State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0760

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Alexander Lee Endres,
Appellant.

Filed June 1, 2026
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-CR-22-1434

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Timothy C. Rank, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Ryan Hansch, McLeod County Attorney, Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Connolly , Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant seeks a new trial, arguing that he was denied his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to comply with discovery rules,
2
failed to obtain a ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony that was critical to his
defense, and misunderstood the district court’s order as to the permissible scope of the
expert’s testimony. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2022, a law enforcement officer received a report of sexual abuse of a
minor victim, Child A, who stated that her mother’s boyfriend, appellant Alexander Lee
Endres, began sexually abusing her in August that year. Child A was 12 years old at the
time of reporting.
Respondent State of Minnesota initially charged Endres with two counts of criminal
sexual conduct (CSC) but later amended the complaint to charge him with (1) CSC in the
first degree in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1a(e) (2022), (2) CSC in the second
degree—complainant under 16, significant relationship, multiple acts—in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1a(h)(iii) (2022), and (3) CSC in the second degree—
complainant under 14 and actor more than 36 months older than complainant—in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1a(e) (2022).
At the jury trial, Child A testified that she had been living in an apartment with her
older siblings in August 2022 while her mother and Endres lived in the apartment below
them (the lower apartment). Child A stated that she and her younger sister spent time in
both apartments, including when their mother and older sister were at work and Endres was
home. Child A testified that she was in the lower apartment with Endres on a weekend day
when he touched her vaginal area for the first time. Child A stated that her cousin was
visiting from out of town and they decided to go to the lower apartment to look for video
3
games. Child A went back to Endres’s bedroom with Endres while her cousin stayed in
the living room. Child A was lying on Endres’s bed watching videos on a laptop when he
placed his hand on her thigh, eventually moving his hand up and under her shorts and
underwear onto her vaginal area. Child A testified that Endres’s hand was “moving
around” in her vaginal area and that he eventually placed his fingers inside of her vagina.
Child A stated that she remembered it hurt when he did this because Endres fre quently bit
his nails and his fingernails were sharp.
Child A testified that Endres touched her on multiple occasions after that day and
that Endres touched her breasts and her butt when she was on the couch or washing dishes
in the apartments as well as during an incident when they were at a gas station. Child A
estimated that the touching occurred more than ten times and recounted specific instances,
including times when Endres kissed her on the lips. Child A reported that one of these
specific instances occurred when she was showering in the lower apartment and Endres
came into the bathroom to urinate. Child A was spitting water outside of the shower and
“pretending to be a water fountain” when Endres told her to stop and then pulled back the
shower curtain while his pants and underwear were around his ankles, exposing himself to
Child A.
The sexual abuse continued until late September, when Child A told her older sister,
A.D., who in turn informed Child A’s mother. After Child A disclosed the abuse, she did
not spend any more time around Endres.
In October 2022, A.D. told her boss about the abuse of Child A, and her boss
encouraged her to call law enforcement to make a report. A.D. then called law enforcement
4
and spoke with an officer. Child A eventually participated in two forensic interviews
regarding the abuse, and the state brought CSC charges against Endres.
In March 2024, the state filed a motion in limine with the district court, raising
multiple evidentiary issues related to trial. One of the state’s requests was that the district
court exclude testimony from Endres’s expert witness, Dr. Susan Revelle Phipps-Yonas, a
licensed psychologist. The state argued that Endres had not disclosed what, if any,
testimony Dr. Phipps-Yonas was expected to provide, that any testimony from
Dr. Phipps-Yonas would not be helpful to the jury, and that the probative value of such
testimony would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or
confusing or misleading the jury.
In May, Endres’s counsel filed motions in limine requesting multiple evidentiary
rulings from the district court, including the admission of evidence of Child A’s prior
abuse. Endres argued that evidence of prior sexual abuse would provide context for the
current accusations against Endres because Child A’s report of abuse by Endres was similar
to her report of prior sexual abuse. Endres’s counsel also argued that Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s
testimony was admissible because she is a qualified expert whose testimony would help
the jury determine Child A’s credibility and reliability.
The day after that filing, the parties appeared before the district court for a hearing
on the motions. The state argued that, although it had previously filed a request for
disclosure and a motion in limine, it had not received any written summary of
Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s proposed testimony until Endres filed his motion in limine the day
before the hearing. The state argued that, because the notice failed to identify the research
5
upon which Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s testimony would rely and the basis for the information to
which she would testify, the notice of her expert testimony was inadequate. Endres argued
that Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s C.V. was made available and that the prosecutor was experienced
enough to cross-examine the expert witness. Endres also argued that the probative value
of the proposed expert testimony outweighed any prejudice because, without the testimony,
Endres could not present a complete defense. The district court t ook the matter under
advisement.
A few days later, Endres’s counsel sent the prosecutor a disclosure letter from
Dr. Phipps-Yonas about the potential testimony she would offer at trial. However, the
letter did not redact confidential information and therefore did not comply with confidential
filing requirements, so it was not filed at that time.
Later that month, the district court issued an order ruling on the motions in limine
in which it determined that Endres failed to meet his obligation of disclosure with respect
to the expert-witness testimony and excluded the testimony. However, the district court
also stated that the parties could revisit the issue before trial if Endres subsequently made
adequate disclosures.
On July 7, 2024, Endres sent an updated letter outlining Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s
proposed testimony that complied with the confidential filing requirements. Endres also
requested a trial continuance, which the district court granted.
Later in July, the parties appeared for a hearing regarding Endres’s renewed motion
to allow Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s proposed testimony. The state took the position that the
proposed testimony from page one of the letter about forensic interviewing was likely
6
admissible but that any proposed testimony from page two of the letter—testimony
regarding Child A’s credibility1—was “speculation and conjecture” and was therefore not
admissible at trial. Endres countered that the testimony would be helpful to the jury
because Dr. Phipps-Yonas could speak in hypotheticals to the jury and talk about her
experience with other children and accusations of sexual assault. Endres asserted that
Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s testimony would inform the jury about “child brain development, child
emotional development, how sexual assaults can affect a child, and how a previous sexual
assault could inform . . . potential nightmares, fantasies, confusion, and other issues that
the child could come up with that would affect her reliability . . . and her credibility” in
testifying about the sexual abuse. The district court took the matter under advisement.
Shortly thereafter, the district court issued a final order ruling on the
expert-testimony issues. The district court ordered that Dr. Phipps-Yonas could testify as
to forensic-interview techniques and protocol, including observations of body language
during videotaped interviews, skill or lack thereof of interviewers, consistency or
inconsistency of the reports of the alleged victim in the forensic interviews, and the
tendency or lack thereof of preteen children to lie outright about sexual abuse. The district
court further ruled that Dr. Phipps-Yonas could not testify about the content described in

