A25-1790 A25-1809

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0793
A25-1790
A25-1809

Raymond Kvalvog, et al.,
Appellants (A25-0793),

vs.

Josh Lee,
Respondent,

Park Christian School,
Respondent,

FCA, UC LLC,
Defendant,

Raymond Kvalvog, et al.,
Appellants (A25-1790),

vs.

Josh Lee,
Respondent,

Park Christian School,
Respondent,

FCA UC LLC,
Defendant,

Raymond Kvalvog, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

2
Josh Lee,
Respondent,

Park Christian School,
Respondent,

FCA UC LLC,
Defendant,

David Chapman, et al.,
Appellants (A25-1809).

Filed August 3, 2026
Affirmed
Beane, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CV-24-3445

Stephen F. Buterin, Coleman & Erickson, LLC, Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for appellants
Raymond Kvalvog and Katherine Kvalvog)

William L. Moran, Briana C. Gornick, Haws-KM, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent Josh Lee)

Lindsey J. Woodrow, Duncan A. Brumwell, Waldeck & Woodrow, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent Park Christian School)

Mark R. Bradford, Samantha J. Buckman, Bradford Andresen Norrie & Camarotto,
Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellants David J. Chapman and DJ Chapman Law, P.C.)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BEANE, Judge
In these consolidated appeals, a ppellants Raymond and Katherine Kvalvog
(collectively, the Kvalvogs) challenge the district court’s dismissal of their complaint

3
brought under Minnesota Statutes section 548.14 (2024). The Kvalvogs argue that the
district court erred in concluding that their claim is barred by collateral estoppel and that
they failed to plead with particularity the facts necessary to sustain a claim under section
548.14. They also contend that the district court abused its discretion by designating them
as frivolous litigants and awarding monetary sanctions against them. Appellant David
Chapman, the Kvalvogs’ former lawyer, separately challenges the imposition of sanctions
against him.1 We affirm.
FACTS
In June 2015, the Kvalvogs’ two sons, Zachary and Connor, were tragically killed
in a motor-vehicle crash while driving to compete in an out -of-state high school summer
basketball tournament. The boys played for the basketball team at respondent Park
Christian School; respondent Josh Lee was the team’s coach. Zachary—with passengers
Connor, M.S., and J.M.—drove third in a caravan of three vehicles. Park Christian’s
football coach drove the lead vehicle, and Lee drove the second vehicle in the caravan.
Shortly after entering the highway, the caravan approached a semi- truck. The first two
vehicles passed the semi in the left lane. Zachary followed , but as he passed the semi, it
moved into his lane, causing him to take evasive action and lose control of his vehicle.
Zachary’s vehicle entered the median and rolled, killing both Zachary and Connor. M.S.
and J.M. survived. The semi driver did not stop and was not identified.

1 Chapman’s solo practice law firm DJ Chapman Law, P.C. is also named as an appellant
from the sanctions award against Chapman.

4
The Kvalvogs sued Park Christian and Lee, alleging that they “were in violation as
coach and school by allowing operation of a vehicle by athletes as individuals to a school
athletic tournament” and that Lee “failed to maintain a reasonable means of transportation
to a school athletic event acting in a negligent and unlawful manner.” They also alleged
that “by operation of the doctrine of respondeat superior ” Park Christian was vicariously
liable for any negligent act of Lee “performed in the course and scope of his employment
at” Park Christian.
That case proceeded to trial, during which the jury heard conflicting expert
testimony about the cause of the crash. Relevant here, the Kvalvogs called a sergeant from
the Minnesota State Patrol (the sergeant) to testify. He testified that speed was not a factor
in causing the crash but that the semi encroaching into the left traffic lane caused Zachary
to veer. Another expert testified that the caravan’s speed and Zachary’s position within it
contributed to the crash. And a third expert testified that neither speed nor the position of
Zachary’s vehicle within the caravan played a role in the crash. M.S. and J.M. testified that
they thought the semi moved within arm’s reach of Zachary’s vehicle. At the end of trial,
the jury determined that the trip was a school activity, that neither Lee nor Zachary was
negligent, and that the semi driver was negligent and the sole cause of the crash. The
Kvalvogs moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which the district
court denied. They then appealed, seeking review of the judgment and the order denying a
new trial.
While that appeal was pending, the Kvalvogs learned that the sergeant had pre-
existing personal connections to some of the leaders at Park Christian. The Kvalvogs

