State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0790

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joshua Gunnar Olson,
Appellant.

Filed May 11, 2026
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-23-243

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Elisabeth M. Johnson, Assistant County
Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Segal,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions for theft and unlawful possession of a firearm,
arguing that he is entitled to their reversal because (1) the evidence supporting his
convictions was insufficient, (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial
counsel declined to file a writ of prohibition , (3) the district court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss pursuant to the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act
(UMDDA), Minn. Stat. § 629.292 (2024), and (4) he is entitled to additional jail credit for
the time he spent in federal custody. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 28, 2022, officers were dispatched to a report of theft of a firearm at a
residence in Scott County.1 Officers arrived at the residence and interviewed A.H. A.H.
told officers that she had recently met appellant Joshua Gunnar Olson while she was
working at a gas station and he was a customer. A.H. and Olson had spent time together,
and their relationship became romantic in nature. A.H. owned multiple firearms, including
a pistol. One night, A.H. and Olson took A.H.’s firearms, including the pistol, and “drove
around and shot at the ditches.” A.H. reported that Olson had expressed interest in the
pistol, had asked her for it—which she declined—and had seen where she kept the pistol
and her other firearms in a closet in her bedroom.

1 We draw the facts from the transcripts of the proceedings and the record before the district
court and construe them in the light most favorable to the verdict.
3
On the night of the alleged theft, Olson called A.H., distraught because he had been
kicked out of the place where he was staying and had nowhere to go. A.H. told Olson that
he could come over to her house to take a shower and that she would make him some food.
When Olson came over, he and A.H. spent some time in her bedroom, where he again made
a comment that he wanted her pistol and A.H. again said no. They both showered, and
A.H. went downstairs to make food for Olson. During this time, A.H.’s adult son, J.H.,
was downstairs playing video games and Olson stayed in A.H.’s bedroom. J.H. reported
to officers that, at one point, he heard a loud sound “like something breaking” come from
A.H.’s bedroom while Olson was in there alone and that, shortly thereafter, Olson came
downstairs “bear-hugging” a pile of his clothes and a towel. Olson told A.H. that he needed
to run his things out to his car and that he would be right back. Olson then left the house.
Olson did not return, and after some time, A.H. went out to check on him and noticed
that his car was gone. She then went into her bedroom and saw that the pistol was missing.
J.H. told A.H. that she should call the police and report the pistol stolen. After talking to
the police, A.H. spoke on the phone to Olson, who threatened her after he learned that she
called the police. J.H. overheard Olson say to A.H. that he could make her disappear. The
next day, A.H. and J.H. gave statements to the police.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Olson with theft in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020) (count 1), and unlawful possession of a firearm in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020) (count 2).
In November 2022, A.H. correctly identified Olson in a photo lineup, and in January
2023, a warrant was issued for his arrest. Olson was never found with the pistol, and the
4
pistol was never recovered. A.H. reported to law enforcement that, at the time of trial, she
had moved residences twice since the night of the incident and still never had located the
pistol.
On May 3, 2024, the Minnesota Board of Public Defense contacted the Scott County
Justice Center to inform officers that Olson was incarcerated in a federal prison in
Massachusetts and that Olson wanted to address the Minnesota warrant. Olson’s counsel
then filed a motion with the district court to dismiss the theft and unlawful-possession
charges pursuant to the UMDDA,2 stating that Olson had been in “state or federal custody”
since the warrant was issued.
In August 2024, the parties appeared for a contested omnibus hearing regarding the
UMDDA motion. Olson appeared via videoconference as he was in federal custody at
Sherburne County Jail in Elk River. Olson stated on the record that he had been in custody
on federal charges since August 1, 2022. The federal charges were based on different facts
than the Minnesota charges. Olson stated that he had not yet filed for disposition of the
Minnesota detainer pursuant to the UMDDA and claimed to have not been given notice of
the Minnesota detainer; he also asserted that the federal charges were still pending and that
he had not yet appeared for an arraignment on the federal charges. Olson stated that, while
he was in custody, he participated in a federal competency-restoration program from
December 7, 2023, to May 5, 2024, and was restored to competency on April 20; however,
he offered no evidence of the program other than his testimony.