1 Specifically, the second page identified proposed testimony that covered Child A’s family
history, her prior experiences of abuse and how it may have affected her credibility,
Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s opinion of whether Child A was telling the truth about the abuse or
was “confused,” the influence of Child A’s older sister on her reporting, Child A’s
emotional problems that may have contributed to a false report, and dreams or false
memories that may have misidentified Endres as Child A’s abuser.
7
page two of the disclosure letter, including how Child A’s prior abuse may have affected
her reporting in the current case.2
The district court provided additional explanation for its ruling in its memorandum
to the order. It also stated that, although Endres had “failed to provide any written summary
in response to the demand for disclosure” in the proceedings, he did provide “such
disclosure in advance of the rescheduled August trial date.” The district court noted,
“While not really excusing the Defense’s late disclosure, the reality is that the timing issue
has been substantially remedied and the Court at this point therefore considers the issue on
its merits rather than the basis of the late disclosure.” The district court determined that
any late disclosure by Endres’s counsel was outweighed by Endres’s “fundamental right to
a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense” and therefore that
Dr. Phipps-Yonas could testify to the forensic interviewing techniques and process because
it would be helpful to the jury. However, because the district court also determined that
the testimony identified on page two of the disclosure letter “represents essentially nothing
more than speculation and no foundational reliability has been established,” it prohibited
that testimony.
The jury trial was held in August 2025. A number of witnesses testified at trial,
including the law enforcement officer who initially responded to the report of abuse, A.D.’s
boss who encouraged her to report the abuse, Child A, Child A’s mother, A.D., both of the

