Hennepin County State of Minnesota v. Derrick Lamon Johnson Moore, III, J

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A25-0709
Hennepin County
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Derrick Lamon Johnson,
Appellant.
Moore, III, J.
Filed: September 16, 2026
Office of Appellate Courts
________________________
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Nicholson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.
Andrew C. Wilson, Wilson & Clas, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.
________________________
SYLLABUS
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding hearsay from a
co-defendant’s cellmate under Minn. R. Evid. 804 because the appellant did not establish
the co-defendant was a legally unavailable witness.
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of
Facebook interactions between the victim and a third party under Minn. R. Evid. 403

1
because the evidence’s minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk
of confusing the jury by suggesting that the third party was an alternative perpetrator.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellant’s
motion for a mistrial after a witness referenced a sexual relationship between the
appellant and a minor.
Affirmed.
OPINION
MOORE, III, Justice.
Appellant Derrick Johnson was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder for
the drive-by shooting of Stevi Palacio. Johnson appeals, seeking a new trial on the
grounds that the district court abused its discretion by excluding two pieces of evidence
and by denying his motion for a mistrial. Because the district court did not abuse its
discretion by making these rulings, we affirm.
FACTS
A Hennepin County grand jury indicted Johnson for first-degree premeditated
murder and first-degree intentional murder committed during a drive-by shooting. See
Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1), (3). Johnson pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to a
jury trial.

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The Murder1
During the summer of 2023, Johnson was selling drugs. He kept the money he
earned from sales in his apartment. In mid-July, on the morning after an incident in which
Johnson had overdosed, he noticed that drugs and money were missing from his
apartment. Johnson accused Palacio, one of the people who had been at his apartment that
morning, of stealing from him.
A few days after the overdose, Johnson had D.C. and Tremaine Bucholz over at
his apartment. Johnson asked if D.C., for $10,000, would “get rid of” Palacio and another
person Johnson believed to have been involved with stealing his money and drugs. D.C.
refused, but Bucholz offered to kill them “for free.”
Palacio learned that Johnson believed she stole from him and that Johnson wanted
to kill her. She denied any involvement in the theft. On July 31, Palacio messaged a
friend that she was afraid she would not live through the night because “[t]here [was] a
hood bounty on [her] head.”
The night of August 8, Johnson had Bucholz and several other people over at his
apartment. Johnson and Bucholz left the apartment at one point. Around midnight,
Johnson’s conversion van pulled up alongside Palacio while she was walking down a
sidewalk in north Minneapolis. Someone fired several shots out of the passenger window
at Palacio and killed her. Johnson and Bucholz returned to the apartment about five

1 The evidence in Johnson’s trial was voluminous. We do not summarize it all here
but instead summarize the relevant portions of the record that provide background for the
issues on appeal.

3
minutes after midnight. It takes about three minutes to drive from the scene of the murder
to Johnson’s apartment.
After an investigation into Palacio’s death—including a review of evidence from
the crime scene, surveillance footage from the crime scene and Johnson’s apartment
building, and bullet casings and fingerprints from Johnson’s conversion van—law
enforcement identified Bucholz and Johnson as suspects. Law enforcement arrested
Bucholz. They collected his cell phone and found a text conversation between Bucholz
and a contact saved in his phone as “CEO” several days before Palacio died. Bucholz sent
CEO photos of himself holding a Glock handgun, and CEO responded, “Damn bro youve
[sic] always wanted a 10 mili.” During the investigation into the murder, a firearms
examiner determined that discharged cartridge casings recovered from the crime scene
and Johnson’s van were fired from a 10 mm Glock handgun.
Johnson fled to Texas. While there, Johnson told the person he was staying with
that he was “on the run.” He also admitted to that person that he was driving Bucholz
when Bucholz shot Palacio. Johnson explained that he targeted Palacio because he
believed she played a part in stealing his money and drugs. When local law enforcement
arrested him, Johnson told the arresting officer—unprompted—that Minneapolis police
would be coming to get him and that he would “get life.”
Trial Proceedings
Among the issues litigated in the case, three of the district court’s rulings are
relevant to this appeal: two evidentiary rulings and a motion for mistrial.

