State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0752

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Sylvester Jones,
Appellant.

Filed April 27, 2026
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-31853

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth Scoggin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Peter H. Dahlquist, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant seeks reversal of his convictions for third-degree criminal sexual conduct
and felony domestic assault arising from an incident on Halloween evening 2019, when

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
the mother of two of appellant’s children reported that appellant beat and raped her after
she returned from trick-or-treating with her children. Appellant argues that the district
court (1) clearly erred by overruling his objection to the state’s peremptory challenge to a
prospective juror of color; (2) abused its discretion by allowing a detective to offer expert
testimony about the typical behaviors of victims of domestic violence; and (3) abused its
discretion by permitting a witness to testify about a prior statement the victim made about
appellant raping her. Because we discern no clear error or abuse of discretion in the district
court’s rulings, we affirm.
FACTS
On November 5, 2019, victim A.L.K. reported that appellant Sylvester Jones, the
father of two of her children, beat and raped her on the night of October 31, 2019.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Jones with two counts of criminal sexual conduct
in the third degree while using force or coercion, 1 and one count of felony domestic
assault.2 The charges were later amended to include an additional count of criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree.3
Jones pleaded guilty to one count of third- degree criminal sexual conduct. He
appealed his conviction, and we affirmed. State v. Jones, No. A21-1713, 2023 WL 125857
(Minn. App. Jan. 9, 2023). The Minnesota Supreme Court granted Jones’ petition for

1 Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(c) (2018).
2 Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2018).
3 Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2018).
3
review and subsequently reversed his conviction. State v. Jones , 7 N.W.3d 391 (Minn.
2024). On remand, the district court allowed Jones to withdraw his guilty plea.
In a subsequent five-day jury trial on the three charges of criminal sexual conduct
and one charge of domestic assault, A.L.K.’s credibility was a central issue. Only A.L.K.
testified firsthand about the physical and sexual assault that occurred on Halloween.
A.L.K. and Jones share two children, and they were in a loving, though high-conflict,
relationship for numerous years, which was “on and off” due to issues such as money and
infidelity. In the days following the Halloween assault, A.L.K. and Jones continued to live
together, and while Jones was later incarcerated, he and A.L.K. communicated frequently.
Jones alleged that A.L.K. had lied about the assault out of anger and jealousy—
emphasizing her behavior after the assault —placing A.L.K.’s credibility at the center of
his defense.
Jury Selection
When conducting voir dire, Jones’ counsel asked how each potential juror would
weigh the testimony if they only heard from “one side.” Juror 18 raised the concept of
“actual proof,” stating that “[t]here has to be some sort of evidence to back up what [a
witness is] saying.” The state followed up on this line of questioning, asking Juror 18
“what kind of evidence” he was talking about. Juror 18 responded that, while he does not
necessarily expect physical evidence, he expects there to be “something to back up what [a
witness is] saying. It’s not just [a witness] say[s] it is true, there is something there.” The
state then asked Juror 18—supposing there was no evidence beyond witness testimony—
whether he would be “willing to follow the judge’s rules and say [he could] use just this
4
testimony to come up with a decision and believe something happened,” or whether he
would still need “some corroborating evidence.” Juror 18 responded:
No, to be honest, like, so—as I said when we were
asking about what we do, I’m a big-time poker player. So
occasionally people tell you a story that you don’t get proof of
and you have to believe it. There is— driving to insanity
whether to believe it or not believe it and think about it in your
head, so you just have to take that proof of evidence you have
in front of you and take it for what it is.

Like I said, there will be more than just one person’s
testimony I will take. I guess it won’t be one person against
another, it’s going to be more than just evidence of one person
saying something and you have to decide on one person. So
it’s a combination of all the evidence together that will help me
come to that decision, especially if it’s only testimony and
there is no physical evidence.

