State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0724

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Charles Valiant Kpaan, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed April 20, 2026
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-24-5023

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicholas G. Kimball, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Susanne R. Gad, Sarah R. Gad, Gad & Gad Law Offices LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Segal ,
Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this appeal from the final judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a
machine gun conversion kit, appellant argues that he must be permitted to withdraw his
guilty plea because it was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. He also argues that the
state’s amendment of the complaint prior to his guilty plea amounts to vindictive
prosecution. Because the record shows that appellant’s plea was knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently entered, and because a guilty plea operates as a waiver of all
non-jurisdictional defects that arose before the plea, we affirm.
FACTS
In March 2024, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Charles Valiant
Kpaan Jr. with two counts: (1) unlawful possession of a machine gun, machine gun trigger
activator, or a machine gun conversion kit, in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 609.67, subdivision 2(a) (2022); and (2) carrying a pistol in a public place without
a permit, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 624.714, subdivision 1a (2022). The
probable-cause statement of the complaint alleged the following facts. Kpaan was the
passenger in a vehicle involved in a traffic stop. Officers searched the vehicle and located
a handgun with an extended magazine. The handgun also had a switch on it that would
make the handgun fire automatically, “meaning multiple shots with a single pull of the
trigger.” Officers located the gun between the front passenger seat and the door of the
vehicle. The complaint further stated that, upon searching Kpaan incident to his arrest,
officers located a baggie of parts to a machine gun switch in Kpaan’s jeans.
3
In June 2024, the state charged Kpaan in another court file with possession of a
machine gun, second-degree assault, and second-degree riot. The state proposed a global
resolution of both the March file (this case) and the June file in which Kpaan would plead
guilty to one of the charges in the March file and either second-degree assault or
second-degree riot in the June file. In exchange, the state would agree to a 58- month
sentence and dismiss all remaining charges. Kpaan rejected the state’s proposals for a
global settlement, not wanting to plead guilty to any charges in the June file.
A jury trial was scheduled for December 9, 2024, in this case. On December 10, in
a motion in limine, Kpaan “move[d] to exclude any evidence or testimony regarding the
alleged ‘baggie with switch parts’ purportedly falling out of Mr. Kpaan’s pocket during
booking at the Hennepin County Jail.” That same day, the state filed an amended
complaint, replacing the single count of unlawful possession of a machine gun, machine
gun trigger activator, or machine gun conversion kit under section 609.67, subdivision 2(a),
with two counts of that same offense—one for unlawful possession of a machine gun and
one for unlawful possession of a machine gun conversion kit. As a result, the amended
complaint included three counts. The probable-cause statement remained unchanged.
Kpaan moved to strike the amendment to the complaint, asserting that instead of
addressing the attorney’s “legitimate concerns” raised by the motion in limine about the
alleged baggie with switch parts, the “[s]tate responded by email stating, ‘If you are saying
[that the state needs] to add an additional count for it to be admissible, then consider that
done.’” Kpaan maintained that the amend ment to add a second count of unlawful
possession of a machine gun, machine gun trigger activator, or machine gun conversion kit
4
under section 609.67, subdivision 2(a), “highlight[ed] a troubling instance of prosecutorial
vindictiveness.”
The jury trial was continued until January 27, 2025. On the morning of January 28,
before the start of trial , Kpaan’s attorney received a new plea offer from the state. The
state offered for Kpaan to plead guilty to one of the two counts of unlawful possession of
a machine gun, machine gun trigger activator, or machine gun conversion kit under section
609.67, subdivision 2(a), in exchange for a 68-month guidelines sentence and dismissal of
the other two counts in this case. In addition, the state would dismiss the above-mentioned
June file.1 Kpaan met with his attorney at the jail to discuss the offer. The meeting was a
no-contact visit because the attorney’s privileges had been revoked due to allegations of
improper conduct.
Later that same day, Kpaan agreed to the terms of the most recent plea offer and
pleaded guilty to Count II of the amended complaint as contemplated by the agreement.
Kpaan waived all his jury-trial rights on the record in a colloquy with his attorney. Kpaan
also acknowledged that he met with his attorney a number of times leading up to the
hearing. At the end of the plea colloquy, in response to questions from the district court,
Kpaan acknowledged that he went over the plea petition line by line with his lawyer.
Defense counsel then stated, “They wouldn’t let us have a contact visit, so it’s going to be
difficult.” In response to this comment by defense counsel, the district court gave Kpaan

