State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0773

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joseph Daniel Shaabneh,
Appellant.

Filed March 30, 2026
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-16135

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of possession of a firearm by an ineligible
person, arguing that his out-of-state conviction did not disqualify him from possessing a
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firearm and the district court improperly prevented him from presenting an entrapment
defense. We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2022, police received information from a confidential reliable informant
(CRI) that a male was waving a gun at traffic. The CRI followed the individual, relaying
his location to the police. Police officers arrived at the location and found appellant Joseph
Daniel Shaabneh. Police discovered and removed a handgun from Shaabneh.
Shaabneh has a 2008 felony conviction for drug possession in Colorado.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Shaabneh with possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person. Shaabneh moved the district court to dismiss the charge for lack of
probable cause and to suppress the gun.
During an omnibus hearing, Shaabneh stated that he wanted to raise an entrapment
defense. The district court told Shaabneh that to submit an entrapment defense, he would
need to waive his right to a jury trial on the issue, and then the district court would conduct
either an omnibus hearing or an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Shaabneh responded
that he thought he was at an omnibus hearing and was raising the entrapment defense.
The district court told Shaabneh to inform the state and the district court of the facts
supporting his entrapment defense. Shaabneh asserted that his truck had been stolen, and
that the CRI, whom he believed to be L.C., 1 lured him downtown to retrieve the truck.

1 At no time during the omnibus hearing did the state or the court disclose the identity of
the CRI. Shaabneh stated he knew that the CRI was L.C. because “only two people . . .
knew [he] was downtown that night.”
3
Shaabneh stated that L.C. knew that he kept “a firearm in [his] home for home protection,”
and led him downtown for the police to arrest him.
The district court told Shaabneh that those facts did not indicate entrapment because
“the issue isn’t [whether] they [guided] you to a spot where you could be arrested, the issue
is [whether] they entrap you by telling you [to] bring a gun, or hold this gun, or do
something else with regard to the gun.” Shaabneh added the fact that L.C. told him that
the people who had his truck were “armed.” The district court then concluded that
Shaabneh had “at least a callable [sic] claim of entrapment.”
The district court judge then indicated that it would not retain the matter because
the judge was switching assignments. The district court judge directed Shaabneh to
provide the state with a written notice of intent to raise the entrapment defense, as required
by the rules of criminal procedure.
At a pretrial hearing before the different district court judge, Shaabneh asserted that
his Colorado conviction did not disqualify him from possessing a firearm under Minnesota
statutes, and he reasserted his entrapment defense. The district court concluded that
(1) Shaabneh’s Colorado conviction met the statutory definition of a crime of violence,
which disqualified him from possessing a firearm, and (2) after reviewing the record,
Shaabneh failed to meet his requisite burden for the entrapment defense. Shaabneh did not
waive his right to a jury trial on the entrapment issue.
A jury found Shaabneh guilty as charged. The district court sentenced Shaabneh to
36 months in prison. This appeal followed.
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DECISION
Entrapment Defense
Shaabneh argues that the district court erred by preventing him from raising an
entrapment defense. When a district court rejects an entrapment defense at an omnibus
hearing, we review its factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
State v. Garcia, 927 N.W.2d 338, 343 (Minn. App. 2019).
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a complete defense at trial.
State v. Cruz, 997 N.W.2d 537, 548 (Minn. 2023). However, that right is not absolute; the
court may limit a defendant’s arguments to prevent jury confusion. State v. Atkinson,
774 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 2009).
“[A]n entrapment defense exists where the government has lured the accused into
committing an offense which he otherwise would not have committed and has no intention
of committing.” State v. Johnson, 511 N.W.2d 753, 754-55 (Minn. App. 1994) (quotation
omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 1994). A defendant asserting an entrapment defense
must choose to submit the defense to the jury or the court. Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.02,
subd. 1(6)(a). To submit the entrapment defense to the court, the defendant must first
waive their right to a jury trial on the matter. Id., subd. 1(6)(b). The district court must
advise the defendant of the jury-trial right, and the defendant must waive the right
personally, in writing, or on the record in open court, after consulting with counsel.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2). The defendant must make the waiver knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently, based on the unique facts and circumstances of the case.
State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 882 (Minn. 2014). An entrapment defense is presumed to
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go to the jury unless indicated by the defendant. State v. Ford, 276 N.W.2d 178, 179
(Minn. 1979).
Here, the district court told Shaabneh that he must waive his jury- trial right before
he could submit the entrapment defense to the court for a determination. However,
Shaabneh did not waive his jury-trial right at that time. Instead, he told the district court
that he thought the current hearing was an omnibus hearing, and he wanted to submit the
issue to the court. Similarly, at the subsequent pretrial hearing, there was no discussion of
waiving any jury-trial right. Based on the record, we cannot con clude that Shaabneh
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial on the entrapment
defense. The district court erred in restricting Shaabneh from raising the entrapment
defense to the jury.
We must next determine whether the district court’s constitutional error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 310, 331 (Minn. 2016). To
successfully raise an entrapment defense, the defendant bears an initial burden of showing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that law enforcement induced their actions.
Cruz, 997 N.W.2d at 550. This proffer is viewed in the light most favorable to the
defendant. See id. If a defendant meets this burden, the state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. Id.
Shaabneh did not meet his proffer burden. Even if we presume, without deciding,
that the CRI was L.C., and L.C. did persuade Shaabneh to travel downtown to repossess
his vehicle, Shaabneh failed to show that L.C. induced him to possess a firearm. To the
contrary, Shaabneh admitted several times to possessing the firearm for “prophylactic”
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purposes before any interaction with L.C. In other words, Shaabneh possessed the firearm
illegally before any inducement could have occurred. Had Shaabneh brought the same
assertion with evidence at trial, and the district court declined to give an entrapment
instruction to the jury, that decision would not have been erroneous. Thus, the district
court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Crime of Violence
In his pro se supplemental brief, Shaabneh argues that the district court erred by
concluding that his Colorado conviction barred him from possessing a firearm under
Minnesota law.
2 Because the issue involves statutory interpretation, we review it de novo.
See State v. Martin, 941 N.W.2d 119, 124-25 (Minn. 2020) (reviewing de novo whether an
out-of-state offense is equivalent to a Minnesota offense).
In Minnesota, a person is ineligible to possess a firearm if they were convicted of a
“crime of violence.” Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (202 2). “[C]rime of violence
includes crimes in other states or jurisdictions which would have been crimes of violence
. . . if they had been committed in this state.” Id. In other words, if an out-of-state crime
meets the same elements for a Minnesota crime of violence, it is also a crime of violence
for the purposes of section 624.713, subdivision 1(2). See Martin, 941 N.W.2d at 124
(analyzing whether predatory offender registration was required in Minnesota based on
out-of-state conviction).

