without offering any evidence, that she did not know
about the mandatory conditional-release term.
Second, even if we assume that the district court clearly erred and that Bardine was
not informed of the conditional-release term when she entered her plea, we still conclude
that Bardine’s plea was valid. Bardine’s plea agreement included no definite sentencing
terms. This court has held that, when a defendant pleads guilty “under a negotiated plea for
a definite-term sentence” and is not sufficiently notified of a mandatory conditional-release
term, “[d]ue process requires that [the defendant] have the opportunity to withdraw [her]
plea.” Kubrom v. State, 863 N.W.2d 88, 95 (Minn. App. 2015) (emphasis added). But
“when a defendant’s negotiated plea is induced by the dismissal of charges, the opportunity
for probation, or an agreed-upon sentence range,” adding a conditional-release term “does
not violate the plea agreement, even if the defendant was not informed of the possibility of
conditional release before sentencing.” Id. at 93 (emphasis added); see also Oldenburg v.
State, 763 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Minn. App. 2009) (“[F]or the addition of a conditional-release

10 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding but “may be cited as persuasive authority.”
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Smith is not persuasive here for the reasons stated.
12
term to violate a plea agreement, the latter must contain an agreed-upon sentence
length.”).11
Bardine’s plea was made in exchange for the state’s promise to dismiss other
charges and the opportunity to argue for a dispositional departure. It included no agreement
on sentencing terms. We therefore conclude that Bardine’s guilty plea was intelligent and
constitutionally valid. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Bardine’s postconviction motion to withdraw the plea.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Bardine’s probation.

Bardine contends that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her
probation. Appellate courts review a district court’s probation-revocation decision for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). District courts
“must make three findings,” known as the Austin factors, before revoking probation:
“1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the
violation was intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that need for confinement outweighs
the policies favoring probation.” Id. at 250. The supreme court has explained that the

11 Bardine separately argues that the district court violated her due-process rights because
she “received no notice” of the conditional-release term. Failure to accurately inform a
defendant of the consequences of a plea may violate the defendant’s due-process rights.
State v. Wukawitz , 662 N.W.2d 517, 521-22 (Minn. 2003). Our analysis of Bardine’s
due-process argument tracks our analysis of Bardine’s challenge to the validity of her plea.
See, e.g., Kubrom, 863 N.W.2d at 91-95 (analyzing whether the post -plea imposition of a
conditional-release term violated Kubrom’s due-process rights). The district court’s
finding that Bardine’s attorney informed her of the possible consequences of her plea was
not clearly erroneous, and the imposition of a conditional-release term did not violate the
plea agreement, which contained no definite sentencing term. Therefore, Bardine’s
due-process rights were not violated.
13
“purpose of probation is rehabilitation and revocation should be used only as a last resort
when treatment has failed.” Id. The revocation of probation is also governed by statute.
Minn. Stat. § 609.14 (2024). A 2023 amendment to section 609.14 states: “Revocation
shall only be used as a last resort when rehabilitation has failed.” Id., subd. 1(a); see 2023
Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 17, § 32, at 1114.
Here, the district court continued the disposition of Bardine’s admitted probation
violations, in part to determine the outcome of her assessments and alternative programs
after mental-health court was removed as an option. At the continued dispositional hearing,
Bardine’s attorney asked the district court to continue the hearing to determine whether
Bardine could be treated at other facilities. The district court denied the continuance and
revoked probation.
The district court found that Bardine’s “decision to violate [her] probation was
intentional and inexcusable and that the need for confinement outweighs the policies
favoring probation.” The district court also found that the failure to order confinement
would “unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation” because Bardine had refused to
comply with the terms of her probation. The district court reasoned that probation officers
had been unable to supervise Bardine and noted that “their supervision and their attempts
have been extensive and frankly so have mine. I’ve given [Bardine] many many chances
here too and it hasn’t worked.”
Bardine makes two arguments in support of reversing the district court’s revocation
decision. First, Bardine argues that the district court “revoked probation without finding
that rehabilitation had failed.” Bardine cites the 2023 amendment to section 609.14 and
14
argues that the district court erred because it “completely ignored” a “new statutory
requirement” to make findings that “rehabilitation had ‘failed.’” Bardine contends that, “if
a court is going to revoke probation, it must now make an affirmative finding that
‘rehabilitation has failed.’” But this court rejected Bardine’s interpretation of
section 609.14 in State v. Eastman, concluding that the “2023 amendment to Minnesota
Statutes section 609.14, subdivision 1(a), does not create a new or heightened standard that
requires a district court, before it may revoke a defendant’s probation, to make any findings
that rehabilitation has failed additional to or different from those currently required by
existing caselaw.” 29 N.W.3d 741, 753 (Minn. App. 2025), rev. granted (Minn. Feb. 18,
2026).
12
Second, Bardine argues that the district court abused its discretion under the third
Austin factor by concluding that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring
probation. The supreme court has adopted subfactors for the third Austin factor for courts
to consider whether
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity by the offender; or
(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
violation if probation were not revoked.

State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted) (Modtland
subfactors).