4
The first evidentiary issue arose before trial. In a pretrial motion in limine,
Johnson sought to introduce testimony from Bucholz’s cellmate who would purportedly
testify that Bucholz admitted to shooting Palacio while CEO drove the conversion van
and Johnson drove in a different vehicle. Johnson’s counsel expressly stated they were
not introducing this evidence to assert an alternative perpetrator defense. Johnson’s
counsel explained that they could not identify CEO, but because CEO was not Johnson,
this evidence would support the presumption that Johnson was innocent. Johnson’s
counsel argued that the cellmate’s testimony was admissible as a statement against
Bucholz’s interest—a hearsay exception if Bucholz was unavailable as a witness. See
Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
2 Bucholz was in prison after being convicted of first-degree
murder for Palacio’s death, but the time to appeal had not elapsed.3 Johnson’s counsel

2 Under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), a statement against interest is “not
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.” A statement
against interest is:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the
declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the
declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position
would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.
Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Additionally, “[a] statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered in a criminal case is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.” Id.
3 Bucholz was convicted in December 2024 and had 90 days to appeal his
conviction. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 29.03, subd. 3 (“An appeal by a defendant from a final
judgment of conviction of first-degree murder must be filed within 90 days after the final
judgment.”). Johnson’s trial occurred during that period of time, in January 2025.

5
represented that they had tried to contact Bucholz’s trial lawyer about whether Bucholz
would testify, but they did not receive a response. Johnson’s counsel did not subpoena
Bucholz or seek a writ to transport him to court. The district court denied Johnson’s
motion to introduce the cellmate’s testimony as a statement against interest because
Johnson failed to show that Bucholz was unavailable to testify or would be unavailable if
called.
The second evidentiary issue arose during trial. Johnson sought to admit evidence
of Facebook interactions between Palacio and a person with the initials “D.G.” These
interactions included missed calls between the two and a message that D.G. sent Palacio
on August 8 saying, “I want my money today. I’m not playing with you Stevi. Yep. Don’t
answer and when I see you, though, I’m not talking.” Johnson asserted he was not
offering the evidence to present D.G. as an alternative perpetrator—that is, as the
individual responsible for shooting Palacio—but rather for the purpose of casting doubt
on the State’s theory that Johnson had a hood bounty on Palacio. The district court ruled
that evidence of Facebook messages between Palacio and D.G. was inadmissible under
Minn. R. Evid. 403 because any potential probative value was outweighed by the danger
of prejudice and confusing the jury about whether D.G. was an alternative perpetrator.
Lastly, as relevant to this appeal, Johnson moved during trial for a mistrial based
on two statements D.C.—the individual whom Johnson initially asked to “get rid of”
Palacio—made while testifying. Two times, D.C. alluded to a relationship between
Johnson and Bucholz’s 14-year-old sister.

6
During direct examination, the prosecutor asked D.C. what D.C. said when
Bucholz offered to kill Palacio for free. D.C. stated, “I just looked at him, man, like this
kid’s sad, man. He should be putting the gun to the back of his head for sleeping with his
little 14-year-old sister.”
4 Immediately following D.C.’s statement, the district court held
a bench discussion where it offered to instruct the jury to disregard D.C.’s statement, but
Johnson declined. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked D.C. to explain the
nature of the relationship between Bucholz and his sister, who was identified in the
question by her first name rather than as Bucholz’s sibling. D.C. said that she was “the
sister/girlfriend of Derrick Johnson, yeah. 14-year-old girl.”
At the end of D.C.’s testimony, the district court instructed the jury that it heard
testimony about Johnson’s “alleged conduct … on separate occasions,” but that Johnson
was not being tried for anything other than the charged offenses. As such, the district
court instructed the jury that it must not “convict [Johnson] on the basis of any conduct
on a separate occasion” from the charged offense.
5 The jury then left the courtroom, and
Johnson moved for a mistrial based on D.C.’s statements. The district court denied the
motion.

