State of Minnesota v. Terry Izeal Heggs

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0785

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Terry Izeal Heggs,
Appellant.

Filed May 26, 2026
Reversed
Johnson, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CR-22-2267

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Heather Kjos Schmit, Assistant County
Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Kirk,

Judge. ∗

SYLLABUS

The state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly failed

to register as a predatory offender by providing an address that was both his workplace

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
∗

to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

address and his secondary address without specifying that the address was his secondary

address.

OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge

A Mower County jury found Terry Izeal Heggs guilty of failing to register as a

predatory offender. The state’s theory at trial was that Heggs violated the statute by not

specifying that his workplace address, where he regularly or occasionally stayed overnight,

also was his secondary address. We conclude that the state did not prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that Heggs knowingly violated the predatory-offender-registration

statute. Therefore, we reverse the conviction.

FACTS

On November 19, 2022, at approximately 8:00 a.m., police officers were dispatched

to a restaurant in the city of Austin to investigate a 911 hang-up call. When officers arrived

and entered the restaurant, they found Heggs, who worked at the restaurant, and a woman

with whom he had been in an intimate relationship. The officers spoke with the woman

and arrested Heggs.

While inside the restaurant, officers saw a room that was furnished with a mattress,

a cushioned chair, and a television. Officers also noticed men’s clothing in the room, which

led one officer to believe that Heggs was staying overnight in the room. In a warranted

search of the premises two days later, a detective found men’s personal-care products, a

full-size bath towel hanging in an adjacent half-bathroom, and a suitcase that contained

documents bearing Heggs’s name.

2

The state charged Heggs with four offenses: (1) failure to register as a predatory

offender, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a)(1) (2022); (2) violation of a

domestic-abuse-no-contact order, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 629.75 subd. 2(c) (2022);

(3) domestic assault, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 2, (2022); and

(4) interference with an emergency call, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.78, subd. 2(1)

(2022).

The case was tried to a jury on three days in April 2023. The state called six

witnesses and introduced 32 exhibits. Among the state’s witnesses was a special agent

employed by the state bureau of criminal apprehension (BCA) who was responsible for

monitoring predatory-offender registrations. She testified generally about the predatory-

offender-registration system and the BCA’s record-keeping, stated that she had never met

Heggs, and stated that she had reviewed the BCA’s file on Heggs.

During the special agent’s testimony, the state introduced exhibit 21, a five-page

“Change of Information” form bearing a BCA logo. Heggs used the form to change his

registered primary address approximately one month before his arrest. The form consists

of 15 parts with various headings. Under the heading “Current Primary Address,” Heggs

handwrote his new primary address. Under the heading “Current Employment

Information,” Heggs handwrote the address of the restaurant where he worked. The part

of the form with the heading “Current Secondary and Other Addresses” was left blank.

Similarly, the state introduced exhibit 23, a five-page “Address Verification Form,”

which Heggs signed approximately three weeks before his arrest. Most of the information

in exhibit 23 is typed, including the address of Heggs’s primary residence and his

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workplace address. The part of the address-verification form with the heading “New

Secondary Address” was left blank. Heggs also initialed 27 paragraphs that recite the

duties of a person required to register as a predatory offender, as directed by the form.

Heggs did not testify. After the state rested, Heggs moved for a judgment of

acquittal. The district court granted the motion with respect to counts 2 and 4. Counts 1

and 3 were submitted to the jury. In the prosecutor’s closing argument, she stated, with

respect to the failure-to-register charge in count 1, that the evidence showed that when

Heggs was arrested at his workplace, he had been staying overnight there for five or more

days but had not registered the workplace address as a secondary address. The jury found

Heggs guilty of the charges in counts 1 and 3.

Heggs filed a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal. The district court granted

the motion and acquitted Heggs of the charges in counts 1 and 3. With respect to the

failure-to-register charge in count 1, the district court concluded that “the circumstantial

evidence is simply insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant

occasionally stayed overnight at” the restaurant. The state appealed. This court reasoned,

with respect to the failure-to-register charge in count 1, that “[g]iven the nature and volume

of personal property in the break room, the only reasonable inference is that a man was

regularly staying overnight in that room, had been doing so for some time, and planned to

continue doing so.” State v. Heggs, A23-1254, 2024 WL 3493817, at *3 (Minn. App.

