In Re: The Paternity of a Female child, born June 26, 2024.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0751

In Re: The Paternity of a Female child, born June 26, 2024.

Filed February 17, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Reyes, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-FA-24-2383

Erik F. Hansen, Kiley I. Eichelberger, Elizabeth Cadem, Mariah Glinski, Burns & Hansen,
PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant R.M.M.)

Kelsey Hopps, Crow Wing County Attorney, Marc Hedman-Dennis, Assistant County
Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Smith & Johnson, Attorneys at Law, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent
Crow Wing County Community Services)

Conrad Kragness, Baxter, Minnesota (for respondent J.R.S.)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant putative father argues that the district court erred by (1) misapplying res
judicata and collateral estoppel to dismiss his parentage proceeding; (2) denying his motion
for genetic testing; (3 ) misapplying the Safe-Place-For-Newborns statutes (Minn. Stat.
§§ 145.902, 260C.139 (2024)); (4) violating his procedural and substantive due-process
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rights; and (5) violating his equal-protection rights. We reverse and remand for genetic
testing.
FACTS
Appellant R.M.M. was in a romantic relationship with a woman, J.R.S., who
became pregnant. Their relationship ended before she gave birth to a female child (child).
R.M.M. registered as a putative father in the Minnesota Fathers’ Adoption Registry (the
registry) before child’s birth.
On June 14, 2024, the registry sent a notice to R.M.M. that J.R.S. intended to place
child for adoption in a proceeding commenced in Dakota County . The registry’s notice
directed R.M.M. to respond by either admitting or denying his paternity and indicating
whether he intended to exercise his parental rights or would agree to the adoption.
On June 26, 2024, J.R.S. gave birth to child at Essentia Hospital in Brainerd. Two
days later, J.R.S. surrendered child to the hospital. Crow Wing County Community
Services (the county) took custody of child and, on July 1, 2024, submitted two petitions
to the Crow Wing County juvenile court division.1 The county first submitted a child-in-
need-of-services (CHIPS) petition alleging that child was in need of protection and, second,
an expedited petition to terminate all parental rights to child (the permanency case). The

1 There are no separate family or juvenile court divisions in Crow Wing County.
Consequently, when handling child-protection matters, the district court acts as a juvenile
court. See Minn. Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1(5) (2024) (providing district courts with
“jurisdiction of a juvenile court as provided in chapter 260”); Minn. Stat. § 260.012 (2024)
(explaining juvenile court duties in child protection matters). We will refer to the Crow
Wing District Court presiding over the permanency case as “the juvenile court division”
throughout this opinion and refer to the Crow Wing County District Court presiding over
the paternity case on appeal before us as “the district court.”
3
juvenile court division heard both petitions the following day. On July 3, 2024, just eight
days after child’s birth, the juvenile court division issued an order adjudicating child
CHIPS and terminating “any and all parental rights of any parents known and unknown to
the child.”2 (the TPR Order).
On July 9, 2024, R.M.M. timely responded to the registry’s notice admitting that he
was the father of J.R.S.’s child, stating his intent to exercise his parental rights, and stating
that he did not agree to the adoption. The registry’s notice instructed R.M.M. that if he
intended to exercise his parental rights, he must also initiate a paternity action within 30
days of the child’s birth. On July 10, 2024, R.M.M. timely initiated a paternity action in
the district court, requesting genetic testing to establish his paternity and seeking sole
physical and sole legal custody of child (the paternity case).
On July 30, 2024, J.R.S., despite having surrendered child within two days of child’s
birth, waited until the last day possible to file an answer in the paternity case, stating that
she did not have physical or legal custody of child. In her answer, she admitted that she
had engaged in sexual intercourse with R.M.M., resulting in child’s birth, but also stated
that R.M.M. was not the father of child. R.M.M. inquired about these statements through
his counsel, and J.R.S.’s counsel informed him that J.R.S. surrendered child at a safe place
and did not have any knowledge about the whereabouts of child or who was caring for her.