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argued that the sergeant’s connections to those leaders created a conflict of interest that
affected the investigation. The Kvalvogs alleged that new evidence showed that the
sergeant improperly communicated with Park Christian about the investigation and
recommended that Park Christian seek legal advice. They also alleged that Park Christian
leadership—including Lee, the school’s principal, the school’s former president, and
another leader—“actively participated in the cover-up of the conflict” by pressuring J.M.
and T.R., another student who was a passenger in the football coach’s vehicle, not to share
information about the crash with law enforcement. And the Kvalvogs claimed that the
sergeant’s investigation of the crash favored Park Christian because he focused on Lee’s
statements to the exclusion of all others, ignored contrary information shared by M.S. and
J.M., and failed to follow up with other witnesses. The Kvalvogs successfully moved to
stay their posttrial appeal so they could seek relief from the judgment in district court.
After the appeal was stayed, the Kvalvogs moved for relief under Minnesota Rule
of Civil Procedure 60.02 on three grounds. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(b), (c), (f). First,
they argued the newly discovered evidence of the relationship between leaders of Park
Christian and the sergeant warranted a new trial because that evidence could not have been
discovered before trial and likely affected the trial. Second, they contended that the
relationship between Park Christian and the sergeant, and the nondisclosure of that
relationship, constituted fraud. They alleged that the sergeant and Park Christian leadership
concealed the relationship between the sergeant and various school leaders; Park Christian
“undertook intentional efforts to silence witnesses and those questioning the events” of the
crash; Park Christian “repeatedly claimed to have friends in law enforcement who would

6
take care of it”; and the sergeant “took active steps to hide information adverse to the
statement by Lee and the theory of the accident being all Zachary Kvalvog’s fault.” Finally,
the Kvalvogs asserted that all of the above separately constituted a fraud on the court,
requiring a new trial.
The district court denied the motion. First, the district court rejected the Kvalvogs’
contention that newly discovered evidence of the sergeant’s connections to Park Christian’s
leaders warranted a new trial. The district court determined that the Kvalvogs’
characterizations of the sergeant’s investigation were inaccurate and that the allegations
that Park Christian leadership relied on friends in law enforcement to steer the investigation
were not credible. Because the lengthy pretrial discovery period allowed for extensive fact
discovery, including depositions of the sergeant and Park Christian’s leaders, the district
court concluded that the Kvalvogs were not diligent in uncovering the connections between
the sergeant and Park Christian. The district court further concluded that the relationship
between the sergeant and Park Christian’s leaders was not significant enough to meet the
mandatory disclosure requirement under state patrol policies. The district court also
determined that none of the Kvalvogs’ purported new evidence would have materially
affected the trial because its sole purpose would have been to impeach the sergeant, but he
was only one of several experts who testified about the cause of the crash.
Second, the district court saw “no merit” in the Kvalvogs’ assertion that the sergeant
“deliberately withheld the information as part of a conspiracy to rob [the Kvalvogs] of a
fair trial” and concluded that the Kvalvogs failed to produce clear and convincing evidence
of fraud. Finally, the district court determined that the Kvalvogs identified no conduct

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amounting to fraud on the court because the evidence regarding the sergeant’s relationship
with Park Christian leadership was neither significant nor useful for impeachment. The
Kvalvogs filed a second appeal challenging the denial of their rule 60.02 motion. We lifted
the stay of the posttrial appeal, consolidated the Kvalvogs’ two appeals, and affirmed the
district court in all respects. Kvalvog v. Lee , No. A20-0693, 2021 WL 3027269, at *1
(Minn. App. July 19, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2021). The supreme court denied
the Kvalvogs’ petition for review.
Meanwhile, the Kvalvogs filed a complaint in federal district court asserting
violations of their federal civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (2018). In that
lawsuit, the Kvalvogs claimed that the sergeant, Park Christian and its leaders, Lee, and
various other parties conspired to “impede, hinder, obstruct, or defeat the due course of
justice” in the wrongful-death action. To support that claim, the Kvalvogs alleged that Lee
and Park Christian conspired to cover up Lee’s involvement in the crash; the sergeant
ignored or rejected evidence supporting Lee’s responsibility for the crash, interfered with
the investigation, and had a close relationship with Park Christian leadership, including the
school’s principal and former president; Park Christian threatened various witnesses, like
J.M. and T.R., to stay quiet; and, in general, the sergeant “provided a deliberately false
narrative . . . intentionally crafted to absolve his friends at Park Christian School of all
liability.” The federal court held that collateral estoppel barred the Kvalvogs’ section 1983
and 1985 claims because they raised the same issues about the sergeant’s relationship with
Park Christian leadership that had been decided against the Kvalvogs in the rule 60.02
motion after the wrongful-death action. Kvalvog v. Park Christian Sch., Inc., No. 21-cv -