July 22, 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 19, 2024). We further reasoned that “the only

reasonable inference is that Heggs was the man staying there regularly.” Id. Accordingly,

we concluded that the state’s evidence was sufficient to support Heggs’s conviction of

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failure to register for the reasons stated by the district court. Id. But we concluded that the

evidence was insufficient to support Heggs’s conviction of the domestic-assault charge in

count 3. Id. Accordingly, we affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of

judgment and sentencing on the failure-to-register charge. Id. at *3-4. On remand, the

district court imposed a sentence of 36 months of imprisonment.

Heggs appeals. He makes four arguments for reversal of his failure-to-register

conviction, all of which are presented in the alternative. First, Heggs argues that the state

did not prove that he regularly or occasionally stayed overnight at his workplace address,

as necessary to establish that his workplace address was his secondary address. Second,

he argues that, even if the state proved that he regularly or occasionally stayed overnight

at his workplace address, the state did not prove that he began doing so five or more days

before his arrest. Third, he argues that the state did not prove that he violated the predatory-

offender-registration statute by providing an address that was both his workplace address

and his secondary address without specifying that the address was his secondary address.

And fourth, he argues that the state did not prove that he knowingly violated the predatory-

offender-registration statute. We need consider only the third and fourth arguments, which

are inter-related and are dispositive of the appeal. 1

We nonetheless note that, if we were to consider Heggs’s first argument, we would
1

conclude that the argument is barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine because the issue was
conclusively determined in the prior appeal. See Heggs, 2024 WL 3493817, at *3; see also
Smith v. State, 974 N.W.2d 576, 582 (Minn. 2022); Lynch v. State, 749 N.W.2d 318, 321
(Minn. 2008).

5

ISSUE

Did the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Heggs knowingly failed to

register as a predatory offender by providing an address that was both his workplace

address and his secondary address without specifying that the address was his secondary

address?

ANALYSIS

To determine whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, this court

undertakes “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when

viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient.” State v. Jones, 977

N.W.2d 177, 187 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). We “carefully examine the record to

determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit

the factfinder to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 900

(Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “We assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses

and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Friese, 959 N.W.2d 205, 214 (Minn.

2021) (quotation omitted).

The above-described standard of review applies so long as a conviction is

adequately supported by direct evidence. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016).

If a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, we apply a heightened standard of

review with a two-step analysis. State v. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d 468, 478 (Minn. 2026); State

v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). At the first step of the circumstantial-evidence

analysis, we “identify the ‘circumstances proved.’” State v. Isaac, 9 N.W.3d 812, 815

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(Minn. 2024) (quoting State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 890 (Minn. 2021)). “The first

step requires us to ‘winnow down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions

of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict,’ which results in ‘a subset of facts that constitute the

circumstances proved.’” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478 (quoting State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d

592, 600 (Minn. 2017)).

At the second step of the analysis, we “consider whether the reasonable inferences

that can be drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and not as

discrete, isolated facts, are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and

inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478

(quotations omitted). At the second step, we independently examine the reasonableness of

the inferences drawn from the circumstances proved. See id. at 483. We do not give

deference to the jury’s verdict at this step. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn.

2017).

A.

A person who has been convicted of certain crimes is required to register as a

predatory offender. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1) (2022). A person required to

register as a predatory offender shall register with the assigned corrections agent or, if there

is no such agent, with the local law-enforcement authority. Id., subd. 3(a). The registration

“must consist of a statement in writing signed by the person, giving information required

by the bureau,” as well as fingerprints, a DNA sample, and a photograph. Id., subd. 4(a).