The state exercised one of its three peremptory strikes to excuse Juror 18.
Jones challenged the state’s use of a strike on Juror 18 as racially discriminatory,
stating: “Jones is African American. There were only two African American men on our
jury panel, Juror Number 18 is one of those African Americans.” The state responded that
Jones had not made a prima facie showing that the strike was racially discriminatory, as
Jones had merely asserted that Juror 18 was a racial minority, and there were at least four
jurors who identified as racial minorities on the jury. Without stopping for the district court
to rule on whether Jones had made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination, the state
further noted that it had a race-neutral reason for striking Juror 18, stating that Juror 18
indicated “he needed more people saying something happened, more witnesses,” and while
other jurors had clearly indicated that they would follow the law, Juror 18 did not.
5
The district court determined that Jones failed to make a prima facie showing that
the state exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race “by the striking of one
African American juror when there are four minority jurors and two African American
jurors, both males on the jury.”
While the district court expressly determined that Jones had failed to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination, it allowed Jones to be heard on whether the state’s
proffered race-neutral reason for striking Juror 18 was pretextual. Jones argued that Juror
10—a white juror—offered similar answers to Juror 18, asserting that “if Juror 10 isn’t
being struck, then it insinuates that the only reason Juror 18 is being struck is because of
the race-based reason.” The district court stated it did “not find purposeful racial
discrimination” and denied Jones’ challenge.
Expert Testimony
Prior to trial, Jones moved for an order prohibiting the state from offering expert
testimony on victim behaviors in cases involving domestic or sexual abuse, arguing that
such testimony would not be helpful to the jury. The district court addressed this matter
on the first day of trial.
In anticipation of testimony that A.L.K, despite Jones’ violent actions towards her,
continued to be in a relationship with him and communicated with him while he was
incarcerated, the state sought to introduce the expert testimony of Detective C.G. The state
explained that A.L.K.’s actions were “counterintuitive behavior that the State would like
the expert to explain, that this is not an uncommon situation.” Detective C.G., the state
proposed, would testify about the “dynamics of domestic violence, ” namely that victims
6
“may not always report violent incidents” and often “return to the people who have been
violent to them.”
Jones objected, noting that the authority the state was relying upon , State v. Obeta,
796 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 2011), was decided about 14 years earlier. The “culture has
changed in the last ten to 15 years as far as the general public’s understanding of sexual
violence, the general public’s understanding of domestic violence, when we see things like
the MeToo movement taking root in the late like 2018, 2017 years,” Jones asserted. The
district court disagreed “that the general public has a better understanding these days than
they did in 2011 about counterintuitive victim behaviors.” It then concluded that it would
allow Detective C.G.’s expert testimony.
Jones then argued that, even if the testimony would be helpful to the jury, Detective
C.G. was not qualified to testify as an expert because she lacked formal education as a
psychiatrist or therapist, her experience was “one-sided” and “bias[ed ]” in responding to
calls involving reports of domestic and/or sexual abuse, and she had “minimal” hours of
training in domestic violence. The district court stated that it would not change its ruling
allowing Detective C.G. to testify, noting that “[w]hat she does not have in formal
education, she has gained through training and experience.”
Detective C.G. testified that she had over 30 years of experience in law enforcement,
during which time she has responded to “hundreds” of domestic-violence calls and has
become familiar with common issues related to domestic violence. In her experience, it is
“very common” for people to delay reporting sexual assaults or never make a report. She
7
also testified that victims of domestic violence will frequently stay with their abusers out
of embarrassment or a hope that the person might change.
A.L.K.’s Testimony
At trial, A.L.K. testified that, on October 31, 2019, she took her kids trick-or-
treating in the evening and then returned to her apartment. When she returned to the
apartment, Jones started “picking with” her one-year-old son until he “woke up and started
crying.” Jones and A.L.K. started arguing, and Jones “got angry” and “started yelling.”
This argument led to A.L.K. and Jones “arguing about cheating,” and A.L.K. ultimately
asked Jones to leave the apartment. A.L.K. testified that Jones told her he “wasn’t going
anywhere,” and at some point, the argument turned physical. Jones “got on top of” A.L.K.
and “start[ed] punching” her on her chest and her arms.
Jones got off A.L.K. at some point and tried to force A.L.K. to have sex with him.
A.L.K. testified that Jones “tried to force his penis into [her] mouth” by grabbing her neck
and “forc[ing] [her] head down onto his penis.” A.L.K. resisted, and Jones “started
punching [her] in [the] head.” Jones then told A.L.K. to “turn around” so he could penetrate
her. She testified that she was “afraid,” “in pain,” and “upset,” and she ultimately turned
around because she was “tired of him hitting [her].” Jones proceeded to penetrate A.L.K.,
which A.L.K. testified she did not want him to do and did not tell him he could do. A.L.K.
further testified that she “just wanted it to be over.”
The next day, A.L.K. saw she was bruised in multiple places and took pictures of
her injuries. Several days later, A.L.K. reported the physical and sexual assault to police.
8
A.L.K. continued to communicate with Jones despite the Halloween assault. She
testified that she “still loved him at the time,” and that, because they had two children
together, she wanted “to make the relationship work.”
Prior Consistent Statement
After A.L.K. testified, Jones objected to the state calling P.T., 4 A.L.K.’s friend, to
provide evidence that A.L.K. had told P.T. about the rape. Jones argued that A.L.K.’s prior
statement to P.T. was hearsay and did not meet an exception allowing for the introduction
of a prior consistent statement. Jones alleged that there were inconsistencies in A.L.K.’s
prior statement to P.T. and A.L.K.’s trial testimony, and that it was possible P.T. may be
talking about an alleged sexual assault from mid-October, as opposed to the assault that
occurred on Halloween.
After speaking with P.T. off the record, the state clarified on the record that P.T.
was aware of the alleged mid-October assaul t, and she would be testifying about what
A.L.K. had told her about the Halloween assault. Based on this representation, the district
court allowed P.T. to offer limited testimony that A.L.K. “stated that she had been raped
by Mr. Jones and when that happened,” as this was consistent with A.L.K.’s trial testimony.
The district court found that P.T.’s testimony was helpful to the jury, as it could bolster
A.L.K’s credibility in that she also disclosed the assault to a friend.
P.T. testified that, about five days after Halloween, A.L.K. called P.T. and told her
that she and Jones had “got into it,” that something “happened on Facebook [and Jones]