4 D.C. did not explicitly identify who he was referring to with the pronouns in this
statement.
5 The district court emphasized to the jury that this evidence was “being offered for
the limited purpose of assisting you in determining whether the defendant committed
those acts with which the defendant is charged” but was “not to be used to prove the
character of the defendant or that the defendant acted in conformity with such character.
The defendant is not being tried for and may not be convicted of any offenses other than
the charged offenses.”

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Verdict and Sentencing
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Johnson guilty of both counts of first-
degree murder. The district court entered a judgment of conviction on the first count of
first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced Johnson to life in prison without the
possibility of release. Johnson appeals.
ANALYSIS
Johnson raises three issues on appeal. First, he challenges the district court’s
decision to exclude testimony that would place CEO, instead of Johnson, in the driver’s
seat of the conversion van when Palacio was shot. Second, he argues that the district
court legally erred or abused its discretion by excluding evidence of Facebook
interactions between Palacio and a third party, which alluded to a debt Palacio owed the
person. Lastly, he claims the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for
a mistrial when a witness alluded to a sexual relationship between Johnson and a minor.
We address each challenge in turn.
I.
We first address Johnson’s claim that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding testimony from Bucholz’s cellmate as inadmissible hearsay. On appeal,
Johnson now argues the cellmate’s proffered testimony—about Bucholz admitting to
shooting Palacio while CEO, not Johnson, drove the conversion van—was admissible as
alternative perpetrator evidence, and that he should have been able to argue to the jury
that CEO committed the crime because (1) the testimony had an inherent tendency to
connect CEO with Palacio’s murder, and (2) Bucholz was legally unavailable. But as the

8
State highlights, Johnson expressly told the district court that he was not presenting CEO
as an alternative perpetrator. As such, the district court did not make any ruling on
whether Johnson could present an alternative perpetrator defense but rather ruled on the
admissibility of the evidence as Johnson offered it: as a statement against interest under
Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
Issues not presented to and considered by the district court are generally forfeited.
Steward v. State, 950 N.W.2d 750, 756 (Minn. 2020); Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580,
582 (Minn. 1988). But whether Johnson forfeited his alternative perpetrator argument is
ultimately irrelevant because it fails on the merits when considering the district court’s
ruling under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
Evidence offered in support of an alternative perpetrator defense must be
admissible under the rules of evidence. State v. Woodard, 942 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Minn.
2020). We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2009). “A district court abuses its discretion when
its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in
the record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). A criminal defendant
“has the constitutional right to present a complete defense,” which “includes the right to
present evidence showing that an alternative perpetrator committed the crime with which
the defendant is charged.” Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d at 589. Even if a district court abused its
discretion by excluding evidence of an alternative perpetrator, we will affirm the
conviction if the evidentiary decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

9
Here, the district court excluded the cellmate’s testimony about Bucholz’s
admission because it was hearsay that did not meet the exception for statements against
interest. Hearsay “is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn.
R. Evid. 801(c). Generally, hearsay is not admissible unless an exception applies. Minn.
R. Evid. 802. One such exception is for a statement that is against the declarant’s
“pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or
criminal liability, … that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have
made the statement unless believing it to be true.” Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). But “[i]n
order for the statement against penal interest hearsay exception to be applicable, the
quoted witness must be unavailable.” State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 227 (Minn. 1995);
accord Minn. R. Evid. 804(b) (stating that the exceptions to the hearsay rule apply only if
“the declarant is unavailable as a witness”). The rules of evidence define five types of
unavailability, but only one is implicated here, which is that the declarant “is absent from
the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure the
declarant’s … attendance or testimony … by process or other reasonable means.” Minn.
R. Evid. 804(a)(5).
We have not previously defined what “reasonable means” are in the context of
Rule 804(a)(5). Yet in other contexts, we have said that a witness is not unavailable
unless counsel “made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.” State v. Trifiletti,
6 N.W.3d 79, 91 (Minn. 2024) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). To
make a good-faith effort, counsel need not “exhaust every avenue of inquiry, no matter