1 The state also requested that Kpaan admit to a probation violation in a case not related to
either the March or June 2024 case files. The 48-month sentence in the probation-violation
file would be executed and run concurrently to the 68-month sentence in this case.
5
time to look at the plea petition again with his attorney. After he did so, he signed the
petition. The district court then asked Kpaan if anyone put pressure on him to plead guilty
and he responded “No.” Kpaan also stated that his decision to plead guilty was made of
his own free will, that he understood “everything that’s going on,” and that he did not need
any more time to discuss his plea or the consequences that might flow from his plea with
his attorney. Based on his testimony at the plea hearing, the district court found that Kpaan
made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his trial rights, and deferred accepting
the guilty plea until the sentencing hearing, which was scheduled for the following week.2
At sentencing a week later , Kpaan’s attorney orally moved to vacate the plea
agreement and asked for additional time to discuss the state’s latest plea offer with Kpaan.
She stated that she was “very concerned that [Kpaan’s plea] was not an informed plea,”
because her meeting with him prior to the plea hearing was a no-contact meeting. The
attorney also asserted that she and Kpaan “really couldn’t hear each other” when they met
due to the nature of the no-contact visit. She also claimed that she did not have an
opportunity to go through the plea petition with him “line by line” when they met. And
she stated that she was not aware that Kpaan was confused until after the plea hearing. The
district court clarified with defense counsel whether she was able to speak with Kpaan in
the week between the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing to answer his questions. She
responded, “I’ve spoken to him this week about it.”

