State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0798

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Albert Charles Flores,
Appellant.

Filed April 27, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Ross, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-24-219

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Natalie Staeheli, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
A Dakota County jury convicted Albert Flores of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct after hearing witness testimony from the minor victim about Flores’s abuse. Flores
appeals his conviction, raising two arguments. He argues first that the district court
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admitted, and the jury heard, statements from his interview with a child-protection
investigator that are inadmissible under Miranda. He argues second that the district court
improperly allowed the criminal complaint to be amended before jury deliberation.
Because the admission of his interview statements was prohibited by Miranda and
substantially affected the verdict, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
The Lakeville Police Department received a report in February 2024 that Albert
Flores had sexually abused his then nine-year -old granddaughter. We will call the
granddaughter “June,” a name we have randomly chosen in the interest of protecting her
privacy. Detective Scott Frame arrested Flores and took him to the police station intending
to collaboratively interview him with Dakota County S ocial Services investigator, Ashley
Rooney. But a collaborative interview did not occur. Detective Frame read Flores a
Miranda warning, and Flores promptly invoked his right to an attorney.
Investigator Rooney, who was not present when Flores invoked his right to counsel,
visited Flores in jail the next day to obtain his statement about the abuse report. She
conducted the interview without law enforcement present and read Flores administrative
warnings (Tennessen and HIPPA) about his disclosing private or confidential information
to the state. Flores participated in Investigator Rooney’s interview for about 45 minutes,
detailing his relationship with June. He said that he had caught June searching “sex, sex,
sex” on YouTube and that she had let the family dog lick her vagina. Investigator Rooney
questioned Flores about his sexual contact with June, asking, “[H]ave you ever put your
mouth on any part of her [b]ody?” Flores answered, “No.” Investigator Rooney later
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specified her question, “[H]ave you ever kissed her vagina?” Flores again said no.
Investigator Rooney also asked about evidence that could substantiate June’s allegations:
“[W]ould there be any reason if like any of her DNA would be in your bed?” Flores
responded, “There shouldn’t be any DNA.” Flores denied having oral or digital sexual
contact with June.
Investigator Rooney shared a recording of the interview with Detective Frame and
gave him her assessment report. The state then charged Flores with two counts of first-
degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor.
Flores moved the district court to suppress evidence of his interview statements
based on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The state opposed the motion,
arguing that Investigator Rooney acted as a social worker rather than as an arm of law
enforcement. Detective Frame testified at the motion hearing, stating that he coordinates
with social services to interview child-abuse suspects in tandem but that he alone handles
the “criminal side” of the interviews. Investigator Rooney testified that her investigations
focused on the child’s well-being and that a Minnesota statute requires her to offer an
“interview to an alleged offender.” The district court denied Flores’s suppression motion,
reasoning that Investigator Rooney questioned Flores within her statutory role as a social
worker and not as law enforcement.
June testified at trial that Flores, who lived with her family in their Lakeville home,
had touched her vagina on 10 to 15 occasions. She also testified that he had “put his tongue
on [her] vagina” while she lay in his bed and that she screamed and immediately left to
clean herself. She said that Flores apologized and that they agreed to tell her parents when
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she was “way older” a fter Flores was “out of the house.” June also said that Flores had
simulated intercourse by getting on top of her and rubbing his penis against her vagina.
Both of June’s parents testified that she isolated herself from the family just before moving
to Minnesota but appeared to become more outgoing once Flores moved out. Investigator
Rooney testified about her interview with Flores, and the state played a recording of it for
the jury.
After the close of evidence, the state moved to amend the criminal complaint’s
second count to second-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota Statutes section
609.343, subdivision 1a(g) (2022). The district court granted the motion over Flores’s
objection, reasoning that the amendment constituted a lesser-included offense of the
original charge. The jury found Flores guilty on the amended charge. The district court
entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Flores to 36 months in prison, stayed for
five years on probationary terms, including Flores’s registering as a predatory offender and
participating in sex-offender treatment.
Flores appeals.
DECISION
Flores raises two arguments to challenge his conviction. He argues first that the
district court erroneously refused to suppress statements he made during Investigator
Rooney’s interview because she had questioned him after he invoked his right to counsel
under Miranda. He argues second that the district court erroneously granted the state’s
request to amend the criminal complaint. We resolve the appeal based on the first
argument.