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how unpromising,” but they must “exhaust some avenues.” Id. at 92 (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). It is undisputed that the cellmate’s testimony about
Bucholz’s alleged statement against his penal interest would be hearsay. The issue is
whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding that hearsay because
Bucholz’s attendance or testimony at trial could not be achieved “by process or other
reasonable means.”
Here, Johnson’s counsel made only one attempt to contact Bucholz’s trial counsel.
When Bucholz’s counsel did not respond, Johnson’s counsel did not follow up. Nor did
Johnson’s counsel attempt to secure Bucholz’s attendance or testimony at trial through a
subpoena or writ. One unanswered attempt to contact Bucholz’s attorney does not
demonstrate that defense counsel exhausted any—much less multiple—avenues for
securing Bucholz’s attendance or testimony at trial. It therefore fails to establish
Bucholz’s unavailability under Rule 804(a)(5).
Johnson’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. He argues that other
means of attempting to secure Bucholz’s testimony—such as contacting Bucholz directly
or compelling his attendance only for Bucholz to refuse to testify—would be unethical
and unpromising. But direct communication with Bucholz was not necessary to secure
his appearance. Johnson’s counsel could have subpoenaed Bucholz or sought a writ for
his transport to trial. And even if it is likely Bucholz would have refused to testify, he
would not have been unavailable on that basis unless he actually refused. See Ford, 539
N.W.2d at 227 (concluding that although “[u]navailability can be established by a witness
deciding to invoke his/her Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination,” a defendant

11
did not establish a witness’s unavailability because the witness “was never asked if he
would testify”). Moreover, there is nothing “categorically prohibiting a defendant from
calling a right-invoking alternative perpetrator to the witness stand.” State v. Foster, 20
N.W.3d 6, 23 (Minn. 2025). Johnson highlights many potential challenges to securing
Bucholz’s testimony, but those challenges do not suggest that Johnson was absolved from
the requirement to “exhaust some avenues” to demonstrate Bucholz’s unavailability. See
Minn. R. Evid. 804(a) (placing the burden on “the proponent of a statement” to show a
witness’s unavailability); see also Miles v. State, 840 N.W.2d 195, 204 (Minn. 2013)
(stating that a petitioner for postconviction relief had the burden to prove a witness’s
unavailability under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding testimony from Bucholz’s cellmate because Bucholz was not an
unavailable witness.
II.
The second issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding
evidence of Facebook interactions between Palacio and D.G.
6 Once again, we review this
evidentiary issue for an abuse of discretion. Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d at 589.

6 Johnson does not directly challenge the district court’s evidentiary ruling but
advocates for a new rule distinguishing between what he describes as specific and general
alternative perpetrator evidence. But here, the district court did not rule on an alternative
perpetrator defense. The district court’s ruling was based on Minn. R. Evid. 403. And
even assuming the evidence was offered to support an alternative perpetrator defense,
such evidence must nonetheless be admissible under the rules of evidence. Woodard,

12
Here, Johnson sought to introduce a series of missed calls and a message that D.G.
sent Palacio on August 8 that said, “I want my money today. I’m not playing with you,
Stevi. Yep. Don’t answer and when I see you, though, I’m not talking.” The district court
excluded this evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 403 because of the danger of prejudice and
confusing the jury.7 The rule states that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. “Evidence
is relevant and has probative value when it, in some degree, advances the inquiry” at
hand. State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2005). Evidence is prejudicial if it
persuades the jury “by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” Id.; see
also State v. Cermak, 365 N.W.2d 243, 247 n.2 (Minn. 1985).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this
evidence as more prejudicial than probative. First, evidence of the Facebook interactions
between Palacio and D.G. has little probative value, and the series of missed calls have
no probative value. The Facebook message suggests that Palacio owed D.G. money hours
before her death. Although this evidence could support an inference that D.G. could have

942 N.W.2d at 142. As such, we review the district court’s ruling under Minn. R. Evid.
403.
7 Johnson claims we should not consider whether the proffered D.G. evidence
satisfies the rules of evidence because “the district court did not reach the question.” This
misstates the record. The district court expressly excluded the evidence under Minn. R.
Evid. 403.