4 The transcript identifies the witness’s initials as “P.S.” However, as both parties refer to
this witness as “P.T.,” we refer to the witness as P.T.
9
confronted her about it.” A.L.K. told P.T. that Jones had “raped her.” A.L.K. was
emotional and broke down crying when she made this disclosure, according to P.T.
The jury found Jones not guilty of count one, criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree, and found him guilty on all remaining counts. The district court imposed
concurrent executed sentences of 27 months for felony domestic assault, 90 months for
attempted criminal sexual conduct in the third degree (fellatio), and 180 months for
criminal sexual conduct in the third degree (penetration).
Jones appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not clearly err in determining that Jones failed to make
a prima facie showing that the state’s peremptory challenge to Juror 18 was
racially discriminatory.

Jones first argues that the district court committed clear error during jury selection
when it overruled his objection to the state’s peremptory challenge to prospective Juror 18,
an African American man.
The use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors is subject to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). If a peremptory challenge is used against a
prospective juror because of their race, both the prospective juror and the defendant are
denied equal protection, as the prospective juror is denied their right to participate in jury
service, and the defendant is denied their right “to be tried by a jury made up of members
selected by nondiscriminatory criteria.” State v. Harvey, 932 N.W.2d 792, 810-11 (Minn.
2019) (quotation omitted). To determine whether a peremptory challenge is motivated by
10
racial discrimination, the United States Supreme Court established a three-step framework
in Batson. 476 U.S. at 96-98.5
The first step of the Batson analysis requires the party objecting to the use of a
peremptory challenge to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Harvey, 932
N.W.2d at 811. To do so, the objecting party must show “(1) that a member of a protected
racial group has been peremptorily excluded from the jury and (2) that circumstances of
the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race.” State v. Blanche, 696
N.W.2d 351, 365 (Minn. 2005).
If the objecting party establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the
second step of the Batson analysis requires the striking party to provide “a race -neutral
explanation.” Harvey, 932 N.W.2d at 811 (quoting Blanche, 696 N.W.2d at 364). If a
race-neutral explanation is provided, the third step of the Batson analysis requires the
district court to “determine whether the objecting party proved purposeful discrimination.”
Id.
On review, we accord a district court’s ruling on a Batson challenge “great
deference.” Id. (quotation omitted). After all, the district court is in a “unique position” to
determine whether the circumstances of the case raise an inference that the challenge was
based upon race, State v. White, 684 N.W.2d 500, 506 (Minn. 2004), and “the record may

