A25-0778

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0763
A25-0778

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of:
J. J. F. and T. D. H., Jr., Parents.

Filed December 1, 2025
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Stevens County District Court
File No. 75-JV-24-153

Thomas Nolan, Nolan Law Offices, Bird Island, Minnesota (for appellant J.J.F.)

Matthew P. Franzese, Wheaton, Minnesota (for appellant T.D.H., Jr.)

Joseph P. Glasrud, Stevens County Attorney, Tegan J. Peterson, Assistant County
Attorney, Morris, Minnesota (for respondent Stevens County Human Services)

Kristi Barber, Willmar, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellants challenge a district court’s adjudication of their four children as children
in need of protection or services (CHIPS), arguing that the district court (1) made clearly

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
erroneous findings of fact; (2) abused its discretion by finding that the children are in need
of protection or services because they are without proper parental care pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8) (2024), and due to an injurious or dangerous behavior,
condition, or environment pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(9) (2024); and
(3) abused its discretion by determining that sufficient evidence supported its adjudication.
We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant parents, T.D.H. Jr. (father) and J.J.F. (mother), have had many encounters
with Stevens County Human Services (the county) since moving to Minnesota in
July 2021. Before the events that led to the county filing a CHIPS petition for the children,
the county assisted the family with accessing resources and followed up on various reports
concerning the family’s four children. The following summarizes the hearing on the
CHIPS petition and the district court’s decision adjudicating the children in need of
protection or services.
In March 2022, county social worker M.V. was conducting a Health and Safety
Assessment in the family’s home when she was bitten by one of the family’s dogs. The
next month, the county received a report of medical neglect when child 1 was bitten by the
same dog because, although father brought child 1 to the local emergency room, he left
with child 1 before medical staff could treat the bite. As reported by medical staff, child 1
and father were moved to a room where medical staff could treat child 1’s wound, but
father became very angry, refused to speak to nursing staff, and stated that they were
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leaving. The next day, after medical staff made the report and police were called, mother
brought child 1 to a clinic for follow-up care.
While meeting with M.V. about the incident and closing the investigation, father
spoke about many other unrelated topics, reporting that he believed their baby monitors
had been hacked and that someone was taking pictures of the children. He also stated that
he and mother believe their house is bugged and that they sit near where they believe
microphones are planted in the house and have scripted conversations with intentionally
false information.
In January 2024, the county received a new report that the children were not
attending school. The reporter said that father had called them to say the children would
not be in school because child 1 had fractured her arm while at school and came home one
day with a tooth filled and he was concerned for the children’s safety. The reporter stated
that father seemed paranoid throughout the conversation.
A few days later, the entire family met with county social worker H.M. at the
agency. H.M. requested to speak with the children alone, but the parents refused. The
children initially said they had not eaten lunch that day. The parents said that was not true
and told the children not to lie. The children were unable to say right away what they had
eaten, and eventually one said they had pizza, but mother said that was not true. Father
told H.M. to stop asking questions.
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Father also met with H.M. separately to discuss the report. H.M. reported that father
spoke rapidly during the interview about irrelevant topics, which included the following:
• Throughout the previous two years, he tried to contact the
county attorney and not received a response.
• When he brings the kids to school, they are taken from school
and brought to a place with a lake. Father said child 2 and
child 3 have talked to him about this.
• Two years ago, he heard people talking to the children through
the baby monitor. Father saw them out the window to the
backyard running away. He called the cops, but they did not
do anything.
• A man reached over their fence and stabbed his dog, and he had
the whole thing on video. The video was later gone when the
cops arrived.
• Years ago, mother was carrying a laund ry basket down the
stairs when she fell. The parents talked about it in front of the
kids, and he thinks that is where [an earlier] report about abuse
to child 3 came from.
• He was stabbed when he was 19.
• He had flesh-eating bacteria and, by a miracle, got better.
• The kids stopped riding the bus three months ago, and he
started driving them to school because he had concerns about
the bus.
• The elevation in their yard fell several feet recently, as though
there are tunnels under their house.