2 The UMDDA is designed to provide a speedy trial for prisoners who face additional
criminal charges.
5
In October 2024, the district court denied Olson’s motion to dismiss the theft and
unlawful-possession charges under the UMDDA. The district court found that Olson was
not serving a “term of imprisonment” as required for the UMDDA to apply because he was
detained pending federal charges and “has not plead[ed ] guilty, been convicted of, or
sentenced on the before mentioned pending charges.”
At the next hearing, Olson appeared before a different judicial officer, Judge
Colleen King, and requested a speedy trial. The file showed that Olson had not previously
requested a speedy trial, and Judge King set the trial date for January 2025. Olson
subsequently filed a notice to remove Judge King pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03,
subd. 14(4), and the district court denied removal as untimely.
Olson’s counsel then submitted a letter to the Chief Judge of the First Judicial
District requesting review of the order denying the notice of removal, arguing that the
notice was timely and asking that the chief judge review the matter “in the interests of
justice.” The state responded via letter that Judge King properly denied the removal
because “she already presided over and decided a critical issue” at the November 26
hearing. The chief judge declined to act on the matter, concluding that she had no authority
to do so absent a request to remove for cause.
In January 2025, the parties appeared before the chief judge for a hearing at which
Olson requested that the district court require his counsel to file a writ of prohibition with
the court of appeals in response to the denial of his removal request. Olson recited
6
Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 1.23 to assert that his counsel was required to
follow his directives regarding actions throughout the proceedings and that his counsel was
refusing to file a writ of prohibition, contrary to Olson’s wishes. Olson clarified that he
did not want new representation— his counsel was an “extremely proficient litigator,” and
Olson “trust[ed] his ability 100 percent”—but he wanted the district court to order his
counsel to file the writ . The chief judge explained that, if Olson was unhappy with his
counsel’s representation, then he could hire an attorney or represent himself, but the court
would not direct his counsel to take a particular legal action. Olson stated that he wanted
to keep his counsel, and the trial date was confirmed for later that month.
In January 2025, Judge King presided over Olson’s three-day jury trial. During
opening statements, the state presented its theory of the case —that Olson and A.H. spent
time together before the offense occurred and Olson then stole her pistol.
A.H. testified that Olson was the one who stole her pistol—that they had gone
shooting together in the past and he asked her then to give the pistol to him; that he came
over to her house the night of the incident and asked for her pistol again; and that, after he
came down from her bedroom bear-hugging a pile of clothes, the pistol was missing. She
also stated that the only people in the house that night were herself, her son J.H., and Olson.
During A.H.’s cross-examination, Olson’s counsel pointed out discrepancies in A.H.’s
story—asserting that A.H. told one officer that the last time she had seen the pistol before

3 The portion of the rule that Olson recited reads, “[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and as required by Rule 1.4, shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.” Minn. R. Prof.
Conduct 1.2(a).
7
it went missing was the day of the incident but told another officer it had been two days
prior. J.H. also testified, stating that he was present the night of the incident and heard a
loud noise while Olson was in A.H.’s bedroom alone, that Olson was “cradling his clothes”
when he came downstairs, and that it seemed like Olson was in a rush to leave. J.H. also
testified that he overheard the phone conversation between A.H. and Olson later that night
and that, during the call, after A.H. told Olson that she called the police because her pistol
was missing, J.H. heard Olson threaten A.H.
The jury found Olson guilty of theft and unlawful possession of a firearm.
After the trial concluded, the Scott County Attorney informed Judge King that Olson
was attempting to obtain the home addresses of the judge, prosecutor, and public defender
on his case. Judge King thereafter recused herself from further proceedings, and a different
district court judge presided over the proceedings that followed. Before sentencing, Olson
filed a motion requesting that the district court require his counsel to take certain actions
in the proceedings but reiterating that he did not want to dismiss his counsel. The district
court denied Olson’s motion, determining that Olson’s counsel was prohibited by the
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct from filing motions he could not ethically
present to the court and that, because of this, the court could not require counsel to file any
specific motions.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court determined that, based on State v. Roy ,
928 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 2019), Olson was not eligible for credit for his time served in
8
federal custody because he was being held on separate charges in another jurisdiction. 4
Olson requested a downward durational sentencing departure, which the district court
denied. The district court then sentenced Olson to 30 months’ imprisonment on count 1
and 60 months’ imprisonment on count 2, to run concurrently, and ordered him to pay $580
in restitution.
Olson appeals.
DECISION
Olson challenges his convictions, arguing that the state did not present sufficient
evidence at trial to support them and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He
also argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss his case
pursuant to the UMDDA and when it denied him jail credit for the time he spent in federal
custody. We consider each argument in turn.
I. The state presented sufficient evidence at trial to sustain the jury’s verdicts.
Olson argues that the state’s evidence was insufficient to establish that he possessed
A.H.’s pistol on the night of the alleged theft. Olson asserts that the evidence did not
“eliminate rational hypotheses inconsistent with Olson’s guilt, such as another person
taking the gun and ammunition,” and that, therefore, his convictions should be reversed.
To support a conviction for theft, the state must prove that the defendant
“intentionally and without claim of right takes, uses, transfers, conceals or retains
possession of movable property of another without the other’s consent and with intent to