2 In its order, the district court reiterated its finding that Child A’s prior abuse falls under
the rape-shield rule, Minn. R. Evid. 412, and is therefore admissible “in a very limited
fashion, i.e. that of the complaint and the sentencing order only.”
8
forensic interviewers, Dr. Phipps-Yonas, and Endres. The jury also viewed
body-worn-camera (BWC) footage of an officer interviewing Endres about the reported
abuse,3 recordings of both of Child A’s forensic interviews, and a video of Child A and
Endres at a gas station that corroborated the date on which Child A said that they were
there. One of the forensic interviewers testified that, during Child A’s second forensic
interview, she seemed to be struggling with talking about the abuse , so the interviewer
allowed Child A to write down her experience. Those written statements were also
admitted into evidence.
Child A’s mother testified about the weekend Endres exposed himself to Child A in
the shower. Child A’s mother confirmed that Child A was taking a shower in the lower
apartment that evening and that Endres went downstairs to use the bathroom. Child A’s
mother also acknowledged that Child A does not have a reputation for truthfulness.
During Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s testimony, she discussed Child A’s forensic interviews
that she observed via video recording, how memories are different in children because they
are “more susceptible to having distorted memories,” general knowledge in the field of the
tendency or not of preteen girls to lie outright about sexual abuse, and the lack of grooming

3 In the BWC footage of Endres’s interview admitted at trial, Endres confirmed several
details Child A previously reported to officers concerning dates and logistics of the alleged
abuse but denied that any sexual contact ever occurred. These details included that Endres
chews his nails—which , the officer testified, Child A had reported as the reason why it hurt
when Endres put his fingers inside of her vagina—that Endres used the bathroom while
Child A was in the shower, and that she had spit water on him from inside the shower. He
also stated to the officer that Child A was a “pretty honest kid.” In that footage, Endres
also told the officer that he accidentally touched Child A’s chest once but that was the only
inappropriate contact between them.
9
evidence in this case. On cross-examination, Dr. Phipps-Yonas agreed that it is not typical
for preteen children to lie outright about having been sexually abused and that it is more
common for children not to report sexual abuse.
After deliberation, the jury came back with guilty verdicts for CSC in the second
degree in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1a(h)(iii) (count 2), and CSC in the
second degree in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1a(e) (count 3).4 The district
court imposed a sentence of 90 months’ imprisonment with a conditional-release term of
ten years on count 2 and entered a finding of guilt with no adjudication on count 3 on the
warrant of commitment.
Endres appeals.
DECISION
“The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 6, of
the Minnesota Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant ‘the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.’” Taylor v. State , 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016) (quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)). Generally, an ineffective-assistance
claim should be raised in a postconviction petition for relief rather than on direct appeal
because an evidentiary hearing, if granted, provides the district court with additional facts
to explain an attorney’s decisions. State v. Gustafson, 610 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn. 2000).
But “[w]hen a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on the

