In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0756

In re the Marriage of:

David Ray Honeman, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Carol Lynn Honeman,
Appellant.

Filed June 22, 2026
Affirmed in part and remanded
Bond, Judge

Brown County District Court
File No. 08-FA-24-195

David Ray Honeman, New Ulm, Minnesota (pro se respondent/cross-appellant)

Jacob M. Birkholz, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant/cross-
respondent)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
In this marital-dissolution appeal, appellant -wife challenges the district court’s
(1) classification of a settlement payment, and assets purchased or improved using the
settlement payment, as marital property; (2) division of marital property; and (3) imposition
2
of a $100,000 lien on the marital home awarded to wife in its amended findings. We affirm
in part and remand for additional findings.
FACTS
Appellant Carol Lynn Honeman (wife) and respondent David Ray Honeman
(husband) have been married twice. 1 They first married in 1980 and then dissolved their
marriage in December 2007. In July 2008, wife was in a car accident which rendered her
quadriplegic. She entered into settlement negotiations with the other driver’s insurance
company and sought first-party benefits through her own insurance carrier.
Wife and husband remarried in May 2009. In August, wife signed a settlement
agreement with the other driver and received a check for $245, 000.2 Wife deposited the
settlement funds into her individual investment account. At around the same time, wife
received three years’ wages and medical expenses through her no-fault insurance carrier.
That insurance carrier continues to pay for wife’s medical expenses.
In 2010, wife and husband purchased a home from husband’s parents for $100,000,
and wife used roughly $25,000 of the settlement funds as a down payment. Wife’s
insurance paid approximately $218,000 for medically necessary modifications to the home.
In addition, wife used the settlement funds to pay for home improvements unrelated to her
medical condition and husband contributed his labor to several home projects.

1 These facts derive from the undisputed evidence received at the court trial and the district
court’s findings of fact.

2 The full settlement amount was $300,000, and wife agreed to pay her attorney $55,000.
3
On a few occasions d uring the parties’ second marriage, wife used the settlement
funds to contribute to husband’s retirement account.3 Wife also used the settlement funds
to buy a customized motorhome and a van.
In March 2024, husband filed for dissolution of marriage. Wife moved for
temporary spousal maintenance and requested an award of the marital home. The district
court denied wife’s motion for temporary spousal maintenance and ordered wife to pay the
marital bills on a temporary basis, noting that “[t]he final property distribution will
necessarily take into account the parties’ contributions to acquiring marital property.”
After a trial, the district court entered its judgment and decree (J&D) in January
2025. The J&D dissolved the marriage, established a valuation date, characterized certain
property as marital or nonmarital, and divided the parties’ marital property. Relevant here,
the district court determined that wife’s settlement funds were presumptively marital
property and, therefore, any assets acquired or improved using those funds were also
presumed marital property. The district court awarded wife the marital home and ordered
wife to pay husband an equalization payment of $75,000.
Both parties filed motions for amended findings; wife also filed a motion for a new
trial. The district court denied wife’s new-trial motion and partially granted the parties’
motions for amended findings on matters unrelated to this appeal . The district court
affirmed its determination that the settlement funds wife received during the second

3 While the record is not entirely clear, it appears that the settlement funds were divided
between an annuity account, from which wife receives a monthly payment, and a savings
account.
4
marriage were presumptively marital property. In addition, the district court set a payment
schedule for the equalization payment and imposed a $100,000 lien in favor of husband on
the marital home to be paid to husband upon her death or the sale of the home.
Wife appeals.4
DECISION
Wife argues that the district court erred in classifying as marital property the
settlement funds she received from the car accident. Wife maintains that the classification
error had a cascade effect on the district court’s division of property. Specifically, wife
contends that, because the settlement funds should have been treated as her nonmarital
property, the district court abused its discretion by failing to apply the Schmitz5 formula to
determine wife’s nonmarital interest in the home and classifying certain other assets
acquired or improved from the settlement funds as marital property. Wife also challenges
the district court’s division of marital property as inequitable and the court’s imposition of
a $100,000 lien on the marital home awarded to wife.

4 Husband, represented by counsel, filed a notice of related appeal. Husband’s counsel
subsequently withdrew. Husband filed a self -represented informal brief addressing the
arguments raised in wife’s brief and requesting that we “affirm the district court’s judgment
in all respects.” Husband’s brief does not raise any issues identified in his notice of related
appeal. While husband has not formally withdrawn his notice of related appeal, his failure
to raise any such issues in his brief forfeits appellate review of any issues in his cross-
appeal. See Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (stating issues not briefed
on appeal are waived).