2 Shaabneh argues that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to support the conviction because
his Colorado conviction was not a “crime of violence” under Minnesota law. However,
whether a crime constitutes a crime of violence is a legal determination; thus, the issue is
for the court to determine. See Underwood v. State, 25 N.W.3d 26, 39 n.16 (Minn. 2025).
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Shaabneh has a felony conviction in Colorado for drug possession. He does not
argue that the Colorado crime does not have the same or similar elements as a Minnesota
felony drug-possession conviction that constitutes a crime of violence. Instead, Shaabneh
asserts that Colorado’s criminal law has changed, and drug possession is no longer a crime;
consequently, the “amelioration doctrine” requires that his 2008 conviction be evaluated
under current Colorado law. Shaabneh misunderstands the amelioration doctrine.
Shaabneh has a drug- possession conviction from 2008 in Colorado. He fails to
identify which amendment to Colorado law he relies upon. W e will presume that he is
referring to a change nearest to his conviction date. An amendment in 2010 removed
“simple possession from [Colorado Revised Statutes,] section 18-18- 405 and recodif[ied]
it as section 18-18-403.5.” See People v. Gonzales, 415 P.3d 846, 849 n.2 (Colo. App.
2017). This change occurred approximately two years after Shaabne h’s conviction. The
amelioration doctrine does not apply in this case. Our supreme court has stated that the
amelioration doctrine does not apply if final judgment has been entered before the criminal-
law amendment takes effect. See State v. Loveless, 987 N.W.2d 224, 238 (Minn. 2023).
The district court did not err by concluding that Shaabneh’s Colorado conviction qualified
as a “crime of violence” in Minnesota, making him ineligible to possess a firearm.
Affirmed.