12 “[A] precedential opinion of this court is binding authority for this court,” even when the
opinion is pending further review by the supreme court. State v. Chauvin, 955 N.W.2d 684,
694-95 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 10, 2021).
15
Here, the district court found that the third Austin factor favored revocation because
Bardine refused to comply with the terms of probation or “to receive any of the help.” The
district court also relied on the third Modtland subfactor, that failure to revoke probation
would “unduly depreciate the seriousness” of Bardine’s failure to comply with the terms
of her probation.
Bardine argues that the district court’s conclusion is undermined by the three-week
delay between Bardine’s admission to violations and the revocation of her probation,
during which the district court “continued to inquire about the possibility of Bardine getting
into Mental Health Court and ordered additional assessments to facilitate Bardine getting
the help she needed in the community.” Bardine argues that, “if the court viewed the
violation as so severe that [the violation] mandated revocation, then there was no reason to
continue to inquire about Mental Health Court or alternatives to incarceration.”
We are not persuaded. The district court initially determined that mental-health
court was an appropriate condition for staying execution of Bardine’s sentence. But
Bardine’s application to mental-health court was denied in July 2023 and again in
January 2025. Because mental-health court was unavailable and Bardine repeatedly
violated the terms of her probation, the district court acted within its discretion when it
concluded that the third Modtland subfactor favored revocation.
We conclude that the district court’s determination under the third Austin factor is
supported by its findings and the record; therefore, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in revoking Bardine’s probation.
16
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bardine’s motion for
a rule 20.02 evaluation during probation-revocation proceedings.

Bardine contends that the district court “was authorized to order” a rule 20.02
examination and abused its discretion by denying Bardine’s motion based on an “erroneous
and unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of Rule 20.02.” Bardine argues that, in denying
the rule 20.02 examination, the district court “precluded her attorney from raising
significant defenses” to her probation violations, leading to “significant due process
concerns.”
No precedential caselaw establishes the standard of review for the denial of a motion
for a rule 20.02 examination in probation-revocation proceedings. Bardine does not discuss
this issue. But a persuasive nonprecedential opinion states that the applicable standard of
review is abuse of discretion. State v. Martin, No. C2-97-588, 1997 WL 739333, at *1
(Minn. App. Dec. 2, 1997); see State v. Lee, 491 N.W.2d 895, 899-901 (Minn. 1992)
(reviewing the district court’s denial of Lee’s proposed mental-illness defense for abuse of
discretion); State v. Vann, No. A08-1000, 2009 WL 2431978, at *3 (Minn. App. Aug. 11,
2009) (reviewing the district court’s denial of a rule 20.01 competency examination for
abuse of discretion), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2009). Abuse-of-discretion review is
consistent with the rule, which states that the district court “may order the defendant’s
mental examination.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.02, subd. 1 (emphasis added). We therefore
review the district court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.
Rule 20.02, subdivision 1(a), allows the district court to “order the defendant’s
mental examination” when “the defense notifies the prosecutor of its intent to assert a
17
mental illness or cognitive impairment defense pursuant to Rule 9.02, subd. 1(5).” See
Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 855 n.1 (Minn. 2016) (“A Rule 20.02 examination is
used to determine whether a defendant may establish a mental-illness defense.”).13
After Bardin e admitted probation violations in January 2025, the district court
continued the dispositional hearing. At a subsequent dispositional hearing, Bardine’s
attorney moved to “have a rule . . . 20.02 done to see if there are any mental illnesses or
anything at the time of” the probation violations. After the district court denied Bardine’s
continuance request, Bardine’s attorney moved for a rule 20.02 mental-illness-defense
examination. Even though Bardine had already admitted to the probation violations,
Bardine’s attorney argued that “the distress of [Bardine’s] mental illness” and lack of
“proper treatments and medication” led to violations that were “not intentional” and were
“excusable.” Bardine stated that she “struggle[s] with mental health and depression that
results in impulsive decisions that led to [her] current legal status.” The district court
deferred ruling, stating its concern that rule 20.02 did not authorize examinations during
probation-revocation proceedings.
At a continued dispositional hearing, the district court denied Bardine’s motion for
a rule 20.02 examination, stating, “[O]n its face I think that a [rule] 20.02 [examination] is
limited to the affirmative defense at trial.” The district court also observed that Bardine

13 Bardine also does not argue that the district court could order a mental examination under
rule 20.02, subdivision 1(b) or (c), which apply to misdemeanor cases and a defense “at
trial,” respectively.
18
“purposely stayed away and wasn’t reporting” to her treatment program “because she knew
where she was supposed to be.”
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bardine’s motion for a
rule 20.02 mental -illness-defense examination. Rule 20.02, subdivision 1(a), does not
authorize the court to order a mental examination during probation-revocation proceedings.
Instead, the availability of an examination under rule 20.02, subdivision 1(a), is triggered
by a defendant’s notice of their “intent to assert a mental illness or cognitive impairment
defense pursuant to Rule 9.02, subd. 1(5).” Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.02,
subdivision 1(5), in turn, refers to a defendant’s mandatory disclosure of defenses in felony
and gross-misdemeanor cases. In other words, rule 20.02, subdivision 1(a), applies in the
context of an affirmative defense raised during the guilt phase of the state’s felony or
gross-misdemeanor charges against a defendant.
Bardine cites no authority that would allow a district court or this court to extend
the applicability of rule 20.02, subdivision 1(a), to the probation-revocation context, and
we decline to do so. See State v. Fitzpatrick, 690 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn. App. 2004)
(“The extension of existing law is the task of the supreme court or the legislature, not of
this court.”). Because rule 20.02, subdivision 1(a), did not authorize the district court to
grant Bardine’s motion for a mental-illness- defense examination during
probation-revocation proceedings, the district court acted well within its discretion in
denying Bardine’s motion.
Affirmed.