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We are persuaded by Flores’s contention that Investigator Rooney improperly
elicited incriminating statements during a custodial interrogation after Flores invoked his
right to counsel. The federal and state constitutions protect persons from state-compelled
self-incrimination. U.S. Const. amend. V; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. To vindicate these
protections, police must inform individuals undergoing a “custodial interrogation” of
specific rights or risk the exclusion from trial of incriminating statements the individual
makes during the interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; State v. Crisler, 438 N.W.2d
670, 671 (Minn. 1989). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and
its legal determinations de novo, including whether Flores was in custody and under
interrogation. State v. Heinonen, 909 N.W.2d 584, 590 (Minn. 2018); State v. Thompson,
788 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Minn. 2010). Our careful review of the law and record leads us to
conclude that Flores was entitled to a Miranda warning before he was questioned in his
child-protection interview.
We must determine whether Flores was subject to an interrogation under Miranda
when Investigator Rooney questioned him the day following his arrest. To be sure, Flores
cut off any in-custody interrogation with law enforcement the day earlier when he invoked
his right to counsel after Detective Frame advised him of his Miranda rights. The United
States Supreme Court has established that a person in custody who has invoked his right to
counsel “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been
made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85
(1981). The state supreme court has likewise stated that “[o]nce a person in custody invokes
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his Miranda right to counsel, all police interrogation must cease.” State v. Miller, 573
N.W.2d 661, 671 (Minn. 1998). And police may not resume questioning unless the arrested
person initiates further discussion and provides a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of his previously invoked right to counsel. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482; State v.
Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 140 (Minn. 1999). Without dispute here, Flores never initiated
further communication about the investigation after he invoked his right to counsel.
The central issue on appeal therefore narrows to whether Flores’s invocation of his
Miranda rights bars not only official police questioning but also Investigator Rooney’s
questioning. We are satisfied that the answer is yes, notwithstanding that Investigator
Rooney was employed as a social worker rather than a police officer, to maintain the
purpose of a Miranda warning. Miranda warnings safeguard a person’s Fifth Amendment
right against self- incrimination during a custodial interrogation by law enforcement . See
State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 30 (Minn. 2016). Law enforcement includes anyone who
uses the “power of the state” to induce an incriminating response. State v. Tibiatowski, 590
N.W.2d 305, 310 (Minn. 1999). In this case, Investigator Rooney fits that description.
Investigator Rooney qualified as law enforcement by acting as an arm of the state
when she exercis ed her statutory duty as a social worker to obtain informative,
incriminating interview statements from Flores after he was accused of sexually assaulting
June. We focus on the investigator’s role and not merely her title when determining
whether a Miranda warning must precede a government agent’s questioning. Mathis v.
United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4– 5 (1968). The Mathis Court held that Miranda applied to an
IRS agent’s questioning of an incarcerated defendant in a civil investigation. Id. at 2–4.
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Similarly in Estelle v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that Miranda applied to the
statements an incarcerated defendant made to a court-appointed psychologist who testified
for the prosecution. 451 U.S. 454, 462, 467 (1981). Minnesota expressly follows suit as
“[t]he warning required by Miranda must be given by all those who use the power of the
state to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect, regardless whether they are law
enforcement personnel.” Tibiatowski, 590 N.W.2d at 310 (applying Estelle). We turn to
whether this caselaw favors Flores’s argument on appeal.
Applying this federal and state precedent, we hold that Investigator Rooney used
her investigative authority to facilitate Flores’s criminal prosecution in a manner that places
Flores’s interview responses within Miranda protection. It is true, as the state maintains,
that she was interviewing Flores in compliance with a statutory directive to review June’s
allegations and provide Flores “an opportunity to make a statement.” See Minn. Stat.
§ 260E.20, subd. 2(d) (2024) (requiring child-protection services to investigate sex-abuse
reports). More critical to our issue, she coordinated her investigation with law enforcement
and directly shared her interview recording and assessment report with Detective Frame.
Her questions were relevant to Flores’s guilt in the criminal proceeding, including his
sexual contact with June and the issue of whether evidence of his DNA might be detected.
Investigator Rooney acted as law enforcement , broadly defined, when she conducted the
jailhouse interview. As a result, she could not lawfully reinitiate the interrogation that
Flores foreclosed when he invoked his right to an attorney with Detective Frame the
previous day.
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We are not persuaded otherwise by the state’s argument that Investigator Rooney’s
statutory duty to safeguard the “welfare of the maltreated child” distinguishes her role from
law enforcement. See Minn. Stat. § 260E.20, subd. 1(a) (2024). Her state statutory duty to
question a person accused of sexually harming a child does not override that person’s rights
to the constitutional, or quasi-constitutional, protection afforded by the Supreme Court’s
Miranda decision.