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1569 (ECT/LIB), 2022 WL 119010, at *5-6 (D. Minn. Jan. 12, 2022), aff’d, 66 F.4th 1147
(8th Cir. 2023). The Eighth Circuit affirmed in all respects. Kvalvog v. Park Christian Sch.,
Inc., 66 F.4th 1147, 1152-53 (8th Cir. 2023).
The Kvalvogs, represented at the time by Chapman, then commenced the instant
lawsuit against Park Christian and Lee, asserting a claim under Minnesota Statutes section
548.14, which states, in relevant part:
Any judgment obtained in a court of record by means of
perjury, subornation of perjury, or any fraudulent act, practice,
or representation of the prevailing party, may be set aside in an
action brought for that purpose by the aggrieved party in the
same judicial district within three years after the discovery by
the aggrieved party of such perjury or fraud.

In support of their claim, the Kvalvogs identified 15 pieces of evidence that they
allege are newly discovered and, taken alone or together with other allegations, support a
claim that the judgment in the wrongful-death action was obtained by Park Christian’s and
Lee’s fraud. The Kvalvogs generally allege that the sergeant’s inadequate and biased
investigation was conducted to favor Lee and Park Christian to prevent the Kvalvogs from
identifying the semi driver, who the Kvalvogs assert would have testified that Lee caused
him to swerve and cause the crash, and that the sergeant and Park Christian employees
conspired to direct liability away from Park Christian.2

2 The Kvalvogs’ complaint also included a second count, stating that they are “entitled to
relief under the common law due to fraud and newly discovered evidence, as well as other
common law bases.” Neither the district court nor either party addressed this count at the
motion to dismiss stage, and the Kvalvogs do not address it here. We consider the Kvalvogs
to have abandoned that count.

9
Park Christian and Lee moved to dismiss the complaint. They also served safe-
harbor letters on the Kvalvogs and Chapman, outlining the grounds on which they intended
to seek sanctions. When the Kvalvogs did not withdraw their complaint, Park Christian and
Lee moved for sanctions against the Kvalvogs and Chapman under Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 and Minnesota Statutes section 549.211 (2024) and moved to designate the
Kvalvogs as frivolous litigants under Minnesota General Rule of Practice 9.
The district court granted the motions to dismiss, dismissed the complaint with
prejudice, awarded sanctions against the Kvalvogs and Chapman, and designated the
Kvalvogs as frivolous litigants. The district court concluded that relief under Minnesota
Statutes section 548.14 was unavailable because the Kvalvogs failed to allege with
particularity the date when they discovered the new evidence, why the evidence was not
discoverable before trial, and how Park Christian or Lee prevented them from presenting
this information to the jury . Moreover, the district court determined that most of the
allegations were not “new” and involved the conduct of individuals who were not parties
to the wrongful-death action and whose conduct is therefore not covered by section 548.14.
The district court also determined that the Kvalvogs’ section 548.14 claim is barred by
collateral estoppel because they unsuccessfully levied the same allegations against Park
Christian and Lee in both their rule 60.02 motion and their federal-court complaint. As for
sanctions, the district court concluded that the Kvalvogs’ allegations were not warranted
by law, lacked evidentiary support, and were filed with an improper purpose, so it awarded
sanctions against both the Kvalvogs and Chapman. Finally, the district court designated the

10
Kvalvogs as frivolous litigants after reviewing the seven factors enumerated in Minnesota
General Rule of Practice 9.02(b).
The Kvalvogs and Chapman appeal.
DECISION
I.
The Kvalvogs first challenge the district court’s dismissal of their section 548.14
fraud-on-the-court claim. We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint for failure
to state a claim. Abel v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., 947 N.W.2d 58, 68 (Minn. 2020). In doing so,
we “accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences
in favor of the nonmoving party.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn.
2014). The complaint should be dismissed “only if it appears to a certainty that no facts,
which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting
the relief demanded.” Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010) (quotation
omitted). All allegations of fraud must be pleaded with particularity. Minn. R. Civ. P. 9.02;
Hardin Cnty. Sav. Bank v. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. of Brainerd, 821 N.W.2d 184,
191-92 (Minn. 2012). “A party pleads the ‘ultimate facts’ of a fraud claim when it pleads
facts underlying each element of the fraud claim.” Hardin, 821 N.W.2d at 191.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, we may consider documents embraced by the
complaint without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Hoskin v.
Krsnak, 25 N.W.3d 398, 409-10 (Minn. 2025); see also Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg.
Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 739 n.7 (Minn. 2000). And we may take judicial notice of filings in
related court proceedings. See Minn. R. Evid. 201; In re Calm Waters Cannabis Co., 24