5 See Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1981) (establishing formula for
district courts to use to determine marital and nonmarital interests in the appreciation of
properties acquired before marriage).
5
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s classification of marital
property. But because we cannot determine the district court’s rationale for imposing the
$100,000 lien on the marital home, we remand for additional findings on that issue. We
do not reach wife’s remaining challenges to the division of marital property.
I. The district court did not err in classifying the settlement funds and related
assets as marital property.

Wife argues that the district court misclassified the settlement funds as marital
property. Wife asserts that, because the settlement funds were used during the marriage to
purchase or improve other assets, the error impacted various other aspects of the district
court’s classification and division of property.
A district court must classify property as “marital property” before valuing and
dividing the property between the parties. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2024). “Marital
property” is defined as any real or personal property acquired by the parties during the
marriage and before the valuation date. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2024). Property
is presumed to be marital if it is acquired during the marriage and before the date of
valuation “regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in a form of co-
ownership.” Id. To overcome the presumption that property is marital, a spouse must
prove, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the property is nonmarital. Baker v.
Baker, 753 N.W.2d 644, 649 (Minn. 2008). Nonmarital property includes real or personal
property obtained prior to the marriage. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b.
Appellate courts review de novo whether property is marital or nonmarital. Gill v.
Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2018). But we defer to the district court’s underlying
6
factual findings and set them aside only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is
clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963
N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). When reviewing findings of fact for
clear error, appellate courts engage in “a review of the record to confirm that evidence
exists to support the decision.” Id. at 222. When applying the clear-error standard of
review, appellate courts (1) view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings,
(2) do not reweigh the evidence, (3) do not find their own facts, and (4) do not reconcile
conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22.
Wife’s argument concerns the settlement funds she received during the parties’
second marriage for injuries she suffered in the car accident before that marriage.
Typically, characterization of a personal-injury award as marital or nonmarital depends on
the purpose of recovery, which allows for separate treatment of various components of the
recovery, rather than the timing of recovery. Van de Loo v. Van de Loo, 346 N.W.2d 173,
176 (Minn. App. 1984). The district court considers whether the purpose of the recovery
is to replace property whose source derives from something acquired before the marriage,
such as a person’s good health, which would make it nonmarital property. Id.
Alternatively, if the recovery replaces property acquired or which would have been
acquired during the marriage, such as the replacement of lost wages, it is marital property.
Id. As the party seeking the nonmarital classification, wife has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence the purpose of the recovery. Id. at 177; see Ward v. Ward,
453 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. June 6, 1990). Absent such
7
proof, the settlement payment must be treated as marital property. See Van De Loo, 346
N.W.2d at 177.
Wife did not provide the settlement agreement at trial for the district court’s review.6
While wife offered the release that accompanied the settlement payment as an exhibit, the
release does not specify what amounts of the settlement were for pain and suffering or lost
wages. Both wife and husband signed the settlement agreement. The check for the
settlement payment is dated August 29, 2009, after the parties remarried, and is payable to
the order of wife. The district court credited wife’s testimony that she separately received
three years’ worth of lost wages and medical expenses but found that wife’s testimony that
the entire settlement was for her pain and suffering was “self-serving” and not credible, a
determination to which we defer. See Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 301.