Father also told H.M. that he had concerns that people were listening inside of their house
and that he does not like having people inside their home. He said that some of their house
supplies, such as toilet paper and laundry detergent, were “going down in supply,” and he
blamed his neighbor and said that the neighbors were “trying to drive him to violence.”
Father told H.M. that he and mother pulled the children out of school because they were
concerned that the children were losing their reading abilities, the school was not teaching
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them to read, and if they could not read, they would be forced to speak in their home, where
“people” were listening to them.
H.M. advised both parents that the children must be back in school or enrolled in a
different school by February 1. When H.M. requested that the parents sign a release of
information so the county could check on the children’s enrollment with the school, mother
refused to sign anything and said that she and father could not trust the school and teachers.
In May 2024, the county received another report with concerns about father’s
paranoia and the welfare of the children. In response to H.M.’s request for a meeting,
mother wrote messages about other topics, blamed the incoming reports on the social
workers, and said, “Put us in front of a judge, I’m tired of being harassed.”
Based on the increased paranoia and concerns about father’s mental health causing
the children to be isolated from peers and school, the county filed a CHIPS petition on
May 29, 2024. The petition alleged, under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8), that the
children are without proper parental care because of the emotional, mental, or physical
disability or state of immaturity of the children’s parent and, under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007,
subd. 6(9), that the children’s behavior, condition, or environment is such as to be injurious
or dangerous to the children or others. The district court then appointed a guardian ad litem
(GAL).
The county created a safety-assessment plan with the family that required that father
not be alone with the children due to concerns about his paranoia and inadequate
supervision of the children. The parents refused to sign the plan on multiple occasions.
An in-home service plan was also created because of the county’s concerns about father’s
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paranoia resulting in the isolation of the children, the lack of mental -health and
chemical-dependency support for each parent, and the parents’ refusal to allow the county
to meet with the children alone. The parents refused to sign the in-home service plan,
accept assistance with daycare, or sign releases for potential caregivers for the children so
mother could return to work.
The GAL submitted a report to the district court before trial that described concerns
about the parents and supported adjudicating the children as in need of protection or
services. She observed that, in her conversations with father and mother, both parents
exhibited concerning behavior and that, during her visits, the children appeared at times to
be dysregulated. The GAL reported her concern that the children’s developmental needs
were not being met because of a lack of social and emotional connections outside of the
home. The county social workers and the GAL also noted that, during their visits, the
windows and doors in the home were covered with blankets, duct tape, and wood.
A trial regarding the CHIPS petition was held, and father and mother testified to
many items addressed in the CHIPS petition, including their decision to remove the
children from school due to child 1 allegedly fracturing her arm while at school and, on a
different occasion, coming home from school with a tooth filled and child 2 and child 3
informing father that they were taken “someplace in the woods” during school without a
permission slip. Throughout father’s testimony, he began talking about irrelevant topics
and had to be redirected to the question asked. During questioning from the county’s
attorney, father was asked if he believed that his “lawn had developed an uneven
elevation.” He responded by saying that it was a fact that “it’s dropping” and then began
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to testify about a time when his dog was stabbed before the county’s attorney redirected
him back to the original question. Father also talked about someone breaking into his truck,
someone stealing his mail, and someone planting suspected marijuana in one of his garden
beds. When the county’s attorney asked father if he felt as though his neighbors were
targeting him, father responded:
Well, I don’t know necessarily about targeting me. But again,
I have to refer back to the—the— where I got reported for my
son being pushed down the stairs when nobody was in the
house. I mean, this was—she’s right there. I’m just saying—
I’m sorry.

Father also testified that someone stole $4,800 from him and mother and that there
were 150 transactions 1 that amounted to “the children’s birthdays.” “Okay, the 50 —the
five, the ten, the 26 dollars and 21 cents. 150 times. That’s exactly my kids’ birthdays.
So, I mean, come on. I mean, is that a joke?” Father testified that the family is not in any
social or community clubs, that they do not leave the house “a whole lot,” and that, since
they pulled the children out of school the previous year, they have not regularly taken the
children to spend time with peers outside of family. Father testified that the only
interactions the children have with other children their own age is through online school. 2
In responding to questions about the incident in which a family dog bit child 1 in
April 2022, father testified that child 1 got “one little, tiny mark on her arm” and that he