5 We note that there are recent amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure
relating to objections to peremptory challenges. The prior version of Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.02, subd. 7, is consistent with the Batson three-step framework. Because the amended
rule did not become effective until March 1, 2025, and therefore was not in effect at the
time of Jones’ trial, we apply the Batson framework to this challenge.
11
not reflect all of the relevant circumstances that the court may consider.”
State v. Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d 717, 724 (Minn. 2007). Ordinarily, we will not reverse a
district court’s determination on a Batson challenge unless it is clearly erroneous. Harvey,
932 N.W.2d at 811.
Here, the district court expressly found that Jones failed to establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination “by the striking of one African American juror when there are
four minority jurors and two African American jurors, both males on the jury.”
The district court did not clearly err in making this determination. The sole
proffered support for Jones’ prima facie case was that Juror 18, like Jones, is an African
American man. “It is well-settled that mere removal of a member of a racial minority does
not necessarily establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” State v. Onyelobi ¸ 879
N.W.2d 334, 345 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). And, as the district court considered
here, “[t]he fact that an African-American was seated on the jury [is] a proper consideration
at step one of the Batson analysis.” Harvey, 932 N.W.2d at 815. Jones’ challenge merely
established that a member of a racial minority was peremptorily excluded from the jury,
but failed to show circumstances that raise an inference that the exclusion was based on
race.
To persuade us otherwise, Jones argues that we should not review the district court’s
determination as to whether Jones established a prima facie showing of racial
discrimination. This first step of the Batson analysis is moot in this case, he asserts,
because the district court “proceeded past step one and appeared to somewhat address step
three of the Batson challenge.”
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We agree that, where a district court proceeds to steps two and three of the Batson
analysis, step one is moot. See State v. Lufkins, 963 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn. 2021) (“[T]he
question as to step one is moot on appeal because the district court proceeded to steps two
and three of the analysis.”). We disagree, however, that the district court here proceeded
past step one. While the district court allowed Jones to be heard on step two and three after
directly addressing step one of the Batson analysis, this decision does not moot the district
court’s express finding that Jones’ Batson challenge failed at step one. See Onyelobi, 879
N.W.2d at 347-48 (concluding that the district court did not clearly err in ruling that
appellant failed at step one despite the district court also making findings on steps two and
three of the Batson analysis); Harvey, 932 N.W.2d at 816 (concluding that the district court
did not clearly err in ruling that appellant failed at step one despite the district court
allowing the state to be heard on steps two and three before expressly stating its
determination as to whether appellant had satisfied step one).6
Jones further argues that the district court clearly erred by failing to fully state its
findings on steps two and three of the Batson analysis. And he contends, related to steps
two and three, that the state’s proffered reason for striking Juror 18 —that Juror 18 stated
he needed “actual proof” beyond a witness’s testimony and did not clearly indicate he
would comply with the law—was pretextual, as shown by the state not using peremptory

6 Because Jones contends that step one is moot, he makes no argument that the district court
clearly erred in determining that he failed to carry his burden in establishing a prima facie
case of racial discrimination.

