A25-0720 Nonprecedential Reversed and remanded Processed

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed February 17, 2026

The holding in the court’s own words

Accordingly, we conclude that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Terrill had three qualified prior impaired driving incidents within the preceding ten years.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0720

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Zachary Ray Terrill,
Appellant.

Filed February 17, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Schmidt, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-24-3005

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Daniel P. Repka, Repka Law, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
A driving-while-impaired (DWI) charge may be enhanced to a first-degree offense
when a driver “commits the violation within ten years of the first of three or more qualified
prior impaired driving incidents.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1) (2024). Appellant
Zachary Ray Terrill argues that the district court erred in convicting him of the enhanced
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first-degree DWI offense because respondent State of Minnesota failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove that he had three qualified driving incidents in the ten years preceding
the underlying offense. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
In December 2024, a law-enforcement officer stopped Terrill’s vehicle and arrested
him on suspicion of DWI. Terrill’s breath test revealed that his alcohol concentration of
0.15 exceeded the legal limit. The state charged Terrill with first-degree DWI based on
three alleged qualified prior impaired driving incidents on his driving record:
(1) a fourth-degree DWI conviction (October 2020);

(2) a third-degree DWI conviction (September 2021); and

(3) the revocation of his license under the implied-consent
law based on a second-degree DWI charge (October 2024).

After the state charged Terrill with first-degree DWI, he filed a petition for judicial review
of the October 2024 license revocation.
The district court presided over a stipulated-evidence trial on Terrill’s first-degree
DWI charge. The district court concluded that Terrill “had three or more qualified prior
impaired driving incidents within ten years”—one being his October 2024 license
revocation—and found him guilty of first-degree DWI. At the time the court found Terrill
guilty, his October 2024 license revocation had not been judicially reviewed.
Terrill appeals.
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DECISION
Terrill argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he had three qualified prior impaired driving incidents within the
preceding ten years. He contends that his October 2024 implied-consent license revocation
is not a qualified prior impaired driving incident because it had not been judicially reviewed
when he was found guilty of first-degree DWI.1 We agree.
The question of whether Terrill’s license revocation is a qualified prior impaired
driving incident is a legal question, which we review de novo. State v. Anderson,
941 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn. 2020). A “[q]ualified prior impaired driving incident” is
defined as “includ[ing] prior impaired driving convictions and prior impaired
driving-related losses of license.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 22 (2024). “Prior impaired
driving-related loss of license” includes a license revocation under the implied-consent law
(Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.50-.53 (2024)), but only when “judicial review has already occurred
or been waived.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 21(a)(1) (2024); State v. Wiltgen,
737 N.W.2d 561, 571 (Minn. 2007) (holding that an implied-consent license revocation
that has not been judicially reviewed cannot be used to enhance a DWI offense).
The district court found that Terrill had three prior impaired driving incidents that
qualified to enhance his current offense to a first-degree DWI. The third qualified incident
that the district court relied upon was the October 2024 revocation of Terrill’s license under
the implied-consent law. But Terrill filed a petition for judicial review of the revocation,

1 The state filed a letter in this appeal, but no brief. When a “respondent fails or neglects
to serve and file [a] brief,” we decide the case on the merits. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
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which was still pending at the time the district court enhanced Terrill’s offense in this case.
Because a court had not ruled on Terrill’s petition for judicial review, the district court
erred in relying on the October 2024 revocation as a qualified prior impaired driving
incident. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d at 570-71. This leaves only two qualified prior impaired
driving incidents, which Terrill does not challenge on appeal.
Accordingly, we conclude that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Terrill had three qualified prior impaired driving incidents
within the preceding ten years. Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1). We, therefore, reverse
Terrill’s conviction for first-degree DWI and remand for the district court to adjudicate him
guilty of second-degree DWI and to resentence him accordingly. See Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.25, subd. 1(a) (2024) (“A person who violates section 169A.20, subdivision 1
(driving while impaired crime), is guilty of second-degree driving while impaired if two or
more aggravating factors were present when the violation was committed.”). See also
Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 12(c) (“If the appellate court . . . reverses the judgment, it
must direct: . . . (c) reduction of the conviction to a lesser included offense or to an offense
of lesser degree, as the case may require. If the [appellate] court directs a reduction of the
conviction, it must remand for resentencing.”).
Reversed and remanded.