4 The district court determined that Olson had 154 days of jail credit because he was held
for 154 days specific to these charges.
9
deprive the owner permanently of possession of the property.” Minn. Stat. § 609.52,
subd. 2(a)(1). To support a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, the state must
prove that the defendant (1) was ineligible to possess a firearm on the date of the alleged
offense and (2) knowingly possessed a firearm. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2); see also
State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2017).
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and “determine whether, given the
facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury
could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.” State v.
Smith, 9 N.W.3d 543, 564-65 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).
Olson specifically challenges only whether the state presented sufficient evidence
that he was in possession of the pistol, which is an element of each of his convictions. The
state can prove this element by establishing actual or constructive possession. Harris,
895 N.W.2d at 601. Actual possession is proved by showing that an individual physically
possessed an item. State v. Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975). Constructive
possession may be proved in one of two ways: by showing either (1) that “the police found
the [contraband] in a place under the defendant’s exclusive control to which other people
normally did not have access” or (2) “that there is a strong probability (inferable from other
evidence) that at the time the defendant was consciously or knowingly exercising dominion
and control over [the contraband].” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601; see also State v. Salyers,
858 N.W.2d 156, 159 -60 (Minn. 2015) (referring to these as Florine’s first and second
prongs, respectively).
10
Here, because the state based its case on Olson’s actual possession of the pistol, we
focus our review on whether the state provided sufficient evidence to prove that Olson had
actual, rather than constructive, possession. The state can prove this element with either
direct or circumstantial evidence. See State v. Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Minn. App.
2016). Direct evidence is “based on personal knowledge or observation and, . . . if true,
proves a fact without inference or presumption.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation
omitted). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether
the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, the state used circumstantial evidence to prove actual possession. When the
state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of an offense, we apply a
heightened two-step standard. State v. Ulrich, 3 N.W.3d 1, 11 (Minn. 2024). At the first
step, we “‘winnow down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact
in favor of the jury’s verdict,’ which results in ‘a subset of facts that constitute the
circumstances proved. ’” State v. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d 468, 478 (Minn. 2026) (quoting
Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600). Identifying the circumstances proved in this manner “protects
the well-established legal principle that the jury is in a unique position to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence before it.” Id. at 479 (quotation
omitted).
At the second step, we consider “whether the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and not as discrete, isolated
facts, are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. at 483 (citing Smith, 9 N.W.3d at 565 ). We
11
independently review the reasonableness of inferences at this second step without
deference to the fact-finder. Id. (citing State v. Isaac, 9 N.W.3d 812, 818 (Minn. 2024)).
And we will not reverse a conviction “based on mere conjecture.” Id. (quoting State v.
Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 861 (Minn. 2008)). However, “[i]f the circumstances proved[,]
when viewed as a whole, support a reasonable inference that is inconsistent with guilt, the
evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction and we must reverse.” Id. (quoting
Isaac, 9 N.W.3d at 818).
Applying the first step of the circumstantial-evidence test, the circumstances proved
are as follows:
• Olson and A.H. spent time together on March 28, 2022, just
before A.H.’s pistol went missing.
• Olson and A.H. went shooting prior to March 28; Olson was
interested in A.H.’s pistol and asked her to give it to him. She
said no.
• A.H. kept her pistol in the closet in her bedroom and had seen
the pistol during the week before it went missing.
• On March 28, Olson called A.H. in distress and asked to come
to A.H.’s house, to which she agreed.
• Olson visited and spent time at A.H.’s house that night.
• A.H., Olson, and J.H., who is A.H.’s adult son, were the only
people in the home that evening.
• J.H. was downstairs playing video games when Olson and A.H.
were upstairs in her bedroom together.
• Olson again asked A.H. to give him the pistol, and A.H. again
said no.
• A.H. and Olson spent time together in her bedroom and
bathroom upstairs. A.H. then went downstairs to make food
for Olson and left him alone in her bedroom, where the pistol
was located.
• J.H. heard a loud sound “like something breaking” come from
A.H.’s bedroom while Olson was in the room alone.
• Olson came downstairs after some time, bear-hugging a bundle
of clothes and saying he would be right back.
12
• Olson left the house and did not return.
• A.H. went outside to see where Olson was and saw that his car
was not in the parking area.
• When A.H. went back to her bedroom, she checked her closet
where she kept her firearms and saw that the pistol was
missing.
• Olson and A.H. spoke on the phone later that night; Olson was
angry when he discovered she had called the police and
threatened A.H. by saying he could “make [her] disappear.”
• A.H. has moved twice since the incident and has never found
the pistol.