2 As contemplated by the plea agreement, Kpaan also waived his right to a
probation-violation hearing and admitted that he violated probation by failing to remain
law abiding. The district court imposed the agreed to 48-month guideline sentence.
6
The district court declined to set another plea hearing as requested by counsel and
instead told counsel that it would set the case back on the trial calendar. In response, Kpaan
personally indicated multiple times that he wanted to move forward with the plea
agreement. Given the concerns of confusion raised by counsel, the district court decided
to “do over” the plea hearing, stating “[W]e’re going to rewind this whole thing. We’re
just going to do it twice, just to make sure Mr. Kpaan is good to go.” The district court
also told Kpaan: “[T]his is all about you. You don’t have to do anything you don’t want
to do. . . . I want to make sure that we do this exactly right.”
The district court then gave Kpaan an opportunity to review the plea petition again.
Kpaan reviewed the plea petition and decided to proceed with the plea agreement. Kpaan
then pleaded guilty to Count II—felony possession of a machine gun trigger activator or
conversion kit—for a second time. After he entered his plea, he engaged in a plea colloquy
with his counsel. In response to detailed questions by his attorney, he waived all his rights
as required by rule 15.01 again. He also signed the plea petition again. And Kpaan
acknowledged that he understood the presumptive sentence and his criminal-history score.
The district court again found that Kpaan made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of his trial rights, accepted Kpaan’s plea, and found him guilty of Count II. The
district court imposed the agreed-to 68- month sentence and dismissed the remaining
charges.
This appeal follows.
7
DECISION
Kpaan seeks reversal of his conviction of one count of unlawful possession of a
machine gun conversion kit, arguing that his plea is constitutionally invalid. He also
requests that this court order that Count II of his complaint be stricken on the basis that the
amended complaint is the “product of prosecutorial vindictiveness.” We address each
argument in turn.
I. Kpaan’s guilty plea is constitutionally valid.
Kpaan argues the district court erred by not allowing him to vacate his plea. “A
defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” State v. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But the district court must allow a defendant to withdraw
a guilty plea, “[if] withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 94. “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary,
and intelligent.” Id. (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)).
The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. The
burden is on the appellant to show that his plea is invalid. Id. Kpaan argues that his guilty
plea is not constitutionally valid because the plea was not intelligent or voluntary. He does
not challenge the accuracy of the plea. We conclude that Kpaan has not met his burden to
show that his plea is constitutionally invalid.
8
Kpaan’s Plea was Intelligent
“The intelligence requirement ensures that a defendant understands the charges
against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” Id. at 96.
“‘Consequences’ refers to a plea’s direct consequences, namely the maximum sentence and
fine.” Id. Kpaan argues that his plea was unintelligent because he “was categorically
denied confidential access to counsel for weeks at the most critical stage of his case.” He
asserts that the lack of access to counsel prevented him from discussing the consequences
of the guilty plea, including reviewing two competing offers from the state. After carefully
reviewing the record, we do not consider Kpaan’s argument persuasive.
The record demonstrates that Kpaan consulted with his attorney, had an opportunity
to ask questions, and understood the rights he was waiving and the consequences of his
plea—both when he initially entered his plea and when he re- entered his plea for a second
time at the sentencing hearing.
At the initial plea hearing, Kpaan acknowledged that he had met with his attorney
multiple times to discuss his rights, waived all his jury-trial rights as required by Minnesota
Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.01, and had reviewed the plea petition with his attorney .
During the plea hearing, his attorney went over the plea petition in detail with Kpaan and
the rights he was waiving. Kpaan did not have any questions about the rights he was giving
up and understood that the contemplated sentence was 68 months’ imprisonment. And
Kpaan understood the charge against him, specifically noting that he was pleading guilty
to Count II of the amended complaint—possession of the machine gun trigger parts or
conversion kit—consistent with the plea petition.
9
Toward the end of the plea colloquy, the district court asked Kpaan if he had gone
over the plea petition “line by line” with his attorney. Kpaan acknowledged that he had
done so. His attorney then told the district court that she was not permitted to have a
“contact visit” with Kpaan on the morning of the plea hearing. But, at the plea hearing, the
attorney did not express any specific concerns about the visit, such as a lack of privacy,
difficulty hearing, or an inability to answer Kpaan’s questions. And, after defense
counsel’s statement about the no-contact visit with Kpaan, the district court asked Kpaan
if he wanted to review the plea petition again. Kpaan availed himself of the opportunity.
After reviewing the petition again, he signed the petition and stated that he was doing so
of his own free will. Neither Kpaan nor his attorney asked for additional time to consider
the plea or to withdraw the plea at the initial plea hearing.
On appeal, Kpaan argues that his initial guilty plea was not intelligent because : he
had limited time to discuss the plea offer with his attorney prior to the plea hearing, there
was “heavy background noise” when they had their no-contact meeting, and he “could not
privately address questions.” The record on appeal does not support these assertions. And
even assuming the factual record supported these claims, any concerns about the
intelligence of the initial plea were resolved at the sentencing hearing when the district
court allowed Kpaan to fully reenter his guilty plea.
10
At the sentencing hearing, Kpaan confirmed multiple times on the record that he did
not want a jury trial and wanted to move forward with the plea. The parties also discussed
the details of the plea agreement on the record again. The district court then explained:
Okay. So we’re going to rewind this whole thing.
We’re just going to do it twice, just to make sure Mr. Kpaan is
good to go.
Because again, Mr. Kpaan, this is all about you. You
don’t have to do anything you don’t want to do. And in fact, I
do not want you to do anything that you’re not prepared to do
or that you do not want to do. I want to make sure that we do
this exactly right, by the book, and you know exactly what it is
you’re getting yourself into. Because there are consequences
for this. All right?

