State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0710

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nathan Luhring,
Appellant.

Filed December 15, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-08-3255

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Jonathan M. Janssen, Assistant
County Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Zachary S. Webster, Jacob M. Birkholz, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his petition under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.165 (2024) to restore his firearms rights, arguing that the district court erred in
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concluding that his misdemeanor conviction does not fall within the scope of that statute.
We affirm.
FACTS
In 2008, appellant Nathan Luhring was charged with gross misdemeanor malicious
punishment of a child, misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and misdemeanor domestic
assault. He pleaded guilty to the first two charged offenses in exchange for the state’s
agreement to dismiss the domestic-assault charge. The district court convicted him of
disorderly conduct and stayed adjudication of the malicious-punishment charge. Luhring
was discharged from probation in 2010, at which time the malicious-punishment charge
was dismissed.
In April 2024, Luhring petitioned the district court under Minn. Stat. § 609.165,
subd. 1d, to restore his firearm rights. He averred that he is prohibited from possessing and
otherwise dealing with firearms pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2018) (“misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence”), and Minn. Stat. § 624.713 , subd. 10(vii) (2024), which
incorporates the federal law, but that there is good cause to restore his firearm rights. The
district court denied the motion, reasoning that Luhring’s misdemeanor conviction is not a
conviction of a “crime of violence” within the scope of Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d,
and therefore that statute “does not provide a remedy for him to restore his firearm rights.”
Luhring moved for amended findings, which the district court denied.
Luhring appeals.

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DECISION
The question whether Luhring may petition for restoration of his firearm rights
under Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d, turns on interpretation of that statute. Statutory
interpretation presents a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Letourneau,
23 N.W.3d 386, 391 (Minn. 2025).
When interpreting a statute, our goal is to discern and effectuate the legislature’ s
intent. State v. Abdus -Salam, 1 N.W.3d 871, 876 (Minn. 2024); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16 (2024). We first determine whether the statute’s language is ambiguous, meaning
that it has more than one reasonable interpretation. State v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623,
625 (Minn. 2018). In doing so, we read the statute “as a whole” and consider its “text and
textual context.” Letourneau, 23 N.W.3d at 391 (quotation omitted). We construe
statutory words and phrases “according to . . . their common and approved usage,” unless
they are “technical words and phrases” that “have acquired a special meaning,” in which
case we use that special meaning. Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2024). If the whole statute is
unambiguous, we simply apply its plain meaning. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d at 625.
The provision at issue states:
A person prohibited by state law from shipping, transporting,
possessing, or receiving a firearm or ammunition because of a
conviction or a delinquency adjudication for committing a
crime of violence may petition a court to restore the person’s
ability to possess, receive, ship, or transport firearms and
otherwise deal with firearms and ammunition.

Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d (emphasis added). The phrase “crime of violence” is the
focus of this appeal.
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No definition of that phrase appears in subdivision 1d. The same phrase appears in
two other subdivisions of the statute, followed in each instance by the words “as defined
in” Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2024). Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subds. 1a, 1b(a). The
referenced definition encompasses only felony offenses and, therefore, does not encompass
Luhring’s misdemeanor conviction. 1 See Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5. The parties
dispute whether that definition applies to the phrase “crime of violence” in subdivision 1d.
Luhring urges us to conclude that it does not. He asserts that applying that definition
in subdivision 1d improperly adds words to that subdivision. And he contends it negates
the reference to Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5, in those other subdivisions because, without
it, that statute’s definition of “crime of violence” would not apply. See Minn. Stat.
§ 624.712, subd. 1 (2024) (stating that “this section” defines terms for Minn. Stat.
§§ 624.711-.717 (2024)).
We readily agree that it is not our role to add to or subtract from a statute. State v.
Jorgenson, 946 N.W.2d 596, 607 (Minn. 2020). And we agree — consistent with that
principle— that when the legislature uses modifying language in one part of a statute but
not in another, we generally treat that omission as an indication that the legislature did not
intend the modification to apply to parts of the statute where it was not used. See i d.
(stating “a condition expressly mentioned in one clause of a subdivision provides evidence
that the Legislature did not intend for the condition to apply to other clauses in which the
condition is not stated” (quotation omitted)). But not always. Effectuating a whole statute

1 We observe that it also does not encompass Luhring’s other two charged offenses—gross
misdemeanor malicious punishment of a child and misdemeanor domestic assault.
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means “harmoniz[ing]” its various parts and accounting for “statutory context.” State v.
Johnson, 995 N.W.2d 155, 160 (Minn. 2023); see also State v. Vagle, 24 N.W.3d 481, 490
(Minn. 2025) (warning against reading a statutory phrase “in isolation rather than in
context”). Sometimes, context shows that the only way to harmonize all parts of a statute
is to apply a modification throughout, even when not expressly stated. See Vagle, 24
N.W.3d at 490 (concluding that the definition of “serial number or other identification” in
two subparts of Minn. Stat. § 609.667 (2024) with reference to federal firearm law does
not, when viewed in context, preclude applying that same definition to “identified by a
serial number” in the statute’s third subpart).
That is the case here. When a person is convicted of a felony, they lose their civil
rights. Schroeder v. Simon, 985 N.W.2d 529, 536 (Minn. 2023) (citing Minn. Const. art.
VII, § 1); see also State v. Craig, 826 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 2013) (recognizing that
felons are traditionally prohibited from possessing firearms). The provision at issue is part
of the statute that restores these rights (including firearm rights) when a person’s criminal
conviction is discharged.
Subdivision 1. Restoration. When a person has been
deprived of civil rights by reason of conviction of a crime and
is thereafter discharged, such discharge shall restore the person
to all civil rights and to full citizenship, . . . the same as if such
conviction had not taken place, and the order of discharge shall
so provide.