Having identified the circumstances proved, we now turn to the second step of the
circumstantial-evidence test and consider “whether the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and not as discrete, isolated
facts, are consistent with the hypothesis that [Olson] is guilty and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 483.
When viewing the circumstances proved above, as a whole and not as discrete,
isolated facts, see id. at 486, we conclude that they support only one reasonable inference:
Olson stole the pistol. The alternative theory on which Olson relies is that a third party
could have stolen the pistol at some point; however, a rational hypothesis alternative to
guilt cannot be based on conjecture—there must be some evidence in the record to support
it. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 858. No such evidence exists here.
Though Olson also argues that there were inconsistencies in A.H.’s testimony, the
jury determined the testimony was credible enough to find Olson guilty of both theft and
unlawful possession of a firearm. See State v. Bliss, 457 N.W.2d 385, 390 (Minn. 1990)
(“It is well-established that a conviction can rest upon the testimony of a single credible
13
witness.”). “[J]urors may accept some parts of a witness’s testimony while rejecting
others.” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 480.
Therefore, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find
that Olson actually possessed the pistol beyond a reasonable doubt and was therefore guilty
of both theft and unlawful possession of a firearm.
II. Olson did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
Olson argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel
should have filed a writ of prohibition to challenge Judge King’s denial of his request to
remove her. Olson asserts that, because the district court improperly denied his request to
remove Judge King, a writ of prohibition was proper and would have been granted by this
court. Olson asserts that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s decision not to file the writ
and that a reversal of his convictions and remand for a new trial with a different judge is
warranted.
“The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 6, of
the Minnesota Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant ‘the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.’” Taylor v. State , 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016) (quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)). “Generally, an ineffective-assistance
claim should be raised in a postconviction petition for relief, rather than on direct appeal,”
because an evidentiary hearing, if granted, provides the district court with additional facts
to explain the parties’ decisions. State v. Gustafson, 610 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn. 2000).
But “[w]hen a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on the
14
basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal.” Andersen v. State,
830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013).
To review a claim that counsel was ineffective, Minnesota has adopted the Supreme
Court’s two-prong test set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694. See State v. Vang,
847 N.W.2d 248, 266 (Minn. 2014) (applying Strickland); State v. Ellis-Strong,
899 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. App. 2017) (applying the two- prong test when an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was brought on direct appeal). To prevail on this
type of claim, an appellant must show that (1) counsel’s performance “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness” and, (2) but for counsel’s unreasonable performance,
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 266.
If an appellant cannot meet one of the Strickland prongs, the claim fails and we need
not address the other prong. Id. To determine an “objective standard of reasonableness,”
we “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts . . . viewed as
of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Id. at 266-67 (quotations omitted). We will generally
not review such a claim if it is based on counsel’s trial strategy, id. at 267, as matters of
trial strategy “lie within the discretion of trial counsel,” Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531,
536 (Minn. 2007). The burden of proof on this prong rests with the appellant, who must
overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of
reasonable assistance.” Gail v. State, 732 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Minn. 2007); see also
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (noting that judicial review should be “highly deferential” to
counsel’s performance).
15
To evaluate whether Olson’s counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, we must first consider Olson’s contention that removal was
appropriate. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure “provide[] for removal as a
matter of right of a judge assigned to a criminal trial or hearing.” State v. Cheng,
623 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Minn. 2001). A notice to remove a judge must be served and filed
within seven days after the party receives notice of the “name of the presiding judge at the
trial or hearing.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14(4)(a). The notice “must be filed before
the start of the trial or hearing” and “is not effective against a judge who already presided
at the trial, Omnibus Hearing, or evidentiary hearing if the removing party had notice the
judge would preside at the hearing.” Id., subd. 14(4)(b)-(c). The purpose of the rule is to
give the parties “one automatic right to remove a judge before that judge presides over a
proceeding involving a substantive issue in the matter.” State v. Dahlin, 753 N.W.2d 300,
308 (Minn. 2008). Reviewing courts narrowly construe the rule permitting peremptory
removal of a judge. Id. at 306.
The state argues that Judge King properly denied the notice of removal because she
had already presided over a substantive issue in the case during the November 26 hearing.
Olson disagrees and asserts that the hearing over which Judge King presided was not a
trial, omnibus hearing, or evidentiary hearing, and therefore, the exception under Minn. R.
Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14(4)(c), does not apply. We agree with the state.
At the November 26 hearing, Judge King heard arguments regarding Olson’s
speedy-trial request, reviewed the record to determine if such a request had already been
made, and determined that “[t]here [was] probable cause on this matter to proceed.” A
16
speedy-trial request may be made at an omnibus hearing. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b);
State v. Strobel, 921 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Minn. App. 2018) (noting that appellant demanded
a speedy trial at his omnibus hearing), aff’d, 932 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2019). Pursuant to
Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.02, “the court must conduct an Omnibus Hearing and hear all motions
relating to” many issues, including “[a]ny other issues relating to a fair and expeditious
trial.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.02(j). And Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(a) provides that
scheduling a trial date is another issue that may be addressed at an omnibus hearing. Here,
because the proceeding Judge King presided over included consideration of and a ruling
on Olson’s speedy-trial demand and scheduling of a trial date, we conclude that the hearing
qualified as an omnibus hearing pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.
The denial of Olson’s removal requests was therefore appropriate because the judge had
already presided over a substantive issue in the case. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03,
subd. 14(4)(c); Dahlin, 753 N.W.2d at 308.
Because Judge King could not be removed as a matter of right under Minn. R. Crim
P. 26.03, there was no basis for a writ of prohibition and we discern no unreasonable
performance in the refusal of Olson’s counsel to file a writ of prohibition with the appellate
court. In sum, Olson is unable to meet the first prong of the Strickland test, and his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails.
III. The district court did not err in denying Olson’s motion to dismiss pursuant to
the UMDDA.

