In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Sherman Kerall Ratliff.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0762

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Sherman Kerall Ratliff.

Filed September 15, 2025
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-MH-PR-24-664

Lauren E. Pockl, Hennepin County Adult Representation Services, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant Sherman Kerall Ratliff)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Annsara Lovejoy Elasky, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Attorney’s Office)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that the record does not support the district court’s order
committing him as a person who has a mental illness and is dangerous to the public (MI&D)
because the district court (1) clearly erred by finding that he committed multiple overt acts
in which he attempted to cause “serious physical harm” to others and (2) did not consider
appellant’s self-defense argument when evaluating his conduct. We affirm.

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FACTS
In November 2023, respondent Hennepin County Attorney’s Office (the county)
charged appellant Sherman Kerall Ratliff with one count of first-degree assault involving
great bodily harm under Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2022), after the victim reported
that appellant shot him in the face following an altercation in their apartment complex.
Apartment management and tenants in the apartment complex recognized appellant as
“self-proclaimed security” in the building, who regularly picked up trash around the
building, walked the hallways, and asked homeless people to leave the building. According
to the complaint, appellant shot the victim, another individual in the apartment building,
after he told victim that he was “cleaning up” the apartment and told victim to leave.
Officers reviewed the surveillance footage from the apartment complex and observed an
altercation between appellant and victim, and victim later running toward the elevators in
apparent distress, as appellant continued to pursue him while holding a long black item that
appeared to be a firearm. In the video, officers observed appellant disappear from view
and then later return to retrieve what appeared to be “a spent bullet casing.” Appellant left
the scene after police arrived, but officers apprehended him a few hours later. In a
subsequent interview with officers, appellant eventually admitted that he “grabbed his
protection” after he got into an altercation with victim, whom he “believed” had a knife or
scissors. Appellant also stated th at he defended himself , “blacked out,” and threw the
firearm into the Mississippi River after the shooting.
In April 2024, the district court ordered an examination of appellant pursuant to
Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01 to determine his competence to stand trial. Dr. Amy Crockford,
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who completed appellant’s Rule 20.01 examination, diagnosed appellant with
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), unspecified depressive disorder, and a mild
intellectual disability. The district court, relying on Dr. Crockford’s uncontested opinion
regarding appellant’s competency, found that appellant, “due to mental illness or cognitive
impairment, lacks the ability to rationally consult with counsel; or lacks the ability to
understand the proceedings or participate in the defense.” The district court determined
that appellant was “incompetent to stand trial. ” The district court ordered the Hennepin
County Prepetition Screening Program to conduct a prepetition screening to determine
whether appellant should be civilly committed.
In June 2024, the county moved for an order from the district court committing
appellant to the Minnesota Security Hospital or another appropriate facility as MI&D.
Dr. Joesph Korevec, who conducted the examination, testified that appellant met the
criteria for PTSD, unspecified schizophrenia, and other substantial psychiatric disorders.
Dr. Korevec agreed that, if the district court determines that appellant’s actions constitute
an overt act or acts, appellant meets the criteria for commitment as MI&D.
After receipt of Dr. Korevec’s report, appellant requested a second examination.
Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the district court appointed Dr. Andrea Lovett to
examine appellant. Dr. Lovett testified that she diagnosed appellant with borderline
personality disorder, PTSD, and unspecified depressive disorder. Dr. Lovett further stated,
if the district court determines that appellant had engaged in an overt act, he meets the
criteria for commitment because he is “at a substantial risk of harming people going
forward, and it’s because of his psychiatric disorders.” Dr. Lovett also testified about other
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incidents in which appellant had engaged in other acts in which he acted violently toward
others, including an incident in 2006 in which appellant threw his ex-wife to the ground
and smashed a plastic toy tricycle into her head, resulting in significant injury, including a
laceration near her eye that required stiches. Dr. Lovett’s testimony also referenced a 2009
incident in which appellant’s ex-wife sought, and the district court granted, an order for
protection (OFP) after appellant’s ex-wife reported that he had suddenly driven a vehicle
away from her while she was holding the door handle. The OFP petition also mentioned
the tricycle incident, an additional domestic-abuse incident, and allegations of threats that
appellant made to his ex-wife and other members of her family. Dr. Lovett also testified
about another incident in which appellant purportedly threatened a fifth-grade student
stating that he “[didn’t] give a f-ck about the school” and he would “blow the b-tch down”
while he put his finger to his head and gestured as if he were shooting his head.
The district court, referencing the reports of Dr. Korevec and Dr. Lovett, found in
part that: (1) appellant has several mental illness diagnoses, including “[PTSD], mild
intellectual disability by history, unspecified anxiety disorder, unspecified depressive
disorder, and unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder”;
(2) appellant’s mental illnesses are “manifested by instances of grossly disturbed behavior
or faulty perceptions”; (3) appellant “presents a clear danger to the safety of others” as a
result of his mental illnesses and has engaged in multiple “overt acts capable of causing
serious physical harm to another”; (4) “[t]here is a substantial likelihood that [appellant]
will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm on another”; and (5) “[ t]he
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Minnesota Security Hospital is the only appropriate placement for [appellant] at this time.”
The district court filed an initial order for commitment in December 2024.1
In February 2025, the district court received a 60-day report which explained that
appellant met the criteria for indeterminate commitment. In April 2025, following the
filing of the 60-day report, the district court filed an order committing appellant to
indeterminate commitment as a person who is MI&D.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
The district court did not clearly err when it found that appellant committed
multiple overt acts in which he attempted to cause serious physical harm to
others.

