Willis Jonathon David Carmack, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0732

Willis Jonathon David Carmack,
Appellant,

vs.

Valley Green Park, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed February 17, 2026
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CV-24-5352

Willis Jonathon David Carmack, Jordan, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Kenneth R. White, Law Office of Kenneth R. White, PC, Mankato, Minnesota; and

Jacob T. Sherlock, Blethen Berens, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Willis Jonathon David Carmack challenges the district court’s summary-
judgment dismissal of his claims against respondents Valley Green Park (Valley Green)
1

1 Valley Green MHC LLC is the legal entity referred to as Valley Green.
2
and Wendy Jo Sonnier . On appeal, Carmack argues the district court: (1) erred when it
granted summary judgment in favor of respondents; (2) violated his procedural due-
process rights; and (3) abused its discretion when it denied his motion to compel. We
affirm.
FACTS
The following facts are undisputed or are stated in the light most favorable to
Carmack, as the party against whom summary judgment was granted. See Henson v.
Uptown Drink, LLC, 922 N.W.2d 185, 190 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
In June 2021, Carmack began living in a mobile-home community that Valley Green
operated. Upon moving into the community, Carmack entered into two separate lease
agreements: one with Valley Green to lease a lot (the lot lease) and a second with
Continental Community Sales II LLC (Continental) 2 to lease a manufactured home (the
home lease). The home lease contained an option to purchase the manufactured home for
a set price at any time during the 18-month lease term. The option provided that, if timely
exercised, Continental would credit Carmack’s rent payments and security deposit toward
the purchase price.
Carmack paid monthly rent for both leases.3 In December 2022, Sonnier—a Valley
Green employee—gave Carmack information about financing the purchase of the
manufactured home. Sonnier told Carmack that he could apply for financing through a

2 Continental is not a party to this action.
3 Valley Green brought a counterclaim against Carmack regarding overdue rent payments,
which the district court awarded. Carmack does not challenge that decision on appeal.
3
lending company called Chartwell LLC or another lending company. Sonnier orally
represented to Carmack that he could get financing at an eight percent interest rate. 4
About ten days before the home lease expire d, Carmack contacted Chartwell, and
Chartwell sent Carmack loan-disclosure documents and an application. Chartwell offered
an interest rate of approximately twelve percent. When Carmack failed to respond within
ten days, Chartwell notified Carmack that it was closing his incomplete application.
The home lease expire d without Carmack exercising the option. The home lease
then converted to a month-to-month lease. In January 2023, Sonnier received an email
from another lending company, which referred to Carmack and a “credit application .”
Sonnier forwarded the email to Carmack.
In December 2023, over a year after the option expired, Carmack submitted another
request for Chartwell to send loan information, but Carmack again failed to complete the
loan application. Carmack then hired an attorney to negotiate an extension for the option,
and despite Continental’s agreement to extend the option, Carmack again failed to
complete the necessary loan application. Chartwell once again closed his application as
incomplete.
On March 20, 2024, Carmack brought this action and alleged five claims, including
a breach-of-contract claim and a retaliation claim related to the home lease. Respondents
filed an answer. A virtual hearing was set for May 14, 2024; however, Carmack failed to
appear for that hearing. Thereafter, another hearing was held, and again, Carmack did not

4 Sonnier denies making this statement, but we must take the facts in the light most
favorable to Carmack. See Henson, 922 N.W.2d at 190.
4
appear. On July 30, 2024, the district court entered judgment dismissing Carmack’s
complaint. Carmack then brought a motion to reopen the case. After a hearing in early
November 2024, the district court granted the motion, vacating the prior dismissal and
reopening the case. In March 2025, the district court issued an order granting summary
judgment in respondents’ favor.
Carmack appeals.
DECISION
Broadly, Carmack raises three challenges on appeal. First, Carmack argues the
district court erred when it granted summary judgment on his breach-of-contract and
retaliation claims. Second, Carmack argues his procedural due-process rights were
violated because he was improperly excluded from the May 14, 2024 virtual hearing.
Finally, Carmack contends the district court erred when it denied his motion to compel
respondents to provide “documents identifying licensed lenders.” We address each
argument in turn.5
I.
Carmack challenges the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment on his
breach-of-contract and retaliation claims. We review a district court’s decision to grant
summary judgment de novo. City of Waconia v. Dock, 961 N.W.2d 220, 229 (Minn. 2021).