Olson argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss pursuant
to the UMDDA because the district court should have construed the act “to apply to a
17
person indefinitely confined in a competency restoration program.” Olson also asserts that
the federal government had an obligation under the UMDDA “to inform Olson of the Scott
County detainer so Olson could invoke the speedy resolution provision in order to address
the warrant while he was confined.” Olson states that the remedy for this violation is that
his convictions be reversed and the charges dismissed.
This claim requires us to interpret the UMDDA statute, Minn. Stat. § 629.292. We
review such questions de novo. See State v. Wilson (In re State), 632 N.W.2d 225, 229
(Minn. 2001) (applying de novo review when interpreting the UMDDA). In reviewing
statutes, we attempt “to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.
Stat. § 645.16 (2024). “If the legislature’s intent is clearly discernable from plain and
unambiguous language, statutory construction is neither necessary nor permitted and we
apply the statute’s plain meaning.” State v. Stay, 935 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted).
The UMDDA provides, “Any person who is imprisoned in a penal or correctional
institution or other facility in the Department of Corrections of this state may request final
disposition of any untried indictment or complaint pending against the person in this state.”
Minn. Stat. § 629.292, subd. 1(a). The UMDDA requires the commissioner of corrections
or their designee with custody of the prisoner to inform the prisoner of pending Minnesota
charges against the prisoner of which they are aware or have notice. Id., subd. 1(b). Failure
of the official to do so within a year of a detainer being filed with the prisoner’s facility
entitles the prisoner to dismissal of the charges with prejudice. Id., subd. 1(c).
18
Olson was in federal custody when the charges in this case were filed. He was not
in the custody of the Minnesota Department of Corrections while he was in the
competency-restoration program. The district court did not err when it denied Olson’s
motion to dismiss pursuant to the UMDDA.
IV. The district court did not err in denying Olson jail credit for his time spent in
federal custody on a federal charge.