1 Father did not clarify or specify to what transactions he was referring during his
testimony.

2 Mother also testified that, since they were pulled out of school in January 2024, the
children have not visited peers outside of the home.
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left the emergency room with child 1 before she received medical care because it was “a
lot” for him to take her there due to his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and child 1
had said she was hungry. When shown a picture of child 1’s injury at trial, father testified
that he did not remember the wound as pictured, initially stating, “[T]hat to me is a severe
injury.” He went on to say, “I managed a machine shop for 15 years. What we consider
stitches like that would get—that would get you laughed right out. I mean, honestly, like
I know what needs stitches and what doesn’t.” The county’s attorney asked about another
incident in which H.M. reported being bitten by the same dog, which father denied. Father
stated that, after the county recommended that they rehome or train the dog based on the
three reported bites—first M.V., then child 1, and finally H.M. —they did not rehome the
dog or get her any additional training.
The county also asked father about an incident described in the GAL’s report—that,
during a home visit, the GAL noticed that child 3 had a broken collarbone and requested
that the parents take him to the hospital. F ather testified that he had asked child 3 earlier
that weekend if he wanted to go to the hospital and that child 3 said no, so they did not take
him to a medical provider until the GAL asked them to do so. Father told the district court
that he believed that, at six years old, child 3 was old enough to tell him if he should go to
the hospital or not. Father also stated, in regard to the children’s injuries, that “only one
little, tiny bite and the collar bone” incidents occurred despite “[s]upervising all [those]
years of childhood, and . . . it was just the boys being boys.”
Father testified that, prior to the CHIPS petition being filed, he and mother would
take the children to different activities like fishing, swimming, and shopping, but that those
9
activities were not available anymore because mother quit her job to stay home with the
children. Mother also testified that the activities for the children were greatly affected since
she quit working. Father said that they had talked about signing child 1 up for a summer
program when they first moved to Minnesota but ended up pulling her out because she was
lost by staff when he went to pick her up.
When asked why the parents refused daycare assistance the county offered so
mother could go back to work, mother stated, “Well, [father]’s home, so it’s like, why?
And that wouldn’t be good for his—I don’t believe it would be good for his mental health,
sitting at home by himself. I mean, that makes no sense.” Mother testified that she never
had any concerns regarding father and the children: “Not even—not even at our worst
moments. I never had concerns about safety when it comes to [father] and the kid s, or
education or none of that because he’s a very proactive dad.” Mother testified that she has
no concerns with father parenting the children or about his mental health. She stated that,
even when father was using controlled substances, she was never concerned about his
parenting. Mother testified that, when the county social worker asked her about sending
the children back to school in August and getting daycare for them, mother refused to sign
the necessary releases to facilitate setting up childcare while she was at work.
Social workers M.V. and H.M. testified about their involvement with the family and
their observations of the parents ’ behavior, specifically father’s paranoia. H.M. testified
that her initial concerns were about the children’s isolation, the effect isolation would have
on their social and emotional development, and their being removed from school after
missing a significant number of school days prior to that. H.M. testified that she attempted
10
to coordinate childcare resources for the family but that the parents refused the assistance.
She also testified that wood and blankets covered the windows in the house when she
visited.
The GAL testified about her concerns based on her home visits with the family. She
discussed the condition of the home, the isolation of the children, and the parents’ behavior.
The GAL said that not being around children their own age would be harmful for the
development of the children at their ages. She also talked about her experience with other
homeschool families and the steps they take to make sure their children are interacting with
peers and are involved in their community. The GAL told the di strict court that, in her
opinion, the children were in need of protection and services.
In a written order after trial, the district court determined that the children are in
need of protection or services pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8) and (9).
Following the order, mother and father both filed motions requesting amendments to the
district court’s findings and a new trial. After a hearing on the motions, the district court
filed amended findings and denied the motions for a new trial, leaving intact its
adjudication of the children as in need of protection or services.
Each parent filed a separate appeal, and we consolidated those appeals.
DECISION
The parents make three arguments to challenge the district court’s adjudication of
their four children as in need of protection or services, asserting that the district court
(1) made clearly erroneous findings of fact; (2) abused its discretion by finding two
statutory bases for its CHIPS adjudication: that the children are without proper parental
11
care pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8), and that the children are ones whose
behavior, condition, or environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to them or
others pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(9); and (3) abused its discretion by
determining that sufficient evidence supported its adjudication of the children as in need
of protection or services as a result of the statutory findings.
For a district court to determine that a child is in need of protection or services,
Minnesota law requires that it find that at least one of the statutory child-protection grounds
under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (2024), exists and that the child needs protection or
services as a result; these statutory requirements must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 1(a) (2024); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 49.03; In re
Welfare of Child of H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d 861, 873 (Minn. 2021); In re Welfare of Child of
S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d 723, 728, 732 (Minn. App. 2009).
The district court is vested with “broad discretionary powers” when deciding
juvenile-protection matters. Hennepin Cnty. Welfare Bd. v. Booth (In re Booth),
91 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Minn. 1958) (quotation omitted) (discussing district court’s broad
discretion in custody determinations). We review a juvenile-protection order’s “factual
findings for clear error and its findings of a statutory basis for the order for abuse of
discretion.” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Minn. App. 2015),
rev. denied (Minn. July 21, 2015). “A district court abuses its discretion by making
findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a
decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d
502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). This review involves an inquiry into the
12
sufficiency of the evidence but requires deference “to the district court, which is in a
superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d at 873
(quotation omitted).
It should be kept in mind that a trial court, unlike an appellate
court, has the opportunity to see the parties as well as their
witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their actions, and
weigh the evidence in light of those factors. In the absence of
a clear abuse of discretion the action of the trial court must be
affirmed.