5 Carmack also argues that his case warrants the submission of an amicus brief “to address
broader consumer protection and constitutional issues.” Our rules of appellate procedure
provide specific steps that a party must follow when seeking to submit an amicus brief .
See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 129. We therefore reject Carmack’s request as procedurally
improper. See id.
5
As set forth above, when reviewing a summary-judgment decision, “we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party [and] resolve all doubts and factual
inferences against the moving part [y].” Henson, 922 N.W.2d at 190 (quotation omitted).
Summary judgment is properly granted only when there are no genuine issues of material
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ.
P. 56.01; Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 172 (Minn. 2021).
Carmack argues the district court erred when it granted summary judgment on his
breach-of-contract claim on the basis that Valley Green needed to comply with Minn. Stat.
§ 559.21 (2024). Respondents assert this issue is forfeited because Carmack did not raise
it before the district court. Generally, we do not consider matters not argued to and
considered by the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Upon
a thorough review of the record, we agree with respondents that Carmack did not raise this
argument below. Accordingly, we conclude the argument is forfeited. See id. at 583.
Carmack next asserts the district court erred when it granted summary judgment on
his retaliation claim under Minn. Stat. § 504B.441 (2024). Under the statute, “[a]
residential tenant’s obligations under a lease [may not] be increased or the services
decreased, if the . . . increase of obligations or decrease of services is intended as a penalty
for the residential tenant’s or housing-related neighborhood organization’s complaint of a
violation.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.441.
Carmack contends that he created a genuine issue of material fact that respondents
violated this statute because respondents publicly listed his home for sale during litigation,
refused to cooperate with third-party lenders, and removed law-enforcement presence from
6
his residence. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Carmack, we conclude
that section 504B.411 does not support Carmack’s argument.
As a threshold matter, this section does not create a right of recovery for Carmack.
Cent. Hous. Assocs., LP v. Olson, 929 N.W.2d 398, 401- 02 (Minn. 2019). Rather, this
statute presents a defense in an eviction proceeding. 6 Id. And even if the statute’s
protections were applicable to these circumstances, Carmack has not presented a genuine
issue of material fact to sustain his claim. First, Continental—not respondents—owns the
manufactured home and listed it for sale. Second, respondents did cooperate with third-
party lenders; for example, the record shows Sonnier forwarded the only loan-application
inquiry she received to Carmack. Third, Carmack submitted no evidence to substantiate
his claim regarding law enforcement.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court appropriately granted
summary judgment on Carmack’s breach-of-contract and retaliation claims.
II.
Carmack argues the district court violated his right to procedural due process.7
“Whether the government has violated a person’s procedural due process rights is a
question of law that we review de novo.” State v. Rey, 905 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Minn. 2018)

6 Valley Green previously brought an eviction action against Carmack and obtained a
favorable outcome.
7 Carmack also argues respondents violated his due-process rights. But private action is
outside the scope of due-process protections, unless there is a “sufficiently close nexus”
between the state and challenged conduct. State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 837 (Minn.
2012) (quotation omitted). Here, no such nexus exists between the alleged actions and the
state.
7
(quotation omitted). Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.8 Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
Here, Carmack’s argument focuses on his exclusion from the May 14, 2024 virtual
hearing, arguing it precipitated default judgment and, thereby, deprived him of procedural
due process. But thereafter, upon Carmack’s request, the district court vacated the entry
of default judgment and reopened the case . Then, after giving the parties notice, holding
another hearing, and providing the parties “additional time to supplement the factual
record,” the district court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment . Due
process is not violated when summary judgment is granted after parties have had the
opportunity to present all essential factual issues to the district court. Bradley v. Bradley,
554 N.W.2d 761, 765- 66 (Minn. 1996). Accordingly, we conclude the district court’s
procedures were constitutionally sufficient. See Sawh, 823 N.W.2d at 632.
III.
Carmack argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to
compel respondents to produce information about the lending institutions that work with
Valley Green. We review discovery-related rulings under an abuse-of-discretion standard.

8 Normally, “[w]e conduct a two-step analysis to determine whether the government has
violated an individual’s procedural due process rights.” Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823
N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012). First, we identify whether an individual was deprived of
a “protected life, liberty, or property interest.” Id. Second, we determine whether
constitutionally sufficient procedures were employed. Id. Constitutionally sufficient
procedures include notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. To decide whether a
procedure meets this standard, we would typically apply the factors from Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Id. Here, Carmack did not engage in the two-step analysis,
and while he cited Mathews, he did not raise any arguments regarding the Mathews factors.
8
Nelson v. Comm’r of Rev., 822 N.W.2d 654, 660 (Minn. 2012). A district court abuses its
discretion when it makes findings that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplies the law,
or issues a decision that is against the logic and the facts in the record. Bender v. Bernhard,
971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022).
Here, the record shows the respondents did respond to Carmack’s request for this
information. In their response, respondents stated that they did not possess any documents
containing such information. Moreover, Carmack failed to provide the district court “a
copy of the subpoena or the defendants’ responses,” and therefore, he failed to allege any
specific deficiencies or prejudices that would result from a failure to compel further
discovery. See Bloom v. Hydrotherm, Inc., 499 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Minn. App. 1993)
(stating appellant has the burden to show error and prejudice), rev. denied (Minn. June 28,
1993). As such, the record does not demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion
in the manner that it handled Carmack’s motion to compel.
Affirmed.