Our holding that Miranda bars the admission of Flores’s interrogation responses
leads to the question of whether the district court’s erroneous admission of them requires
us to reverse Flores’s conviction. We will reverse the conviction unless we determine that
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 886
(Minn. 2021) (analyzing the harmless-error standard in the evidence-suppression context);
State v. Shoen, 598 N.W.2d 370, 377 n.2 (Minn. 1999) (“[T]he burden of showing that an
error is harmless properly falls on the state.”). Specifically, Minnesota recognizes that
“[h]armless-error review looks . . . to the basis on which the jury actually rested its verdict.”
State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 291–92 (Minn. 1997) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508
U.S. 275, 279 (1993)). “The inquiry, in other words is not whether, in a trial that occurred
without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty
verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Id. at 292.
Applying this standard on appeal, “[i]f the verdict rendered is ‘surely unattributable’ to the
error, then the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and the conviction stands.” Id.;
see also McInnis, 962 N.W.2d at 886. We apply the harmless-error standard to analyze if
there is a “reasonable possibility” that the admission of impermissible Miranda evidence
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substantially affected the jury’s verdict. See State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48, 54 (Minn.
2024). Flores argues that the district court’s error here requires reversal under this standard.
Four factors guide our harmless-error review: the evidence’s manner of
presentation, its persuasive value, its use in the state’s closing argument, and its effective
countering by Flores. Id. at 54. Our careful review leads us to conclude that the district
court committed a reversible error.
The manner-presented (first) factor favors reversing. Presenting video evidence is
improper if it shows a defendant’s inconsistent statements as an attack on his credibility.
See State v. Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d 744, 749–50 (Minn. 2005). Flores contends reasonably
that the recorded interview improperly strengthened June’s credibility because Investigator
Rooney presented herself as an authority on forensic-interview techniques and because she
framed her questions to strongly imply that children are incapable of fabricating sex-abuse
allegations. This factor suggests reversing.
The persuasive- value (second) factor also favors reversing. Flores’s interview
statements made the state’s allegations more conceivable. An inadmissible statement has
high persuasive value when it elicits new information that impacts the verdict. Bigbear, 10
N.W.3d at 57. The prosecutor characterized Flores’s salacious reference about the family
dog as an improbable substitute for his own conduct even though Flores never presented
his statement as a substantive defense. This emphasis on an implausible argument that
Flores neither raised nor suggested by evidence leads us to suspect that the statement likely
influenced the jury. By contrast, the record lacks overwhelming evidence of guilt to
countervail the persuasive impact of Flores’s improperly admitted interview statements.
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The state’s other strong evidence of guilt can undermine the persuasive value of wrongly
admitted evidence. Id. at 59–60. But the state’s case rested on the credibility of June’s
testimony. Although a criminal-sexual-conduct conviction can rest on a single credible
witness’s testimony, Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2024); State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d
536, 539 (Minn. 2004) , Flores challenged June’s credibility in his closing argument by
emphasizing her volatile home environment, her impressionability for developing false
allegations, and her inconsistent recollection of the reported sexual contact. The strength-
of-evidence factor does not undermine the persuasive impact of the inadmissible interview
statements.
We next observe that the closing-argument (third) factor also favors reversing. The
prosecutor dwelt on Flores’s statement about the dog’s purported cunnilingus at the
conclusion of her seven-page closing argument, drawing attention to it as Flores “com[ing]
up with something” to explain June’s report. The prosecutor highlighted Flores’s
explanation to exaggerate the absurdity of a defense that he did not raise. This factor favors
Flores.
The opportunity-to-effectively-counter (fourth) factor is a closer question and
slightly favors the state’s position. Flores certainly had the opportunity to cross-examine
Investigator Rooney about how the dog reference related to their conversation about June’s
precocious awareness of sex and her complaints about having an “itching” vagina. Flores
reasonably asserts on appeal that he chose not to address the more salacious interview
statements during his closing argument so as not to draw even more attention to them. But
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because he had the opportunity to address his interview statements after the jury heard
them, his tactical decision not to do so tips toward finding the error harmless.
On balance, these factors lead us to conclude that the state failed to prove that the
inadmissible Miranda evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore
reverse Flores’s conviction and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
Because of our decision that Flores is entitled to a new trial based on the erroneous
admission of his statements under Miranda, we do not address his remaining argument.
Reversed and remanded.