6 In support of her combined motion for amended findings or a new trial, wife submitted a
May 2009 letter from her personal-injury attorney to the other driver’s insurance company
purporting to demonstrate the nonmarital nature of the settlement funds. The district court
declined to consider the May 2009 letter, reasoning that wife neither submitted the letter
as evidence at trial nor offered any explanation for her failure to do so. See Minn. R. Civ.
P. 59.01(d) (providing that a new trial may be granted for “[m]aterial evidence newly
discovered, which with reasonable diligence could not have been found and produced at
the trial”); see also Zander v. Zander, 720 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Minn. App. 2006) (holding
that when considering a motion for amended findings, a district court must apply the
evidence submitted at trial and may not consider new evidence), rev. denied (Minn. Nov.
14, 2006). Because the district court did not receive the 2009 letter into evidence, we do
not consider it. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988) (“An appellate
court may not base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal, and may not
consider matters not produced and received in evidence below.”). We observe, however,
that the May 2009 letter reflects the initial settlement negotiations between wife and the
other driver’s insurance company and does not indicate which portion of the as-yet-
undetermined settlement amount is marital or nonmarital.
8
In the J&D, the district court found that “part of the settlement —indeed, probably
the greater part— was intended as compensation for [wife’s] pain, suffering, and loss of
good health.” But the district court determined that, without any evidence identifying
“which parts of the settlement were marital, such as lost wages, and which were non-
marital, such as pain and suffering or loss of good health,” wife had not met her burden of
showing that the settlement payment was nonmarital. Accordingly, the district court
classified the entire settlement payment as presumptively marital and concluded that any
assets acquired using the settlement funds were marital because they could not be traced to
a nonmarital source. On this record, we agree.
Property acquired during marriage is presumed marital property, absent a showing
that it is nonmarital in nature. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b. And “[t]he nature of the
property requires an identification of the property source.” Van de Loo, 346 N.W.2d at
176. Here, both parties signed the settlement agreement and wife received the settlement
funds during the second marriage. In the absence of the settlement agreement—and given
the district court’s finding that wife’s characterization of the settlement payment was not
credible—we cannot determine the “purpose of the recovery.” See id. Because wife did
not meet her burden of showing that the settlement funds were nonmarital, they must be
treated as marital property. Id. at 177; see Ward, 453 N.W.2d at 732.
To persuade us otherwise, wife argues that Van de Loo and its progeny are not
dispositive because the injury in those cases occurred during the marriage. She asserts that
because her injury occurred prior to the second marriage, the settlement funds in their
entirety are presumptively nonmarital. Wife’s argument is unavailing.
9
Minnesota courts do not apply a “mechanical” view when determining whether
property is marital or nonmarital. See Grigsby v. Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Minn.
App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2002). In Grigsby, we considered whether the
proceeds from a husband’s severance agreement were marital or nonmarital. Id. Husband
argued that, because he signed the severance agreement one month after the valuation date,
the $1.8 million in proceeds were not acquired during the marriage and thus not
presumptive marital property. Id. at 719, 721. We rejected such a “mechanical” approach,
instead applying an “analytical” approach which “requires a more detailed review of the
elements of the agreement to determine their individual sources.” Id. at 722. Because the
severance agreement was “significantly connected to [husband’s] marital employment,”
we concluded that the statutory presumption applied. Id. at 723.
Under Grigsby, the nature of wife’s settlement funds is not mechanically controlled
by the date of wife’s injury, as wife contends. Thus, even if we agreed with wife that
Van de Loo was not dispositive because the injury in this case, unlike in Van de Loo,
occurred before the parties’ second marriage, our conclusion would be the same. As we
have explained, caselaw instructs that if a personal-injury settlement replaces property that
would have been acquired during the marriage, it is presumed marital property.
Van de Loo, 346 N.W.2d at 176. Using the analytical approach, we cannot determine the
purpose of the recovery without the settlement agreement. See Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d at
722; see also Van de Loo, 346 N.W.2d at 176. Therefore, wife failed to prove that the
entirety of the settlement funds must be treated as nonmarital property.
10
Wife urges us to apply Weakley v. Weakley, a decision from the Kentucky Supreme
Court. 731 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1987). In that case, the court held that, when a personal injury
occurs before the parties’ marriage, “the entire compensation received therefor is
nonmarital, and this is true regardless of when the judgment or settlement is obtained or
whether the recovery is for the loss of wages, replacement of earning capacity, or pain and
suffering.” Id. at 245. Weakley is not binding on this court. See Mahowald v. Minn. Gas
Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 861 (Minn. 1984) (noting that, although decisions from courts of
other states are not binding, they may be persuasive). Because the rule adopted by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Weakley is a significant departure from binding Minnesota
precedent that analyzes the “purpose of the recovery” rather than a “mechanical” approach,
we decline wife’s invitation to rely on Weakley. Van de Loo, 346 N.W.2d at 176.
In addition to the settlement funds themselves, wife argues that assets she purchased
or improved using the settlement funds—including the home, motorhome, van, and
contributions to husband’s retirement account—are nonmarital property. Our conclusion
that wife did not meet her burden of proving that the settlement funds were nonmarital
property resolves wife’s additional claims of error. Because wife has failed to prove that
these assets were acquired or improved through nonmarital funds, the district court did not
err in classifying them as marital property.
II. The district court’s imposition of a $100,000 lien on the marital home must be
remanded for additional findings.