13
challenges on two jurors with allegedly similar answers to Juror 18.7 But the district court
was not required to have reached steps two and three if it properly determined that Jones
did not make a prima facie showing that the strike was motivated by discrimination.
Harvey, 932 N.W.2d at 817 n.18. Because we conclude that the district court did not
commit clear error when it determined that Jones did not meet his burden at step one, the
court thus also did not commit clear error by not making express findings about steps two
and three. See id.
Because the district court’s determination is entitled to “great deference,” and the
district court here relied on considerations our law has recognized as proper, we conclude
that it did not clearly err when it determined that Jones failed to make a prima facie showing
of racial discrimination. See id. at 811 (quotation omitted). As a result, the district court
did not commit clear error in overruling Jones’ objection to the state’s peremptory
challenge of prospective Juror 18.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted an experienced
detective to offer limited expert testimony about the typical behaviors of
victims of domestic violence.

The district court ruled that Detective C.G. was qualified to testify as an expert
witness on typical victim behaviors in situations involving domestic violence based on her
training and experience. The court noted “counterintuitive victim behaviors” remain

7 We note that Jones only argued at trial that the state’s proffered race-neutral reason for
striking Juror 18 was pretextual because Juror 18’s answers were similar to those of one
other juror, Juror 10. Generally, we do not analyze issues not raised before the district
court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988); State v. Bakken, 871 N.W.2d
418, 422 (Minn. App. 2015).
14
outside the understanding of the ordinary jury, and it stated that “this limited type of expert
witness testimony has consistently been allowed” under Minnesota law.
A district court’s decision, like this one, to admit expert testimony consistent with
rule 702 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence falls within its wide discretion.
State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 638 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16,
2010). Under rule 702, if specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify in
the form of an opinion. Minn. R. Evid. 702. Once a witness is qualified as an expert, their
testimony is admissible if it has foundational reliability and it is helpful to the jury. Id.;
Obeta, 796 N.W.2d at 289. Expert testimony can be helpful “if it explains a behavioral
phenomenon not within the understanding of an ordinary lay jury.” State v. Ritt, 599
N.W.2d 802, 811 (Minn. 1999). And on appeal, the appellant has the burden of showing
(1) the district court abused its discretion by admitting the challenged testimony, and
(2) that the error prejudiced the appellant. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d at 638; see also
State v. Thao, 875 N.W.2d 834, 840-41 (Minn. 2016) (reviewing admission of expert
testimony).
Here, Jones contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
Detective C.G.’s expert testimony because she was not qualified to offer this testimony and
her testimony did not help the jury understand the evidence or resolve fact disputes. We
address each argument in turn.
Turning first to the qualification issue, Jones contends that Detective C.G.’s lack of
formal education or specialized training in domestic violence rendered her unqualified as
15
an expert. We are not persuaded. Under rule 702, a witness can qualify “as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Minn. R. Evid. 702 (emphasis
added). Detective C.G.’s resume reflects her approximately 30 years of law-enforcement
experience, which involved responding to “hundreds of domestic violence calls,” as well
as the “several domestic violence-related trainings” she had completed throughout her
career. And “Minnesota appellate courts have permitted police officers to provide expert
testimony concerning subjects that fall within the ambit of their expertise in law
enforcement.” State v. Carillo, 623 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn. App. 2001) (compiling cases
in which police officers were allowed to testify as experts despite a lack of formal training,
including in fingerprint identification, intoxication, and accident reconstruction),
rev. denied (Minn. June 19, 2001); see also Valentine, 787 N.W.2d at 639 (discerning no
abuse of discretion in district court’s determination that police officer with 13 years of
experience and a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice and corrections, who completed
trainings relating to domestic violence and cycles of domestic abuse and “frequently dealt
with domestic-violence issues” throughout her career, was qualified to testify as an expert
on battered-woman syndrome). Given Detective C.G.’s ample experience and training in
cases involving domestic violence, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
determination that Detective C.G. was qualified to testify as an expert about
counterintuitive victim behaviors in situations involving domestic violence.
But Jones further contends that admitting Detective C.G.’s expert testimony was not
helpful to the jury and amounted to “improper vouching” for A.L.K.’s credibility. He
summarily asserts that the “Me Too movement served to educate lay jurors about the
16
counterintuitive behaviors of the victims of domestic violence,” and therefore the jury
could assess A.L.K.’s credibility and behavior without Detective C.G.’s testimony. We
are not persuaded.
As the district court acknowledged, Minnesota appellate courts have deemed expert
testimony about the typical behaviors of victims of rape and sexual assault to be helpful to
the jury and admissible. For example, in Obeta , the supreme court recognized that expert
opinion testimony on “typical rape-victim behaviors” and “the typical behaviors of victims
of similar crimes” may be helpful to the jury. 796 N.W.2d at 291. The supreme court
noted that “the experiences and reactions of victims of certain crimes are outside the
common knowledge of the jury,” and in these cases, “expert testimony on typical victim
behavior may be helpful to assist the jury in evaluating the facts in the case.” Id. at 292.8
In this case, Jones put A.L.K.’s credibility at issue and emphasized her behavior
after the assault as central to his defense, so testimony explaining counterintuitive victim
behaviors was particularly relevant. And we are not persuaded that the district court abused
its discretion by rejecting Jones’ unsupported assertion that the “Me Too” movement has
placed the counterintuitive behaviors of victims of domestic violence within the common
understanding of most jurors. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district