4 The jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on count 1.
10
basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal.” Andersen v. State,
830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013).
To determine whether counsel was ineffective, Minnesota has adopted the Supreme
Court’s two-prong test set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694. See State v. Vang,
847 N.W.2d 248, 266 (Minn. 2014) (applying the Strickland test in a Minnesota criminal
case); State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531 , 535 (Minn. App. 2017) (applying the two-
prong test and not an abuse-of-discretion standard when an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was brought on direct appeal). This test requires
an appellant to show that (1) counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness” and (2) but for counsel’s unreasonable performance, there is a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Vang, 847 N.W.2d
at 266. If an appellant cannot establish one of the Strickland prongs, the claim fails and an
appellate court need not address the other prong. Id. Because we conclude that Endres’s
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness but it did not
prejudice the outcome of Endres’s trial, we affirm.
A. Endres’s counsel’s conduct was objectively unreasonable.
In applying an “objective standard of reasonableness,” we “judge the reasonableness
of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.”
Id. at 266-67 (quotations omitted). We will generally not review an ineffective-assistance
claim if it is based on counsel’s trial strategy, id. at 267, because matters of trial strategy
“lie within the discretion of trial counsel,” Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn.
2007). The burden of proof on this prong rests with the appellant, who must overcome the
11
“strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable
assistance.” Gail v. State, 732 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Minn. 2007); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689 (noting that judicial review should be highly deferential to counsel’s performance).
Endres argues that his counsel’s conduct was objectively unreasonable for three
reasons, including that his counsel (1) failed to obtain a ruling from the district court on
the admissibility of proposed expert testimony, (2) failed to properly understand the district
court’s ruling about the permissible scope of proposed expert testimony, and (3) failed to
comply with discovery rules by not properly providing disclosures regarding the proposed
expert testimony. We consider each of Endres’s contentions in the order presented.
First, Endres argues that, because Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s disclosure letter did not
address testimony about child brain development, child emotional development, and how
prior sexual abuse may affect a child and influence later accusations, his counsel erred by
not disclosing potential testimony on those issues at a later date or requesting a ruling on
said testimony from the district court. The disclosure letter Endres’s counsel offered
outlining Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s proposed testimony includes how prior abuse could have
affected Child A’s accusation and memory and caused false memories of Endres and
dreams that misidentified Endres as her previous abuser. Endres seems to suggest in his
brief that the testimony his counsel should have proposed and elicited was how prior abuse
could have affected a child “in general” and not specifically Child A because it would have
been helpful to the jury in assessing Child A’s credibility.
In its first order granting the state’s motion to exclude Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s
testimony, the district court stated that the only information about the content of
12
Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s testimony that Endres had disclosed up to that point was in Endres’s
motion in limine. Endres’s motion stated that Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s testimony would cover
forensic interviewing and “behaviors and memories of children” that included the
following:
how children can confuse dreams or imagination and reality;
how children can be particularly suggestible; what a child
understands or doesn’t understand about the meaning of their
accusations, etc. She would also explain how trauma can affect
the developing child brain and project fears and imagined
abuse onto unrelated adults . . . and will provide the jury with
evidence that will help them weigh the credibility and
reliability of [Child A]’s allegations.