11
N.W.3d 507, 515 n.8 (Minn. App. 2025) (stating that we may “take judicial notice of the
filings” in a related action); see also Rohricht v. O’Hare, 586 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Minn.
App. 1998) (stating that a district court “may take judicial notice of adjudicated findings in
a prior proceeding”), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 1999).3
We conclude that the Kvalvogs’ complaint fails to state a legally viable claim for
relief for at least two reasons: (1) many of the ostensibly “new” facts were known to the
Kvalvogs more than three years before they commenced this action, and (2) many of the
fraud allegations in the complaint pertain to conduct by individuals who are not
“prevailing” parties in the wrongful-death action. We address each of those issues in turn.
A.
The Kvalvogs’ complaint fails to state a viable claim for relief under section 548.14
because it is predicated on allegations of fraud that were largely known to them more than
three years before they commenced this lawsuit. Minnesota Statutes section 548.14 permits
an aggrieved party to set aside a judgment procured by the prevailing party’s fraud, when
evidence of that fraud is newly discovered, and a claim is brought “within three years after
the discovery by the aggrieved party.” Minn. Stat. § 548.14. That three-year “period fixed
by [section 548.14] makes actions within the time fixed a condition precedent to relief.”

3 We note that the record presented to the district court on the motion to dismiss was
voluminous. Lee submitted 28 exhibits in support of his motion to dismiss, Park Christian
submitted 6 exhibits in support of its motion, and the Kvalvogs submitted 58 exhibits in
opposition to the motions. The district court could have converted this to a motion for
summary judgment, but it was not required to do so because the documents provided to the
court were fairly embraced by the complaint or were part of the court files from the
extensive litigation history involving these parties. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02.

12
Murray v. Calkins, 254 N.W. 605, 608 (Minn. 1934) (discussing precursor statute).
Because section 548.14 authorizes the extraordinary remedy of setting aside a judgment,
an action under the statute must be based on “tangible and substantial” misrepresentations
and cannot be used to “excuse a party from exercising proper diligence in preparing for
trial.” Wann v. Nw. Tr. Co., 139 N.W. 1061, 1063 (Minn. 1913) (addressing precursor
statute).
The Kvalvogs’ fraud- on-the-court theory focuses on an alleged scheme by the
sergeant and Park Christian to prevent Lee from being blamed for the crash. They claim
that Lee was absolved of liability in the wrongful-death action because the sergeant, Park
Christian, and Lee conspired to conceal evidence of the true cause of the crash. Much of
the alleged new evidence of fraud identified in the Kvalvogs’ complaint concerns the
sergeant’s biases and personal relationships with Park Christian employees, as well as the
inadequacy of the sergeant’s investigation into the cause of the crash. But many of these
same allegations appear in the Kvalvogs’ court filings dated more than three years before
they commenced this lawsuit.
The sergeant’s relationship with various Park Christian employees, for example, has
been raised repeatedly in proceedings involving these parties . The Kvalvogs alleged in
their rule 60.02 motion and the federal district court lawsuit—both filed more than three
years before this lawsuit was commenced—that the sergeant and several Park Christian
employees, including the school’s principal and its former president , were close family
friends and that this undisclosed relationship tainted the sergeant’s investigation in favor
of Lee and Park Christian. The Kvalvogs allege nearly identical facts in their complaint

13
here, so the relationship between the sergeant and Park Christian employees cannot
constitute newly discovered fraud.
The sergeant’s failure to identify the semi driver as part of his investigation also is
a long-contested issue. Back in September 2020, in support of their rule 60.02 motion, the
Kvalvogs argued that the sergeant’s failure to “diligently look for the semi” during his
investigation indicated that he was biased in favor of Park Christian. And in July 2021, in
their federal lawsuit, the Kvalvogs alleged that the sergeant included false statements in his
report, withheld information about the semi driver, and failed to talk to material witnesses
about the cause of the crash. They allege much of the same in their complaint here, now
supported by an affidavit from a witness who avers that she is the semi driver’s sister. The
sister stated that the semi driver is her brother, that Lee cut him off, and that she tried to
share this information with the sergeant. But the Kvalvogs have previously alleged that the
sergeant failed to speak with witnesses following the crash. The fact that the Kvalvogs
obtained a new affidavit from a person claiming to be the semi driver’s sister cannot
transform their long-standing theory that the sergeant ignored evidence that the semi driver
caused the crash into newly discovered fraud.
The Kvalvogs also generally allege that the sergeant ignored information from
various eyewitnesses. The Kvalvogs alleged in their federal court complaint that the
sergeant included Lee’s description of the crash in his report, but excluded J.M.’s
description, and that the sergeant ignored a diagram of the crash prepared by T.R. and M.S.
They also asserted in their rule 60.02 motion that the sergeant did not disclose statements
he took from M.S. and J.M. following the crash. Similarly here, they allege that the sergeant