The information that must be included in a predatory-offender registration is

described in the statute:

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A person required to register under this section shall
provide to the corrections agent or law enforcement authority
the following information:

(1) the person’s primary address;[2]

(2) all of the person’s secondary addresses[3] in
Minnesota, including all addresses used for residential or
recreational purposes;

(3) the addresses of all Minnesota property owned,
leased, or rented by the person;

(4) the addresses of all locations where the person is
employed;

(5) the addresses of all schools where the person is
enrolled;

(6) the year, model, make, license plate number, and
color of all motor vehicles owned or regularly driven by the
person;

(7) the expiration year for the motor vehicle license
plate tabs of all motor vehicles owned by the person; and

(8) all telephone numbers including work, school,
and home and any cellular telephone service.

Id., subd. 4a(a).

A person required to register as a predatory offender must update a previous

registration if there is a change in circumstances that makes the previously provided

2
The term “primary address” is defined by the statute to mean “the mailing address”
or “the physical location” of “the person’s dwelling.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1a(h).
3
The term “secondary address” is defined by the statute to mean “the mailing
address” or “the physical location” of “any place where the person regularly or occasionally
stays overnight when not staying at the person’s primary address.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 1a(j).

8

information no longer valid. Id., subd. 4a(b). A person who knows or reasonably should

know that he or she has a duty to register is guilty of a felony if the person “knowingly

commits an act or fails to fulfill a requirement that violates any provision of” section

243.166. Id., subd. 5(a)(1).

B.

For his third argument, Heggs argues that the state’s evidence is insufficient as a

matter of law to prove that he failed to register a secondary address. He notes the

undisputed evidence that he “provided the . . . address to law enforcement when he updated

his registration information in October 2022.” He asserts that he “complied with the

registration statute’s requirement that he provide the address to law enforcement.” He

contends that the registration statute does not require a predatory offender to provide the

required information in any particular format or manner and, thus, did not require him to

provide his workplace address twice and to specify that it was both his workplace address

and his secondary address. For his fourth argument, Heggs argues that the state did not

prove that he knowingly violated the predatory-offender-registration statute.

The relevant subdivision of the statute states, “A person required to register under

this section shall provide . . . the following information: . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 243.166,

subd. 4a(a) (emphasis added). That subdivision then lists eight categories of information

that must be provided. Id. Heggs is correct that the relevant subdivision does not expressly

require a predatory offender to present the required information in any particular format or

manner. See id. In addition, subdivision 4a(a) does not expressly require a predatory

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offender to specify the statutory category or categories that apply to the information

provided. See id.

The state argues, “It is clear that Appellant [must] list both a secondary address and

a work address separately, even if they are the same address.” The state does not cite any

statutory provision or caselaw in support of that assertion. Contrary to the state’s position,

subdivision 4a does not expressly require a predatory offender to provide an address

“separately” or multiple times within the same registration if the address is responsive to

multiple paragraphs of section 243.166, subdivision 4a(a). The state also contends that

“[t]he registration forms are clear in that each required piece of information is listed on the

form separately.” But the registration forms do not determine Heggs’s obligations under

the predatory-offender-registration statute; he may be convicted of a crime only if he

violates a requirement imposed by the statute. The state’s arguments appear to be a request

that this court impose additional obligations that are not found in the plain language of the

statute. The supreme court repeatedly has stated that an appellate court may not “add words

or phrases not supplied by the Legislature to an unambiguous statute.” Underwood v. State,

25 N.W.3d 26, 36 (Minn. 2025); see also In re Commitment of Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711,

716 (Minn. 2024); State v. Schwartz, 957 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Minn. 2021).

In State v. Munger, 858 N.W.2d 814 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 25,

2015), the appellant was convicted of failing to register based on evidence that he did not

give written notice to his corrections agent of a change in his employment. Id. at 817-18.

On appeal, the appellant argued that he complied with the registration statute by giving

oral notice of his change in employment. Id. at 819. We agreed, noting that, although the

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registration statute requires a written notice for initial registrations and new primary

addresses, it requires merely that predatory offenders “immediately inform” the assigned

corrections agent or the local law-enforcement authority of other changes in circumstances.