2 There is no indication that child is an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2018), or Minnesota Indian Family Preservation
Act. Minn. Stat. §§ 260.751-.835 (2024).
4
On August 30, 2024, R.M.M. amended his petition in the paternity case to add the county
as a defendant.
On September 18, 2024, R.M.M. filed a motion for intervention and a motion to
compel genetic testing in the permanency case. He amended his petition in the permanency
case a few days later to include a motion to vacate the TPR order. Because R.M.M. had
moved to compel genetic testing in both cases, the parties stipulated to a stay in the
paternity case until the juvenile court division presiding over the permanency case issued
its decision.
The juvenile court division noted R.M.M.’s motions but, because genetic testing
had not yet been completed, it found that R.M.M. had “merely [a] possible or hypothetical
injury” and denied his motions under the “[d]octrine of [r]ipeness. ” Furthermore, the
juvenile court division denied R.M.M.’s request to order genetic testing but stated: “It is
this Court’s opinion that the paternity file is the forum in which [paternity] can be
substantiated,” explaining that, “[i]f paternity can be established, [the juvenile court
division could] then assess the merits of the moving party’s request for relief.” It stayed
“[the] matter at Post Permanency, subject to timely review.” R.M.M. petitioned the
juvenile court division for reconsideration of its determination that his motions were
unripe, but it denied his request.
R.M.M. then requested that the district court move the status of the paternity case
to “open status and schedule a motion hearing regarding genetic testing.” After a hearing,
the district court denied R.M.M.’s motion to order genetic testing and granted the county’s
motion to dismiss.
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This appeal follows.
DECISION
“There is a presumption [in juvenile-protection law] that natural parents should be
entrusted with the care of their children, and they should not be deprived of custody except
for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Matter of Welfare of Solomon, 291 N.W.2d 364, 369
(Minn. 1980) (quotation omitted). This presumption is based in part on the public-policy
determination that a child’s best interests are normally served by parental custody. Id. In
addition, it is important to provide each child with “a home that is safe and permanent
without unnecessary delays in court proceedings.” In re Welfare of Child of G.A.H., 998
N.W.2d 222, 231-32 (Minn. 2023) (quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]e require an
expeditious resolution of permanency because we will not allow children to linger in
uncertainty.” Id. at 232 (quotation omitted). Both of these overarching goals are equally
at issue in this case.3
As an initial matter, the county argues that R.M.M. does not have standing to bring
his paternity claim. We first address the threshold issue of standing. See Annandale
Advocate v. City of Annandale, 435 N.W.2d 24, 26 (Minn. 1989).
I. R.M.M. had standing to file his paternity claim.

The county argues that R.M.M. lacks standing because (1) his “paternity petition
failed to allege the facts necessary to show that [he] had standing under the Minnesota

3 Despite these stated goals, R.M.M.’s consistent efforts to obtain genetic testing in hopes
of establishing a father -daughter relationship with child, have been met with procedural
roadblocks, leaving him caught between proceedings in the paternity and permanency
cases.
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Parentage Act” because he did not plead specifically that child had no presumptive father
and (2) the juvenile court division terminated his parental rights prior to him filing the
paternity action.4 We disagree.
“This court applies a de novo standard of review to a district court’s determination
that a party has standing to bring a paternity action.” In re Welfare of C.F.N., 923 N.W.2d
325, 329 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2019); see also Richards v.
Reiter, 796 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2011); Pollard v. Crowghost, 794 N.W.2d 373, 376
(Minn. App. 2011). “A person has standing to file a lawsuit if they have suffered an injury
in fact or if they are the beneficiary of some legislative enactment granting standing.”
B.D.D., 25 N.W.3d at 712 (quotation omitted). “The [Minnesota Parentage Act (the act)]
provides the exclusive bases for standing to bring an action to determine paternity.” Witso
v. Overby, 627 N.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Minn. 2001); see also Minn. Stat. §§ 257.51-.75 (2024).
The act “creates causes of action for individuals seeking to establish the existence or
nonexistence of a father-child relationship.” In re Estate of Jotham, 722 N.W.2d 447, 451
(Minn. 2006).
[A] party alleging he is a child’s father has standing to bring a
paternity action under section 257.57, subdivision 2 to compel