Subd. 1a. Certain convicted felons ineligible to
possess firearms or ammunition. The order of discharge
must provide that a person who has been convicted of a crime
of violence, as defined in section 624.712, subdivision 5, is not
entitled to ship, transport, possess, or receive a firearm or
ammunition for the remainder of the person ’s lifetime. Any
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person who has received such a discharge or . . . whose ability
to possess firearms and ammunition has been restored under
subdivision 1d, shall not be subject to the restrictions of this
subdivision.

Subd. 1b. Violation and penalty. (a) Any person who
has been convicted of a crime of violence, as defined in
section 624.712, subdivision 5, and who ships, transports,
possesses, or receives a firearm or ammunition, commits a
felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more
than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000,
or both.
. . . .
(c) The criminal penalty in paragraph (a) does not apply
to any person . . . whose ability to possess firearms and
ammunition has been restored under subdivision 1d.

Subd. 1c. [Repealed, 1999 c 61 s 2]

Subd. 1d. Judicial restoration of ability to possess
firearms and ammunition by felon. A person prohibited by
state law from shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving
a firearm or ammunition because of a conviction or a
delinquency adjudication for committing a crime of violence
may petition a court to restore the person’s ability to possess,
receive, ship, or transport firearms and otherwise deal with
firearms and ammunition.
The court may grant the relief sought if the person
shows good cause to do so and the person has been released
from physical confinement.
If a petition is denied, the person may not file another
petition until three years have elapsed without the permission
of the court.

Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subds. 1-1d.
These first four subdivisions—tellingly grouped as 1, 1a, 1b, and 1d—form a
coherent multifaceted process for restoring a person’s rights upon discharge from a felony
criminal conviction. The first subdivision provides that a person convicted of a felony must
have all civil rights restored upon discharge from the conviction . Id., subd. 1; see
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Schroeder, 985 N.W.2d at 546 (describing Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1, as addressing
restoration of rights “to persons convicted of a felony”). The next subdivision creates an
exception to this general rule, stating that such a discharge does not restore firearm rights
to persons convicted of a felony “crime of violence, as defined in section 624.712,
subdivision 5”—unless their “ability to possess firearms and ammunition has been restored
under subdivision 1d.” Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1a (emphasis added). 2 The third
subdivision makes it a crime for felons described in subdivision 1a to ship, transport,
possess, or receive a firearm or ammunition. Id., subd. 1b. And the fourth subdivision—
expressly referenced in subd. 1a—creates a discretionary mechanism for a court to restore
firearm rights to a person convicted of a “crime of violence.” Id., subd. 1d. This clear
structure persuades us that the same definition of “crime of violence” must apply
throughout for the whole statute to make sense and work harmoniously.
This conclusion finds further support in the broader statutory context, which reveals
that the legislature generally uses “crime of violence” as a technical term with a consistent
specialized meaning. When deciding whether a statutory phrase has a technical meaning,
we consider “the context in which the phrase appears” because we assume that the
legislature acts with full knowledge of statutes on “the same subject.” State v. Bradley, 4
N.W.3d 105, 112 (Minn. 2024). The context of Minn. Stat. § 609.165 includes the
numerous other statutes that use the phrase “crime of violence.”

2 We note that the juvenile rights-restoration statute, Minn. Stat. § 242.31, subd. 2a (2024),
says essentially the same thing; it also links the definition of “crime of violence” in Minn.
Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5, and restoration of firearm rights under Minn. Stat. § 609.165,
subd. 1d.
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Commonly, the legislature defines that phrase with a reference to Minn. Stat.
§ 624.712, subd. 5. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.171, subd. 2a (2024) (defining “crime of
violence” per Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5); Minn. Stat. § 299C.37, subd. 1(a) (2024)
(same). Or it uses a subset of that list of felonies. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.171, subd. 9(3)
(2024) (defining “crime of violence” per Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5, excepting offenses
under chapter 152); Minn. Stat. § 504B.171, subd. 2a (same). Even in the rare instance in
which the legislature defines “crime of violence” more expansively, it does so by adding
to that list. See Minn. Stat. § 299F.72, subd. 1b (2024) (defining “crime of violence” per
Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5, plus certain domestic-assault convictions); Minn. Stat.
§ 609.668, subd. 1(c) (2024) (same). This shows that when the legislature intends the
phrase to sweep in a non-felony, it will say so. Overall, we discern that the legislature uses
“crime of violence” as a technical phrase with a special meaning that encompasses only
violent felonies unless specified otherwise.
In sum, the phrase “crime of violence” in Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d, when
viewed in the context of the whole statute and other statutes that use the same phrase, is
susceptible of only one reasonable interpretation—that it means the list of felonies assigned
to that phrase in Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5. Because that definition does not include
Luhring’s misdemeanor conviction, the district court did not err by denying his petition to
restore his firearm rights.
Affirmed.