Booth, 91 N.W.2d at 924 (quotation omitted). We do not reverse CHIPS findings unless
they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence. In re Welfare of D.N.,
523 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 29, 1994).
We first analyze the parents’ challenge to the district court’s factual findings,
followed by their challenge to the district court’s findings of a statutory basis for CHIPS
and that the children are in need of protection or services as a result.
I. The district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous.
The parents challenge many of the factual findings presented in the district court’s
order adjudicating the children as in need of protection or services. We have reviewed the
record to confirm that each of these findings was supported, and we are satisfied that the
challenged findings were properly based on evidence in the record, including father’s and
mother’s testimony. We thus conclude that the challenged factual findings are not clearly
erroneous.
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On appeal from a district court’s CHIPS adjudication, “[w]e are . . . bound by a very
deferential standard of review [of factual findings].” S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 734.
Findings in a CHIPS proceeding will not be reversed unless
clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence.
Under the ‘clearly erroneous’ portion of this court’s review of
the district court’s findings, a district court’s individual
fact-findings will not be set aside unless the review of the entire
record leaves the court with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.

In re Welfare of B.A.B., 572 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Minn. App. 1998) (quotations omitted);
accord In re A.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 43, 50 (Minn. App. 2000).
“When the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is
immaterial that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings
to the contrary.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 223 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation omitted). When applying the clear-error standard of review, appellate courts
(1) view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings; (2) do not reweigh the evidence;
(3) do not find their own facts; and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22.
Our duty is performed when we consider all the evidence, as we have done here,
and determine that it reasonably supports the findings. See Wilson v. Moline, 47 N.W.2d
865, 870 (Minn. 1951). “[A]n appellate court need not ‘go into an extended discussion of
the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the trial court.’” Id.
at 222 (quoting Meiners v. Kennedy, 20 N.W.2d 539, 540 (Minn. 1945)); see also Wilson,
47 N.W.2d at 870 (stating that the function of an appellate court “does not require [it] to
discuss and review in detail the evidence for the purpose of demonstrating that it supports
14
the trial court’s findings”); Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 357-58 (Minn. App. 2004)
(applying this aspect of Wilson in a family-law appeal).
The parents assert clear error as to several findings, including findings about the
following: statements father made to social worker H.M. during their initial meeting; the
nature of the reports received by the county and the county’s concerns and reasons for
filing the CHIPS petition; statements contained in the county social workers’ reports;
whether father’s paranoia is cause for concern, whether father is allowed to care for the
children alone, and whether the parents refused voluntary services or increasingly isolated
their children by removing them from school and refusing to involve them in activities
outside the home; and the circumstances surrounding whether the parents would re-enroll
the children in school. But t he findings that the parents deem erroneous were supported
through testimony and exhibits admitted at trial. The parents’ argument that the district
court should have made different findings is not persuasive because, “[w]hen the record
reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that the record might
also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the contrary.” Kenney,
963 N.W.2d at 223 (quotation omitted). And, as previously stated, this court defers to the
district court’s findings because the district court is in a “superior position to assess the
credibility of witnesses.” H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d at 873 (quotation omitted).
After considering the evidence before the district court, we conclude that the record
contains ample evidence to support all of the findings that the parents challenge on appeal.
Many of the findings that the parents deem erroneous are supported by testimony from the
county social workers, father, and mother and by the case-summary notes admitted as
15
exhibits at trial. After examining the record, we are not left “with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed,” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221 (quotation
omitted), and thus, we conclude that the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that two
statutory bases existed that support a CHIPS adjudication.