Id. at 819-20. We reasoned that “the legislature has not expressly required written notice

of changes in circumstances that invalidate reported information under subdivision 4a(b)”

and that the absence of such statutory language “demonstrates that changes in

circumstances, such as changes in employment, do not need to be in writing.” Id. at 820.

The present case is similar to Munger inasmuch as the legislature required predatory

offenders to provide information that is responsive to the eight categories of information

described in section 243.166, subdivision 4a(a), but did not expressly require a predatory

offender to specify the applicable statutory category or categories if information is

responsive to multiple paragraphs of section 243.166, subdivision 4a(a).

Given the evidence presented at trial and this court’s prior opinion, the state proved

that Heggs’s workplace address also was his secondary address. See Heggs, 2024 WL

3493817, at *3. Accordingly, Heggs was required by both the second and fourth

paragraphs of section 243.166, subdivision 4a(a), to provide that address. Exhibit 21 shows

that, when Heggs signed a change-of-information form on October 17, 2022, he provided

the address, albeit not under the heading “Current Secondary and Other Addresses.”

Exhibit 23 shows that, when Heggs signed an address-verification form on October 31,

2022, he provided the address, albeit not under the heading “New Secondary Address.”

We need not decide whether Heggs complied with or violated the statutory

requirement that he register a secondary address because, for the reasons stated below, we

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conclude that the state did not prove that he knowingly violated the statute. The statute

provides that a person who knows or reasonably should know of the person’s duty to

register is guilty of a felony if the person “knowingly commits an act or fails to fulfill a

requirement that violates any provision of” the statute. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a)(1)

(emphasis added). “The plain text of the statute suggests that the defendant must know

that he is violating the statute when the violation occurs.” State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d

600, 603 (Minn. 2017). A defendant’s “knowledge of the law at the time of the violation

is an element of the offense,” id. at 604, and a defendant’s “mistake of law is a defense

because it negates the existence of the required mental state,” id. at 603. In analyzing

whether Heggs knowingly violated the statute, we assume without deciding that—as the

state argues—the statute required him to specify that his workplace address also was his

secondary address and that he failed to properly provide his secondary address by

completing the change-of-information and address-verification forms without specifying

that his workplace address also was his secondary address, such as by writing that address

multiple times in multiple parts of the forms.

If knowledge of the law is an element of a criminal offense, a defendant’s

knowledge typically is proved with circumstantial evidence. See State v. Lehman, 3

N.W.3d 875, 878-80 (Minn. 2024); see also State v. Alarcon, 932 N.W.2d 641, 647-50

(Minn. 2019) (analyzing circumstantial evidence in failure-to-register case and reversing

conviction). In this case, the state sought to prove Heggs’s knowledge of the law at the

time of the alleged offense with circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, we apply the

circumstantial-evidence standard of review.

12

At the first step of the analysis, we must identify the circumstances proved relevant

to whether Heggs knowingly violated the predatory-offender-registration statute by not

specifying that his workplace address also was his secondary address. See Firkus, 31

N.W.3d at 478; see also Alarcon, 932 N.W.2d at 648-49 (identifying circumstances proved

relevant to whether appellant knowingly violated predatory-offender-registration statute by

not registering primary address). Neither party attempts to identify the circumstances

proved relevant to whether Heggs knowingly violated the predatory-offender-registration

statute. We identify the following relevant circumstances proved. Approximately one

month before his arrest, Heggs signed a change-of-information form on which he

handwrote his workplace address under the heading “Current Employment Information”

but left blank the part of the form under the heading “Current Secondary and Other

Addresses.” Approximately three weeks before his arrest, Heggs signed an address-

verification form on which his workplace address was pre-printed, but the part of the form

under the heading “New Secondary Address” was left blank. At the time of his arrest,

Heggs was “regularly staying overnight” at his workplace address. Heggs, 2024 WL

3493817, at *3. 4

4
The state relies in part on the testimony of the BCA special agent. She testified
that she had never met Heggs but had reviewed the BCA’s file on him. Based on her review
of Heggs’s prior registrations, she testified generally that Heggs knew that he was required
to register as a predatory offender. But she did not testify about whether Heggs knew or
believed that he was required to specify that his workplace address also was his secondary
address, such as by writing that address multiple times in multiple parts of the change-of-
information and address-verification forms. Thus, we do not include any facts stated by
the special agent in the circumstances proved.