Olson argues that he is entitled to additional days of jail credit for the time that he
was in federal custody for several reasons, asserting that Minn. Stat. § 611.51 (2024)
mandates that the district court give him credit for his time served in confinement during
his competency restoration, that equitable notions of fundamental fairness support granting
him jail credit for time served, and that denying him jail credit would violate his
constitutional right to equal protection. 5 The district court denied Olson’s request for jail
credit for the days he served in federal custody because, applying Roy, 928 N.W.2d at 345,
it determined that it could not award credit for the time served on a completely separate
case in a different jurisdiction.
A defendant is entitled to credit against their sentence for time spent in custody “in
connection with the offense or behavioral incident being sentenced.” Minn. R. Crim.

5 Olson’s arguments that denial of his jail credit is a violation of fundamental fairness and
his constitutional right to equal protection of law is raised for the first time on appeal and
is therefore forfeited. State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 806 (Minn. 2016) (holding that,
when an issue has not been raised before the district court, we consider the issue forfeited).
Olson argues that, because his jail-credit issue is preserved on appeal, then his
fundamental-fairness argument is preserved; however, Olson fails to identify where in the
record he raised equal- protection or fundamental-fairness arguments to the district court
regarding his jail credit.
19
P. 27.03, subd. 4(B). Whether a defendant is entitled to custody credit is not within the
district court’s discretion. Roy, 928 N.W.2d at 344. “A district court’s decision whether
to award custody credit is a mixed question of fact and law; the court must determine the
circumstances of the custody the defendant seeks credit for, and then apply the rules to
those circumstances.” State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 376, 379 (Minn. 2008). The
defendant bears the burden of establishing that they are entitled to custody credit. Id. In
reviewing a district court’s decision whether to award custody credit, we review the court’s
factual findings for clear error and review questions of law de novo. Roy, 928 N.W.2d at
344.
When determining whether to award custody credit, Minnesota courts distinguish
between custody within Minnesota (intrajurisdictional) and custody outside of Minnesota
(interjurisdictional). Id. at 345. Pursuant to the interjurisdictional custody rule, to receive
credit against a Minnesota sentence for time spent in custody in another jurisdiction, “the
defendant’s Minnesota offense must be the sole reason for the custody.” Id. (quotation
omitted). “[A] defendant can only receive credit for time spent in the custody of another
jurisdiction if the time was served solely in connection with the Minnesota offense.” Id.
Here, Olson was not arrested on the Minnesota charges. Olson testified that he was
taken into federal custody beginning August 1, 2022, on federal charges. Notwithstanding
Olson’s assertion, it is clear that the Minnesota offense was not the sole reason for Olson’s
time in custody, and therefore, the district court properly determined that he was not
entitled to jail credit for the time he spent in federal custody for his federal charges.
20
Olson asserts that Minn. Stat. § 611.51 allows him credit for the time he was in the
federal competency-restoration program; however, Olson’s competency-restoration
program was associated with his federal charges. Olson’s competency was never raised in
the district court relative to Olson’s Minnesota charges or subsequent trial. Because Olson
was in federal custody based solely on his federal charges, the district court did not err in
denying Olson jail credit for his time spent in federal custody.
Affirmed.