The parents argue that the district court abused its discretion by ruling that a
statutory basis for a CHIPS adjudication existed under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6.
The parents maintain that they have not put their children in any harm or risk of harm and
that, without a finding that they did so, the district court’s CHIPS adjudication was not
supported. The parents point to father’s testimony explaining why the children were not
enrolled in any activities or school programming as evidence that he was not isolating the
children. The parents argue that, because they have reported that they want to get their
children involved in activities and that they understand the importance of peer interaction,
that is enough to show that the district court erred in finding they are isolating their
children.
“[W]e review the [district] court’s . . . finding of a statutory basis for the order for
abuse of discretion.” D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 321. Section 260C.007, subdivision 6, sets
forth 18 separate statutory grounds for a child to be found in need of protection or services.
The district court need find that only one of these conditions exists to determine that a child
is in need of protection or services. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 49.04, subd. 2; In re Welfare of
R.M.M., 316 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Minn. 1982).
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Here, the district court ruled that the two of the 18 statutory grounds exists: first,
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8), the children are without proper parental
care because of the emotional, mental, or physical disability, or state of immaturity of the
children’s parents, and second, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(9), the children
are ones whose behavior, condition, or environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous
to them or others . Based on our review of the record, we conclude that both statutory
grounds are established by record evidence and support the district court’s CHIPS
adjudication.
Notwithstanding their testimony, the district court found that the parents have not
taken steps to make sure their children are interacting with peers or anyone outside of their
home. From January of 2024, when the parents pulled their children out of school, to
January of 2025, when the trial occurred, the parents did not take any steps to enable the
children to participate in activities or to allow them to spend time with peers outside of the
home. The district court also found that the parents are unwilling to cooperate with the
county, participate in recommended services, access childcare resources so mother can
return to work, or allow social workers to speak privately with the children.
Based on a court-ordered mental-health assessment, the district court found that
father has previous diagnoses of PTSD; panic disorder; unspecified schizophrenia;
generalized anxiety disorder; ADHD; stimulant use disorder (amphetamine type, in
sustained remission); opioid use disorder, severe (heroin substance of choice, in early
remission); and alcohol use disorder, severe (in early partial remission). Throughout his
interactions with the county, father has shown signs of paranoia and distrust of county
17
social workers. Father continues to deny accountability for his mental health and blames
all child-protection involvement on others, including his mother-in-law, other
child-protection agencies, and the county. Thus, the evidence supports the district court’s
finding that father’s paranoia prevented him from having a full awareness of reality and
has, at times, undermined the well-being of the children—and that finding, in turn, supports
the determination that the children are without proper parental care because of the
emotional, mental, or physical disability, or state of immaturity of the children’s parents—
the statutory basis set forth in subdivision 6(8) of section 260C.007.
The district court also made findings that child 1 was bitten on her forearm by the
family dog and that, although father took child 1 to the emergency room, he left the hospital
with child 1 before she could be treated because he became angry and was experiencing
anxiety and PTSD. His decision to leave before child 1 could be treated was against
medical advice and led to the opening of a child-protection investigation. Though mother
took child 1 back to the hospital the next day to have the wound treated, father’s paranoia
and mental-health struggles prevented child 1 from receiving immediate care on the day of
her injury. The district court found the GAL’s testimony compelling and credible that the
children were dysregulated during her visits, their developmental needs are not being met,
and she was concerned about the negative impact of the parents’ isolation of the children
on their social and emotional development. The GAL explained that she had ample
experience with homeschooled children and that they are usually connected to the
community in ways outside of school, such as through sports or clubs, regular library or
swimming time, or other field trips. It also found H.M.’s and M.V.’s testimonies about
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their interactions with the family over multiple years credible, including their concerns
about the children’s home environment as a result of father’s paranoia, the parents’
isolation of the children from peers and covering windows with blankets and wood, and
the need for increased mental-health and chemical-dependency support for the parents.
The record evidence supports the district court’s findings on father’s extreme
paranoia and mother’s lack of awareness or insight around father’s mental health and that
the children’s environment was preventing the children from fulfilling their educational
and social developmental needs, undermining the well-being of the children, and placing
them at risk of harm. Moreover, the county need not demonstrate actual harm to the child—
a showing of conduct likely to be detrimental to the child’s physical or mental health is
sufficient. In re Welfare of Kidd , 261 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Minn. 1978). The continued
isolation and increasing paranoia stemming from father’s mental health have a likely risk
of further negatively affecting the children’s emotional and social development and
inhibiting the parents from properly attending to the children and their accidents and
injuries. Thus, the district court’s findings support its determination that the children are
ones whose behavior, condition, or environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to
them or others—the statutory basis set forth in subdivision 6(9) of section 260C.007.
The parents rely on S.S.W. to support a reversal of the CHIPS adjudication. In
S.S.W., this court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a CHIPS petition. 767 N.W.2d
at 725. The parents assert that their case is like that in S.S.W., in which the district court
found that “there was no evidence that S.S.W. was not providing for her child’s needs, the
19
home was neat, she behaved properly with the child, and the child appeared to be doing
well.” However, the parents misapply this court’s reasoning in S.S.W.
This court in S.S.W. held that, in interpreting Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6
(2008), when ruling a child to be in need of protection or services, a district court is given
broad discretion:
[G]iven the broad discretion entrusted to the district court when
deciding juvenile-protection matters, subdivision 6 should be
interpreted in a manner that allows the district court to render
a decision that takes into account the particular circumstances
of each case and the individual needs of children.