14
ignored a diagram of the crash prepared by J.M.’s cousin, based on information provided
by J.M. All these witnesses were available for the Kvalvogs to subpoena and depose during
pretrial discovery and call to testify during trial, so none of the information they have is
new. Indeed, J.M., T.R., and M.S. testified at trial. That the sergeant may not have pursued
information from some witnesses or included their statements in his report does not
constitute newly discovered fraud.
The Kvalvogs also contend that Lee bribed J.M.’s cousin not to testify and that Park
Christian’s counsel intimidated two individuals, one of whom was listed on the Kvalvogs’
witness list and testified at trial. The complaint includes no information showing whether
evidence of Lee’s alleged bribery is new or was discovered in the three years before the
Kvalvogs filed this complaint. And as to the alleged intimidation of two other individuals,
the complaint alleges that the intimidation occurred before or during trial in 2020, but
notably does not allege that the Kvalvogs discovered this information in the three years
before commencing this lawsuit.
The remaining allegations fare no better. The Kvalvogs allege that defense counsel
in the underlying action “were fully aware” of the relationship between Park Christian
employees and the sergeant, and Lee’s counsel “knew all along” that Lee was responsible
for the crash; the sergeant hated Raymond Kvalvog and, if asked, would refuse to help him;
a law firm representing Raymond Kvalvog also represented the Minnesota State Patrol; a
previously undisclosed letter distributed to families following the crash included details
provided by Lee; a Park Christian employee consulted with the school’s insurance agent
following the crash; Lee pressured players to attend the tournament; the sergeant and Park

15
Christian employees harbored racial bias; and Park Christian did not secure waivers for the
tournament. The Kvalvogs do not allege when they discovered this information, but
documents from other legal proceedings involving these parties establish that many of
these alleged facts were known to the Kvalvogs at trial or shortly thereafter. And even if a
few of the facts the Kvalvogs allege in support of their section 548.14 claim have not been
raised in other legal proceedings, the gravamen of their claim—that the sergeant and Park
Christian conspired to cover up the cause of the crash to deflect blame away from Park
Christian and toward the semi driver or Zachary—has been previously addressed in their
rule 60.02 motion and their federal lawsuit. We are not persuaded that the addition of a few
details somehow transforms these long-standing allegations of a cover-up into a newly
discovered fraud that warrants the extraordinary remedy of setting aside a judgment.
To convince us otherwise, the Kvalvogs contend that Minnesota Statutes section
548.14 does not require them to affirmatively plead the date on which they discovered each
of the facts constituting fraud. Even assuming that is true, it does not change our
conclusion. To have a viable claim under section 548.14, the Kvalvogs needed to discover
fraud and serve the complaint within three years of that discovery. Minn. Stat. § 548.14.
Signed pleadings relating to the rule 60.02 motion in the wrongful-death action and in the
federal lawsuit establish that the Kvalvogs discovered most of the information they now
claim is “new” more than three years before commencing this case. Because the Kvalvogs
filed and served the complaint on September 5, 2024, only evidence they discovered on or
after September 5, 2021, can support their section 548.14 claim. The Kvalvogs filed their
rule 60.02 motion in September 2020 and the federal-court complaint in July 2021, alleging

16
many of the same facts they rely on here, so none of the information is new under section
548.14. And the overarching allegation in their complaint here, the federal lawsuit, and the
rule 60.02 motion remains the same: the sergeant conspired with Park Christian to cover
up the cause of the crash and divert attention away from Park Christian. Under these
circumstances, we conclude that no set of facts the Kvalvogs could prove consistent with
their pleading would entitle them to relief. See Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 80.
B.
The Kvalvogs’ section 548.14 claim suffers from yet another fatal defect: it relies
largely on allegations of fraudulent conduct by individuals who were not prevailing parties
in the underlying lawsuit. Section 548.14 permits an “aggrieved party” to seek relief from
a judgment obtained by fraudulent conduct “of the prevailing party.” Minn. Stat. § 548.14.
Cases addressing section 548.14 and its precursor statute have explained that only a party
to the prior action that resulted in the challenged judgment may bring an action under this
section. See, e.g., Lenhart v. Lenhart Wagon Co., 298 N.W. 37, 39 (Minn. 1941) (stating
that “aggrieved” party is only one who participated as a party); Stewart v. Duncan, 42 N.W.
89, 90 (Minn. 1889) (stating that the phrase “the party aggrieved” is an “undoubted
reference to a party to the action”). By the same logic, the “prevailing party” for purposes
of a section 548.14 claim is the party that prevailed in the prior action, not other individuals
who may benefit from the litigation or who were witnesses in the prior action.
Many individuals whose conduct the complaint characterizes as part of the alleged
fraud on the court were not parties to the wrongful-death action at all and therefore could
not have been “prevailing” parties with respect to the resulting judgment. For example,