13

At the second step of the analysis, we must determine whether “the circumstances

proved, when viewed as a whole,” are consistent with guilt. See Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478

(quotation omitted). The state contends that Heggs “knew of his duty to register both a

secondary address and a work address on the registration forms.” The state’s contention

does not refer specifically to whether Heggs knew or believed that he was required to

specify that his workplace address also was his secondary address, such as by writing that

address multiple times in multiple parts of the change-of-information and address-

verification forms, which we assume to be the applicable law. Nonetheless, one reasonable

inference that may be drawn from the circumstances proved is that Heggs knew or believed

that he was required to be more specific when providing information to ensure that the

registration forms effectively communicated that his workplace address also was his

secondary address.

Next, we must determine whether the circumstances proved are “inconsistent with

any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” See Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478 (quotations

omitted). Heggs contends that one reasonable inference from the circumstances proved is

that he “believed he was in compliance with his registration by registering the restaurant

as his employment address and that he was not violating the registration statute by not also

listing it as a secondary address.” The state does not specifically respond to Heggs’s

identification of a hypothesis that is inconsistent with guilt. The state contends only that

Heggs “knew of his duty to register both a secondary address and a work address on the

registration forms.” But the precise question is whether Heggs knew or believed that, to

comply with the statute, he was required to specify that his workplace address also was his

14

secondary address, such as by writing that address multiple times in multiple parts of the

change-of-information and address-verification forms. The state contends that Heggs’s

knowledge may be inferred from the fact that he initialed each paragraph of a 27-paragraph

recitation of registration requirements in the address-verification form. But nowhere in

that form is there a statement that a person in Heggs’s circumstances is required to specify

that a workplace address also is a secondary address, such as by writing that address

multiple times in multiple parts of a form.

Heggs’s asserted hypothesis is a rational hypothesis and is inconsistent with guilt.

Within one month before the alleged offense, Heggs twice provided the address where he

worked and where (it has been established) he regularly or occasionally stayed overnight.

See Heggs, 2024 WL 3493817, at *3. Heggs did not conceal the address that the state

contends was not properly provided. 5 The state’s theory of a registration violation depends

on a highly technical interpretation of the predatory-offender-registration statute. If we

assume that the state is correct in its interpretation of the statute, the state would be required

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Heggs interpreted the statute in the same manner

and, thus, had “knowledge of the law at the time of the violation.” See Mikulak, 903

N.W.2d at 604. In other words, the state would be required to prove that Heggs subjectively

believed that he was required to specify that his workplace address also was his secondary

5
Heggs’s conduct stands in contrast with the conduct of other persons who have
been convicted of failing to register as a predatory offender because they neglected or
refused to communicate any information required by statute. See, e.g., State v. Larson, 980
N.W.2d 592, 595 (Minn. 2022); State v. Martin, 941 N.W.2d 119, 121 (Minn. 2020); State
v. Washington, 908 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Minn. 2018); Weitzel v. State, 883 N.W.2d 553, 555
(Minn. 2016); State v. Jones, 729 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2007).

15

address or to provide that address multiple times and that he chose to violate the law by not

doing so. The conclusion that Heggs knew or believed that he was required to do more

than he actually did is not the only reasonable inference that may be drawn from the

circumstances proved. As Heggs contends, another reasonable inference is that he believed

that he was complying with the statute. Accordingly, we conclude that the circumstances

proved are not “inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” See Firkus, 31

N.W.3d at 478 (quotations omitted).

Thus, the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to prove that Heggs knowingly

violated the predatory-offender-registration statute.

DECISION

In sum, the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Heggs knowingly

failed to register as a predatory offender.

Reversed.

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