S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 728. This court recognized that the district court has “broad
discretionary powers” in child-protection matters and that it is crucial to allow the district
court to “consider the particular circumstances of the case and the individual needs of the
child” for each child-protection case. Id. at 731. This court stated that it was a “close case”
and that the findings could have supported a CHIPS adjudication, but given the standard
of review, this court concluded “that the district court properly exercised its discretion”
and affirmed the dismissal of the CHIPS petition. Id. at 735. The appellate court in S.S.W.
affirmed the dismissal of the CHIPS petition based largely on the district court’s order and
the extent of its discretion, not the specific facts of the case.
A reviewing court has a “limited scope of review” in child-protection cases that
does not allow us to engage in additional fact-finding or to
remand for different factual findings supporting different
conclusions. Although the record contains evidence which, if
believed, would support findings of fact more favorable to the
department, because the record contains evidence to support
the district court’s findings of fact, and because those findings
support the district court’s conclusion, we may not reverse just
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because we might have found the facts differently in the first
instance.

Id. at 733-34 (quotation omitted). That the district court could have, based on facts it found,
exercised its discretion to reach a result other than the one it reached is not a basis to reverse
the decision it made. That a certain set of facts found by a district court can generate more
than one affirmable result is inherent in the combination of (a) discretionary decisions (like
CHIPS adjudications) by a district court; and (b) appellate deference to a district court’s
discretion. Unless an appellant shows a district court’s discretionary decision is based on
a misapplication of the law or on findings that are not supported by the record, the appellant
must show that discretionary decision to be contrary to logic and the facts on record, not
the result in an allegedly similar case. See Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that, pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8), the children are without proper parental care because
of the emotional, mental, or physical disability, or state of immaturity of the children’s
parents and that, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(9), the children are ones
whose behavior, condition, or environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to them
or others; and thus, two statutory grounds exist that support the district court’s CHIPS
adjudication.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there was
sufficient evidence to find that the children are in need of protection or services.
To adjudicate a child in need of protection or services under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007,
subd. 6, the district court must find that “one of the enumerated child-protection grounds
exists and the child needs protection or services as a result.” S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 732
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(emphasis added). The district court’s determination that the children are in need of
protection or services is supported by its detailed factual findings, including those affirmed
above, and its determination that the children are at risk of harm based on the facts found.
A CHIPS adjudication does not require evidence of current abuse or neglect; “[t]he
dispositive issue . . . is whether the child in question is being abused or neglected or appears
to be presently at risk.” Id.
The district court found that the parents’ behavior and mental health were
concerning enough to warrant protection or services by the county. We agree that the
record supports the determination that the children are in need of protection or services.
The testimony from the county social workers, father, and mother and the case-summary
notes admitted as exhibits support the district court’s finding that father’s mental health
and severe paranoia are placing the children’s social and emotional development at risk.
In addition, the reported lack of concern from the parents regarding their children’s injuries
is alarming and supports the district court’s finding that the children are presently at risk
of harm.
This court has implemented a less restrictive standard when the children who are
the subject of the CHIPS petition are not being removed from the home but are found in
need of protection or services. See B.A.B., 572 N.W.2d at 779 (rejecting the application of
the “severe deprivation of education standard” in a CHIPS adjudication when “the
disposition does not involve the drastic step of removing the child from the home”). The
children in this case are not being removed from the home or the parents’ custody, but the
county filed the CHIPS petition based on its assertion that protection or services are needed
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to ensure the children’s safety, and the district court agreed. We discern no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s determination that the children are in need of protection or
services or in its ultimate CHIPS adjudication.
Affirmed.