Kpaan then reviewed the plea petition one more time and confirmed that he wanted
to proceed with the plea agreement . He also waived all of his jury-trial rights as required
by rule 15.01 and signed the plea petition again. And, in response to questions by the state,
Kpaan acknowledged that he understood the presumptive sentence and his criminal-history
score. He also asked questions about how he could have three criminal-history points if he
was only convicted of two crimes, and acknowledged that he understood that one point was
assigned for being charged with a crime while on probation.
The district court then confirmed an additional time whether Kpaan “need[ed] any
more time to speak to [his attorney] or any other lawyer about the case,” “need[ed] any
more time to talk to friends, family, pastors, anybody about the case,” and if he had “any
questions for [the district court] about the rights that [he is] giving up today.” Kpaan
responded “No” to all three questions. The district court also asked Kpaan if he
11
“underst[ood] everything,” to which he responded “Yes.” In short, the record from the
sentencing hearing confirms that Kpaan’s plea was intelligent.
We are not persuaded otherwise by his argument that his plea was unintelligent
because he “was categorically denied confidential access to counsel for weeks at the most
critical stage of his case.” A t the sentencing hearing, the district court asked Kpaan’s
attorney whether she had spoken to Kpaan about his questions in the week between the
plea and sentencing hearings. Defense counsel stated, “I’ve spoken to him this week about
it.” And Kpaan acknowledged at the sentencing hearing that “we have met numerous times
and discussed this case extensively.”
Ultimately, the record shows that Kpaan understood the charges against him, the
rights he was waiving, and the consequences of his guilty plea. We therefore cannot
conclude that Kpaan has shown his plea was not intelligent.
Kpaan’s Plea was Voluntary
The record also refutes Kpaan’s argument that his plea was not voluntary. The
requirement that a plea be voluntary “ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to
improper pressure or coercion.” Id. A reviewing court considers all relevant circumstances
and “examines what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea
agreement.” Id. “A guilty plea is involuntary when it rests in any significant degree on an
unfulfilled or unfulfillable promise.” Uselman v. State, 831 N.W.2d 690, 693 (Minn.
App. 2013) (quotation omitted). And the state may not secure a guilty plea “through actual
or threate ned physical harm or by mental coercion [that] ‘overbear[s] the will of the
12
defendant.’” State v. Abdisalan, 661 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn. App. 2003) (quoting
State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 719 (Minn. 1994)), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 2003).
Kpaan argues that his plea is not voluntary because it was coerced in two ways.
First, he contends that the state leveraged improper pressure by extending a new plea offer
the morning of trial and imposing an immediate deadline on that offer. He maintains that
under these circumstances and without private consultation, he was “forced to decide—
plead guilty or face imminent jury selection, entirely cut off from private consultation with
his lawyer.” Second, Kpaan argues that the district court pressured him to plead guilty by
inserting itself into the plea negotiations. These arguments are unavailing.
Argument Regarding Coercion by the State
The record does not support Kpaan’s argument that his plea was coerced by the
state. The record does reflect that the state extended a new plea offer shortly before trial
was scheduled to begin, which Kpaan accepted. But the record also demonstrates that the
parties had been engag ing in plea negotiations for approximately six months. The state
initially sought guilty pleas to one count in each of the two cases (this case and the June
court file) in exchange for a 58-month sentence. When Kpaan refused, the state offered a
guilty plea to one count in this case, to dismiss the other case, and to recommend a
68-month sentence. And during the plea colloquy at the sentencing hearing, Kpaan
acknowledged that he and his attorney had “met numerous times and discussed this case
extensively.” The district court also asked Kpaan if he had enough time to talk to his
attorney “about all” of his cases, asked him twice if he needed more time to speak with his
attorney or anyone else, and asked him if he had any questions about the rights he was
13
giving up. The district court also asked, at both the plea hearing and sentencing hearing,
“[D]id anybody make you, force you, or put pressure on you to plead guilty . . . today?”
Each time, Kpaan answered “no” and agreed to move forward with the plea. On this record,
we cannot conclude that Kpaan’s plea was coerced by the state.
We acknowledge that Kpaan did not have much time to consider the plea because it
was made shortly before trial was scheduled to begin, but Kpaan does not present any
authority requiring the state to keep a plea offer open for a certain amount of time.
Additionally, he does not provide us with any authority to support his argument that his
plea was somehow involuntary because he and his attorney had a no-contact meeting to
discuss the plea offer that he accepted . The two cases that Kpaan primarily relies on to
support his argument are distinguishable. Both cases involve claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. In Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80,
91 (1976), the Supreme Court held that “an order preventing petitioner from consulting his
counsel ‘about anything’ during a 17-hour overnight recess between his direct- and cross-
examination impinged upon his right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.” Similarly, in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-66 (1984), the
Supreme Court concluded that the surrounding circumstances, including the amount of
time counsel had to prepare for trial, the character of a particular lawyer’s experience, the
gravity of the charge, the complexity of the case, and the accessibility of witnesses, did
“not demonstrate that counsel failed to function in any meaningful sense as the
Government’s adversary.” 466 U.S. at 666.
14
Here, unlike in Geders and Cronic, Kpaan does not raise a claim that his Sixth
Amendment rights were violated or argue that he received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. Instead, he challenges the validity of his guilty plea. Our review of that claim is
focused on whether, when looking at the record made at the time the plea was entered,
Kpaan’s plea was voluntary. And, as discussed above, the record does not support Kpaan’s
assertion that he was “categorically denied confidential access to counsel for weeks at the
most critical stage of his case.” We therefore reject this argument.
Argument Regarding District Court
The record also refutes Kpaan’s argument that his plea was not voluntary because
the district court improperly inserted itself into the plea bargaining. A district court “must
not participate in plea negotiations.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.04, subd. 3(1); Wheeler v. State,
909 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn. 2018). This principle “is not solely a prohibition on judicial
plea offers, promises, or threats. It also prohibits unsolicited judicial comments regarding
the propriety of the parties’ competing settlement offers.” Wheeler, 909 N.W.2d at 560.
Judicial participation includes “generat[ing] and propos[ing] a plea deal not presented by
the parties.” Id. at 567. However, “a judge does not participate in the plea bargaining
negotiation by merely inquiring into the status of the parties’ plea negotiations, sharing
general sentencing practices, or disclosing nonbinding plea and sentencing information at
the joint request of the parties.” Id. at 560. Whether the district court impermissibly
intervened in plea negotiations is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Id.
at 567.
15
Kpaan asserts that the district court improperly participated in plea bargaining
during the following exchange:
THE COURT: Okay. But you can’t say I don’t want a trial
and I don’t want to do anything else, right? If you don’t want
a trial, then it sounds like you want to plead, right? There
aren’t any other options at this point.