17
much of the alleged fraudulent conduct relates to the sergeant’s investigation. The
Kvalvogs claim that he failed to interview material witnesses or investigate the true cause
of the crash because he wanted to protect Park Christian and Lee. They also claim he
harbored animosity toward Raymond Kvalvog and racial bias against Park Christian
students the Kvalvogs supported, which contributed to his faulty investigation. But the
sergeant was not a prevailing party in the wrongful-death action, so even assuming the
Kvalvogs’ allegations about his conduct and motivations are true, his actions cannot be the
basis of their section 548.14 claim as a matter of law.
The same is true of other individuals mentioned in the complaint. Park Christian’s
principal, its former president, M.S., Park Christian’s football coach, various attorneys, the
pastor of a member church, Park Christian’s insurance agent, and others were not parties
to the wrongful-death action. Thus, their conduct also cannot support the Kvalvogs’ section
548.14 claim.
Of all the individuals identified in the complaint, only Lee was a prevailing party in
the wrongful-death action, and the allegations against him are sparse. The Kvalvogs allege
that Lee gave J.M.’s cousin $500 “to say nothing further” and that Lee insisted that players
attend the out- of-state summer basketball tournament, placing especially heavy pressure
on the captains, including Zachary, to organize transportation. But the Kvalvogs do not
allege that Lee prevented J.M.’s cousin from testifying or that they subpoenaed him to
testify and he refused. Even if they had, the only information J.M.’s cousin had about the
crash was what he had been told by J.M. and T.R.—J.M.’s cousin’s son—and both J.M.
and T.R. testified at trial. So any information J.M.’s cousin could have provided about

18
Lee’s involvement in causing the crash was known to and relied upon by the Kvalvogs at
trial. In fact, the Kvalvogs’ counsel emphasized Lee’s involvement in causing the crash in
his closing argument , so the jury heard and rejected the theory supported by these
witnesses’ testimony. In other words, even if all these allegations were proved true, they
could not amount to fraudulent conduct perpetrated by a prevailing party.
Because we conclude that the Kvalvogs’ complaint was properly dismissed because
it fails to state a legally viable claim for relief under section 548.14, we need not address
the parties’ alternative arguments as to whether the complaint should have been dismissed.
See Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 402 n.3 (Minn. 1995) (deeming it
“unnecessary” to address alternative arguments in light of determination that summary
judgment was appropriate).
II.
The Kvalvogs next contend that the district court abused its discretion by
designating them as frivolous litigants. We review a party’s frivolous-litigant designation
for an abuse of discretion. See Szarzynski v. Szarzynski , 732 N.W.2d 285, 290, 294-95
(Minn. App. 2007). A district court abuses its discretion if its findings of fact are
unsupported by the record or if it misapplies the law. Honke v. Honke, 960 N.W.2d 261,
265 (Minn. 2021).
A frivolous litigant is a party who repeatedly relitigates a final determination,
repeatedly serves or files frivolous documents, or “institutes and maintains a claim that is
not well grounded in fact and not warranted by existing law.” Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 9.06(b).
After notice and a hearing on a motion to have a person declared a frivolous litigant, a

19
district court may, if it determines the person to be a frivolous litigant, require the frivolous
litigant to post security or impose preconditions that the frivolous litigant must meet before
serving or filing any new claims, motions, or requests. Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 9.01. The
district court must consider seven factors in making its frivolous-litigant determination:
(1) the number of claims pursued with an adverse result; (2) whether the party has a
“reasonable probability” of prevailing on the claim; (3) whether the claim “was made for
purposes of harassment, delay, or vexatiousness, or otherwise in bad faith”; (4) “inju ry
incurred by other litigants” and “to the efficient administration of justice as a result of the
claim”; (5) the “effectiveness of prior sanctions in deterring” the conduct; (6) whether
“imposing sanctions will ensure adequate safeguards”; and (7) “whether less severe
sanctions will sufficiently protect the rights of other litigants, the public, or the courts.”
Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 9.02(b).
The district court considered each of the seven factors and made the following
findings: (1) the Kvalvogs have litigated the same issues, with adverse results, in state and
federal courts several times; (2) the Kvalvogs will not prevail on their claim because they
failed to plead the elements needed to sustain a claim under section 548.14 and their claims
are barred by collateral estoppel; (3) because the Kvalvogs have repeatedly made (and lost)
these claims, “it is difficult to conclude this action was brought in good faith, and for
purposes other than to harass [Lee and Park Christian]”; (4) the Kvalvogs’ claims form the
basis of nearly ten years’ worth of litigation against Lee and Park Christian, forcing Lee
and Park Christian to endure “emotional, expensive, and time-consuming litigation, as well
as attacks to their reputations on social media and through the press”; (5) while no court