At the second hearing on the motions in limine, Endres’s counsel again raised the issue of
admission of all the testimony as described in Endres’s motion. Nevertheless, in its final
order on the motions, the district court did not rule specifically on introducing general
knowledge about how prior sexual abuse affects children. Endres’s counsel did not raise
the issue again before trial.
Decisions about what evidence to present at trial are questions of trial strategy that
rest soundly in the discretion of counsel. Leake, 737 N.W.2d at 536 ; see also Francis v.
State, 781 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. 2010) (noting that whether to call an expert witness
and whether to cross-examine on a certain topic were matters of trial strategy); Opsahl v.
State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Minn. 2004) (holding that counsel’s decision to pursue certain
evidence and not other evidence fell within the realm of defense strategy); Cooper v. State,
565 N.W.2d 27, 33 (Minn. App. 1997) (holding that appellant’s allegations that counsel
failed to obtain expert testimony “involved the exercise of tactical judgment and will not
13
support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 1997).
Endres’s counsel’s choice not to raise for a third time the admissibility of testimony from
Dr. Phipps-Yonas regarding child brain development, child emotional development, and
how prior sexual abuse may affect a child falls well within trial strategy and is not
reviewable by this court.
Second, Endres argues that the record suggests his counsel misunderstood the
district court’s order, that his counsel was not prohibited from eliciting testimony regarding
how previous trauma can affect a child’s mind, and that, therefore, her failure to elicit such
expert testimony was unreasonable. However, at trial, Endres’s counsel attempted multiple
times to ask Dr. Phipps-Yonas questions about the effects of prior abuse on children, but
each time she began to ask a question on this topic, the state objected and the district court
sustained the objection. In addition, her decision whether to elicit such expert testimony
falls within trial strategy and is thus not reviewable by this court. See Cooper, 565 N.W.2d
at 33.
Third, Endres contends that his counsel “repeatedly failed to provide the required
disclosure regarding Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s proposed expert testimony.” He argues that,
because his counsel initially failed to disclose the expert testimony and then provided only
the letter written by Dr. Phipps-Yonas that did not include a description of testimony about
child brain development, child emotional development, and the effects of prior sexual
abuse on children, his counsel failed to comply with discovery rules and therefore provided
him with ineffective assistance.
14
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.02 requires a defendant to disclose
“[r]elevant written or recorded statements of the persons the defendant intends to call at
trial.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02, subd. 1(4)(a). And any testifying expert witness who does
not make any reports regarding the case “must provide to the defense for disclosure to the
prosecutor a written summary of the subject matter of the expert’s testimony, along with
any findings, opinions, or conclusions the expert will give, the basis for them, and the
expert’s qualifications.” Id., subd. 1(2)(b).
Endres is correct that his counsel initially failed to comply with the discovery rules
for admission of expert testimony. At the first hearing on the parties’ motions in limine,
Endres’s counsel had not provided any written summary or statement regarding the content
of the proposed testimony from Dr. Phipps- Yonas and only presented an indication of
potential subjects the day before the hearing. Endres’s counsel then sent a disclosure letter
from Dr. Phipps- Yonas; however, it was not filed because it contained unredacted,
confidential information, so the district court initially excluded all of Endres’s expert’s
testimony.
Even though the required disclosures ultimately were provided, Endres’s counsel’s
actions were objectively unreasonable and fell below the “level of skill and diligence that
a reasonably competent attorney would [exercise] under the circumstances.” Berry v. State,
33 N.W.3d 683, 693 (Minn. 2026); see also State v. Palodichuk, No. A22-0070, 2022 WL
17747869, at *4 (Minn. App. Dec. 19, 2022) (concluding that trial counsel’s insufficient
15
notice of expert testimony was deficient performance), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 14, 2023).5
Exclusion of evidence is a possible sanction for noncompliance with discovery
requirements. See State v. Lindsey, 284 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. 1979). And reasonable
trial counsel must understand that the failure to comply with discovery requirements could
result in the exclusion of evidence. See id.
The district court gave Endres’s counsel an opportunity to remedy the mistake, but
that does not alter the fact that Endres’s counsel made a significant mistake. Because we
determine that Endres established the first Strickland prong on this issue, we move to the
second prong to determine if Endres’s counsel’s conduct prejudiced his trial.
B. The outcome of Endres’s trial was not prejudiced by his counsel’s
conduct.
Endres argues that his counsel’s performance was prejudicial because, but for her
“unprofessional errors,” the result of his trial would have been different. Because we have
concluded that Endres’s counsel’s performance fell below the standard for reasonable
conduct only with respect to counsel’s failure to comply with the discovery rules, we focus
our analysis on that conduct when assessing prejudice.
To succeed under prong two of the Strickland test, the appellant must prove that,
but for counsel’s unreasonable performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result
of the proceeding would have been different. Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 266. This court
determines prejudice “by examining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the

5 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority but can be cited for their persuasive
value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
16
result would have been different if counsel had not erred.” State v. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d
785, 790 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted).
Based on our review of the record, there is no reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different but for Endres’s counsel’s error. The district
court stated, in its final order excluding part of Dr. Phipps-Yonas’s testimony, that although
Endres’s counsel initially failed to follow proper procedure, “the timing issue ha[d] been
substantially remedied” and the district court was therefore deciding “the issue on its merits
rather than the basis of the late disclosure.” Based on the merits, the district court still
determined that part of Dr. Phipps- Yonas’s testimony was inadmissible because it was
“nothing more than speculation and no foundational reliability has been established.”
Therefore, the late disclosure on the part of Endres’s counsel had no bearing on the district
court’s ruling.
Accordingly, Endres fails to establish the second Strickland prong. See 466 U.S. at
694.
Affirmed.