DEFENDANT: All she was saying was asking for time so she
can go over—because there were two offers, just to go over.

THE COURT: Okay. But there’s one offer right now, it
sounds like. And that’s the offer we talked about, and now
she’s had a week to talk to you about it.

DEFENDANT: But that’s why I’m saying, yes, we can move
forward. I’m comfortable moving forward.

Later, the district court clarified that there was only one offer for consideration at
the time of the sentencing hearing, during the following exchange:
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Okay. And I would just like to note
that there were two offers that were presented to
Mr. Kpaan . . . I just wanted to make that clear if it wasn’t clear
for the record.

THE COURT: Okay. But now we have one offer, right?

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Yes. The offer that he is pleading
to.

Kpaan argues that “[b]y framing the choice that way, the court not only pressured
the defendant but also prevented counsel from explaining both offers and their
consequences.” But, when talking directly to Kpaan, the district court did not make any
comments about the specific terms of the plea . The record demonstrates that the district
court was seeking clarification on the status of the plea negotiations and whether Kpaan
16
understood the offer. We do not discern any attempt by the district court to actively
participate in the negotiations. Moreover, Kpaan’s attorney did not put the terms of any
competing offers on the record and agreed with the district court that there was only one
offer.
In sum, the record before us shows that Kpaan’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent. We therefore conclude that Kpaan entered a valid guilty plea and plea
withdrawal is not necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
3
II. Kpaan waived his vindictive-prosecution claim by pleading guilty.
Kpaan also argues that the additional count in the amended complaint (Count II)
must be dismissed because the state’s decision to amend the complaint amounts to
vindictive prosecution. Alternatively, Kpaan argues that the matter should be remanded
for an evidentiary hearing for the state to explain the amendment under oath. Kpaan
maintains that the amendment occurred after the scheduled trial date, and asserts it was
retaliation for Kpaan exercising a legal right and challenging the state’s evidence.
“In limited situations in which action detrimental to the defendant has been taken
after the defendant exercises a legal right, a presumption of prosecutorial
vindictiveness will arise.” State v. Pettee , 538 N.W.2d 126, 132 (Minn. 1995) (citing
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982)). But this presumption “will arise
only in those situations where a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness exists.” Id. “A mere

3 See State v. Schaefer, 374 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Minn. App. 1985) (“Post-conviction
proceedings are the proper forum for presentation and evaluation of matters not of record
supporting withdrawal of a guilty plea.”).
17
opportunity for vindictiveness is insufficient to justify imposing an inflexible prophylactic
presumption.” Id. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a claim that actual
vindictiveness existed is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 133 (concluding
that appellant “has failed to sustain his burden because the evidence in the present case
is not sufficient to support a claim that actual vindictiveness existed”); see also
State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Minn. 2015) (reviewing whether defendant has
been denied due process de novo).
While we review such claims de novo, we need not decide whether the state’s
decision to amend the complaint amounted to prosecutorial vindictiveness in this case
because Kpaan waived this argument by pleading guilty. “A guilty plea by a counseled
defendant has traditionally operated, in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions, as a waiver
of all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford,
397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986). Because the record shows that Kpaan’s plea is valid,
we conclude that he waived his prosecutorial-vindictiveness claim by pleading guilty. See
State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 918 (Minn. 1996) ( mentioning that appellant’s
prosecutorial-vindictiveness claim raised in a self-represented brief is waived by
appellant’s guilty plea).
Affirmed.