4 Minnesota Statutes section 260C.317, subdivision 1, states that a parent whose parental
rights have been terminated has no standing to appear at any further legal proceeding
concerning the child. However, we do not address the county’s argument that section
260C.317 precludes R.M.M. from seeking relief because we do not have a record or
briefing regarding whether R.M.M.’s parental rights were irrevocably terminated or
whether he has procedural options remaining to challenge the TPR. See In re Welfare of
Child of B.D.D., 25 N.W.3d 707, 710, 712 (Minn. 2025) (holding that Minnesota Rules of
Juvenile Protection Procedure control when section 260C.317 conflicts with the rules and
stating that TPR becomes final only after time to challenge TPR order under rules has
passed) (citing Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 21,01, subd.1, 22.02, 23.02, subd. 2)).
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blood or genetic testing as provided in section 257.62,
subdivision 1, even though he does not at the time the action is
commenced possess blood or genetic tests that establish he is
the child’s presumed father under section 257.55, subdivision
1(f).
Witso, 627 N.W.2d at 69.
R.M.M. pleaded several facts to demonstrate that he had standing to initiate a
parentage action, including that he (1) had a sexual relationship with J.R.S., resulting in
child’s birth; (2) knew that child’s due date was June 24, 2024; (3) discussed and agreed
with J.R.S. upon a particular name for child; (4) had registered with the Minnesota Fathers’
Adoption Registry; and (5) had filed an Admission of Paternity and Intent to Claim
Parental Rights in the adoption proceeding declaring that he was the father of child and did
not consent to the adoption of child.
The county argues that R.M.M. lacks standing because he did not plead that child
had no presumptive father. That fact is not dispositive, because even if child had a
presumed father, R.M.M. could still bring an action to compel genetic testing to establish
himself as the biological, and therefore, a “presumed father.” See id. (concluding that
putative father who files affidavit establishing reasonable possibility he could be biological
father of child who has presumed father may bring action to compel mother and child to
undergo tests to determine whether he is also presumed father). The only question is
whether the putative father “set forth facts to establish a ‘reasonable possibility’ that there
was the requisite sexual contact between the parties.” Frieson v. Pahkala, 653 N.W.2d
199, 201-02 (Minn. App. 2002). R.M.M. pleaded that he had a sexual relationship with
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J.R.S., resulting in child’s birth , in addition to other facts tending to show his status as
father of child.
We conclude that R.M.M. pleaded sufficient facts to establish standing to petition
the district court to compel genetic testing so that he may establish paternity under the
Minnesota Parentage Act.
II. The district court abused its discretion by denying R.M.M.’s motion to compel
genetic testing and granting the county’s motion to dismiss.

R.M.M. claims that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing his
parentage proceeding by (1) misapplying res judicata and collateral estoppel; (2) denying
his motion to compel genetic testing so that he could establish his paternity of child;
(3) misapplying the safe-place statute that is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to
him; (4) violating his due-process rights; and (5) violating his equal -protection rights.
Because we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by denying R.M.M.’s
motion to compel genetic testing, we do not reach the other issues raised by R.M.M.
A district court abuses its discretion if its findings of fact are unsupported by the
record, if it improperly applies the law, or if it resolves an issue contrary to logic and the
facts on the record. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022). “Whether
the district court correctly applied the law is a legal question, which we review de novo.”
In re Welfare of Child. of M.A.H., 839 N.W.2d 730, 746 (Minn. App. 2013).
Parentage-determination matters are heard in the family court division. See Minn.
Gen. R. Prac . 301.01 (b)(6). “The juvenile court [division] has original and exclusive
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning the termination of parental rights to a child.” Minn.
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Stat. § 260C.101, subd. 2(1) (2024); see also In re Welfare of Child of S.B.G., 991 N.W.2d
874, 882 (Minn. 2023).
Here, the district court correctly determined that it could decide the motion to
compel genetic testing. However, the district court then evaluated whether R.M.M. would
succeed in challenging the juvenile court division’s TPR order under Minnesota Rule of
Juvenile Protection Procedure 22.02. In fact, in its order, the district court stated that “once
the 90-day timeline for review [of] the permanency order expired, there are no further
remedies to be found in this lateral court.” To the extent that the district court made its
decision based upon R .M.M.’s rights or expected outcome in the permanency case, the
district court erred because that case was not before the distri ct court. The permanency
case is also not before us, so we focus only on whether the district court erred by not
granting genetic testing.
An alleged father may request genetic testing by filing an affidavit with the court
“either alleging or denying paternity and setting forth facts that establish the reasonable
possibility that there was, or was not, the requisite sexual contact between the parties.”
Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 1(a). We have previously interpreted this statute and concluded
that, “once an alleged father files an affidavit ‘setting forth facts that establish the
reasonable possibility that there was the requisite sexual con tact between the parties,’
[then] the district court is required to compel blood or genetic testing to determine
paternity.” Frieson, 653 N.W.2d at 200 (emphasis added) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 257.62,
subd. 1). Here, R.M.M. filed an affidavit with the district court alleging, among other
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things, sexual contact between him and J.R.S. resulting in child ’s birth. The district court
therefore was required to compel genetic testing to determine paternity.
We conclude that the district court erred by basing its decision on the possible
outcome in the permanency case and misapplied the law when it denied R.M.M.’s request
to compel genetic testing. We reverse the district court’s order and remand this case with
instructions to order genetic testing as requested by R.M.M. and to proceed with actions
consistent with the results of the test.
Reversed and remanded.