13
had a motive to harm Palacio, the message does not suggest D.G. was present when
Palacio died, was involved with a plan to kill her, or had any role in her death. The fact
that Palacio may have owed D.G. money does little to “advance the inquiry” about who
was involved with killing Palacio. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d at 478. As such, its probative
value in this case was not significant.
Second, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding—
under the specific facts of this case—that this evidence risked confusing the jury about
whether D.G. was being presented as an alternative perpetrator. Cf. Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d
at 593 (concluding that social media images offered by the defendant to prove another
person’s motive were inadmissible because they had “limited probative value” with
respect to motive but had “the potential to mislead and confuse the jury”). At trial, the
defense disclaimed any intent to offer this evidence in order to identify D.G. as an
alternative perpetrator. But evidence suggesting D.G. had a motive to harm Palacio could
confuse the jury about whether the defense was arguing D.G. killed Palacio. And the risk
of confusing the jury is a legitimate concern as to the potential for unfair prejudice. See
id.; see also Doe 136 v. Liebsch, 872 N.W.2d 875, 881 (Minn. 2015) (stating that
evidence which may confuse the jury causes undue prejudice).
Under the specific facts of this case, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of Facebook interactions between D.G. and
Palacio because the district court had reason to do so under Minn. R. Evid. 403. Even if
another district court may have reached a different conclusion regarding the admissibility
of this evidence, that difference does not warrant reversal here. See State v. Bertsch, 707

14
N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006) (noting that we do not reverse on the basis that another
district court may have made a different sentencing decision that was within the district
court’s discretion); see also State v. Diggins, 836 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. 2013) (“We
defer to the court’s evidentiary rulings because the court stands ‘in the best position to
evaluate the prejudicial nature’ of evidence.” (quoting State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776,
783 (Minn. 2006))).
III.
Finally, we consider Johnson’s claim that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for a mistrial based on D.C.’s testimony at trial referring to an alleged
relationship between Johnson and Bucholz’s 14-year-old sister. Specifically, when D.C.
was asked about his reaction to Bucholz offering to kill Palacio for free, D.C. said, “I just
looked at him, man, like this kid’s sad, man. He should be putting the gun to the back of
his head for sleeping with his little 14-year-old sister.” Later, D.C. described a 14-year-
old girl as Bucholz’s “sister/girlfriend of Derrick Johnson.”
A district court may grant a motion for a mistrial “only if there is a reasonable
probability, in light of the entirety of the trial
[8] including the mitigating effects of a

8 Johnson argues that instead of considering the totality of evidence presented at
trial, we should consider only the evidence admitted at the time a defendant moves for a
mistrial. But Johnson cites no legal authority for this statement and acknowledged at oral
argument that he has none. We decline to adopt such an approach, which is contrary to
our well-established precedent. See Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 262 (explaining that we
consider “the entirety of the trial” to determine if a mistrial should have been granted);
State v. Jaros, 932 N.W.2d 466, 474 (Minn. 2019) (stating “we examine the entire record”
when reviewing the denial of a motion for mistrial).

15
curative instruction, that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the
incident resulting in the motion not occurred.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 262
(Minn. 2016).
9 We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion.
Id.; State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 819 (Minn. 2013) (noting that we review for abuse
of discretion because “the district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial
impact, if any, of an event occurring during the trial”).
The State argues that it is not clear whether the jury heard D.C.’s comments or
understood them. We have no basis upon which to conclude the jury did not hear D.C.’s
statements. The statements are clear in the record, and it would be speculative to assume
they were not clear to the jury. But even assuming the jury heard D.C.’s comments and
understood that he was referring to a sexual relationship between Johnson and a minor,
we agree with the State that there is no reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict
would have been different but for the statements.
First, the district court instructed the jury immediately after D.C.’s testimony that
it must not find Johnson guilty based on any uncharged conduct. In other words, the