8 In a recent nonprecedential opinion, we applied the rationale underpinning Obeta and
stated that “delayed reporting and counterintuitive behaviors of sexual-assault victims
remain outside the common understanding of a jury.” State v. Perez-Robles, No. A23-
1216, 2024 WL 3877492, at *6 (Minn. App. Aug. 19, 2024). We cite nonprecedential
opinions only for their persuasive value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P 136.01, subd. 1(c).

17
court’s determination that Detective C.G.’s limited testimony would be helpful to the jury
in assessing A.L.K.’s behavior after the assault and her credibility.9
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting A.L.K.’s prior
disclosure of the sexual assault to P.T.

Finally, Jones contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing P.T.
to testify that A.L.K. told P.T. that she had been raped by Jones. Jones argues that A.L.K.’s
statement to P.T. “did not bolster” A.L.K.’s credibility and was “not consistent” with her
trial testimony, so it did not fit the exception to the hearsay rule allowing a prior consistent
statement to be admitted.
“We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.”
State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). On appeal, the
appellant has the burden of showing (1) the district court abused its discretion by admitting
the challenged testimony, and (2) that the error prejudiced the appellant. Holt v. State, 772
N.W.2d 470, 483 (Minn. 2009).
We begin our review with the rules of evidence. Hearsay is generally not admissible
at trial. Minn. R. Evid. 802. However, a witness’s prior out-of-court statement is not
hearsay and is admissible as substantive evidence if (1) the declarant testifies at trial,
(2) the declarant is subject to cross-examination, (3) the statement is consistent with the
declarant’s testimony, and (4) the statement is helpful to the trier of fact in evaluating the
declarant’s credibility as a witness. Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). A prior statement is not
admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) unless the witness’s credibility has been