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has yet sanctioned the Kvalvogs, they have been warned by several courts that they need
to stop litigating the same claims; (6) motions for sanctions are pending in other open cases,
and some precedent supports that a party may be designated a frivolous litigant even
without a prior sanction; and (7) monetary sanctions alone are unlikely to deter the
Kvalvogs because of their demonstrated history of raising identical issues and claims in
other lawsuits.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to designate the
Kvalvogs as frivolous litigants. The district court’s findings as to the first three factors are
supported by the record. The Kvalvogs have litigated the same issue of the sergeant’s
alleged bias and relationship with Park Christian leadership since 2020, with adverse
results in both state and federal courts, and they cannot now prevail on their claim because
it was dismissed under rule 12.02(e). The Kvalvogs’ repeated attempts to litigate the same
issues, especially after the federal court dismissed nearly identical claims, support a
conclusion that this case was brought for an improper purpose. See Liedtke v. Fillenworth,
372 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Minn. App. 1985) (affirming award of attorney fees against appellant
because of her “frivolous, vexatious claims”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 13, 1985).
The record also supports the district court’s findings as to the remaining factors. The
Kvalvogs’ repeated lawsuits alleging the same or substantially the same conduct have
harmed Lee and Park Christian, as they have had to defend against those claims in other
lawsuits. See Schwandt v. Park Christian Sch. , No. A23-0052, 2023 WL 6054270, at *2
(Minn. App. Sept. 18, 2023); Kvalvog, 2021 WL 3027269, at *1. We note that, contrary to
the district court’s conclusion, Park Christian and Lee have not been directly involved in

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all the litigation stemming from the crash since the wrongful-death action. But that fact
does not undermine the district court’s conclusion that Lee and Park Christian have been
harmed by having to defend repeated lawsuits involving the same claims by the Kvalvogs.
As to the fifth factor, a motion seeking sanctions under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure
11.03 and Minnesota Statutes section 549.211 against Raymond Kvalvog, and seeking to
designate him as a frivolous litigant as to the school’s principal, was pending in district
court during the pendency of this case. See Kvalvog v. Nellermoe , No. 14-CV- 23-2707,
slip op. at 1-22 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2025). And as to the sixth and seventh factors, the
Kvalvogs have continued to file lawsuits and litigate issues arising from the crash and have
been unsuccessful, despite the threat of pending sanctions motions in some of those cases,
so monetary sanctions alone are likely insufficient to deter them from continuing to do so.
On this record, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
designating the Kvalvogs as frivolous litigants.
III.
Finally, the Kvalvogs and Chapman each contend that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing sanctions. We review a district court’s award of sanctions under
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Minnesota Statutes section 549.211 for an abuse
of discretion. In re Est. of Flatgard, 14 N.W.3d 305, 313 (Minn. App. 2024), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 18, 2025). “A [district] court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact
that are not supported by the record, misapplies the law, or resolves the matter in a manner
that is contrary to logic and the facts on record.” Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170, 175
(Minn. App. 2020) (quotation omitted). Under rule 11, an attorney must certify that

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submissions to the district court are “not being presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation,”
that existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for a change in a law supports the claims
made, and that evidence supports or is likely to support the factual allegations. Minn. R.
Civ. P. 11.02(a)-(c). “A district court may impose sanctions against an attorney or a party
who violates these requirements.” Collins v. Waconia Dodge, Inc., 793 N.W.2d 142, 145
(Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011).
Here, the district court determined that sanctions were appropriate because the
Kvalvogs’ claims were not warranted by law, lacked evidentiary support, and were brought
with an improper purpose. And the district court determined that the Kvalvogs and
Chapman maintained these claims beyond the safe-harbor period. We discern no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s award of sanctions against the Kvalvogs or Chapman.
The district court determined that the Kvalvogs’ claims were not warranted by law
because Minnesota Statutes section 548.14 requires a claimant to show new evidence that
the prevailing party in the underlying action engaged in fraud and that this new evidence
was discovered in the three years preceding the filing of the complaint, but the Kvalvogs
failed to allege facts as to any element. The district court determined that most of the
allegations concern conduct by non-parties to the underlying action, none of the allegations
interfered with the Kvalvogs’ access to the court, none of the allegations materially
impacted the outcome of the trial, and the Kvalvogs failed to plead that new evidence was
discovered in the three years before the complaint was filed.