Wife contends that the district court’s division of marital property was inequitable.
Wife highlights the district court’s imposition in its amended findings of a $100,000 lien
11
on the marital home awarded to wife, arguing that the district court declined to order a lien
in the J&D and provided no factual or legal rationale for doing so in its subsequent order.
In a dissolution proceeding, the district court “shall make a just and equitable
division of the marital property of the parties without regard to marital misconduct, after
making findings regarding the division of the property.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1. A
district court has broad discretion in dividing marital property, and we will not disturb the
property division absent an abuse of discretion. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 964 N.W.2d 221, 231
(Minn. App. 2021). A district court abuses its discretion if it makes factual findings that
lack support in the evidence, misapplies the law, or renders a decision that is “against logic
and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022)
(quotation omitted).
We begin with the lien issue. In the J&D , the district court determined that its
division of marital property resulted in wife receiving $399,939 more than husband, largely
because of the award of the marital home to wife. The court noted that, “to equalize the
parties’ property awards, Wife would have to pay Husband $199,969.50.” The court
further reasoned that wife needed the interest from the settlements funds to live on and that
a lien on the home in favor of husband “would not be reasonable,” as “it might be many
years before the house is sold and Husband can receive any payment on a lien.” Balancing
these considerations against husband’s interest in the marital property, the district court
concluded that a $75,000 equalization payment from wife to husband was equitable.
Husband’s motion for amended findings requested that the district court amend its
findings to order an equalization payment of $199,969.50. The district court denied
12
husband’s request and stated that its division of property was equitable given wife’s
inability to work and the absence of available assets. But the district court modified its
original award as follows:
[W]ithin 90 days of the date of this order, Wife shall pay
Husband half the equalization ordered, $37,500. She will then
pay $1,000 a month until the remaining half is paid. If Wife
misses a monthly payment, Husband can declare the remaining
balance due immediately. To protect Husband’s interest in the
equity in the house, Husband will have a lien on the homestead
in the amount of $100,000. This lien will not bear interest and
will be paid only upon the death of Wife or the sale of the
house, whichever occurs first.

Wife submitted an informal request for reconsideration of the lien. The district court
denied this request, ruling:
The Court established a lien in order to protect
Husband’s interest in the marital homestead. It is important to
remember that both parties contributed to the purchase of the
home, and the Court believes it is appropriate to protect
Husband’s interest in it. The lien is limited and only becomes
operative upon Wife’s death or sale of the home. The lien is
less than half the amount of the home’s assessed value.

On appeal, wife argues that the district court abused its discretion in awarding
husband a $75,0007 equalization payment and a $100,000 lien in favor of husband on the

7 In its amended findings, the district court ordered wife to pay $37,500 of the equalization
payment within 90 days and thereafter “pay [husband] $1,000 per month until the
remaining $30,000 is paid in full.” Wife argues that, in so stating, the district court reduced
the previously ordered $75,000 equalization payment to $67,500. But the district court
otherwise rejected husband’s request to amend the equalization payment and, in the
accompanying memorandum stated, “Wife shall pay Husband half the equalization
ordered, $37,500. She will then pay $1,000 a month until the remaining half is paid.” We
are thus not convinced that the district court’s reference to the “remaining $30,000” reflects
the court’s decision to change the equalization payment. Any discrepancies in the district
13
marital home awarded to wife. A marital lien is a method of distributing property in a
marital-dissolution proceeding. Bakken v. Helgeson, 785 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. App.
2010). We review a district court’s lien arrangements when dividing property for an abuse
of discretion. See Rohling v. Rohling, 379 N.W.2d 519, 522-23 (Minn. 1986) (holding that
the district court’s award of the homestead to one party subject to an equitable lien in favor
of the other party was proper because it had “an acceptable basis in fact and principle”
(quotation omitted)).
Our review of this issue is hampered by the lack of findings in either the J&D or the
amended findings explaining the district court’s rationale for an award of a $100,000 lien
on the marital home in favor of husband in addition to a $75,000 equalization payment to
husband. See Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. 1976) (holding that,
when the district court has broad discretion, “it is especially important that the basis for the
court’s decision be set forth with a high degree of particularity if appellate review is to be
meaningful”). Absent such findings, we cannot determine whether the lien functions as an
award of marital property and, in turn, whether the district court’s distribution of the marital
estate is just and equitable. 8 Accordingly, a remand to the district court for additional

court’s amended findings related to the amount of the equalization payment may be
addressed on remand.

8 For example, given the district court’s intent to protect husband’s interest in the home
and its determination that the $75,000 payment was “still equitable,” the district court may
have intended the lien to operate as a security interest. But given the amount of the lien
and the district court’s ruling that it will be paid upon wife’s death or the sale of the home,
the lien appears to operate as an additional award of marital property—effectively
increasing the equalization payment from $75,000 to $175,000.
14
findings is appropriate. Dick v. Dick, 438 N.W.2d 435, 437 (Minn. App. 1989) (remanding
for additional findings when district court included “no stated explanation” for an award
of property).
On remand, the district court should clarify whether the lien in favor of husband on
the wife’s home functions as an additional award of marital property, and if so, whether
the total award to husband is an equitable distribution of the parties’ marital estate. In
doing so, we leave the district court discretion to reopen the record to consider additional
evidence as it deems necessary. To the extent that the district court makes findings of fact
on remand that warrant adjustment of its other awards, it has the authority to make those
adjustments it deems equitable. This remand does not affect the dissolution of the parties’
marriage or any other provision of the amended judgment and decree otherwise affirmed
in this opinion.
Affirmed in part and remanded.