9 In his briefing, Johnson argued that the factors outlined in State v. Cox govern our
review. 322 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Minn. 1982) (describing the factors to consider for a
mistrial motion under certain circumstances as “the nature and source of the prejudicial
matter, the number of jurors exposed to the influence, the weight of evidence properly
before the jury, and the likelihood that curative measures were effective in reducing the
prejudice”). But at oral argument, Johnson properly conceded the Cox factors do not
control. Indeed, we have limited Cox’s application to prejudicial material outside of the
trial itself; it does not apply to potentially prejudicial witness testimony. See Jaros, 932
N.W.2d at 473 (rejecting the application of the Cox factors to witness testimony).
Accordingly, we do not consider Johnson’s arguments pertaining to the Cox factors and
instead focus our review on whether, considering the entire record, there is a reasonable
probability that D.C.’s testimony affected the verdict.

16
district court instructed the jury that it could not find Johnson guilty of murdering Palacio
based on evidence that he had a sexual relationship with a minor. This instruction
mitigates any potential prejudice because “we presume that the jurors followed the
district court’s instruction.” Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 262.
Second, the State did not elicit the testimony or reference the testimony in its
closing argument. Rather, the State represented, and Johnson does not dispute, that the
State took steps to prevent the testimony from coming in by admonishing D.C. on
multiple occasions not to reference Johnson’s relationship with Bucholz’s sister. The
State did not rely on the testimony at issue to make its case.
Third, and most significantly, there was ample evidence connecting Johnson with
the crime. Among other things, the trial record included evidence of Johnson’s motive for
killing Palacio (his suspicion that she had stolen from him), statements Johnson made
about killing Palacio (asking D.C. to “get rid of” her for $10,000, admitting to a person in
Texas that he drove the van when Bucholz shot Palacio, and acknowledging to police
during his arrest that he knew he would “get life” in prison), and evidence placing
Johnson at the scene of the crime (leaving the apartment with Bucholz before Palacio’s
death and returning minutes later). When considered alongside this evidence of Johnson’s
guilt, D.C.’s two references at trial to Johnson’s relationship with Bucholz’s sister were
isolated incidents. The jury heard six days of witness testimony, and these statements
occupy only a few lines in a trial transcript that spans over 1,900 pages. See State v.
Chavez-Nelson, 882 N.W.2d 579, 590–91 (Minn. 2016) (determining a district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial because the problematic testimony was “one

17
short statement in a lengthy trial that produced over 1,400 pages of transcript,” and “the
State’s overall case against [the defendant] was strong”); Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d at 819
(concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial
because “the disputed reference was isolated and brief: it was uttered only once during
the course of a 4-day trial,” and “the State’s case against [the defendant] was strong”).
Johnson’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. The fact that we have
recognized that evidence of criminal sexual conduct not charged may be prejudicial, as
Johnson highlights, see State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 319 (Minn. 2009), does not
necessarily mean that a reference to such conduct creates the reasonable probability that
the outcome of the trial would have been different but for that reference. Cf. State v.
Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263, 274 (Minn. 2017) (concluding there was no reasonable
possibility that the admission of evidence that a defendant sexually abused a child
affected the jury’s verdict). For the reasons already stated, on this record, there is no
reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict would have been different but for D.C.’s two
statements. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Johnson’s motion for mistrial.
10
In sum, Johnson has failed to demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of his trial would have been different but for D.C.’s two references to Johnson’s

10 Johnson also argues that D.C.’s comments appeared to have been prompted by a
desire to prejudice Johnson. Even if that is true, D.C.’s subjective desire to prejudice
Johnson does not mean that his two comments did prejudice Johnson, particularly in light
of the court’s instruction to the jury that it must only convict Johnson based on the
charged conduct and the ample evidence of Johnson’s guilt for the charged offenses.

18
relationship with Bucholz’s sister. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Johnson’s motion for a mistrial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.