Appellant contends that appellant’s prior assaultive conduct which resulted in the
district court granting his ex-wife an OFP did not “amount to the necessary degree of
seriousness” contemplated by Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17(2) (2024). We are not
persuaded.
Before committing a person to a secure treatment facility, the district court must
find by clear and convincing evidence that the person is MI&D. Minn. Stat. § 253B.18,
subd. 1(a) (2024). A person has a mental illness and is dangerous to the public when, in
addition to having a qualifying mental illness,2 (1) the person “presents a clear danger to

1 The Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act under Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subds. 2(a),
3 (2024), requires the state-operated treatment program file a written treatment report
within 60 days after commitment and prior to a review hearing in which the district court
determines whether a MI&D commitment should be indeterminate.
2 Appellant does not dispute that he has a mental illness.
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the safety of others,” as evidenced by the person’s “engag[ing] in an overt act causing or
attempting to cause serious physical harm to another” as a result of that mental illness and
(2) “there is a substantial likelihood that the person will engage in acts capable of inflicting
serious physical harm on another” in the future. Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17 (2024).
After a person is initially committed as MI&D, the district court must typically hold a
review hearing to make a final determination on whether the person remains MI&D and
thus must continue the commitment. Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 2(a). If the person is
determined to continue to be MI&D, the district court must order commitment “for an
indeterminate period of time.” Id., subd. 3 (2024).
Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17, does not require that an overt act “attempting to
cause serious physical harm to another” constitutes an “attempt” within the meaning of
Minn. Stat. § 609.17, subd. 1 (2022 ), which requires that a person act “with intent to
commit a crime.” An action may be “equally dangerous to the public” regardless of
whether the person “had an intention or capacity to cause harm” or “even to recognize its
potential for causing serious harm.” In re Jasmer, 447 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Minn. 1989).
The question of dangerousness is a factual determination for the district court, which
we will not disturb unless it is clearly erroneous. In re Welfare of Hofmaster, 434 N.W.2d
279, 282 (Minn. App. 1989). Appellate courts review a district court’s factual findings in
an order for indeterminate commitment for clear error and defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995). Appellate
courts view the evidence in “a light favorable to the findings” and will not reweigh the
evidence nor resolve conflicting evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d
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214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021). Appellate courts will not set aside a district court’s findings of
fact as clearly erroneous unless “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” Id. at 221 (quotation omitted). But whether clear and convincing
evidence supports the district court’s determination that the standards for commitment are
met is a question of law, which we review de novo. In re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d 140, 144
(Minn. App. 2003).
A. Appellant’s assaultive conduct constitutes an overt act.