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The record supports the district court’s findings. As we have already explained,
nearly all the allegations in the complaint relate to conduct by individuals who were not
prevailing parties in the wrongful-death action, and none of the allegations against Lee
show that he deprived the Kvalvogs of their access to the court. None of the allegations
include new information, and other legal proceedings involving these parties clearly
establish that most of the purported new evidence was known to the Kvalvogs more than
three years before they commenced this lawsuit. We therefore conclude that the district
court’s determination that the Kvalvogs’ claims were not warranted by law is supported by
the record.
The record also supports the district court’s conclusion that the Kvalvogs’ claims
lack evidentiary support. Most of the ostensibly new evidence was presented in the rule
60.02 motion and the federal lawsuit, which establishes that it is not newly discovered.
Allegations concerning Lee’s involvement in the crash, witness intimidation, the sergeant’s
personal relationship with Park Christian employees, Lee’s pressure on players, Park
Christians’ violation of policies, and various other claims against the sergeant were
discussed in either the rule 60.02 motion or the federal case, or both. The overarching
allegation that the sergeant and Park Christian conspired to divert attention away from Lee
and Park Christian was presented in both the rule 60.02 motion and the federal case.
Evidence on these issues has been developed and addressed—and ultimately, rejected— in
other cases.
The district court found that this action was filed with an improper purpose: to
relitigate the original wrongful-death action. The main allegation here, of a conspiracy

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between Park Christian employees and law enforcement to deprive the Kvalvogs of a fair
trial, has been heard and decided by the district court. Most of the “new evidence” was
available and presented during the trial in the wrongful-death action and allegations based
on that evidence were heard and decided by the district court during posttrial motions. And
years ago, the federal court dismissed the Kvalvogs’ claim predicated on many of these
same allegations because it concluded then that they had already been litigated. Given the
extensive litigation history between these parties, and the Kvalvogs’ history of filing other
unsuccessful lawsuits asserting these same conspiracy claims, we see no basis to disturb
the district court’s finding that the Kvalvogs brought this lawsuit for an improper purpose.
The Kvalvogs argue that we should reverse the sanctions award because the amount
of the award is excessive and “only serves to punish” them for bringing this claim. We are
not persuaded. The district court has “wide discretion to award the type of sanctions it
deems necessary.” Gibson v. Coldwell Banker Burnet, 659 N.W.2d 782, 790 (Minn. App.
2003) (quotation omitted). The district court determined that Park Christian and Lee “had
to review, evaluate, and organize thousands of pages of pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and trial transcripts, in almost a dozen separate actions,” to prove that the allegations in the
complaint were barred by collateral estoppel and did not satisfy the requirements of section
548.14. The district court observed that some of the work was likely completed before this
action since Park Christian and Lee retained similar counsel in other actions. But the district
court nonetheless found that Park Christian and Lee “devoted hundreds of hours of their
time, successfully defending this action, and that the time spent was reasonable under the
circumstances.” And while Lee and Park Christian sought nearly $200,000 in attorney fees,

25
the district court awarded them only $30,000 each. The district court’s determinations are
supported by the record, and we see no abuse of the district court’s wide discretion.
For their part, Chapman and his law firm argue that sanctions should not have been
awarded against them because Chapman had an objectively reasonable basis for bringing
this claim and acted in good faith. Rule 11 places “an affirmative duty on counsel to
investigate the factual and legal underpinnings of a pleading.” Flatgard, 14 N.W.3d at 313
(quotation omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 549.211; Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.02. The violation
of these requirements supports an award of sanctions. Flatgard, 14 N.W.3d at 313. “But
sanctions should not be imposed when an attorney has an objectively reasonable basis for
pursuing a factual or legal claim or when a competent attorney could form a reasonable
belief that a pleading is well-grounded in fact and law.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The district court determined that Chapman “made an informed decision to
represent” the Kvalvogs in this case and, despite concerns about the case, he “willingly
authored, signed, and filed the Complaint and Amended Complaint, attesting that the
claims were warranted by existing law.” And Chapman persisted in pursuing the claims
even after being presented with a motion for sanctions and given the opportunity to
withdraw them. The record supports the district court’s conclusions. In his response to Park
Christian’s and Lee’s safe-harbor letters, Chapman defended the basis for the claims and
declined to withdraw the complaint. While Chapman contends that he conducted a
thorough investigation, which included consulting with other attorneys and independently
reviewing the claims and allegations, we remain unconvinced that the complaint was “well-
grounded in fact and law.” See id. (quotation omitted).

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In sum, the district court’s conclusions as to the basis for awarding sanctions are
supported by law and its determinations as to the appropriate amount of those sanctions are
supported by the record. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
decisions to award sanctions against the Kvalvogs and Chapman.
Affirmed.