9 Because there was no abuse of discretion, we need not address the issue of prejudice.
18
challenged and the statement will bolster the witness’s credibility. State v. Nunn, 561
N.W.2d 902, 909 (Minn. 1997). “[A] prior consistent statement might bolster credibility
by showing a fresh complaint, obviating an improper influence or motive, providing a
meaningful context, or demonstrating accuracy of memory.” State v. Bakken, 604 N.W.2d
106, 109 (Minn. App. 2000). But a prior statement does not need to be identical with the
trial testimony to be consistent. State v. Zulu, 706 N.W.2d 919, 924 (Minn. App. 2005);
see also In re Welfare of K.A.S., 585 N.W.2d 71, 76 (Minn. App. 1998) (holding that the
admission of a videotaped statement that was “reasonably consistent” with trial testimony
was not reversible error).
Here, Jones does not dispute that A.L.K. testified at trial and was subject to
cross-examination. Nor does Jones dispute that A.L.K.’s credibility was challenged. Our
focus, therefore, is whether the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that
the limited statement —that A.L.K. told P.T. that Jones raped her on October 31—was
admissible as a prior consistent statement because it bolstered A.L.K.’s credibility and was
consistent with her trial testimony.
We discern no abuse of discretion in this decision. With regard to A.L.K.’s
credibility, the district court determined that A.L.K. disclosing the assault to a friend in
addition to reporting the assault to the police would tend to bolster her credibility.
Considering that Jones argued that A.L.K. was lying about being raped and simply reported
Jones to the police out of anger, the district court properly exercised its discretion in
19
deciding that A.L.K.’s disclosure of the assault to a friend would tend to bolster A.L.K.’s
credibility and, therefore, would help the jury assess A.L.K.’s veracity.10
With regard to the consistency between A.L.K.’s prior statement and her trial
testimony, the district court limited P.T.’s testimony to “what really is the only consistent
part[,] . . . which is that [A.L.K.] stated that she had been raped by Mr. Jones and when that
happened.” P.T. testified that, about five days after Halloween, A.L.K. told P.T. that Jones
had “raped her.” The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that this
statement was consistent with A.L.K.’s testimony at trial about Jones raping her on October
31.
To persuade us otherwise, Jones raises three arguments. First, Jones contrasts
A.L.K.’s detailed trial testimony with P.T.’s limited testimony about the assault itself—
that A.L.K. “stated that she had been raped by [Jones].” We understand Jones to argue that
this contrast demonstrates that P.T.’s statement did little to bolster A.L.K.’s credibility and
that it was not consistent with A.L.K.’s trial testimony given the lack of detail. Jones does
not explain how the district court abused its discretion by determining that A.L.K.’s
statement to P.T. would bolster her credibility. Nor does he identify any authority
supporting the proposition that a prior statement is not consistent with testimony offered at

10 Additionally, a victim’s emotional state when disclosing a sexual assault can bolster the
victim’s credibility. See State v. Gamez, 494 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. App. 1992) (noting in
the context of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge that a victim’s testimony regarding
sexual assaults was credible when “the testimony was corroborated by her consistency in
telling of the assaults, her prompt reporting of the assaults, and her emotional state when
reporting the assaults”). P.T. testified about A.L.K.’s emotional state when she disclosed
the sexual assault, which also bolstered A.L.K.’s credibility and helped the jury assess
A.L.K.’s veracity.
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trial because the testimony offered at trial is more detailed. We therefore discern no abuse
of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that P.T.’s limited testimony would bolster
A.L.K.’s credibility and was consistent with A.L.K.’s more detailed trial testimony.
See Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944) (“[O]n appeal error is
never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be
reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.”).
Second, Jones alleges that A.L.K.’s prior statement was not consistent with her trial
testimony because it is possible that P.T.’s testimony was “not about the October 31, 2019
incident at all.” But Jones raised this concern at trial, and the district court specifically
considered it. The state then clarified on the trial record that P.T. was aware of the alleged
mid-October assault and A.L.K. had told her about the October 31 assault. Thus, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that A.L.K.’s prior statement to
P.T. was consistent with her testimony at trial that the assault occurred on October 31.
Finally, Jones points out that P.T.’s testimony differs from A.L.K.’s with regard to
what initiated the October 31 fight between A.L.K. and Jones. A.L.K. testified that she
and Jones began arguing after Jones woke up their one-year-old child and that the argument
escalated to arguing about cheating. P.T. testified that A.L.K. told her that she and Jones
had “got into it,” and that something “happened on Facebook [and Jones] confronted her
about it.” Even assuming that this is an inconsistency between A.L.K.’s prior statement to
P.T. and her trial testimony regarding what initiated the argument between A.L.K. and
Jones, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that the thrust of
P.T.’s testimony—that A.L.K. and Jones got into a fight before Jones raped her —was
21
reasonably consistent with A.L.K’s trial testimony. See Zulu, 706 N.W.2d at 924-25
(holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence as a prior
consistent statement where it concluded alleged inconsistencies were not “substantial,”
including inconsistencies about whether a discussion began during a family meeting or in
private and whether other family members were present or absent during the disclosure).
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
P.T.’s testimony.11
Affirmed.

11 Because there was no abuse of discretion, we need not address the issue of prejudice.