Appellant’s conduct leading to the 2009 OFP falls squarely within the definition of
an overt act under Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17. As noted above, in the domestic
incident, appellant threw his ex-wife to the ground and then repeatedly struck her in the
head with an object which resulted in a laceration near her eye, requiring her to get stiches.
Each act in that incident, considered independently, is an act “capable of causing serious
physical harm.”
Following that incident, in 2009, appellant’s ex-wife sought and obtained an OFP ,
also reporting that appellant had threatened members of her family and another incident in
which appellant drove a car away from her while she was holding on to the door, which
caused her to trip and fall on her knee.
Appellant characterizes these incidents as “intolerable” rather than violent and
argues that the conduct, specifically the tricycle incident, does not “rise to the level of
‘serious physical harm’ and should not, by itself, be sufficient to demonstrate that
[appellant] poses a clear danger to others.” Contrary to appellant’s argument, the district
court found that appellant had committed “multiple overt acts causing or attempting to
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cause serious physical harm to another” which were “related to, precipitated by, or caused
by [appellant’s] mental illness.” (Emphasis added.) In doing so, the district court
specifically referenced the instances documented by physicians from their interviews with
appellant in which he admitted to assaulting his wife and threatening elementary school
students, in addition to the conduct in the instant case that resulted in his commitment.
Moreover, Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17, requires only that the person has engaged in
an overt dangerous act capable of causing serious physical harm to another, not that the
conduct result in serious physical harm. Jasmer, 447 N.W.2d at 195-96.
Appellant attempts to distinguish this case from our decision in Hofmaster, 434
N.W.2d 279, arguing that appellant’s assaultive conduct involving his ex- wife did not
constitute overt acts because if “considered in isolation, [the conduct] would not rise to the
level of ‘causing or attempting to cause serious physical harm to another.’” But Hofmaster
is actually similar to, rather than different from, this case and ultimately supports the
district court’s finding that appellant had committed an overt act in which he attempted to
harm another person. In Hofmaster, we concluded that the district court “could properly
consider Hofmaster’s entire history” in addition to a remote incident in which he stabbed
his wife, to determine whether Hofmaster could be considered a danger to others. 434
N.W.2d at 280-81. Here, the district court considered appellant’s long history of violence,
which included threats he made to others; suicide attempts; explicit admissions that he had
“fantasies” about killing people; reported “blackouts” when he felt anger or rage ;
psychiatric hospitalizations; and the incidents with his ex-wife. These incidents, taken
together, support the district court’s determination that appellant poses a danger to society.
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We therefore discern no error by the district court in finding the domestic-assault
incident as an overt act.
B. The district court properly considered the November 2023 incident as
an overt act and was not required to consider appellant’s self- defense
claim.

Appellant contends that the district court failed to analyze his self-defense claim in
determining that the November 2023 incident constituted an overt act. Appellant
emphasizes evidence in the record that purportedly shows the victim brandished a weapon
and was the initial aggressor. Appellant’s argument is unavailing.
In a criminal prosecution, to find that a defendant acted in self-defense, the fact-
finder must find that force was necessary to prevent the harm feared. See State v.
Pendleton, 567 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. 1997) (explaining that self -defense justification
to intentional killing requires evidence that defendant used reasonable force in response to
reasonable belief of exposure to great bodily harm or death); Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd.
1(3) (2022) (explaining that individuals may use reasonable force to “resist[] . . . an offense
against the person”). A defendant claiming self-defense in a criminal prosecution may use
a level of force that is reasonable under the circumstances. State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d
392, 402-03 (Minn. 2001).
Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17, does not require the district court to predicate its
finding as to whether a defendant committed an overt act sufficient to satisfy the
commitment statute on the lack of a viable claim of self-defense. Appellant also does not
cite to any binding authority that requires the district court to consider appellant’s self-
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defense claim. 3 But even if the district court were required to consider appellant’s self-
defense claim, it appears that the district court considered it and implicitly rejected it. In
the order, the district court highlights appellant’s inconsistent statements provided to law
enforcement during the investigation, noting that appellant initially “told police that he had
‘blacked out’ and did not remember the altercation” and later claimed that he did remember
the altercation and that he “was defending himself.” The county also submitted the police
report from the night of the incident to the district court in which officers who reviewed
the surveillance footage from the apartment complex documented that they observed
footage which depicted (1) the victim and appellant having a “heated exchange”; (2) the
victim “visibly f[alling] to the floor as [appellant] [was] in the immediate vicinity”; (3) the
victim injured and “running around the corner” in the elevator hallway and later leaning
against the wall for support; and (4) appellant bending over and picking up what officers
believed to be a shell casing or a live round of ammunition before leaving the scene.
Appellant did not present any additional evidence to the district court to support his self-
defense claim, including testimony that the victim had attempted to injure appellant in any
manner with the scissors that appellant believed he had.

3 To support this argument, appellant cites our decision in the case In the Matter of the
Civil Commitment of Rhone, a nonprecedential opinion, in which Rhone argued that the
district court erred by determining that she committed an overt act when she killed victim
in self-defense. No. A18-0943, 2018 WL 6165252, at *1, *5 (Minn. App. Nov. 26, 2018),
rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 2019). But Rhone is a nonprecedential opinion and therefore
is not binding on us. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Furthermore, in Rhone we
concluded that, although the district court did not make an explicit finding as to Rhone’s
defense-of-dwelling claim, the record was sufficient to support the district court’s finding
that Rhone’s killing of G.J.M. was not justifiable. 2018 WL 6165252, at *4.
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We conclude that the district court did not err by finding that the November 2023
incident constituted an overt act.
Affirmed.